European Union

Committee and political group meetings, Brussels

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Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

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Disclaimer : The interpretation of debates serves to facilitate communication and does not constitute an authentic record of proceedings. Only the original speech or the revised written translation is authentic.
Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

As we move into the final weeks of the original Article 50 time period, it is useful to try and round up several aspects of the EU27’s positions, insofar as they impinge on the UK’s decisions (which is to say, a lot). As much as Parliament is caught up in working out what it might accept, it is essential that this is done in the context of understanding the EU side, given that this is a negotiation.

Renegotiation and the backstop

The first stopping point on this has to be the question of renegotiation.

The EU, both collectively and in its member states, has been very firm that it will not consider renegotiation of the Withdrawal Agreement itself, although that does not preclude discussions on the Political Declaration or another document to provide elaboration of position.

However, those discussions will not include the kinds of changes still being discussed in Westminster, such as an end-date to the backstop or an unilateral exit clause.

This is best understood as a function of three elements that have reinforced the firmness of the EU’s stance.

Firstly, the Irish border issue has long been framed in terms that make it very hard indeed for the EU to move on its requirements. The Irish government was very successful in its lobbying of the Union and other member states that the border issue was an fundamental one for Ireland, that also threatened several core EU values, not least the peace project on the island that the Union has long supported and promoted. Moreover, other small member states have recognised that leaving Ireland exposed on this at any point much cause problems should they themselves need help on something in future.

Secondly, the EU view the backstop as something that they have already made major compromises on: the temporary customs arrangement was a concession to the UK and causes substantial concern in several member states, on the grounds that it gives the UK unfair access to the EU, including for smuggling. To be told that it is the UK that has given all the ground has not made a positive impression in Brussels or elsewhere.

Thirdly, the British approach to date has been to offer problems, rather than solutions. Dislike of the backstop is well-understood, but the repeated request on the EU side is for detailed proposals on how to address this, to which very little has been forthcoming. The EU sees it as the UK’s responsibility to take the lead, given that it is the one that will be leaving and since it should know better what is likely to be acceptable to Parliament.

Extension

Of increased importance is the matter of an extension to Article, 50 since even the most problem-free path to approving the Withdrawal Agreement seems to be taking the UK past 29 March.

The EU’s position is cautiously framed at present, but the main thrust appears to be that it is willing to consider and agreed to an extension. However, this comes with several caveats.

Procedurally, it must be remembered that the EU27 have to give unanimous approval to an extension. This leaves open the possibility of one or more states pressing from side-payments, especially if they are not so exposed to the direct effects of a no-deal Brexit: this possibility would only grow if there were to be future requests for further extensions.

Politically, the EU has long-underlined that extension must be for a purpose: it cannot be given simply in the hope that something might pop up. Thus a short extension to allow the UK to complete ratification of the Withdrawal Agreement and/or enabling legislation would be acceptable, as would a longer extension for a general election or referendum that would have a material impact on British government policy.

The European elections will be one major issue in all this.

Recall that that European Parliament has to approve the Withdrawal Agreement too: its last sitting is 18 April, so it cannot give that approval between then and 2 July, when it first sits post-election.

Legal advice to both the UK and EU suggests that an extension to the end of June would be unproblematic, since while the UK would not participate in the elections, MEPs would not be sitting. However, that bumps up against the need for approval of the Agreement, not to mention that the Court of Justice – if asked – might come to a different view on the need for elections on 23 May.

If the UK remains a member states past the end of June without MEPs, then this would be an infringement of Art.223 TFEU, which requires direct elections: proposals to second or appoint MEPs have been floated, but without any great support to date.

However, if the UK does hold elections and/or appoints MEPs, then this is also problematic. The Parliament forms its groups on the basis of minimum numbers of MEPs from a minimum number of member states: currently two groups would not meet the threshold without UK MEPs. Groups matter because they also determine the allocation of Parliament’s officers, speaking time and funding, even before it gets to the matter of voting for the new Commission in the late summer. Those member states that are due to receive additional seats post-Brexit would also have to work out whether to elect to these seats pre-Brexit.

No-Deal

Behind all of this is the concern over a no-deal Brexit, something that is a clear and substantial concern for all EU member states and its institutions.

While the primary effort has been directed to secured a Withdrawal Agreement, there has also been very substantial work (especially in the past year) on preparing for a no-deal outcome. The consistent advice from many national agencies in the EU27 has been that until there is a signed and ratified Withdrawal Agreement, there is nothing and business and individuals would be sensible to prepare as such.

The extent of resources available can be gauged from the websites available from the Commission and the governments of Ireland, France, Belgium, the Netherlands, Germany and Denmark (to take just the immediate neighbourhood): each provides a lot of information on the impact of no-deal for assorted groups and individuals. These also highlight the substantive funding that has gone into place already, including 580 new customs officials in France and 400 in Ireland.

However, despite the very substantial range of work, it is also evident that very major gaps remain. As the Institute for Government notes, only Germany, Cyprus and Malta will have full legislation in place to protect UK citizens’ rights by 29 March: Spain will only have arrangements ready in relation to voting, rather than residence or access to services. Likewise, reports from various member states report very incomplete preparation by businesses (especially smaller ones), which will make the impact of the uncertainty generated by a no-deal even more substantial.

Finally, it should be noted that a no-deal would also strongly condition how member states and the EU approach any subsequent negotiations. The first priorities will be any life-critical systems not already addressed, but then the focus will be on securing the resolution of the content of the Withdrawal Agreement – that is citizens’ rights, financial liabilities and the Irish backstop – before any discussion of future trading arrangements. Given that the UK would no longer be a member state at that point, there is no indication that there would be any immediate reason to offer more generous terms on these points than are already embodied in the Agreement.

The post The EU view on the Article 50 endgame appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Outside the EU, we’ll only have a say in our country, and there will be barriers to trade with our most important customers and suppliers in the world.

But inside the EU, we have a say in our country AND our continent, and enjoy NO barriers to trade with our most important customers and suppliers in the world (by far).

Brexiters say we must have full sovereignty over Britain. Why would that be a good thing?

The definition of sovereignty is ‘supreme power or authority’. Only one country in the world has that. North Korea.

But whilst North Korea has cast iron sovereignty over its nation and people, in the outside world it has very little power, authority or influence.

Indeed, North Korea is considered to be a pariah state, shunned and excluded by the outside world, and with tough sanctions imposed upon it.

In the modern, rational, democratic world, countries recognise that sharing some sovereignty actually increases their power and strength….and sovereignty.

NATO countries realise that in their promise to come to the immediate aid of another NATO country under attack. That’s a classic example of sharing power and sovereignty.

Brexiters say that Britain was misled into thinking that the European Community was only ever about free trade. That, of course, is nonsense – which any cursory study of history will reveal.

The European Economic Community (now called the European Union) was always about a Union of countries sharing some of their power, sovereignty and strength for the common good.

Back in 1961, when Britain first applied to join the European Community, there was much talk about what impact joining would have on Britain’s sovereignty.

The then Prime Minister, Harold Macmillan, explained to the British people:

“Accession to the Treaty of Rome would not involve a one-sided surrender of ‘sovereignty’ on our part, but a pooling of sovereignty by all concerned, mainly in economic and social fields.

“In renouncing some of our own sovereignty we would receive in return a share of the sovereignty renounced by other members.”

Mr Macmillan added:

“The talk about loss of sovereignty becomes all the more meaningless when one remembers that practically every nation, including our own, has already been forced by the pressures of the modern world to abandon large areas of sovereignty and to realise that we are now all inter-dependent.

“No country today, not even the giants of America or Russia, can pursue purely independent policies in defence, foreign affairs, or the economic sphere.

“Britain herself has freely made surrenders of sovereignty in NATO and in many other international fields on bigger issues than those involved in the pooling of sovereignty required under the Treaty of Rome.”

Almost 60 years later, one might have thought these issues would have been settled and agreed by now.

But it seems some British people (actually, they most often refer to themselves as ‘English’ rather than British) do not accept this idea of sharing some sovereignty for the common good.

They want England to have ‘supreme power’, meaning complete sovereign rule over its nation and its people, presumably just like in the ‘good old days’ when England had supreme power over its nation, its citizens and its Empire.

For those of us who belong to the modern world, we can see this makes no sense.

Britain is part of a planet that increasingly needs to work together with other nations, and working together, means sharing some power and agreeing some rules.

That’s our road to more civilisation, safely and prosperity.

That, of course, is the great strength of the European Union. 28 neighbouring countries coming together to share power and influence for the common good. It’s a huge success.

The EU is the world’s most successful economic, trade and political union of countries. No one can deny that the EU is the world’s biggest, richest trading bloc, and that it has considerable influence in the world.

Brexit means less sovereignty. In the EU, we gain sovereignty over our continent. In the EU, we have MORE control, not less.

Let’s not throw that away by retreating into an island mentality. Having 100% sovereignty – like North Korea – will not make Britain Great. It will make us small.

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
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Being a member of the EU costs us only around 34p a day each. That’s a bargain, especially as the value of EU benefits far outweigh the cost.

The Confederation of British Industry has estimated that EU membership is worth around £3,000 a year to every British family — a return of nearly £10 for each £1 we pay in.

So, in reality, EU membership costs nothing – it makes Britain, and Britons, better off.

(Source: CBI)

Article continues after one-minute video:

The calculations for our annual EU membership fee have been published by the UK’s Office of National Statistics.

(Source: ONS)

When deducting from the EU membership fee all the money we get back from the EU, including our £5 billion rebate that’s never actually sent to the EU, the net cost of EU membership in 2016 was only £8.1 billion – or £156 million a week, or just 34p per person per day

That’s far short of the claim made on Boris Johnson’s campaign bus that we send £350m a week to the EU. That was entirely incorrect.

But after the referendum, the Vote Leave campaign director, Dominic Cummings wrote:

“Would we have won without £350m/NHS? All our research and the close result strongly suggests no.”

(Source: Spectator)

So, we are leaving the EU based on a whopper of a lie (actually, lots of whopping lies).

Ok, if Mr Johnson had instead put ‘£156m a week’ on his bus, it would still have seemed a lot of money. But something Brexiters never like to do is reveal how much we get back in return for the membership fee.

Back in 2011, this was estimated by the government to be between £30 billion and £90 billion a year – a return of between 800% and 2370%.

(Source: UK government)

Can anyone name any other government expenditure that gives a return of over 800%?

Let’s put this in another context.

In 2016, the government spent £814.6 billion on all aspects of public spending. This means that the net annual EU membership fee represented only 1% of all UK government expenditure. (A miniscule amount).

Furthermore, the EU funds many thousands of projects in the UK every year, that our national government would be unlikely to finance. Such as Liverpool’s John Lennon Airport, or superfast broadband in Cornwall.

(Source: European Commission)

In addition, across Europe, our annual membership fee helps to fund projects that benefit our continent and its people as a whole – such as Galileo, to give Europe its own satellite navigation system.

And the Horizon 2020 project – the world’s biggest multinational research programme, funding leading-edge research in all aspects of science and innovation that will directly benefit all EU citizens.

Individual European countries could not afford to take on the projects that the EU helps to fund for the welfare and prosperity of its half-a-billion citizens.

The advantages of EU membership considerably outweigh the cost of membership. So, why are we leaving?

I cannot find one valid or validated benefit for Brexit. Not even one.

Indeed, by NOT paying the annual EU membership fee, we will all be poorer, according to the UK government’s own impact assessment reports.

(Source: The Guardian)

• Follow my journalism page on Facebook: Jon Danzig writes
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Britain’s vote to leave the EU has produced a wealth of books, which should come as no surprise given the unprecedented challenges and debates it has led to in the UK, the rest of Europe and around the world. Recently published in International Politics Review, ‘Brexitology: delving into the books on Brexit’ covers almost 60 books. It looks at the full range of books published in the run-up to and after the referendum, ending with books published in late 2018.

It offers a way of breaking down the literature into seven manageable topics: how to study Brexit; the history of UK–EU relations; the referendum campaign; explaining the result, Britain’s Brexit; Europe’s Brexit; and Global Brexit. The review identifies some common themes in the books so far published and looks at what the future holds for this topic.’

Full article – Brexitology: Delving into the books on Brexit – can be found here– https://link.springer.com/article/10.1057/s41312-018-0069-1

Books reviewed or referenced in the review—

• Adonis, A. (2018). Half in, half out: Prime ministers on europe. London: Biteback.
• Armour, J., & Eidenmüller, H. (Eds.). (2017). Negotiating Brexit. Oxford: Hart Publishing.
• Armstrong, K. (2017). Brexit time: Leaving the EU—Why, how and when?. Cambridge: CUP.
• Ashcroft, M., & Culwick, K. (2016). Well, you did ask… why the UK voted to leave the EU. London: Biteback.
• Bailey, D., & Budd, L. (2017). The political economy of Brexit. Newcastle upon Tyne: Agenda.
• Banks, A. (2016). The bad boys of Brexit. London: Biteback.
• Barnett, A. (2017). The lure of greatness: England’s Brexit and America’s Trump. Kansas City: Unbound.
• Bennett, O. (2016). The Brexit club. London: Biteback.
• Bickerton, C. (2016). The European Union: A citizens guide. London: Penguin.
• Booker, C., & North, R. (2005). The great deception: Can the European Union survive?. New York City: Continuum.
• Buckledee, S. (2018). The language of Brexit: How Britain talked its way out of the European Union. London: Bloomsbury.
• Cato the Younger. (2017). Guilty men: Brexit edition. London: Biteback.
• Clarke, H., Goodwin, M., & Whiteley, P. (2017). Brexit: Why Britain voted to leave the European Union. Cambridge: CUP.
• Clegg, N. (2017). In his how to stop Brexit (and make Britain great again). New York City: Vintage.
• Connelly, T. (2017). Brexit and Ireland: The dangers, the opportunities, and the inside story of the Irish response. London: Penguin.
• Diamond, P., Nedergaard, P., & Rosamond’s, B. (2018). The Routledge handbook of the politics of Brexit. Abingdon: Routledge.
• Dinan, D., Nugent, N., & Paterson’s, E. W. (Eds.). (2017). The European Union in crisis. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
• Drozdiak, W. (2017). Fractured continent: Europe’s crises and the fate of the west. New York City: W.W. Norton.
• Dunt, I. (2016 and updated in 2018). Brexit: What the hell happens now? Kingston upon Thames: Canbury Press.
• Fossum, J. E., & Graver’s, H. P. (2018). Squaring the circle on Brexit: Could the Norway model work?. Bristol: Policy Press.
• Gamble, A. (2003). Between Europe and America: The future of British politics. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
• George, S. (1998). An awkward partner: Britain in the European community. Oxford: OUP.
• Gibbon, G. (2017). His breaking point: The UK referendum on the EU and its aftermath. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
• Glencross, A. (2016). Why the UK voted for Brexit. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
• Green, D. A. (2017). Brexit: What everyone needs to know. Oxford: OUP.
• Hannan, D., & Next, W. (2016). How to get the best from Brexit. London: Head of Zeus.
• Hassan, G., & Gunson’s, R. (Eds.). (2017). Scotland and the UK after Brexit. A guide to the future. Edinburgh: Luath Press.
• Hillman, J., & Horlick, G. (Eds.) (2017). Legal Aspects of Brexit: Implications of the United Kingdom’s decision to withdraw from the EU. Washington: Institute of International Economic Law.
• Humphreys, R. (2018). Beyond the border: The Good Friday agreement and irish unity after Brexit. Kildare: Merrion Press.
• Kearns, I. (2018). Collapse: Europe after the European Union. London: Biteback.
• Lyons, G., & Halligan, L. (2017). Their clean Brexit: Why leaving the EU still makes sense—Building a post-Brexit economy for all. London: Biteback.
• MacShane, D. (2015). Brexit: How Britain will leave Europe. London: IBTauris.
• MacShane, D. (2016). Brexit: How Britain left Europe. London: IBTauris.
• MacShane, D. (2017). Brexit, no exit: Why Britain won’t leave Europe. London: IBTauris.
• McGowan’s, L. (2017). Preparing for Brexit: Actors, negotiators and consequences. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
• Melchior, A. (2018). Free trade agreements and globalisation: In the shadow of Brexit and Trump. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
• Menon, A., & Evans, G. (2017). Brexit and British politics. Cambridge: Polity Press.
• Mindus’s, P. (2017). European citizenship after Brexit: Freedom of movement and rights of residence. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
• Morphet, J., & Brexit, B. (2017). How to assess the UK’s future. Bristol: Policy Press.
• Morris, D., & Thomson, J. (2018). Can you Brexit?: Without breaking Britain?. Avening: Spark Furnace.
• Mount, H., & Madness, S. (2017). How Brexit split the Tories, destroyed Labour and divided the country. London: Biteback.
• Oliver, T. (Ed.). (2018). Europe’s Brexit: EU Perspectives on Britain’s vote to leave. Newcastle upon Tyne: Agenda.
• Oliver, T., (2018). Understanding Brexit: A concise introduction. Bristol: Bristol University Press.
• Oliver, C., & Demons, U. (2016). The inside story of Brexit. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
• Outhwaite, W. (2017). Brexit: Sociological responses. Cambridge: Anthem Press.
• Owen, D., & Ludlow, D. (2017). British foreign policy after Brexit. London: Biteback.
• Peston, R. (2017). WTF. London: Hodder & Stoughton.
• Rohac, D. (2016). Towards an imperfect Union: A conservative case for the European Union. Lanham: Rowman and Littlefield.
• Sanders, D., & Houghton, D. P. (2016). Losing an empire, finding a role. Basingstoke: Palgrave.
• Shipman, T. (2016). All out war: The full story of how Brexit sank Britain’s political class. Glasgow: William Collins.
• Shipman, T. (2018). Fall out: A year of political mayhem. Glasgow: William Collins.
• Simms, B. (2016). Britain’s Europe: A thousand years of conflict and cooperation. London: Allen Lane.
• Smith, J. (2017). The UK’s journey into and out of the EU: Destinations Unknown. Abingdon: Routledge.
• Staiger, U., & Martill’s, B. (Eds.). (2018). Brexit and beyond: Rethinking the futures of Europe. London: UCL.
• Tannam, E. (Ed.). (2018). Beyond the Good Friday agreement: In the midst of Brexit. Abingdon: Routledge.
• Wall, S. (2012). The official history of Britain and the European community, volume II: From rejection to referendum, 1963–1975. Abingdon: Routledge.
• Welfens, P. (2017). An accidental Brexit: New EU and transatlantic economic perspectives. Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan.
• Young, H. (1998). This blessed plot: Britain and Europe from Churchill to Blair. New York: Overlook.

The post Brexitology: delving into the books on Brexit appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

Baltic Media Alliance
SERV
Advocate General Saugmandsgaard Øe: the Audiovisual Media Services Directive does not preclude the adoption by a Member State of a measure imposing an obligation to broadcast or retransmit a foreign television channel only in packages available for an additional fee, in order to restrict the dissemination by that channel to the public of that State of information inciting hatred

Amazon EU
Environment and consumers
Advocate General Pitruzzella proposes that the Court rule that an e-commerce platform such as Amazon cannot be obliged to make a telephone number available to consumers

Craeynest and Others
Environment and consumers
Advocate General Kokott proposes that the Court of Justice should rule that national courts must, on application by affected individuals, examine whether air sampling points were sited in accordance with the criteria set out in EU law

Línea Directa Aseguradora
Approximation of laws
Advocate General Bot proposes that the Court should declare that spontaneous burning of a vehicle parked in a private garage for more than 24 hours falls within the concept of ‘use of vehicles’

It might not be the first question on your mind when you think about Brexit, but should French SMEs be better prepared for a no deal scenario?

Pierre Séjourné

Pierre Séjourné certainly thinks so. As the head of the international mission at DIRECCTE, a French trans-ministerial agency for economic development, he politely but very firmly has been pressing business leaders across the country to start realising that ‘no deal’ has become the most likely option, and that there is an urgent need to prepare for the unpleasant consequences that the UK’s messy departure will inevitably have for their activities.

No public comment he makes lacks a reference to the government’s virtual helpdesk brexit.gouv.fr which provides assistance to smaller firms with the necessary risk assessment and mitigation.

As a recent public event held on 7 February at ESSCA School of Management in Angers – dedicated to the impact Brexit on Western France’s Pays-de-la-Loire region – showed, Monsieur Séjourné is not alone in having growing concerns with the relative ‘unpreparedness’ of French business.

The public authorities, regional councils or larger conurbations known as ‘métropoles’ in the French provinces are also increasingly worried, as every single regional policy maker pointed out in the various round-tables of the event

The key word is, of course, uncertainty. Since nobody is capable of providing any clarity on what scenario will prevail at the end of March, SMEs are caught like rabbits in the Brexit headlights.

Brexit is destabilising in many ways: this is the first time in most business leaders’ lifetime that intra-European trade has not led to fewer barriers, and it turns back the clock in order to reinstall long-forgotten ones. It is also deeply unsettling on a cultural level.

In France, with its long-standing tradition of high principles often thwarted by practical earthly details and regularly resulting in collective frustration, there has always been a strong belief that pragmatism and phlegmatic down-to-earth problems-solving were the very essence of Britishness.

Giving priority to concrete business interests rather than indulge in grandstanding philosophical dogma was a collective aptitude attributed to the British, despised and envied at the same time.

And now France and the rest of Europe are witnessing how pragmatism is drowned in a sea of collective hysteria, and how clear business interests have been sacrificed on the altar of irrational politics.

This irrationality, to which Hervé Jouanjean, former DG at the European Commission, pointed in his keynote, simply does not fit century-old cultural patterns. There are many business leaders who are convinced that reason will prevail in the very last minute and a sensible solution will be found that will keep consequences down to a perfectly manageable minimum.

As Gérald Darmanin, the French budget minister, recently pointed out, this was the first time in his political career where the public authorities seemed to be better prepared than the corporate world.

At the Angers conference his assessment was indirectly corroborated by the panel dedicated to the transport sector.

Pierre Rideau, director of the customs office for Western France, explained very clearly how they had already been preparing for the worst case for several months and what resources (both human and material) were being mobilised to mitigate the forthcoming problems of cross-border trade.

What they would be unable to avoid, though, was the expected increase in transport costs, which he had no doubt would drive many French SMEs out of the British market.

On each of the round-tables, experts from The UK in a Changing Europe (Raquel Ortega-Argilés, Carmen Hubbard, Christopher Huggins, John-Paul Salter, Ignazio Cabras, and Simon Usherwood) shared their own understandings about the likely disruptions in the different sectors that were addressed by the panels composed of policy-makers, business representatives and researchers.

The agrifood round-table, with Fabrice Sciumbata (Brioches Pasquier), Lydie Bernard (Regional Council Pays-de-la-Loire), Joao Pacheco (Farm Europe), and Carmen Hubbard (UK in a Changing Europe).

One of the major takeaways of the event was the perceived need to give more consideration to regional perspectives.

Just as Scotland feels – understandably – left out of a debate that circles around Westminster issues, so too the French regions, across which the impact of Brexit will vary considerably, have not been helped by a national approach either.

As one the regional councillors, Lydie Bernard, complained, even in a sector as essential to the French economy as the agrifood business, the available data is hardly ever broken down on a regional level.

Beyond the business data and economic prospects, however, the event concluded in a surprisingly humanistic profession of faith in transnational cooperation.

The Pays-de-la-Loire, as provincial as they may seem on a map, have their Brussels representation right on Rond-Point Schuman. Their policy makers and high civil servants are embedded in European networks, the British counterparts they regularly meet with are highly appreciated.

Vanessa Charbonneau

As Vanessa Charbonneau, Vice-President of the Regional Council, repeatedly insisted, they would – ‘of course!’ – be willing to continue to work together with their British neighbours in order to make the best of whatever would be going to happen.

Rather than shoulder-shrugging at the unforced self-destruction of a former premium nation, the overall attitude that seems to prevail in this part of France is one of compassion with a trusted partner whom you would like to help out of an impasse, but are unable to.

 

This post was initially published
on “The UK in a Changing Europe”

The post Business interests and cultural perception patterns. A French region’s view on Brexit. appeared first on Ideas on Europe.

REPORT on the 2018 Commission Report on Turkey
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Kati Piri

Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

REPORT on building EU capacity on conflict prevention and mediation
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Soraya Post

Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

REPORT on the post-Arab Spring: way forward for the MENA region
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Brando Benifei

Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

REPORT containing a motion for a non-legislative resolution on the draft Council decision on the conclusion, on behalf of the Union, of the Cooperation Agreement on Partnership and Development between the European Union and its Member States, of the one part, and the Islamic Republic of Afghanistan, of the other part
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Anna Elżbieta Fotyga

Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

REPORT on the state of EU-Russia political relations
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Sandra Kalniete

Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

INTERIM REPORT on the draft Council and Commission decision on the conclusion by the European Union and the European Atomic Energy Community of the Partnership and Cooperation Agreement establishing a Partnership between the European Communities and their Member States, of the one part, and Turkmenistan, of the other part
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Ramona Nicole Mănescu

Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

REPORT on a European Parliament recommendation to the Council, to the Commission and to the Vice-President of the Commission / High Representative of the Union for Foreign Affairs and Security Policy on the association agreement between the EU and Monaco, Andorra and San Marino
Committee on Foreign Affairs
Juan Fernando López Aguilar

Source : © European Union, 2019 - EP

Associação Peço a Palavra and Others
Freedom of establishment
The conditions set by the Portuguese Government for the reprivatisation of TAP are compatible with EU law with the exception of the requirement to maintain and develop the existing national hub