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ANDRÁS ISTVÁN TÜRKE

EUFOR LIBYA : « PHANTOMIZED OPERATION OF THE INVISIBLE LEGION? »

The EU, the CSDP and the Crisis in Libya



CERPESC - CENTRE EUROPÉEN DE RECHERCHE POUR LA PESCE
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Introduction

Almost a year ago that an operation "never" performed was launched by the European Union on 1 April 2011. Why the first official operation of the CSDP has become a failure - before being made? What conclusions about the future of the CSDP¹?

About events in Libya the first reaction to EU 27 date 21 February 2011, four days after the escalation of events in Tripoli. The joint statement called for an immediate end to the use of force against protesters². The axis of Italy, Malta and Cyprus vetoed from the beginning the Franco-German & Danish proposal for immediate sanctions against Gaddafi. The establishment of a no-fly zone was refused by the Secretary General of NATO and the Foreign Minister of France, Alain Juppé, shortly after his inauguration³.

At that time, Ashton and the mechanism of CSDP remained unspoken - specifically saying "wise and diplomatic" - on the intervention in Libya. Unlike the French and British leaders, They did not force neither intervention nor the recognition of the National Transitional Council, that after most European leaders have agreed to this solution.

Why Libya and why now? - The country before the war

Resistance, prephase the crisis began on 13 February 2011. The rebels have fought for more democracy and less corruption. Muammar Gaddafi himself likewise took power as "revolutionary" in 1969 and proclaimed the Libyan Arab Republic. (He kept his place as president of his country the longest in Africa, for 42 years in 2011). Libya is a large country (1,750,000 km²) and 90% desert populated only 6 million inhabitants (2010), 20% of immigrants. The country is historically divided into three parts: Tripolitania, Cyrenaica and Fezzan. Italy occupied Tripolitania and Cyrenaica in 1911, to the Ottoman Empire. They are grouped into a single colony in 1934, called Libya. After the Second World War, the territory was divided between the British administration (Tripoli) the Emirate of Cyrenaica (under British control) and the French administration (Fezzan)⁴. This country, the poorest in the Mediterranean coast, became independent in 1951 after the UN resolution 289⁵, as Constitutional Monarchy (and federation of the three entities until 1963). King Idris I (former Emir of Cyrenaica), to attract Western credits, accepted the installation of British and American bases. After ten years of the discovery of oil in the country, Gaddafi (born near Sirte, Tripoli, former rival of the monarchy) made a coup d'état. He started the renationalisation, introduced a system inspired by the currents of Arab nationalism and Arab socialism. At a time with pan-Arab, pan-African and Third World orientations⁶.

From December 2010 to avoid the negative effects of the Arab Spring, Gaddafi proposed a program of \$ 24 billion for the creation of new housing and the development of the country. However, it has banned demonstrations as riots in Tunisia and Egypt did not extend to his country - without success.

¹ "The invisible legion" is the title of a Hungarian novel (author : Jenő Rejtő / P. Howard.)

² COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, PRESS RELEASE 3069th Council meeting, Foreign Affairs, Brussels, 21 February 2011

³ War in Libya: Europe's confused response, IISS Strategic Comments, Volume 17, Comment 18 – April 2011

⁴ Savès, Joseph « Libye - Trois régions un État », Herodote's site, <http://www.herodote.net/Libye-synthese-578.php>, (downloaded on 23.05.2011.)

⁵ 21 November 1949.

⁶ François Burgat - André Laronde, *La Libye*, Presses universitaires de France, 2003, pp. 54-58.

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Many intellectuals were arrested by the police. Gaddafi has accused Al-Qaeda as the masters of the riots, and (it must be said) not without reason, because AQIM has been present in the South-West Libya for years. Small problem that the center of the insurgents were in Benghazi, north-east of the country. It is now that we must remember the three historical regions: Tripolitania (in Northwest), the Fezzan (at Southwest, with the presence of AQIM and with remarkable oil resources) and Cyrenaica (in East, with oil). Below last became the center of insurgents and deserters from the Libyan army found refuge here.

Unification in 1946 and the Federation (1951) of these three regions was artificial result of the initiative of Cyrenaica. This alliance of the three parties was never very close and this is especially the iron hand of Libyan leader who kept the country together. European leaders clearly have not calculated this factor in stabilizing this very important region for the EU's oil resources. I must say it was rather inter-clan rivalries, inter-tribal and inter-region as a "people's revolution against Gaddafi" whose political system was *"supposed to have found the perfect balance slipped gradually into a control of the tribe al Kadhafa, Tripolitania, combined with some other tribes, such as al Makarha, further west. But the challenge and the insurgency are organized from the east, with tribes as al Zawiya, but especially al Warfalla, large in number and weapons."*⁷

According to the latest UN reports, Libya was the most advanced country in Africa. Despite the political dictatorship, the country has made remarkable economic progress and the standard of living was the highest in Africa. Thanks to oil the country's GDP reached \$ 14,800 / capita (see Hungarian

GDP: \$ 14,900 / h.)⁸. Until 2011, Libya was the second largest producer of oil in Africa, after Nigeria and before Algeria. Despite the prohibition of torture and freedom, 75-80% of the population owned his apartment (largely new housing). The total number of hospital beds per 1000 inhabitants was four times more than Hungary. Until the date of resurrection, the army, the Gaddafi's terrorists and Al-Qaeda were enemies. In the late 1990s, the terrorist network of Gaddafi created cells in North Spain and France, territories in which AQIM was also present as a competitor. Each African immigrant was potentially their target for recruitment ...

Against the Gaddafi regime (1 September 1969 - 23 August 2011) the United States declared a boycott in 1982 accused of supporting international terrorism. The country has been bombed several times and especially the Lockerbie bombing in 1988 led the country to the isolation. In 1992 the UN Security Council put up sanctions against Libya in Resolution 748. And then, despite the attacks against Gaddafi, neither the EU nor the United States have not considered "urgent" military intervention to save the "democratic" opposition. In addition, they made the trade (the U.S., France and especially Italy) and negotiated with the family of the dictator.

From the mid-1990s, the Libyan head of state began to work for his country ceases to be isolated internationally. In 1999, for example, intelligence agents suspected of the Lockerbie bombing were delivered to the Scottish justice whose consequence was the suspension of UN sanctions and the resumption of diplomatic relations with the United Kingdom⁹. Gaddafi became an important figure of African Unity and the African Union was created after the declaration of Sirte, Libya, on 9 September 1999.

⁷ Théron, Julien « Un an après la révolution, la Libye implosera-t-elle ? », Géopolitique des conflits (Blog), 12/03/2012, <http://geopolitiqueconflits.blog.lemonde.fr/>

⁸ Benke, József, *Az arab országok története* III., Kossuth, Budapest, 1997., pp. 375-400.

⁹ Bron, Eugénie « Kadhafi : de la monarchie à la monarchie révolutionnaire », CERMAM, Genève, http://www.cermam.org/fr/logs/portrait/kadhafi_de_la_monarchie_a_la_m/ (downloaded on 23/02/2011)

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Besides the dictatorship, Libya has taken seriously its future and began to follow the example of Norway concerning investment for the future after the period that oil resources will empty. They created a fund of 70 billion dollars for the development of the country and another \$ 6 billion to support the development of other African countries in solidarity with them to ensure the common future of the African continent (programs devoted to the development of agriculture, tourism, trade, mining)¹⁰. Before the war, the country has launched very important logistical and infrastructural investments, with strategic goal, to establish the East-West and North-West axis of railway transport in Africa, and to take the role of the hub and logistics base of the internal commercial traffic on the African continent. First, the G8 proposed substantial financial aid, curiously blocked after some time. Maintaining control of this strategic hub is open to the stakeholders ¹¹...

The war has suddenly stopped this project, more contracts with Chinese (\$ 20 billions), the with the Turks (\$ 12 billions), then, in order of volume, contracts with Italians, Russians and French were suspended. Libyan labor market ceases to function, many African immigrants have more work and continue their exodus to Europe. Gaddafi's Libya was not democratic, it must be emphasized. But it must also be said that his main objective was to contribute to the efforts of each African state in order to

guarantee its self-sufficiency in the field of foods: Ensure that the export does not take place in spite of their own needs¹². Our research has always followed the principle of "audiatur at altera pars", that is to say, the objective presentation of the views of the parties.

According to the former Libyan officials the biggest goal of intervening powers is to maintain African industry to a very low level, that Africans produce effectively nothing and do only export their raw materials at the lowest price possible. They cite several examples : When coffee from Uganda had been collected on the spot, and marketing (packaging, casting, distillation) was made in Germany, 80% of profits arrived to German companies.

Then, with the help of Libya, factories ready to export finished products have been installed in Uganda, and the opportunity rate has changed in favor of Uganda: 80:20. It is quite understandable why the Libyan activity was not very popular in the West. Other projects in Mozambique and Liberia were also launched to support the professional culture of rice and rice exports, creating 100,000 jobs. Projects throughout Africa Libya have been created for such purposes and came right away in collision with speculative agri-food companies in the West and the East. Libyans have also funded the project to create the course the highways (between Libya-

¹⁰ Interview with Libyan Minister of Cooperation, Mohammed Siala, directed by Thierry Meyssan and published under the title « La guerre contre la Libye est une catastrophe économique pour l'Afrique et l'Europe. » *Voltairenet.org*, 03.07.2011, <http://www.voltairenet.org>

¹¹ *Idem, ibidem.*

¹² Remind biofuels policy of the European Union, which had serious consequences: The cultivation of wheat for food has been reduced in favor of plantations for agrofuels. Thus the price of food products have dramatically increased wheat whose outcome was significant increase in the number of deaths due to hunger. "In 2008 (when biofuels accounted for 3.5% of the fuel used for transport in Europe), if the land used to produce biofuels destined for the European Union had instead used to grow wheat and corn, agricultural production Following these lands could feed 127 million people for an entire year "(especially in Africa). Before the French presidency of the EU, in summer 2008 at the European level officials were already aware that European biofuels program kills as a WMD. In 2008, the program was renamed and experts have emphasized that the program no longer exists. Reality and different, see « Politique européenne d'agrocarburants : vers un scénario catastrophe », <http://www.enerzine.com/6/14486+politique-europeenne-dagrocarburants---vers-un-scenario-catastrophe+.html>, 9/27/2012. "In 2020, the European support to biofuels alone could result in a price increase of around 36% vegetable oil, 22% corn, 21% sugar, 20% for oilseeds and 13% for wheat."

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Sudan, Niger-Eritrea) the construction of a navigable channel of 32 km in Mali (etc. etc.)¹³.

The war has blocked all these investments. Officials of the Gaddafi regime are unable to understand why the EU takes this war, while the Libyan investments across Africa contributed massively to stop the migratory fluxes to Europe. However, the former Libyan officials have said repeatedly that it is Gaddafi who funded the election campaign of President Sarkozy in 2007¹⁴ (and perhaps other political leaders campaign in Europe). Now we understand why the reasons for the war in Libya were they so complex.



The first European and American reactions

The refused project of Mini-Atalanta mission

The first collective response of the European Union was the common statement issued on 21 February 2011, four days after the bloody escalation of the crisis in Tripoli. This press release has requested to immediately cease all acts of violence. Following the veto of the United Kingdom and Germany (21 March 2011), the EU has refused the establishment of a maritime operation, based on the 1970 and 1973 decisions of the Council of the UN Security for control of the Libyan embargo. This operation was proposed by France, Finland, Estonia, Lithuania and Malta. (Nota bene, France has carried arms for the revolutionaries, but by air¹⁵.)

According to the plan, a mission Mini-Atalanta should have created with four warships, air support and resupply by a oil carrier. The FHQ was in Italy, Greece and Malta. Medical Support Role of type 2 or 3 would have been insured in one hour by helicopter. Ashton did not support the mission and, (once again) she did not seem very competent¹⁶.

The maritime blockade was established de facto by NATO (March 8, 2011, including food shipments), well before the Organization has been a authorization *de jure* (March 22). Meanwhile, the 1970 and 1973 resolutions of the UN Security Council have been adopted but the NATO mandate remained unclear. It became clear, however, why the planned EU mission to control the implementation of the embargo was blocked with British aid. The lack of oil is produced in an oil-rich country because its own refineries have been stopped by the war.

¹³ Interview with Libyan Minister of Cooperation, Mohammed Siala, *op. cit.*

¹⁴ "Me Essid Bashir, a member of the defense committee of former Libyan Prime Minister Baghdadi Ali Al-Mahmoudi said his client claimed that the Gaddafi regime was well-funded campaign of Nicolas Sarkozy in 2007. "We funded a mondant important, almost 50 million EUROS, or something that comes close," said the lawyer, quoting former Prime Minister of Gaddafi "Source: « Kadhafi a financé la campagne de Sarkozy en 2007 », *LeMonde.fr*, 03.05.2012., <http://www.lemonde.fr/>


¹⁵ "Libye: La France fournit des armes aux insurgés", *L'EXPRESS.fr*, le 29/06/2011, http://www.lexpress.fr/actualite/monde/afrique/libye-la-france-fournit-des-armes-aux-insurges_1007497.html

¹⁶ Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, "Comment rater une opération en cinq leçons", *Bruxelles2 blog*, <http://www.bruxelles2.eu/defense-ue/defense-ue-droit-doctrine-politique/comment-rater-une-operation-en-cinq-lecons.html>

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NATO was responsible for the control of the embargo (for which France has been arming the rebels through air) and as an actor not neutral, it blocked the import of food and oil only to areas loyal to Gaddafi. Russian and Chinese ships were forced to retrace their paths, but it is not excluded that these

boats have also carried weapons. Firstly, in the opinion favorable implementation of Resolution 1973 of the Security Council of the UN mission would be feasible for crisis management in the context of the CSDP. NATO took control of the arms embargo (while France has been arming the rebels through



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air) and as an actor not neutral, it blocked the import of food and oil, only to areas loyal to Gaddafi.

Firstly, in the opinion favorable implementation of Resolution 1973 of the UN Security Council, mission would be feasible for crisis management in



the context of the CSDP. But the contradiction political talks also led to the use of NATO. Even in 2011, NATO proved the only multinational framework in which European states that are willing to intervene, were able to work together. So, the concept of sharing tasks (that the EU managed conflicts "less big" on its border and NATO manage the "out-of-area" crises) has fallen dramatically. However, the United States concluded that events in Iraq remained "a little farther" of the conflict and left the responsibility to the Europeans. As Nobel Prize laureate, Obama chose to act to ensure the stability of Saudi Arabia during the Arab Spring.

During this period, the goal of U.S. policy was twofold:

- 1.) Prepare the transfer of U.S. troops in the Middle East to Africa, because the concept of the broader Middle East has failed.

- 2.) Be ready to give a helping hand to American allies (Saudi Arabia, Bahrain, UAE) in case of danger.

In short, NATO has taken the role of "hard" conflict management (air strikes) and in theory the EU

would continue the peacemaking by its soft means (humanitarian crisis management of EUFOR Libya). The scheme applied by NATO had ambiguous results because the army of Gaddafi managed to recover more ammunition for the rebels. This revolution "remote" also applied the same pattern as Omar al Bashir applied against Darfur in Sudan : First, by NATO destroyed infrastructure by Apache helicopters (according to observers on the ground, they shaved almost everything). Then the rebels arrive and before the cameras of the media they take power. Finally revolts began to loot, but this phase is no longer broadcast. Arguably this "funny war of revolution" was led by NATO. August 21, 2011, boarding special forces of NATO intervention has become more targeted and effective.

Psychological warfare has also begun, because much of the population remained loyal to Gaddafi. In addition, the rebels proved incapable of organizing only defense and administration, and most of the Libyan people do not support mainly due to foreign intervention. The simplified diagram that "the Libyan people" struggle against Gaddafi was no longer tenable.

The new U.S. strategy has been developed on the story that Bin Laden, he (according to the American version), was killed by a special commando 2 May 2011. This tactic starts against religious fundamentalism and Arab nationalism in the struggle the United States need, according to some scholars, veterans, well equipped and specially trained by ... Al-Qaeda. In the Mashreq and Maghreb region, rivalry in the Arab world is not a novelty.

The only major innovative element is considered the common struggle of Bin Laden's Wahhabi fighters and the Muslim Brotherhood fighters, and the Palestinian branch of this, the Hamas. So, even if successful, future rivalries are pre-coded in the region. The religious leader of the "new covenant" is Sheikh Youssef al-Qaradawi. This leader has daily forced the fight against Gaddafi and Assad and

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greatly influenced the events in Egypt where, thanks to the revolution, Islam became the religion of the State.

However, the interpretation of this new strategy has produced some malfunction in the American administration on rapid response to events in Libya. General Carter F. Ham the head of AFRICOM (8 March 2011) refused himself the supply of arms to Gaddafi enemy (thus "the Libyan people") because to him it was quite obvious that the revolts incorporate several elements of Al-Qaeda, mostly from Iraq. It is not a coincidence that USAFRICOM did not shine in the fight against Gaddafi, and he was forced to transfer command to NATO. In addition, David Petraeus became CIA director (6 September 2011 - 9 November 2012) who, as CENTCOM commander, cooperates for some time with the network of Bin Laden to fight together against the opposition in Iraq.

Obama's strategy for the future is as follows: reduce concrete military engagement as the great supporter of peace (Nobel Peace Prize winner) and at the same time promoting (more or less) secret operations of US commandos. The aim is to perpetuate the chaos and support both sides as the war between Iraq and Iran (1980-1988). So under the auspices of the U.S. policy, the African mercenaries of the Israeli company Global CST has been sent to fight alongside Afghan mercenaries Gaddafi and services to strengthen the Saudi ally of the rebels. But this "plan A" was failed and the "Plan B" has fostered crisis management by Europeans, whose failure would be useful to prove (once again), that the EU would be unable to manage a conflict alone. Close U.S. elections (November 2012) Obama could not risk a massive commitment in Libya.

EUFOR Libya: a military or a humanitarian mission?

At the same time, the 27 gave the green light to the CSDP, for planning a (military) mission whose objective is "to support humanitarian assistance and civil protection." But the parties fail to agree on the CMC¹⁷ and waited for the agreement with Egypt and Tunisia, condition *sine qua non* of the operation's launch.

The target is relatively small, compared to 10 years of experience CSDP: humanitarian aid support and provide strategic airlift and maritime lift for the evacuation of refugees after the request the UNHCR / OIM. The latter is particularly important for poor countries like Bangladesh and sub-Saharan states.

Apart from these objectives, because of the close coordination with OCHA (humanitarian support), logistics support (communications, strategy, water purification) of the local missions of the UN were also provided¹⁸. To achieve this goal, according to the plans, the establishment of an EU-UN coordination unit was planned as well as cooperation with ECHO (EU Humanitarian Support). The security of refugee camps and refugees have not been included¹⁹.

Solidarity of Denmark (active member of the intervention against the Gaddafi regime by its air force) has not supported - this time either - the costs of the military operation of the European Union (ATHENA Mechanism) to strengthen internal cohesion in the EU. Especially the UAE has proposed equipment & planes.

Common costs were capped at 7.9 million euro of which 1.6 was provided by Germany, France and 1.3 by the United Kingdom, and one from Italy.

¹⁷ CMC - Crisis Management Concept

¹⁸ COUNCIL OF THE EUROPEAN UNION, Council decides on EU military operation in support of humanitarian assistance operations in Libya, Brussels, 1 April 2011, 8589/11, PRESSE 91

¹⁹ Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, „Vers une mission PSDC humanitaire près de la Libye. Détails d’une opération d’un nouveau genre“, *Bruxelles2 Blog*, 22/03/2011, <http://www.bruxelles2.eu>

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This sum is intended to cover medical expenses, satellites and in case of authorization (Ashton was against) the costs of strategic airlift for the deployment of *battle groups*. The mission commander is Admiral Italian Claudio Gaudiosi.

The mission was forced to close cooperation with NATO. Specialists visionnent strengthening the rivalry between Cyprus and Turkey because Turks have been lobbying for NATO to launch a "rival" mission.

Rome was destined to be the center of the mission with CSDP's multinationalisable OHQ in Cento Celle (suburb of Rome). The idea of activating the "(O)HQ Europe" in Brussels of the CPCC (Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, see below) was quickly dismissed, although the creation of this center has exactly targeted such missions... The QGF could be implemented at a port or airport, in Egypt or Tunisia. The size of the mission would be 600-1500 people with Airbus A330, C-17s, C-130s and C-160s and the transport wessels. The mission would also include medical support Role-2 (military field hospital) and logistical support for autonomy.

As part of EUFOR Libya, the deployment of battle groups would be feasible. They are already almost deployed and successfully controlled by the EATC²⁰, during operations Pegasus I (evacuation of EU citizens, Libya) and Pegasus II (non-EU citizens evacuation and repatriation, Tunisia) without a decision on a transaction of the CSDP²¹. 10-12 rotations were performed.

The establishment of the EATC (*European Air Transport Command*, F, D, NL, B) was decided in

2006 and has been active since the summer of 2010. It is one of dozens of European organizations (EAG, EAAC, EAC, SACC, SCC²²) designed to coordinate air transport. The EATC has 29 C-130 Hercules, 135 C-160 Transall, 19 CASA CN-235, 10 Airbus A-310, 2 Airbus A340, two KDC-10, and 20 other aircraft.

At the first April 2011, the EU Council has approved the for four months mandate of EUFOR Libya, developed by RELEX. (Previously this mandate was appointed Council Joint Action). Soon after, in practice the process was blocked and the operation "was virtualized." Why?

The Oplan has not been finalized nor for May 4, when the EU rapid reaction process allows for years to give an answer in 15 days to most major challenges. In all cases, the FGP (Force Generation Process) was started. At the time, the European Union has accused the UN - and especially the Office of Humanitarian Affairs BCHA/OCHA) of blocking the mission. That is to say it last "sabotaged" to give permission for political reasons. In May 2011, military experts felt that a new Security Council resolution would be necessary.

It seems that the UN was the first who has been traumatized by the first "hormone-disordered" EU mission (a humanitarian mission rather military than civil; chaos on the institutional structure and planning): In the letter written on April 11 2011, by Lady Amos²³, Under-Secretary-General of OCHA, and addressed to lady Ashton, we can find a very curious argument:

According to the lady, the cooperation project between the European Union and the OCHA is perhaps remarkable, but OCHA would not want to

²⁰ EATC = European Air Transport Command

²¹ Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, L'Europe n'a pas à rougir de son action humanitaire, 06/03/2011, <http://www.bruxelles2.eu/zones/maghreb/leurope-na-pas-a-rougir-de-son-action-humanitaire-la-chorale-europeenne-en-action.html>

²² see : <http://pesd.visuart.eu/?q=institutions>

²³ Fabrice Colette, "Libye la résistance humanitaire", *La lumière des racailles*, 20/04/2011. <http://www.lalumieredesracailles.net/?p=206>

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compromise its purely humanitarian activities through cooperation with a quasi-military operation²⁴. It was a concrete and predictable refusal to Ashton and to the CSDP, which paralyzes the mission for many long months.

The OpPlan was finalized on May 13, after 1.5 months of work. It presents four scenarios:

- 1, escort of humanitarian convoys
- 2, evacuation of humanitarian personnel
- 3, securing the Port of Misrata
- 4, provide humanitarian aid in the long term (over 30 days). This is why a safety zone around Misrata should be implemented.

On May 22 2011, according to the homepage of the Hungarian Presidency of the Council of the European Union comment of the planned operation was still terse:

"Preparations for EUFOR Libya, a military operation (sic!) designed to support humanitarian assistance in the region, are well under way, and the operation will be launched if requested by the United Nations." That is to say to the UN in May, the mission was still "embarrassing" although paradoxically the resolution 1973 of Security Council strongly request its implementation...

Until the end of May, Malta, Portugal, Hungary, Austria, Finland and Poland have declared their intention to provide assistance in the operation. Added to that the EU Member States have withdrawn their ambassadors in Tripoli, with the exception of Hungary. That is to say, after the NATO air strikes on the night of April 30, 2011, only the embassy of the Presidency of the European

Union, Hungary owned a diplomatic presence in Tripoli and provided information to the EU²⁵.

After analysis of ISIS-Europe, on June 28, 2011, in the opinion of high officials of member states, the realization of EUFOR Libya becomes less and less possible²⁶.

To draw the conclusion we can say

1.) the measures of the challenges in relation to the planning of EUFOR Libya are at about the same height as those of the WEU in 1990s (see ALBA mission, that without the agreement of member states finally left out of the WEU).

2.) The fact that we no longer speak of a real military mission but a humanitarian mission is the logical consequence of the implementation of the CSDP after the processing of the ESDP for 2-3 years : Firstly, the creation of the CPCC (Civilian Planning and Conduct Capability, in 2007/2008), the management of civil operations was "separated" from the parallel structure of civil-military operations. And it is in this cell that the really common and integrated management (planning & conduct) of the first (exclusively humanitarian) EU missions was envisaged.

Then the new HR / VP (High Representative / Vice President Ashton) puts ESDP in the integrated diplomatic pillar (not in the action pillar) by the creation of CMPD²⁷ (*Crisis Management and Planning Directorate*, at the EEAS, November 2009), which predestines the ESDP in the future, and limits its activities to the field of humanitarian crises management - if we continue in this direction.

²⁴ Lettre de Valerie Amos Under-Secretary-General for Humanitarian Affairs and Emergency Relief coordinator, à Catherine Ashton, non datée ; to read more details : Nicolas Gros-Verheyde, "EUFOR Libya : la réponse de Lady Amos (OCHA) à Lady Ashton (UE). Document", *Bruxelles2 Blog*,
<http://www.bruxelles2.eu/zones/maghreb/eufor-libya-la-reponse-de-lady-amos-ocha-a-lady-ashton-ue-document.html>

²⁵ "La Hongrie, seule représentante de l'UE à Tripoli", Euractiv.com, 03/05/2011

<http://www.euractiv.com/fr/europe-dans-le-monde/la-hongrie-seule-repr-sentante-de-lue-tripoli-news-504473>

²⁶ Sebastian Bloching , „CSDP and EU Mission Update – June/July 2011“, ESR Briefing 6 - 28 June 2011, ISIS Europe

²⁷ For more information see: *András István Törke, La structure de commandement des missions et des opérations de la PSDC - Vers un Quartier Général Européen?*

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And at that point, the flexibility of definitions can bypass the system of the European Union, because it is not obvious that such a humanitarian mission would it be "military" or "civil". This question, as we have seen, can worsen the relationship between the EU and the UN (and especially OCHA).

3.) Moreover, the scheme proposed and presented above, does not work either, because this logic would require that the center of such a humanitarian operation is in Brussels (with the CPCC or perhaps CMPD, although these cells, and especially the latter are unable to act without help from the member states).

And even what we can observe at first? That this option was quickly put to the side, and from DG RELEX²⁸ to PSC, several different civilian and military institutions were responsible for military planning. And finally the conduct of the operation was provided by a national OHQ (multinationalisable) in Cento Celle (near Rome) just like in the case of civilian or civilian-military operations...

4.) As we saw earlier, near the border of Europe, the European Union did not assume more responsibility for the establishment of a embargo-monitoring mission, as it had already made between 1992-95 in the Adriatic Sea : first with NATO, and then next to NATO. Or the result is (would) always the veto of a Member State.

It is true that in the debates around the mission Atalanta, NATO would have liked to refuse (in this day once again) to give free hand in the EU. The conclusion is that security along the border of the European Union would be ensured by using American-Turkish military aid, which is a considerable drop in the history of independent ESDP/CSDP operations.

Lessons learned

Are we may discuss the results for a not-launched operation? The mission was officially canceled November 10, 2011. In any case, the EU underlines the wider horizon (first mission in the Maghreb) and extended cooperation (with the Arab League) and focuses on the possible deployment of battle groups : Issue debated umpteenth time since 5-6 years (since the deployment of EUFOR DR Congo in 2006.) This is the first major test of crisis management in the new framework of the Lisbon Treaty (and especially the EEAS) - or could have been. Since then, officials can count only on one battle group in the first half of 2012 (instead of two during the period 2007-2011).

Added to that at the time of the war against Libya, the risk of any mixing of civilian and military missions was relatively high because Italy offered these bases not only to *Operation Odyssey Dawn* and to the mission Hermes of FRONTEX (Lampedusa is the nearest place to the area²⁹), but also, as we have seen, to humanitarian missions. In any case the UN considers the EUFOR Libya as "a military operation disguised as a humanitarian mission".

In summer 2011 several experts saw the total decomposition of the CSDP, because the Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union (from July 2011) has openly declared its objectives under which the FRONTEX ("traditionally Polish" with a Polish center) should be reinforced as part of the CSDP as possible including the development of civilian-military capabilities ...

And it seemed that those responsible had more than one battle group in the first half of 2012 (instead of two during the period 2007-2011). It

²⁸ or rather these elements in a state of transition because in the context of the Lisbon Treaty, the European External Action Service (EEAS) took over the functions DG RELEX, merging them with his counterpart in the Council of the European Union from 1 December 2010. Finally, the DG RELEX was dissolved on December 1, 2011.

²⁹ Operation Hermes was launched in February 2011 with four aircraft, two helicopters, 30 boats and two experts on site. Its objective is to provide assistance to Italian authorities the fight against migratory fluxes from Libya. Participating countries are: F, E, B, P, D, AU, NL, Malta, Sweden, Switzerland. Instruments are supplied mainly by the Italians and even by France, Germany, the Netherlands, Spain and Malta.

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should be noted the role of the African Union in the conflict that has requested a cease-fire and a return to negotiations. Despite the agreement partnership between the European Union and the African Union (2007) and in theory they are taken as "equal partners" it is quite remarkable to what extent the States of the European Union have neglected the opinion of their partner in the management of Africa.

We doubt that with this attitude, the prospects for future cooperation will be fruitful and would it be possible to establish long-term for intercontinental relationships based on the trust. The African Union has left the Paris summit on 19 March 2011, as its representatives did not agreed, and proposed negotiations. In addition, a single African country has not participated in the conference. The goal of the African Union was the cease-fire at all costs, and has contributed to support a longer process of negotiations for transitions. Instead, the rebels have refused it, because the stranglehold of (family) Gaddafi significantly reduced their legitimation.

As the EEAS lessons are learned: during the earthquake in Haiti (January 12, 2010) to the events in Libya, he remained paralyzed in its new form. Regarding Libya, the EEAS network did not prove unity, Member States made statements clearly different. Up to this point, nothing new about EU "common" diplomacy. But the fact that the statements of the different EU institutions and officials does not have any signs of coordination means that the new structure of the European Service have serious defects. Even if the masses of EU statements

made the same position (completely neutral) it was impossible to know which is the "most important", that is to say, the official position of the European Union.

For a year, the evolution of the new structure, under the auspices of Mrs Ashton, could not be able to publish a single concrete official statement about a crisis at the border of the Union. In addition, the European Union did not remain impartial in the conflict! May 22 2011 Catherine Ashton opened the EU office in Benghazi, HQ of libyan rebels³⁰. How to accomplish the criterion of neutrality - a humanitarian mission independent European theory - which is one of the foundations of the famous Brahimi report? Events prove bad calculates of EU leaders: AQIM has considerably strengthened in Libya and derives the greatest benefit from the dissolution of the Libyan state.

The well-know scenario of Iraq³¹ is also strengthened al-Qaeda and a good part of the army of Gaddafi joined to the terrorists, consequence of which was that now AQIM has also heavy arms and became one of largest militia in the Sahel region. Algeria is the most worrying, as AQIM is based on the Algerian GSPC. It adds Tuareg secessionism took a new stimulus in the region or the domino effect occurs: in Mali they have already declared the independence of the Azawad region³², and even in Niger Agadez region is almost independently "administered" by AREVA since 2007.

At the end of June 2011, according to unambiguous reports on the events in Libya of Amnesty

³⁰ « Catherine Ashton opens European Union office in Benghazi », Europa Press releases, <http://europa.eu/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/11/625&format=HTML&aged=0&language=EN&guiLanguage=en>, downloaded on 02/07/2011

³¹ Pascal Boniface, « Premières leçons de la guerre d'Irak » in : Pascal Boniface (dir.), *L'Année stratégique 2005*, IRIS, Armand Colin, 2004, pp. 29-49.

³² Northeast-Mali Timbuktu region, Kidal and Gao : Azawad Islamist Republic declared independence 6 April 2012 but international actors have not recognized. Its capital is Gao, with 1,295,000 inhabitants and an area of 822,000 km².

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International³³ and International Crisis Group say that the credibility of events and alleged killings and torture of Gadhafi's army presented by media³⁴ is highly questionable (nota bene, crimes committed by the revolts were not distributed). We can draw the conclusion that it is very likely that the intervention in Libya is based on such "lies" like the one about Iraq³⁵. The Iraqisation of the region begins and (as it was predictable) Cyrenaica declared its semi-autonomy in March 2012. The wealth of Libya's oil is in Cyrenaica as the most important refineries (north, along the coast) : Ras Lanuf, Marsa el Brega, Tobruk and Sarir.

The failure of EUFOR Libya reflects the new challenges emerged around management (C & C) of a European mission: is it de facto a OQG for European missions or not? (Because, de jure, yes, for humanitarian missions.) In addition, to hide the lack of political will and political impotence, the European Union has led once again on the slippery path definition highly polished and sharp different kinds of missions (humanitarian mission, civil / military mission, with military elements etc..) to make a decision on its commitment. The lesson of EUFOR Libya has shown that within the framework of a humanitarian mission, participants can not distinguish between the warring parties in favor of one or the other. And military elements threaten the safety of neutral humanitarian activity - at least according to UN officials. The EU should also concluded that to avoid a future impasse.

As for the CSDP (which did not work, once again, when is a real issue) we can conclude that even in 2011 rather bilateral solutions (Franco-British entente cordiale) and coalitions of the willing are favored. Conclusions military operation Harmattan,

especially in terms of logistics, is more positive with five key elements were: 1, complementarity means; 2, Good performance of a structure in phase ramp, 3, Accelerated deployment of GAN (Naval Air Group) 4 A particularly fine gesticulation transportation of ammunition and 5, the unique expertise of the 519th GTM (Shipping Group)³⁶. The rapid deployment of elements of the operations (strategic transport) could not have been done without the Ukrainian / Russian large aircraft rentals (Antonov-124-76 and Ilyousine) beside air assets of EU countries (A310, A340, C160, C130) even if they acted a region not far from Europe.

The rapid deployment of elements of the operations (strategic transport) could not have been done without the large aircraft rentals Ukrainian / Russian Antonov-124 and Ilyousine-76, next to the air assets of EU countries (A310, A340, C160, C130) even if it was an area not far from Europe. *"Without effective action by the EATC (European Air Transport Command) we would have been forced to repatriate immediately in the metropolis, while some of our air assets were deployed to other theaters of operations"*, but from the start, Belgian and Dutch means have contributed to strengthening the available (French) capacity.

The EATC was also responsible for regular lines between sites every two days, *"even add other means from national OPCON if necessary"*. Because, for the military, *"it is always easier to work from scheduled flights, even cancel if necessary, rather than trigger regularly, but in an emergency, flight to meet a sudden need."*

At the border of Europe, in the theater, for tactical transport C-130 and C-160 were sufficient without

³³ « Libye : Amnesty conteste le nombre de victimes et accuse les rebelles », 17/07/2011, Algeria-Watch, http://www.algeria-watch.de/fr/article/pol/ligue_arabe/ai_libye.htm

³⁴ We note that the reports of Amnesty International and the ICG are generally objectives. <http://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/africa/>, « Amnesty questions claim that Gaddafi ordered rape as weapon of war, Patrick Cockburn », TheIndependent.co.uk, Friday, 24 June 2011

³⁵ The role of revolts on the kidnapping and torture of Bulgarian nurses (4,000 in the country) was a feature of most ...

³⁶ « Retour sur l'Harmattan - Le multimodal en action », Soutien Logistique Défense, N°7, Printemps/Été 2012, pp. 24-25. (Interview with général Boussard).

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the need to use larger or more efficient carriers. In the normal case, GAN is deployed for 5 days, here, in accelerated phase, for 48 hours, with all the needs for a range of 45 days. *"The land routes were used extensively in France, in particular the transport of material from Bretagne. (...) GAN refueling was by helicopter, based from 120 nautical miles in Sicily or Crete"* and by three oil-tankers. *"The theft of ammunition were scheduled every forty-eight hours from the limited capacity of ammunition bunkers in Crete and Sicily."* French forces never get ran out of ammunition, but *"it happened that the mission is canceled with already taxiing aircraft, because once delivered, the ammunition could not be stored on site. It was therefore a delicate neutral balance between planning and responsiveness."*

The Centre of transport and transit area (CTTS) created the 519th GTM Toulon in July 2011 to provide post-delivery of materials to their home base and has planned ten missions to repatriate the equipment³⁷. Despite these positive lessons learned especially to France for this intervention as military exercise, we must not hide the negative consequences: French participation in Libya has resulted largely unnecessary expenses and even worse with enlargement of the crisis of the French army whose *"new year budget program 29 billion in 2015, almost have 10 % less. (...) Between 2010 and 2012, the operating budget has been reduced by 7.5% an activity of operational readiness decreased gradually, with lower credit for scheduled maintenance of equipment over the period. External operations remaining priority, there is far more of an army at two speeds - one warring party, the other not - which is never a good solution"*³⁸.

Sources of images



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³⁷ « Retour sur l'Harmattan - Le multimodal en action », *op. cit.*

³⁸ Olivier Jehin, « France/Défense : La crise commence à peser de tout son poids sur la Défense française », Regards-Citoyens, 06/11/2012., <http://www.regards-citoyens.com/> ; read more : Türke, A. I., « The French Army in Peril », CERPESC-CSDP Blog, 11/13/2012 <http://csdp.visuart.eu/fr/csdpblog/thefrencharmyinperil>

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Abstract

Almost a year ago that an operation "never" performed was launched by the European Union on 1 April 2011. Why the first official operation of the CSDP has become a failure - before being made? What conclusions about the future of the CSDP?

About events in Libya the first reaction to EU 27 date 21 February 2011, four days after the escalation of events in Tripoli. The joint statement called for an immediate end to the use of force against protesters.

In summer 2011 several experts saw the total decomposition of the CSDP, because the Polish Presidency of the Council of the European Union (from July 2011) has openly declared its objectives under which the FRONTEX ("traditionally Polish" with a Polish center) should be reinforced as part of the CSDP as possible, including the development of civilian-military capabilities ...



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CERPESC ANALYSES
14/AF/05/2012

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Association Objectif Europe III
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Editor-in-chief

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1135 Budapest, Szent László út 15. 5. em. 8,
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ISSN 2073-5634