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THE OPERATION ARTEMIS IN THE DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC OF CONGO

EU and UN crisis management in Ituri, in the context of conflicts at the Great Lakes region in 2003

/ Translated from the French original version /



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Introduction

In 2003, the European Union, following the launch of operations/missions like CONCORDIA and EUPM in the Balkans, has expanded its outreach to the African continent. After understanding the context of conflicts in the Great Lakes region, we will deal with the various phases of the presence of the union in the Democratic Republic of Congo.

Operation ARTEMIS is considered the first military operation led by the EU, *"The first autonomous EU operation, the first rapid response mission of the EU first operation outside Europe, first operation applying the principle of the framework nation and first example of "relay operation", conducted in cooperation between the EU and the United Nations¹."*

But how she really left between the frames of the Union? What are the lesson learned for future missions ? Has the EU well played its role? How was the cooperation with UN ? The specialized military force of the EU might be more effective as UN Blue Helmets? Cooperation between the EU military operation and the operation of Blue Helmets would be more advantageous than that between Blue Helmets and NATO (and especially the US Army)?

The United Nations could count on the EU special army as the "second army" of the UN whose "civilian control" respect better the decisions of the Security Council? Are there parallels between a Operation ARTEMIS and the operation in Afghanistan or Iraq in the field of strategy or logistics management? And if the operation can be considered successful, what are the reasons for success that differentiate it from the ineffectiveness EU reactions during the first Balkan crisis in the 1990s?

Operation ARTEMIS can be considered a global commitment to international security in a situation that is described by former Secretary of State of the United States, Madeleine Albright as *"Africa's first world war."*² Is it important for European security reasons or is it just a "practice" how to manage future crises close to Europe?

Is this a new form of colonial ambitions of France? (Because we know that a new policy began to ex-colonies during the Iraq crisis (in 2003) by the visits of President Chirac.) An operation like this can be used in the preparation of an EU economic expansion? (For example, the expansion of the euro zone.) Why the United States have left this operation in European hands?

This inaugural operation falls more problems on the objectives of the CFSP and its articulation with the EU Member States, international organizations and other powers.

Finally we will address the development of the European diplomacy and operations with two different missions: EUPOL Kinshasa, the first (civilian) police mission of the ESDP in Africa and EUSEC DR Congo, a mission with SSR and DDR issues.

¹ *Le maintien de la paix en Afrique sub-saharienne : une approche concrète*, A/1913, op. cit., p. 24.

² REISS, Andreas, "European Union sends troops to Congo - First independent EU military mission" (27 June 2003), <http://www.wsws.org/>

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I. The interaction between conflict areas in the Great Lakes Region

1.1. The Rwandan Genocide and the interests of alliance networks

To better understand the highly complex situation in the Great Lakes region, we need a little back in history: Trying to understand the origins of the conflict and the causes of the genocide of Rwanda in 1994. The objectives of the French and American politics area.

After being separated from the Belgian Congo (became independent in 1960) the Rwanda-Burundi is in turn divided into two independent states in 1962. George Kayibanda became president of Rwanda, whose power is weakened and finally Juvenal Habyarimana overthrown him in July 1973.

In 1975, he founded the National Republican Movement for Development (Mouvement révolutionnaire national pour le développement ; MRND) and has signed with French President Giscard d'Estaing a Military Technical Assistance Agreement, which allowed the transfer of arms from France to the Rwanda.

The former Belgian Congo, Zaire became independent in 1960 and Joseph Desire Mobutu took power. At the time the level of development in Zaire was equivalent to South Korea. In 1996, the DRC was among the poorest countries in the world while Mobutu became one of the ten richest men in the world: The exploitation of gold and diamond was a private activity in favor of the president. *"The Kasai diamond counters were leaded by his son Kongolu trough liege men, mostly Lebanese"* and Kinshasa was the place of narco-dollars laundering where they bought diamants with cash³.

In Rwanda in 1978, Habyarimana changed the Constitution and passed a one-party, MRND, which all Rwandans are ex officio members. Tutsi exiles organized and formed the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in 1987. On 1 October 1990, from Uganda, the RPF comes into force in Northern Rwanda.

In DRC during the war in Katanga, by a Franco-Belgian military intervention in Kolwezi in 1978, French paratroopers were permanently secured the French military influence on the regime. The city of Kolwezi was taken over by secessionist rebels, 600 paratroopers jumped on Kolwezi to extract 2700 Europeans threatened.

The history of rehabilitating Mobutu back in 1990 when the DST (*Division spéciale présidentielle*; Special Presidential Division 1,500 men) of Mobutu intervened in Rwanda, alongside France and the Habyarimana army, to fight the RPF. The assistance provided to Rwandan refugees in eastern Zaire was \$ 2.5 billion, almost the Rwandan GDP⁴.

HRW says that much of this money was diverted by the brother-Mobutu, head of supply fields and by *Hutu Power* that controlled the distribution of food⁵. The report of the Commission of Inquiry of the UN (1996) assumes that the militias were funded in part by the sale of products of the humanitarian aid. But "the dark crowning" of Jacques Foccart's work, the Zairian epic covers the period from 1994 to 1997 Zaire. Paris needs Mobutu to keep the country and access to its wealth⁶.

October 16, 1993, President Mitterrand agreed to receive Marshal, outside the Francophone Summit in Mauritius, but some argue that the true rehabilitation of Mobutu began at the end of April 1994, full of the Rwandan genocide.

During a visit to Zaire, Jacques Foccart (with

³ VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, *La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République*, Paris, Stock, 1999., pp. 227-229.

⁴ VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, *La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République*, op. cit., pp. 243-244.

⁵ *Rwanda/Zaire, Réarmement dans l'impunité*, Human Right Wach Report, mai 1995.

⁶ VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, *La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République*, op. cit., pp. 243-44

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Robert Bourgi lawyer and former minister Michel Aurillac) found at Marshal Mobutu, American and Belgian representatives of pro-Mobutu lobbies, Herman Cohen and Max-Olivier Cahen.

In May 1994, them and Robert Bourgi have signed a \$ 600,000 contract of policy communication with Mobutu. The scenario was as follows: Strengthening the Mobutu regime, politically and financially by the announcement of a (customized) presidential election and rehabilitation of Zaire in the international financial system⁷.

In November 1994, the French have invited Mobutu to the Franco-African Summit in Biarritz. According to some opinions, Mobutu became a strong pillar in the fight against pan-African aims and against the "Anglo-Saxon axis of evil" of the Ugandan leader Yoweri Museveni, allied to the Rwandan Patriotic Front (Front patriotique rwandais (FPR))⁸.

To understand why Zaire has become so important in one go, we need to return to Rwanda wire:

During the famine in Rwanda, was born the slogan *Hutu Power!* This military-political extremist group, racist, consisting of close family of the president "phagocytosed" the regime. In addition, the clan of President's wife Agathe monopolized the wealth of the country.

To respond to the offensive of the rebels of the Rwandan Patriotic Front (RPF) in Rwanda, France organized in 1990 *Operation Noroît* which would continue until the establishment of UN troops (UNAMIR commanded by General Dallaire) in December 1993 and with dubious legality.

The official number of French soldiers involved

in *Noroît* reach 688 people, thousands of Tutsis were immediately imprisoned and, according to Minister of Cooperation Robert Galley, the French army has been used to stop the advance of FPR⁹.

In 1991, Hutu extremists carried out several massacres of different Tutsis groups. From its rear bases established in Uganda, with the support of the Ugandan army, the RPF gradually establish a bridgehead in northern Rwanda where fighting will continue until 1994. Under pressure of the international community, the successive agreements of Arusha, signed in August 1993 with the RPF, include organizing the return of exiled Tutsis and the political and military integration of various internal and external components of the Rwandan nation¹⁰.

April 7, 1994, after the attack that brought down the plane of President Habyarimana, the *Hutu Power* took power in Kigali, with the support of the presidential guard, militia, gendarmerie, and some of the Rwandan Armed Forces (Forces armées rwandais - FAR).

Radical eradication of Tutsis began in April-May 1994, during the genocide, the result was 800,000 killed in seven weeks (5 times the elimination of Auschwitz daily rate). The core of the genocide was the group of officers led by Colonel Bagosora; General Augustin Bizimungu, the ousted the moderate chief of staff Marcel Gatsinzi and Jean Baptiste Gatete, the leader of the *Interahamwe* militia¹¹.

What was the French reaction? They evacuated the French and other European citizens. Moreover exfiltration of part of the clan Habyarimana and 34 Rwandan, under cover of the evacuation of an orphanage was observed. Glued to *Hutu Power*,

⁷ VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, *La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République*, op. cit., pp. 231-232.

⁸ VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, *La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République*, op. cit., p. 232.

⁹ audition de M. Robert Galley (13 mai 1998), in : *Mission d'Information sur le Rwanda*, Sommaire des comptes rendus d'auditions, Assemblée Nationale, pp. 273-286.

¹⁰ MELVERN, Linda, *Conspiracy to murder : the Rwandan genocide*, Verso, 2004, p. 104.

¹¹ VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, *La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République*, op. cit., pp. 23-30.

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they delivered ammunition to the FAR through Goma. *Operation Turquoise* from June 23 to August 22, 1994 was rather a sham, a humanitarian alibi. The French expeditionary force equipped with armored vehicles was welcomed triumphantly by those responsible for genocide¹².

By the way, this operation was one of the first European operations that benefited from satellite coverage provided by the WEU Satellite Center in Torrejón. His images have helped the deployment of forces enabling them to help refugees as quickly as possible, and prevent fighter's infiltration¹³. Thus the reason of Mobutu's rehabilitation became clear: he had to ensure the rear-base in Zaire during a war against Rwanda. Jacques Foccart since his relocation to the Interior Ministry, was campaigning for the rehabilitation of Mobutu.

French officials have decided almost unanimously despite the Mitterrand-Balladur cohabitation. Guy Pen says that "*in 1994, during Operation Turquoise (...) the French authorities had an opportunity to clean up the Great Lakes Region. (...) They allowed the contrary, the flight of militia ...*"¹⁴ Patrick de Saint-Exupéry complete him: "*In sum, it comes to cutting the Kigali regime (dominated by Tutsis) from the Hutu population that remained in countries. It is necessary that this system has the reputation of a racist power*"¹⁵. The French section of *Médecins sans frontières* emphasize the need to continue to feed the criminals: "*It was the price to pay to feed hundreds of thousands of innocent women and children*"¹⁶.

What were the results of the situation resulting from the French policy?

1.) Mobutu was allowed to install an impressive French logistics in Zaire. Mobutu was the ally of the *Hutu Power*: together they composed the exodus of a million refugees.

2.) The *Hutu Power* was transferred to Zaire 20,000 tons of coffee, and stocks in stores, belonging to the Mobutu family.

3.) At the Franco-African Summit in Biarritz, in November 1994 François Mitterrand gave a positive assessment of the Franco-African relations during his mandate. The principle of an *African Standby Force* was endorsed : Mobutu could participate despite the massacres and his support of the civil war in Angola.

4.) With the diplomatic support of the Elysee, the interim government of *Hutu Power* succeeded in torpedoing with Mobutu a meeting for the reconciliation in Tanzania. Bruno Delaye gives explanations: "*We can not let the Anglophone countries decide the future of a francophone country.*" The rapid response could have prevented hundreds of thousands of deaths ... Some argue that Mitterrand said that "*in these countries, a genocide is not too important*"¹⁷.

5.) According to a journalist, the French strategy was as follows: First goal is the maximum deterioration of the situation in Rwanda for the return of the forces of the former government and the power sharing. Zaire as a rear base, allows FAR to reorganize and train with Mobutu's presidential guard. Finally it all makes possible an invasion in Rwanda, or causing the FPR for a counterattack against the FAR bases in Zaire. And this response was opening the door to an intervention in Kigali¹⁸.

¹² VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, *La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République*, op. cit., pp. 31-35.

¹³ *L'Union européenne et le maintien de paix en Afrique*, Document A/1880, op. cit., p. 29.

¹⁴ VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, *La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République*, op. cit., p. 240

¹⁵ VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, *La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République*, op. cit., p. 242

¹⁶ VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, *La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République*, op. cit., p. 243

¹⁷ VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, *La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République*, op. cit., p. 32. et Jean-Paul Gouteux, *Un génocide sans importance. La France et le Vatican au Rwanda*, Tahin party, 2001, p. 102.

¹⁸ VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, *La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République*, op. cit., p. 245.

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6.) According to HRW, France delivered via Mobutu, artillery, machine guns and assault rifles for *Hutu Power*. Cargo planes companies registered or based in Zaire transported most of the weapons provided. Mobutu quietly left the *Hutu Power* train in Zaire and according to HRW, France trained the *Hutu Power* in CAR after the defeat of FAR.

7.) FAR received weapons via the airport of Goma within the area controlled by the French, and the French have left behind at least a cache of weapons in the Rwandan town of Kamembe. According to the rapporteurs of the UN, the supply of weapons to the ex-FAR was organized from Kenya. In addition, in June 1996, Russian aircrafts loaded weapons crashed in Kinshasa. Thus the former army Habyarimana received a portion of *Operation Turquoise's* arm (AML 60 and AML armored vehicles with 120-millimeter mortars, anti-aircraft weapons, rocket launchers, howitzers, military trucks) and the other part was sold by Zairian officers¹⁹.

8.) The international context was as follows: France was afraid of vacuum caused by the collapse of Habyarimana clan. The French goal was to trap Uganda and its allies²⁰. They have increased the stress to Mobutu of Zaire, asking him to take over and "*extend its protective shadow over the pacific and Great Lakes region.*"

The consequence of this was that Mobutu allowed the massacre descendants of Kasaïans in Katanga and the massacre of Banyarwanda in Kivu. "*By choosing to deploy around Goma in Zaire, its military-humanitarian logistics, and then letting it install the Rwandan refugee camps, Paris can demonstrate how Mobutu is essential*²¹. Following the logic "*the enemy of my enemy is my friend*", two areas have started to form:

- **1st axis:** the alliance between the CAR, DRC, Sudan, *Hutu Power* in Rwanda, with French support against the

- **2nd axis:** cooperation between Uganda of the "Anglo-Saxon" Yoweri Museveni, Paul Kagame of Rwanda, and the Movement of John Garang in South Sudan supported by the United States that even armed Sudanese opposition via Eritrea and Ethiopia.

Libya funded rather "the 1st axis," but kept good contact with Rwanda. So, how different conflict zones and regions interact under the supervision of (great)powers, whose knowledge is essential to understand the background of the issues in the conflict in the DRC and Sudan²². We add that this is a simplified diagram because different alliances change from time to time, several times with "antagonism". We'll see how certain "allies" of these axes are fighting each other or make tactical maneuvers following the idea of *divide et impera* in certain theaters, such as Rwanda and Uganda in the DRC, in the Ituri region.

This is the Central African Republic (CAR), which still plays a key role is the reason why we must delve a little into the details:

The strengthening of relations between France and the CAR, the former *Oubangui-Chari* also date back to the second half of the 1970s, such as in DRC and Rwanda. The country has a limited diamond and uranium resource. In 1959 David Dacko took power and sought to rely on China.

In 1965, Colonel Bokassa "discreetly supported" by France took power and a French paratrooper detachment arrived in the country under defense agreements between the two contracting parties. But megalomania and massacres of President (then

¹⁹ VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, *La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République*, op. cit., pp. 246-247.

²⁰ This is the reason for the rapprochement between French and Sudanese Secret Service, led by Charles Pasqua. VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, *La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République*, op. cit., p. 80.

²¹ VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, *La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République*, op. cit., p. 232.

²² VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, *La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République*, op. cit., p. 236.

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
Emperor) Bokassa became increasingly embarrassing for France, moreover Bokassa turned to Libya²³.

After the famous case of diamonds, in 1979, France launched *Operation Barracuda* in CAR, depositing President Bokassa. The French army took Bangui, bringing "in his luggage" the President David Dacko. Under the reign of Dacko, France has strengthened its positions in Central Africa. A French military occupation force of nearly 1,500 men may radiate throughout the

region and was the counterweights of Libya.

Dacko was again overthrown in 1981 by General Kolingba, always advised by Paris. It created a real tutelary regime under the good offices of Colonel of the DGSE, Jean-Claude Manton.

According to François-Xavier Verschave *"This is to maintain the trainability and airborne intervention of French troops in a wide perimeter including African oil fields in the Gulf of Guinea. It is also extending the covert action capacities in the countries of the region: Zaire, Chad, Rwanda,*



²³ GOURÉVITCH, Jean-Paul, *La France en Afrique – Cinq siècles de présence : vérités et mensonges*, op. cit., pp. 277-279.

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*Sudan, Congo, etc ...*²⁴

Now we understand the key role of CAR in the region. We have already mentioned that the Rwandan RPF has found strong support to Uganda. In Uganda, the "axis" of which France is part 3 supported three guerrillas operating in the cross-border area Zaire (DRC) - Sudan-Uganda^{25, 26}:

1 The LRA (*Lord's Resistance Army*) a Christian movement that builds on the Bible, raised in 1987. Under the tutelage of Alice Auma priestess, it is led by Joseph Kony, and sustained by weapons of Sudan. In 1993, the LRA had only 200-300 men, but until 1997, its man force increased to 5,000 troops, very well equipped, with new trellis, a weapon for every man, rocket launchers and mines.

2 The WNBF (*West Nile Bank's Front*) was born around 1995 and is led by Juma Oris. Front incorporates the Muslim minority, the warriors of Aringa, the Kakawa (tribe of Uganda Idi Amin Dada) and Nubis (descendants of the slaves of the Egyptian-Sudanese army of the nineteenth century).

3 FDA - Allied Democratic Forces arose later along the Zaire-Uganda border. These "surreal" forces mixed Hutu elements of the former Rwandan army ; the Tabek a trans-ethnic Muslim

sect; and Bakonjo, a Ugandan ethnic group that lives on the Ruwenzori dish fighting against the Ugandan government since 1952 for an administrative autonomy. Since 40 years they fight against "all the world": the English, Idi Amin, Obote, Museveni.

These Ugandan guerrillas operating in southern Sudan and northern Zaire are meeting in the region of Kaya (Uganda-Sudan-Congo common border). This is the place where the weapons transiting including those paid by the French. It was not the French weapons but the weapons purchased in the Eastern bloc²⁷.



1.2. President Chirac and the two wars in the DRC

What were the changes in French policy in Africa after the election of President Jacques Chirac in May 1995? In short, there was no change. On 24 April 1996, Chirac received Mobutu at the Elysée and Jacques Godfrain (near Jacques Foccart), Minister for Cooperation, announced the formal resumption of Franco-Zairian cooperation²⁸.

"The Elysée-network" and those of Foccart Pasqua-operate rather neglecting Dominique de Villepin, Secretary General of the Elysee. The pillars of this policy on the theater remained Paul Barril, the former super-gendarme of Mitterrand that brings Mobutu advice and services to its private security company. Also in CAR his private company is responsible for the security of the Central African President Ange-Félix Patassé.

²⁴ « Mascarade électorale en Centrafrique », (12/03/2005), <http://www.pressafrique.com>


²⁵ VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, *La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République*, op. cit., pp. 237-239.

²⁶ *Negotiating Peace: Resolution of Conflicts in Uganda's West Nile Region*, June 2004, Refugee Law Project, Kampala, Ouganda, p. 3.

²⁷ VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, *La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République*, op. cit., pp. 237-239.

²⁸ The Mr. Africa (Monsieur Afrique) of the General de Gaulle, the man who oversaw (until his death) French African politics, the right hand of President Chirac in African affairs.

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The other is Christian Tavernier, the leader of the mercenaries of Mobutu, who (with Paul Barill and his 284 men in Watsa) is responsible for maintaining the delivery channel RCA-DRC-Sudan for Ugandan guerrillas²⁹.

September 1996 is the start date of the war in Kivu. This war has replicated the "Rwandan quake", swept the Mobutu regime and signed the death of Zaire, became the Democratic Republic of Congo led by Laurent-Désiré Kabila.

The overthrow of Mobutu was a very unpleasant surprise for France. Laurent Désiré Kabila, leader of the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (*Alliance des Forces Démocratiques pour la Libération du Congo - AFDL*) took power. Moreover, as to its allies, he quickly became the opponent of French intentions in the region, during the period 1997-1998: His allies at that time were Uganda (of Yorevi Museveni), Rwanda (of Paul Kagame), Angola, and especially the United States and Sudan (who provided for him 2,000 soldiers).

Moreover, Libya was ready to fund his regime. His political method involved a racist basis: antitoutsisme and hatred against the French. Against the Alliance of Kabila and the AFDL France has rounded up³⁰:

- The Congo - Brazzaville for attacks against Kinshasa
- Zairian soldiers and officers
- military and militia of the Rwandan genocide and Burundian allies
- remnants of the army of Ugandan Ubu, Idi Amin Dada
- the LRA
- Muslim fundamentalists, supported as the previous two groups by the Khartoum regime ("cleaner" in the Nuba Mountains of and other Sudanese countries)
- Serb militia "fanatics" of ethnic cleansing

However, the second war, a war of predation, broke (1998-2002): the vast natural resources aroused the envy of neighbors. Because many rapes and massacres approximately 4 million people died.

Despite mutual distrust between Kabila's DRC and France of President Chirac, in a short time, both sides had to radically change their goals to eventually become allies.

Firstly, the political method Kabila was monitored when after July 1, 1998, against the "looting of Rwandan troops in the DRC", he quit his Rwandan and Ugandan advisors. Even France has sought to regain his lost ally again the United States. And "the need for France" ally of French support for Kabila, who began to separate and remain alone, resulted ultimately the alliance with France. As in the days of Mobutu, part of the armament of troops Kabila passes by Chadian airports - under French supervision³¹.

Kabila has lost his Ugandan and Rwandan allies, (who have looted and refused to leave the DRC) and won the support of the alliance structure around France: Angola, *Hutu Power*, Sudan, Chad. Libya, Angola and France have funded such military intervention in Zimbabwe for his favor.

²⁹ VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, *La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République*, op. cit., pp. 232-233., p. 239.

³⁰ VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, *La Françafrique – Le plus long scandale de la République*, op. cit., p. 251.

³¹ VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, *Noir silence – Qui arrêtera la Françafrique?*, Paris, Les Arènes, 2002., p. 129.

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The result was a real snub to Washington : Troops from Angola have changed sides, Zimbabwe and Namibia have helped Kabila to keep Kinshasa. *"In fact, between two legal principles, the non-aggression a sovereign state and the outlawing of genocidal groups, the Elysee chose the one that would suit without consulting Parliament³². "*

II. Geopolitical framework, the peace process and MONUC³³

II.1. The DRC and the Powers

Central Africa is very rich in minerals. Several local wars erupted in controlling the trade. The environment is particularly hostile, and the general situation very degraded by inter-ethnic violence that left several thousand dead. In Ituri, a conflict between different ethnic groups (farmers and pastoralists) persists long time ago and Ugandan forces (UPDF - Uganda People's Defence Force) have occupied the area, which relief was provided by the Luanda Agreement in September 2002³⁴.

There is also a significant oil and forest reserve. The Canadian Heritage Oil Company has made successful drilling with the permission of the Kabila government, and the United States have pursued a discreet financial commitment to acquire political influence. For several years, 65 UN soldier (originating mainly from Uruguay), without clear mandate, were in Congo to defend military observers. You have to remember that in 1996 the European Union has appointed Mr Aldo Ajello Special Representative for the Great Lakes Region³⁵.

The Democratic Republic of Congo is a former Belgian colony as large as Western Europe. During 32 years (until 1997, the Democratic Republic of Zaire) it was led by Marshal Mobutu Sese Seko. His corrupt reign survived thanks to the help and French influence, but after his fall, the influence of France fell to the benefit of the United States.

So the competition between the US and Europe is characteristic of this region. During five years of war, since 1998, more than 3.5 million people died estimated due to the effects of conflict³⁶. But at the

³² VERSCHAVE, François-Xavier, *Noir silence – Qui arretera la Françafrique?*, op. cit., p. 126.

³³ REISS, Andreas, *European Union sends troops to Congo - First independent EU military mission*, op. cit.

³⁴ *Le maintien de la paix en Afrique sub-saharienne : une approche concrète*, Document A/1913, op. cit., p. 25.

³⁵ FARIA Fernanda, *La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne – Le rôle de l'Union européenne*, op. cit., p. 49.

³⁶ FARIA Fernanda, *La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne – Le rôle de l'Union européenne*, op. cit., p. 47.

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time of Kofi Annan's application for intervention in summer 2003, attacks against US troops in Iraq have deterred the Bush administration to intervene.

What were the reasons for the action? Is it a philanthropic mission to secure (temporarily) the rights when it was clear that MONUC (*Mission of the UN in the DRC - Mission de l'Organisation des Nations Unies en République Démocratique du Congo*) was unable to perform its mission? Perhaps the strengthening of political relations with the parties on the ground have yielded significant results. But is it sustainable especially true after the evacuation of troops in a situation that is changing day after day?

Operation ARTEMIS was rooted in the UN peacekeeping. Although several EU states have signed the famous letter assuring their support the United States during the Iraq crisis, the EU seeks to respect the stabilizing role of the UN in international relations. Legally, ARTEMIS was a special operation with the authorization of the United Nations to strengthen the UN mission MONUC, unable to effectively manage this kind of crisis.

II.2. The African policy framework and MONUC (30.11.1999. - 30.04.2004.)

From the first Congo War (1996-97), in 1997, Mobutu Sese Seko was overthrown by the Alliance of Democratic Forces for the Liberation of Congo (AFDL) and Laurent Kabila became president by the help of Uganda and Rwanda.

The crisis began August 2, 1998 (Second Congo War, 1998-2003), when it was faced with a rebellion led to the east by his former comrades AFDL. A few months later another front in the

Northeast was opened. Various rebel movements trying to overthrow the Kabila regime:

1, The RCD (*Congolese Rally for Democracy - Rassemblement Congolais pour la démocratie*) in the eastern part of the country (with the massive participation of Banyamulenge / Tutsi /) supported by the Government of Rwanda. And

2 the MLC/ALC (*Army/Movement for the Liberation of Congo - Mouvement/Armée de Libération du Congo*), led by Jean Pierre Bemba who control the North. It is supported by the Government of Uganda.

Infighting overflowed Borders: Zimbabwe, Chad and Namibia sent troops to the DRC to lend a hand to the loyalist army, while Rwanda, Uganda and Burundi support rebel movements.

Before the internationalization of the crisis that adversely affected the international law³⁷, the Security Council expressed its concern with regard to stability and peace in the Great Lakes region. He reiterated the need for all States to refrain from interfering in the internal affairs of others, and called for a cease-fire and the immediate withdrawal of foreign forces.

He also proposed a national reconciliation that respects the equality and harmony of all ethnic groups and emphasized the importance of democratic elections. In April 1999, the Secretary General appointed Niassé (Senegal) as his special envoy to control the peace process in DRC³⁸.

II.3. The Cease-fire in Lusaka (10.07.1999)

In accepting the call of the UN July 10, 1999, the DRC, Angola, Namibia, Rwanda, Uganda, Zimbabwe and MLC signed in Lusaka (Zambia) an ceasefire agreement. Burundi, Chad and RCD were absent³⁹. The agreement was to normalize the

³⁷ « Historique de la MONUC », <http://www.monuc.org/Faits.aspx> (10.11.2003.)

³⁸ « Historique de la MONUC », <http://www.monuc.org/Faits.aspx> (10.11.2003.)

³⁹ « Mandat et résolution de la MONUC », http://www.un.org/french/peace/peace/cu_mission/monuc/monucB.htm

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situation on the borders of the DRC and emphasized the following duties:

- control of illegal arms trafficking
- control of armed groups' infiltration
- opening a national dialogue
- ensure the security
- disarmament of militias and armed groups

The agreement also set up a military commission composed of two representatives of each party under the authority of a neutral mediator appointed by the Organisation of African Unity (OAU)⁴⁰. To ensure the whole, agreement provided for a United Nations force in coordination with the OAU.

II.4. The establishment of MONUC

The violence in the DRC had left fear a new genocide in neighboring Rwanda in 1994⁴¹. The UN has called the RCD to sign the Agreement and the Security Council, in its resolution 1258, authorized the deployment of 90 members of military and civilian staff in the Joint Military Commission.

On 1 November 1999, the Secretary-General decided on the deployment of MONUC and 500

military observers. The mandate and instruments of MONUC did not allow an intervention to halt abuses⁴².

Following the event, the UN has extended eight times the mandate of the mission by continually increasing its man force, which grew from 90 troops (in August 1999) to 10,800 (from July 2003 to July 2004⁴³). All the personal is already almost seven times larger than that of ARTEMIS. Both divisions included military and civilian personnel.

The mission is responsible for civil duties - to monitor human rights, humanitarian affairs, information, child protection, political affairs, medical support.

II.5. The political situation between 2000 and 2003

In March 2000, Kofi Annan has appointed Major General Mountaga Diallo (Senegal, Commander of MONUC Forces). In 2001, violence erupted again with the assassination of President Laurent Kabila. His successor was his son, Joseph Kabila, 29 years old.

By resolution 1376 the Council launched the third

⁴⁰ « Mandat et résolution de la MONUC », http://www.un.org/french/peace/peace/cu_mission/monuc/monucB.htm

⁴¹ DUFFIT, Olivier - SÉRÉ, Thomas, « Misson Artemis », in: *Cols bleus – Le magazine de la Marine et de la mer* N. 2672 du 13/09/2003 pp. 6-7.

⁴² DUFFIT, Olivier - SÉRÉ, Thomas, « Misson Artemis », op. cit., pp. 6-7.

⁴³ « Résolutions du Conseil de Sécurité », <http://daccess-ods.un.org/> : (S/RES/1258 of 6 August 1999 - 90 members)

S/RES/1273 of 5 November 1999: until 15 January 2000 (500 observers)

S/RES/1291 of 24 February 2000 : until 31 August 2000 (up to 5537 soldiers)

S/RES/1316 of 23 August 2000 : until 15 October 2000

S/RES/1323 of 13 October 2000 : until 15 December 2000


S/RES/1332 of 14 December 2000 : until 15 June 2001

S/RES/1355 of 15 June 2001 : until 15 June 2002

S/RES/1417 of 14 June 2002 : until 30 June 2003 (up to 8700 personnel)

S/RES/1493 of 28 July 2003 : until 30 July 2004 (up to 10,800 personnel)

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phase of MONUC, devoted to Disarmament, Demobilization, Repatriation, Reintegration and Resettlement (DDRRR) of foreign armed groups. On 25 February 2002 began in Sun City (South Africa) the inter-Congolese negotiations were temporarily suspended following the resumption of Moliro by RCD-Goma⁴⁴.

On 5 October 2002, a certain "*détente*" began with the withdrawal of Rwandan troops from the DRC. MONUC noted the departure of 21,941 soldiers from 21 sites. On December 30, a cease-fire agreement was signed between MLC, RCD-N and RCD-K/ML which the mediator was MONUC (the Gbadolite Agreement).

In the first months of 2003, the situation has

⁴⁴ « Historique de la MONUC », <http://www.monuc.org/Faits.aspx> (10.11.2003.)

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returned disturbing: MONUC observers confirmed serious violations of human rights in the Mambasa region, and shortly after received information on troop movements in the East and North-Eastern DRC⁴⁵. However, after the withdrawal early May of the Ugandan army Ituri, militias fought immediately cities, and atrocities on civilians resumed⁴⁶.

On February 10, foreign ministers of Uganda and the DRC signed in Dar es Salaam (Tanzania) an agreement specifying the timetable for the implementation of the Ituri Pacification Commission and withdrawal of Ugandan troops from Bunia. At the end of the month MONUC has suspended flights to Bunia because of a serious incident, that risky life of Force Commander of MONUC, General Diallo Mountaga: his helicopter suffered a fire in Bunia.

The situation has peaked around Bunia. The population of the Ituri region's 5 million people belonging to 12 different ethnic groups⁴⁷. 500,000 to 600,000 displaced people are scattered throughout the region. Most importantes warring parties are UPC and FIPI:

- **The Union of Congolese Patriots** (*L'Union des Patriotes Congolais*, UPC), especially the militia of the ethnic group Hema (150,000 people, culturally breeders) and Gegere ; led by Thomas Lubanga⁴⁸. Until December 2002, the union was supported by Uganda, but Lubanga turned to Rwanda to seek support, and formed an alliance with the RCD-

Goma⁴⁹. This is why the Union was expelled from Uganda to Bunia in March 2003, but it resumed its positions. It consist of 2000-3000 military since June 2002.

- *The Party for Unity and Safeguarding of the Integrity of Congo* (*Le Parti pour l'Unité et la Sauvegarde de l'Intégrité du Congo*, PUSIC), dissatisfied Hema of the UPC, led by Kahwa Mandro, supported by Uganda. This is a military force of 1,000 people since November 2002. The objective of Khawa was to bring together local people within the **Front for Integration and Peace in Ituri** (*Front pour l'Intégration et la Paix en Ituri*, FIPI), a coalition⁵⁰ created in December 2002, supported by Uganda, so that local people themselves control the mineral resources of the region and avoid interference between the Nande and officials in Kinshasa.

- The Nationalist Front (*Front des nationalistes*, FNI) of the Lendu ethnic group (750,000 people, farmers), is led by Floribert Ngabu Njabu and supported by Rwanda. It received training and a military support from the RCD-ML. The Front has 1,000 military people.

- The Front for Reconciliation, Peace and Integration (*Front pour la Réconciliation, la Paix et l'Intégration*, FRPI), the political party Ngiti, is chaired by dr. Adirodo, it has 400 military people.

The conclusion that these relatively few armed

⁴⁵ « Historique de la MONUC », <http://www.monuc.org/Faits.aspx> (10.11.2003.) : RCD/G against Kanyabayonga, four battalions of the Congolese Armed Forces in Beni, Rwandan troops in Ituri, Ugandan troops towards Mahagi, North of Bunia, soldiers in Rwandan uniform Kivu.

⁴⁶ GRIGNON, François, *The Artemis Operation in the DRC. Lessons Learned for the Future of EU Peacekeeping in Africa*, IGC, Paper presented at International Conference of IEEI entitled "Challenges of Europe-Africa Relations: an Agenda of Priorities" held in Lisbon on 23 and 24 October 2003, p. 2.

⁴⁷ To see all the history of the various combatants in the DRC and their interactions, see PROMÉ, Jean-Louis, « Comprendre la question de l'Ituri : un dossier particulièrement complexe » in : *RAIDS*, juillet 2003, pp. 16-18.

⁴⁸ Lubanga was transferred March 17, 2006 from Kinshasa to The Hague to appear before the ICC.

⁴⁹ ... backed by Rwanda after being excluded by the RCD-ML and MLC from cease-fire discussions in Mambasa, in December 2002. Source : « Ituri: le coin le plus sanglant du Congo -Qui est qui - Groupes politiques armés en Ituri » (mai 2003), Human Right Wach, <http://hrw.org>

⁵⁰ whose members are: PUSIC, FNI and FPDC (Popular Forces of DRC - Alur and Lugbara political party)

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persons including child soldiers are well represented and rivalry between ethnic groups can not be simplified to the conflict between the Hema and Lendu (see PUSIC inside the FIPI). The purpose of Uganda is to keep the chaos, applying the principle of *divide et impera* to justify the need for his presence, in order to exploit the wealth of the region (wood, uranium, the largest gold mines in Africa).

MONUC has deployed military forces in Ituri (411, then 600 people), and April 23 up to 700 Uruguayan peacekeepers. The report of the WEU Assembly stresses *"but these forces have neither the means nor the mandate to enable them to cope with the situation"* and stop UPC⁵¹ supported by Rwanda. The child soldiers under 12 to 16 years old drugged and wearing small caliber guns were patrolling around the city, extorting the population⁵².

It seemed that the mission had a tendency to lose control of events between 7 and 16 May, violent fighting took place between the Hema and Lendu ethnic groups in Bunia. MONUC managed the humanitarian aid by distributing more than 10 tons of food and protecting more than 15,000 people. Meanwhile two military observers of the mission were brutally killed near Bunia, heavy fighting broke out between MONUC HQ and UPC making 14 deaths and 100 injuries among civilians.

At that time, the Secretary-General Kofi Annan has decided to seek the help of members of the UN Security Council, but the United States refused,

contrary to the EU. On 10 May, France has put three conditions for its participation: acting under UN mandate, do not be alone, and obtain the consent of all parties⁵³.

In France, an EU-led operation was more favorable because of his dubious role in the region and in the *Operation Turquoise* in Rwanda in 1994. By the time *Operation Turquoise* was deployed, the Rwandan Patriotic Front took power in Kigali, in July 1994. The Front is still there, and President Paul Kagame has been extensively involved at different levels in the wars of Ituri⁵⁴.

The countries of the region involved in the combat (including the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda) would support officially the French intervention. *"According to a source, the African Cell of the Élysée who proposed to transform this intervention by EU operation"*⁵⁵. Moreover, Kofi Annan has adopted a dual approach to asking for help to both France and the EU.

At European level, the question of Ituri was discussed on 19 May by the ministers of defense at the General Affairs Council⁵⁶. Thus, the Operation ARTEMIS was set up ...

The European Commission has welcomed the intervention but also raised some concerns about the overall priorities of the EU in crisis management matters vis-à-vis the previously EU policy towards the Africa. It recognizes that such operations are sometimes necessary and complementary to other EU instruments. The Council also stressed the primacy of long-term

⁵¹ *L'Union européenne et le maintien de paix en Afrique*, Document A/1880, op. cit., p. 15.

⁵² GRIGNON, François, *The Artemis Operation in the DRC. Lessons Learned for the Future of EU Peacekeeping in Africa*, op. cit., p. 2.

⁵³ TARDY, Thierry, «L'Union européenne, nouvel acteur du maintien de la paix : le cas d'Artemis en République démocratique du Congo» in : COULON, Jocelyn (dir.), *Guide du maintien de la paix 2005*, Athéna-CEPES, Montréal, 2005., (Manuscrite) p. 5.

⁵⁴ TARDY, Thierry, «L'Union européenne, nouvel acteur du maintien de la paix : le cas d'Artemis en République démocratique du Congo», op. cit., p. 12.

⁵⁵ GRIGNON, François, „The Artemis Operation in the DRC. Lessons Learned for the Future of EU Peacekeeping in Africa”, op. cit., pp. 2-3.

⁵⁶ TARDY Thierry, «L'Union européenne, nouvel acteur du maintien de la paix : le cas d'Artemis en République démocratique du Congo» op. cit., p. 5.

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instruments with a view to sustainable stabilization⁵⁷.

As for NATO (and especially the US), it has neither welcomed an autonomous EU operation, nor wished not support such an operation because of these priorities in the Balkans and Afghanistan. But the well-established consensus is the consideration of EU actions by EU states in areas where NATO has no strategic interest⁵⁸.

And still recall the rivalry between France and the US in the DRC, around President Kabila: a series of such disagreements in Africa helps us understand why Americans are not looking too much to help their French ally in NATO.

Within NATO, there was no formal debate on possible intervention in the DRC. Indeed the EU has committed itself rapidly, and the Director General of the General Secretariat of the Council of the European Union, Robert Cooper, said the DSG (NATO Deputy Secretary General) with a letter.

In this case, the problem is the principle of "*first refusal*", supported by NATO, that the EU-NATO relationship is interpreted in the following way: The EU is not allowed to charge from an external operation before NATO expresses its commitment not (indifference) above. (All of the Alliance "*is not involved*"). Cooper's letter was a sign to NATO and the European Union not share this principle and would not reach the "blessing" of the Atlantic Alliance⁵⁹.

The British were fairly good for an operation despite disagreements within NATO. Previous discussions with the French on a possible EU action in Sudan's pushed it. But they would have preferred to start an operation under *Berlin Plus*.

London was always a big supporter of the *Berlin Plus Agreement* (2002) and began against the establishment of autonomous structures C2 (*command & control*) of the EU. With English using the basis of Entebbe Uganda became possible. As we have treated more forward, the French networks long fought against Uganda "Anglo-Saxon" of President Museveni Yorewi.

Thanks to English, using the base in Entebbe Uganda became possible. As we have treated more forward, the French networks long fought against the "Anglo-Saxon" Uganda of President Yorewi Museveni.

For Germans, Africa seems remote and dangerous. But when France and the UK have decided to intervene, Chancellor Schröder and Foreign Minister Joschka Fischer saw the need not stay away⁶⁰. Moreover, the Germans and the Italians (compared to NATO) were not against an autonomous EU operation⁶¹.

⁵⁷ FARIA Fernanda, *La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne – Le rôle de l'Union européenne*, op. cit. pp. 45-46.

⁵⁸ FARIA Fernanda, *La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne – Le rôle de l'Union européenne*, op. cit. pp. 57-58.

⁵⁹ Author interview at SHAPE

⁶⁰ THARDY, Thierry, «L'Union européenne, nouvel acteur du maintien de la paix : le cas d'Artemis en République démocratique du Congo », op. cit., p. 12.

⁶¹ Author interview at SHAPE

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COMPOSITION DE L'OPÉRATION ARTEMIS

PAYS DE L'UE	CONTRIBUTION	DÉPLOIEMENT
FRANCE (NATION-CADRE)	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - FORCES SPÉCIALES (ENTRE 60 ET 100 HOMMES) - UNITÉS D'INFANTERIE ET DU GÉNIE - UNITÉS DE SOUTIEN LOGISTIQUE - AUTRES UNITÉS - 4 MIRAGE F1 CR (RENSEIGNEMENT ET PROTECTION AÉRIENNE) - 5 MIRAGE 2000D ET 3 MIRAGE F1 CT (STATIONNÉS AU TCHAD ; PROTECTION AÉRIENNE) - ÉTATS-MAJORS DE NIVEAUX STRATÉGIQUE (OHQ) ET OPÉRATIONNEL (FHQ) ENVIRON 1 750 PERSONNELS AU TOTAL, DONT 1 200 À BUNIA <i>(1659 PERSONNES SELON LES SOURCES DU SÉNAT)</i> <i>(1785 PERSONNES SELON LES SOURCES DU CMUE)</i>	PARIS / ENTEBBE (OUGANDA) / BUNIA (RDC)
ROYAUME-UNI	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - DÉTACHEMENT DU GÉNIE (70 « ROYAL ENGINEERS ») - MOYENS DE TRANSPORT - PERSONNEL D'ÉTAT-MAJOR UNE CENTAINE DE PERSONNELS AU TOTAL <i>(111 PERSONNES SELON LES SOURCES DU CMUE)</i>	PARIS / ENTEBBE / BUNIA
SUÈDE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - FORCES SPÉCIALES (ENVIRON 80 HOMMES) - PERSONNEL D'ÉTAT-MAJOR <i>(81 PERSONNES SELON LES SOURCES DU CMUE)</i>	PARIS / ENTEBBE / BUNIA
ALLEMAGNE	350 HOMMES AUTORISÉS PAR LE BUNDESTAG MAIS EN PRATIQUE BEAUCOUP MOINS <ul style="list-style-type: none"> - UNITÉ MÉDICALE D'ENVIRON 35 PERSONNES - 2 OFFICIERS À L'ÉTAT-MAJOR À PARIS <i>(7 PERSONNES SELON LES SOURCES DU CMUE)</i>	PARIS / ENTEBBE
BELGIQUE	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - TRANSPORT STRATÉGIQUE ET TACTIQUE - SOUTIEN LOGISTIQUE - UNITÉ MÉDICALE - PERSONNEL D'ÉTAT-MAJOR ENVIRON 65 PERSONNELS AU TOTAL <i>(82 PERSONNES SELON LES SOURCES DU CMUE)</i>	PARIS / ENTEBBE
AUTRICHE / GRÈCE / ESPAGNE / IRLANDE / ITALIE / PAYS-BAS / PORTUGAL	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> - PERSONNEL D'ÉTAT-MAJOR <i>(3 / 7 / 1 / 5 / 1 / 1 / 2 PERSONNES SELON LES SOURCES DU CMUE)</i>	PARIS ET/OU ENTEBBE
ETATS TIERS		
AFRIQUE DU SUD	22 HOMMES ET 2 HÉLICOPTÈRES DE TRANSPORT	ENTEBBE / BUNIA
BRÉSIL	50 HOMMES AVIONS DE TRANSPORT <i>(43 PERSONNES SELON LES SOURCES DU CMUE)</i>	ENTEBBE / BUNIA
CANADA	2 AVIONS DE TRANSPORT AVEC ENTRE 30 ET 50 PERSONNELS	ENTEBBE / BUNIA
HONGRIE / CHYPRE	1-1 PERSONNE	PARIS
SECRÉTARIAT UE	4 PERSONNES	PARIS

Source : TARDY Thierry, «L'Union européenne, nouvel acteur du maintien de la paix : le cas d'Artemis en République démocratique du Congo » in : COULON, Jocelyn (dir.), *Guide du maintien de la paix 2005*, Athéna-CEPES, Montréal, 2005., (Manuscrite) et ARTEMIS General briefing (EUMC/CMUE)

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III. Operation ARTEMIS: Effective crisis management or military training?

III.1. The launch of the operation; legal frameworks

The European Union has launched the military operation ARTEMIS in Bunia, town in north-eastern DRC, in accordance with Resolution 1484 of the UN Security Council and the EU Joint Action of June 5 2003. The operation was formally conducted until 1 September 2003⁶².

What does the Council Joint Action (2003/423/CFSP) mean? The operation must be placed within a legal framework established by the Treaty on European Union, in particular Article 17, paragraph 2, and Article 25. The EU has decided to provide a temporary stabilization force in the Ituri, in authorization of resolution 1484.

According to the third paragraph: *"The Council authorized the Political and Security Committee (PSC) to take the relevant decisions concerning the political control and strategic direction of the operation."* The next paragraph states abstaining from Denmark, Article first and second reinforcing the approval of the Operation Plan and the authorization message.

The military operation was officially launched on 12 June 2003 - the day of signing of the decision. As for the command, Article 4 directs that it *"is authorized with immediate effect to release the activation order (ACTORD) to execute the deployment of forces, prior to transfer of authority following their arrival at the theater, and start execution of the mission"*⁶³.

A few days later, in the Conclusion of the Presidency in Thessaloniki on 19 and 20 June 2003, the operation will be reaffirmed in Title VIII / External Relations, CFSP and ESDP - EU Security Strategy. In ESDP, Article 58 says that *"the EU's operational capacity has been strengthened by the launch of three ESDP operation, EUPM in Bosnia-Herzegovina, CONCORDIA in FYROM and ARTEMIS in Bunia, DRC"* and the operations EUPM and ARTEMIS need to cooperate closely with the United Nations (Article 59)⁶⁴.

So the European military force is obliged to act in close cooperation with MONUC. The two main goals of this cooperation are the stabilization of the security conditions and improving the humanitarian situation in Bunia.

But the Multinational Interim Force in Bunia is responsible for additional duties in a limited area in the city and airport of Bunia: it is responsible for the protection of the airport and displaced persons in the camps in Bunia; if the situation requires, it helps to ensure the safety of the civilian population, UN personnel and humanitarian organizations present in Bunia⁶⁵. About 1800 soldiers are part of the Interim Emergency Multinational Force in Bunia, the base-support joint mission (BSVIA, *base-soutien à vocation interarmées*) is in Entebbe.

But what is the *specificity of this action* is not reflected at first glance in official EU documents? To answer this, we must mention the debates of the Senate of the French Republic around the ARTEMIS financial report compared to a previous operation:

"No doubt the Union has already assumed a first military operation, "Operation Concordia" an operation in Macedonia, which consisted of a

⁶² Opération militaire de l'Union européenne en République Démocratique du Congo (RDC) <http://ue.eu.int/pesd/congo/index.asp?lang=FR> (10.11.2003.)

⁶³ Décision 2003/432/PESC du Conseil, du 12 juin 2003, concernant le lancement de l'opération militaire de l'Union européenne en République Démocratique du Congo

⁶⁴ Presidency Conclusions – Thessaloniki European Council, 19 and 20 June 2003, p.18.

⁶⁵ Opération ARTEMIS en République Démocratique du Congo (RDC) <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/artemis.htm> (10.11.2003.)

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succession of NATO, but this first operation was done using NATO assets and capabilities. In addition, this operation took place on European territory."

The double innovation is an EU military operation outside Europe and without means (and thereby guardianship) of NATO. The control of this operation seeks to ensure full transparency between the EU and NATO⁶⁶.

France played the role of "lead nation" (*nation cadre*). General Neveux was appointed commander of the EU operation, based in Paris. Brigadier Thonier was appointed commander of the force. The general Neveux, who owns several orders of merit, was previously (in 2002) Deputy Chief of General Staff of joint force and training, then head (at the CENTCOM) of the French mission for Operation "Enduring Freedom". And in 2003 he was second in command of EMIA-FE, he assured the conception and conduct of multinational exercises, particularly in Africa, which France participated.

General Thonier participated in several french operations in Lebanon, Iraq and the former Yugoslavia. He was the leader of the third office in the upper Command of the Armed Forces in New Caledonia (1992-1994) and Land Forces Commander of Land Forces Command in Djibouti (1999-2001). Between 2002-2003 he was Deputy General Staff Force Nr. 1.

III.2. The Operation BLACK MAMBA⁶⁷

On 20 May 2003 a French military reconnaissance mission arrived in Kinshasa where it would go to Ituri (in Bunia, on 6 June) to assess the needs of a deployment of an international UN emergency force⁶⁸.

The authorization of the deployment of this force, to the request of Kofi Annan, was endorsed on May 16 by the UN Security Council. The group of 12 men of the reconnaissance mission belonged to the French Marines, and was composed mainly of logisticians who will evaluate the technical constraints of the deployment⁶⁹.

On 5 June 2003, before the delivery by air of French troops, French special forces, as part of the mission MAMBA NOIR (Black mamba), seeped into the wild to collect all the necessary information to the deployment of the main forces. This mission was entrusted with the technical and safety conditions in favor of conventional forces ARTEMIS, so it was an autonomous operation under the operational command of General commander (COS). It was an action of marine commandos from Arta in the Republic of Djibouti⁷⁰.

MAMBA "took place within the framework of the ESDP (Africa Express 2003)⁷¹)," but the categorization of this mission is still unclear: There are those who consider MAMBA as a French preparatory operation (in the EU context) which preceded the ARTEMIS, and the other by which MAMBA even cover the French participation

⁶⁶ Budget Communautaire - Communication de M. Hubert Haenel sur une action commune relative à l'opération militaire de l'Union européenne en République démocratique du Congo, www.sénat.fr, (23.05.2004.)

⁶⁷ Mamba is a very dangerous snake in the region

⁶⁸ LINDSTROM Gustav, *Enter the EU Battlesgroup*, Paris, Chaillot Paper Nr. 97, 02/2007, p. 11.

⁶⁹ Arrivée d'une mission de reconnaissance militaire française en RDC, 21/05/2003 (Xinhua)

⁷⁰ DUFFIT, Olivier - SÉRÉ, Thomas, « Misson Artemis », op. cit., p. 7.

⁷¹ BAGAYOKO, Niagalé, *L'opération Artémis, un tournant pour la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense ?*, in: Afrique contemporaine - Printemps 2004, p. 102.

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throughout the ARTEMIS operation.

The Headquarters of Forces (FHQ) Mamba was also in Uganda and ARTEMIS was planned on this current operation⁷². Planning MAMBA operation was conducted by the Center of Planning and Conduct of Operations (CPCO) of the French Ministry of Defense in Paris⁷³.

The special forces of MAMBA were deep intelligence, lighting and guidance for possible air strikes. France had five Mirage 2000-D positioned in Africa and responsible for air support to ground forces and aircraft KC-135 for their refueling⁷⁴. The ALT2 the French Naval Aviation have worked in close collaboration with the pilots of Mirage FI CR (observation aircraft) to support ground and aerial reconnaissance (RESCO), and the detachment to combat SAR (*CSAR - Combat Search and Rescue* : RESCO in French)⁷⁵.

The operation MAMBA has regained Bunia, on 12 and 16 June 2003, and it became ARTEMIS peace keeping mission conducted under Article 14 of the TEU⁷⁶. CPCO officers joined officers from other Member States (see OHQ structure below). The OHQ was located in the center of CCPO in Paris, but in separate rooms⁷⁷. On June 18, 400 soldiers were already in Bunia and another 500 in Entebbe. July 6, all military forces were deployed⁷⁸.

The French element of MONUC consisted of 9 persons in 2005 (6 military observers and a

contingent of 3 people) and we assume that even in 2003, this number did not exceed 10. It is unlikely (but not excluded) that the french elements were in contact with those of MAMBA.

III.3. The Operational Chain of command

The duality between the French capacity of command and those of the EU is very characteristic and can make conclusions for the future. There are two questions: was it a genuine EU operation under the command ("*guardianship*") of France, or rather a French operation in the EU framework? As we have seen, France chose a clean operation codenamed "Mamba"⁷⁹, as other sources: "Black Mamba".

The organization of the command of the operation reveals much about the nature of the operation. There are four different levels of action: political-military, strategic, operational, tactical level.

III.3.1. The politico-military level

This is the level of the **European Union in Brussels**, which is the head of the operation. The PSC (COPS in French) exercises political control and strategic direction of the operation under the responsibility of the Council. The Council approved the Operation Plan (OPLAN) and decided to launch the operation. It authorized the PSC under Article 25 of the EU Treaty. This authorization includes the modification of the OPLAN, the Command Series (*Chain of*

⁷² Author interview at EUMC.

⁷³ BAGAYOKO, Niagalé, *L'opération Artémis, un tournant pour la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense ?*, op. cit., p. 106.

⁷⁴ DUFFIT, Olivier - SÉRÉ, Thomas, « Misson Artemis », op. cit., p. 7.

⁷⁵ DUFFIT, Olivier - SÉRÉ, Thomas, « Misson Artemis », op. cit., p. 6.

⁷⁶ *L'Union européenne et le maintien de paix en Afrique*, Document A/1880, op. cit., p. 15.

⁷⁷ THARDY Thierry, «L'Union européenne, nouvel acteur du maintien de la paix : le cas d'Artemis en République démocratique du Congo », op. cit., p. 6.

⁷⁸ FARIA Fernanda, *La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne – Le rôle de l'Union européenne*, op. cit., p. 49.

⁷⁹ BAPTISTE, Colonel Christian, « Les ministres de l'Union européenne entérinent l'accord sur une force commune en R.D.C. » Kinshasa, (06.06.2003), <http://www.digitalcongo.net/>


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OPERATION
ARTEMIS

EU CONFIDENTIAL - RELEASABLE TO NON EU/CN



AIR ASSETS



OPERATION
ARTEMIS

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OPERATION ARTEMIS Operational Reserve (OPRES)



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Command) and ROE (*Rules of Engagement*). Decision-making authority assists with the SG/HR.

The PSC is obliged to inform the Council, receives regularly reports of the Military Staff of the EU (EUMS) who chairs the EU Military Committee (EUMC). The PSC regularly invite the Operation Commander to a joint meeting⁸⁰.


The EUMC has monitored and supervised the execution of the military operation, it also received reports of the General Staff of the EU and regularly invite the Operation Commander to a joint meeting. The EUMC is composed of the Chiefs of the Defence Staff (CEMA in French) of the Member States represented in Brussels at the Council Secretariat, through their Military Representatives (MILREP). Its president, General Gustav Hägglund, served as the main point of contact with the Operation Commander. Finally, the EUMC has learned from the experience gained at the end of the operation⁸¹. This is the EUMC which had the primary contact with the EUMS⁸².

The EUMS has performed the tasks entrusted to it by the EUMC and provided military expertise. He has been assisted during the strategic planning phase by the Situation Centre (SitCen), responsible for providing analysis and information on the basis of information provided to it by the Member States and the General Directorate E (especially in its womb by the Sub-Directorate VIII which deals with defense issues)⁸³.

From DG E VIII, three administrator has been charged by the ESDP operations. One of them was

deployed OQG as a political adviser OPCOM (Operation Commander). According to the Council's report, a larger team would have been helpful⁸⁴.

Organigramme O.H.Q ARTEMIS



General Neveux held office under the political control of the ambassadors, members of the PSC. According to a European diplomat, "*is that the PSC will ensure political control and strategic direction of the operation*" and the Committee will not have to go back to the Council (ministerial level) to make decisions⁸⁵.

In short, at the European level, no strategic or military option was developed. Strategic planning at this level did not affect the launch of the military leadership (*IMD - Initiating Military Directive*) at the OPCOM. It was at this point that the true "European" nature of the operation must question: This means that the pattern described above (*IMD > OPCOM > CONOPS / Oplan*,) was modified in practice : Oplan was already developed by the

⁸⁰ Council Joint Action, 2003/423/CFSP, June 5, 2003.

⁸¹ BAGAYOKO, Niagalé, *L'opération Artémis, un tournant pour la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense ?*, op. cit., p. 109.

⁸² Council Joint Action, 2003/423/CFSP, June 5, 2003., op. cit., articles 6-8.

⁸³ BAGAYOKO, Niagalé, *L'opération Artémis, un tournant pour la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense ?*, op. cit., p. 109.

⁸⁴ *Political, political-military and institutional lessons identified from Operation ARTEMIS*, Brussels 20/01/2004, Council of the EU, DG E VIII 5213/04, 1 A Rapid reponse, p. 18.

⁸⁵ BAPTISTE, Colonel Christian, « Les ministres de l'Union européenne entérinent l'accord sur une force commune en R.D.C. » op. cit.

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
French, in advance (and linked to the operation MAMBA) before the IMD and any EU decision-making has begun to start⁸⁶.

In addition, the scenario of a possible evacuation of the forces deployed in an unexpected case (even if there was a French scenario) was fully ignored before the allies at the EUMC⁸⁷. At European level, the nations have not provided a OPRES (operating reserve). For cons, the Committee's internal documents contain some information about the possible projection of the French forces (OPRES) if needed⁸⁸:

- 2 infantry companies in Gabon : 30 hours - "National Technical Means" (NTM) - 2.5 days
- 1 infantry company in Chad: 3 days MTN
- 1 infantry company in Djibouti: 4 days MTN

III.3.2. The strategic level⁸⁹

The strategic level in **Paris** seems to be the true center of the operation: the document of the French Ministry of Defense is already reporter, he begins by introducing the OHQ (*Operation*



⁸⁶ Author interview at EUMC. See also *Political, political-military and institutional lessons identified from Operation ARTEMIS*, Brussels 20/01/2004, Council of the EU, DG E VIII 5213/04, 1 A Rapid response, p. 4.


⁸⁷ Author interview at EUMC.

⁸⁸ General Briefing of EUFOR ARTEMIS (CMUE/EUMC), Power point

⁸⁹ « Opération ARTEMIS en République Démocratique du Congo (RDC) », op. cit.

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Headquarters). The Operation Commander (*Op Cdr*; *COPER in French*) is Major General Bruno Neveux, which the OHQ is subject. General directs the action of the island Saint-Germain. The OHQ has about 80 soldiers from the three armies which 60% come from the framework nation and 40% of other EU member states. (The OHQ should also include members of the EU Council Secretariat⁹⁰.) The working language was English.



The OHQ has the following organs: COPER; Director of Operation and his deputy; Liaison Officers of the EU Military Staff (the General Staff of the EU) at OHQ, and the EU Military Staff OHQ; the particular Staff and policy, legal and communication advisors. Multinational Staff is organized conventionally way in offices (J1 to J9) specialized areas, including three commanders not part of the framework nation:


- (C) Personal J1 - (Hungarian command)
- (C) J2 Information (EN)
- (C) J3 (FR)
- (C) J4 Logistics / Movement (B)
- (C) J5 Plans - (EN)
- (C) J6 SIC (information and communication systems)

- (C) J7 Training - (IT)
- (C) J8 Budget / Finance (FR)
- (C) J9 ACM ("civil-military" missions, humanitarian actions, aid to the population, reconstruction of public infrastructure, transport and protection of minorities, etc.) - (SW)

The operation of the office was not always as usual: Normally J1 Office (Personnel) is responsible for coordinating the transport of injured and deaths, procurement and regular changing of quotas on site. But the office was forced to deal with the convening of delegates of national staffs (!) and this spot does not prove easy as a series of repeated calls proved it⁹¹.

III.3.3. The operational level

At the theater level in Entebbe (Uganda - chosen by France) was installed the FHQ (*Force Headquarters*) or BSVIA (*Joint intended to support*



base, in French : base de soutien à vocation interarmées) made up of 650 people⁹². General Thonier command to the multinational force (*Force*

⁹⁰ Press Release - Adoption by the Council of the Joint Action on the European Union military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) <http://ue.eu.int>, (24.04.2006.)

⁹¹ A concrete example: The arrival in Brussels (to EUMS) of one of the representatives of national Military Staff had been postponed several times due to the vaccination (sic!) of that person. Finally his arrival was scheduled for 1 September : to the end date of the operation ... Source: Author interview at EUMC.

⁹² FARIA Fernanda, *La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne – Le rôle de l'Union européenne*, op. cit., p. 51.


The military authorities decided to apply the same strategy as in Afghanistan last year, where the capital of neighboring Tajikistan, Dushanbe, was the basis for air support. As in Kabul, no direct airlift to Bunia town was only possible because of poor infrastructure.

Engaged units are installed directly in Entebbe (Uganda) in Bunia (DRC) and N'Djamena (Chad):

- BSVIA (Joint Support Base) commanded by Colonel French Koehl was presented at *Entebbe* airport. 100 people were deployed in Kampala replacement basis of Entebbe, where applicable⁹⁵.

- The French GTO (Operation Transport Group) or GTIAM (Groupement tactique interarmés multinational - Multinational Joint Battle Group) has several medium tactical air transport type C-130 Hercules and Transall C-160 (the EU has 140 + 150 aircraft) of other African bases (Chad)⁹⁶ to ensure an air bridge to the elements and the force deployed in Bunia.

- The **1,100 members** (of infantry, light armored vehicles, means of support and engineering) of GTIAM are deployed in Bunia. A French and Swedish "special forces group", and a French "battle group " which brought together most of the infantry and



⁹⁶ FARIA Fernanda, *La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne – Le rôle de l'Union européenne*, op. cit., p. 51.

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armored force units were the two components of the ground forces⁹⁷. About 85% of soldiers were French, with 70 Swedish and 100 British⁹⁸. They were supported by the South African Oryx helicopters, 1 Belgian medical team, 1 Belgian radio team and one team of British specialists responsible for maintenance of the facilities of the airfield. The French Mirage F1 and 2000 were responsible for the recognition and ground strikes⁹⁹.

- (A reserve of 1,000 French soldiers stationed in other countries in Africa, ultimately not used, has been scheduled if needed¹⁰⁰.)

Although the number of participants is set at 1,800 people (this number is more ambitious than the 350 soldiers deployed of Mission CONCORDIA in Macedonia, but at roughly one seventh of MONUC personnel) and any (public) official documents EU refutes it, press reviews mention personal "between 1200 and 1800"¹⁰¹.

Because of financial problems, the EU was forced

to reduce the troops. As for the framework nation, the French would have particularly favored a broad commitment to Poland¹⁰², but at the time the Poles supported rather the war against terrorism of the United States. France also asked Hungary for a reserve battalion that *J1 Office* forwarded to the Ministry of Defense of Hungary who finally refused¹⁰³.

The status of the "EU Force" (in French : « force de l'UE », FUE) and the staff of the FUE is governed by the Agreement between the European Union and the Democratic Republic of Congo and by the Agreement between the European Union and the Republic Uganda on the status of forces under the leadership of the European Union, as well as their implementation¹⁰⁴.

In the ARTEMIS' structure, the French Navy was represented by a detachment of commandos, an Atlantic crew of the flotilla 21F and his technical team, led by the commander of the 23F, the ALT2 of Naval Aviation (the "*penguins of Peace*") positioned at Entebbe airport, the 3th RIMA unit,

⁹⁷ Ordre de mission de l'opération ARTEMIS, exposé du Général Thonier lors de la journée d'étude de la Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS) tenue à Paris le 14 janvier 2004, cited by *L'Union européenne et le maintien de paix en Afrique*, Document A/1880, op. cit., p. 16.

⁹⁸ FARIA Fernanda, *La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne – Le rôle de l'Union européenne*, op. cit., p. 51.

⁹⁹ Ordre de mission de l'opération ARTEMIS, exposé du Général Thonier, op. cit., p. 16.

¹⁰⁰ FARIA Fernanda, *La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne – Le rôle de l'Union européenne*, op. cit., p. 51.

¹⁰¹ „The EU mission, which was approved by the UN Security Council at the end of May, is limited to 1,400 troops and is scheduled to end in August, which critics say gives it too little time to achieve results.” Source: EGGLESTON, Roland « Germany: Parliament Agrees To Send Small Military Force To Congo » (06.19.2003)

<http://www.freerepublic.com/>; or „Cette force sous mandat de l'ONU comprendra environ 1.500 hommes dont une majorité de soldats envoyés par la France...” Source: BAPTISTE, Colonel Christian, « Les ministres de l'Union européenne entérinent l'accord sur une force commune en R.D.C. », op. cit.

¹⁰² That is to say, a Polish contingent is among the largest contingents of the operation, or at least, among observers. The Office J1 also contacted several times the Poles to the French request to persuade them, without success. The French have expressed the same wish in fall 2007 on the EUFOR Chad/RCA.

¹⁰³ Author interview at EUMC.

¹⁰⁴ Accord entre l'Union européenne et la République de Chypre relatif à la participation de la République de Chypre à la force de l'Union européenne (FUE) en République démocratique du Congo *Journal officiel* n° L 253 du 07/10/2003 p. 0023 – 0025 22003A1007(01) <http://publications.eu.int/>, Article 3, paragraphe 1.

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air parachute commandos, and the crews of the projection of air power¹⁰⁵. The total French troops was 900 people.

The German military contingent had 350 people. Germany wanted in on the operation especially in the field of transport, with logistical support and had a military hospital aircraft that were stationed in Uganda. The German Defence Minister Peter Struck said the German participation does not include military troops¹⁰⁶. The Greens, especially the foreign minister, Joschka Fischer, has strongly argued for the operation costing Germany 10 million euros¹⁰⁷.

Denmark declared abstention from the operation¹⁰⁸. Or an action can be difficult considered "*common*" part of a "*common*" foreign policy in the case where members can arbitrarily be absent. Contrary to the view of the European Convention, the second pillar thus remains rather intergovernmental and closer to that of a confederation. No state is forced to participate, which facilitates decision making.

III.4. Applied transport capacity

Strategic transport was divided into two parts: to

Entebbe (6200 Km), the EU needed for long-range machines. A military analyst points out that the geographical scope of EU operations is not clear, it depends on what the EU wants to manage an action, as a regional or global player. In the Brussels Declaration on Military Capability Commitment of 20 November 2000, it was decided an operation within 4,000 km of Brussels.

The boundaries of this zone are Central and Eastern Europe (Balkans included), North-West Africa, the Middle East. The Caucasus and Russia are also included. But there are several areas where European forces have acted outside of this radius: the Gulf, East Timor, Sierra Leone, Rwanda and Afghanistan too! "*The radius of 4000 km mean the framework within which the EU should be able to operate without the help of the United States*"¹⁰⁹.

For the realization of the Operation ARTEMIS France has leased large aircraft, mostly Antonov 124, DC-8 and Boeing C-5 Galaxy (including Britain rents 4 from the US). It required forty rotations between France, or French bases in Africa and Entebbe¹¹⁰. Antonov cargo aircraft (able to carry more than 80 tons) were transported 3400 tons of needed goods, including 400 combat vehicles, especially between Nîmes and Entebbe with 40 rotations.

¹⁰⁵ DUFFIT, Olivier - SÉRÉ, Thomas, « Misson Artemis », op. cit., p. 6.

¹⁰⁶ "*We are not going there to fight but to provide noncombat support, (...) There could be an exception if fighting breaks out while our men are evacuating the wounded or other victims. But generally, they will not be there to fight.*" Source: EGGLESTON, Roland « Germany: Parliament Agrees To Send Small Military Force To Congo » ,op ; cit.

¹⁰⁷ REISS, Andreas, *European Union sends troops to Congo - First independent EU military mission*, op. cit., et EGGLESTON, Roland, «Germany : Parliament Agrees To Send Small Military Force To Congo » op. cit.

¹⁰⁸ Council Joint Action 2003/423/CFSP of 5 June 2003 on the European Union military operation in the Democratic Republic of Congo – Official Journal L 143/50 11.06.2003 paragraphe (13)

¹⁰⁹ VLACHOS-DENGLER, Katia, *Getting there: building strategic mobility into ESDP*, Occasional Papers N° 38. November 2002, Institut d'Études de Sécurité, p.13.

¹¹⁰ BAPTISTE, Colonel Christian, « Les ministres de l'Union européenne entérinent l'accord sur une force commune en R.D.C. », op. cit.

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Second, for transport mean distance between Entebbe and Bunia (300 km), about 200 rotations¹¹¹ of tactical transport aircraft C-160 Transall (whose range is 16t/1800 km¹¹²) were necessary¹¹³. In Bunia, *"the airstrip is in such poor condition that it must be repaired after each landing, which (before the work of sappers) limited to three the number of daily round trips between Entebbe and Bunia."* Bunia is about 300 km or 45-minute flight from Entebbe and *"all the support will go by air"*¹¹⁴.

IV.5. The example of Cyprus - The frameworks of acceding countries's participation

In addition to the EU participants (France, Great Britain, Sweden, Germany, and Belgium, the last two by non-military divisions)¹¹⁵, some candidate countries, namely Cyprus, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, and the Slovak Republic rallied to action. In addition to the foreign detachments of Brazil and South Africa and Canada have supported the mission¹¹⁶.

To analyze the contact with the candidate countries, take the example of the Agreement between the EU and the Republic of Cyprus¹¹⁷. Cyprus has accepted the provisions of Council Joint Action 2003/423/ CFSP. Although it was an EU operation after subsection 1 and 4 of Article 4 of the Agreement (about the Chain of Command), all the forces and personnel participating in the FUE (i.e. the candidate countries forces or EU forces) force management is further evidence of

intergovernmental and confederation of the operation.

In addition, its forces remained under the full command and jurisdiction of their national authorities. This fact remains strangely hidden in the official or public documentation of the operation ; it is suggested that this is only a joint operation of a *"coalition of the willing"*.

National authorities shall transfer operational control to the EU Operation Commander. Paragraph 3 provides the same rights and obligations for the Republic of Cyprus and for the Member States, but the EU Operation Commander may at any time request the withdrawal of the contribution of the Republic of Cyprus. (p. 4.) Moreover, *"the Republic of Cyprus designates a Senior Military Representative (SMR) to represent its national contingent in the EUF. ... "* (p. 5.)

Regarding the financial dimension, Cyprus assumes all costs of its participation except those which are the subject of joint funding (Article 6). Any disputes shall be settled by diplomatic means, and parties have the right to denounce the agreement with a notice of one month.

IV.6. Brief History of Operation ARTEMIS¹¹⁸ - an operation of "a single D"

Four days after the decision of the Council, on 9 June 2003, the first French soldiers, after a long 24 hour transit via Dakar and N'Djamena, arrived at

¹¹¹ 526 rotations according to the statement of General Thonier in: *L'Union européenne et le maintien de paix en Afrique*, Document A/1880, op. cit., p. 16.

¹¹² VLACHOS-DENGLER, Katia, *Getting there: building strategic mobility into ESDP*, op. cit., Annexe

¹¹³ See the table on the disposal of transport aircraft in the subchapter III.3.1.

¹¹⁴ BAPTISTE, Colonel Christian, Les ministres..., <http://www.digitalcongo.net/> Kinshasa, 6. June 2003.

¹¹⁵ HAINE, Jean-Yves, *Force structures* <http://www.iss.org> ; It is strange, no (public) official document mentions the list of participants.

¹¹⁶ DUFFIT, Olivier - SÉRÉ, Thomas, « Misson Artemis », op. cit., p. 6.

¹¹⁷ Accord entre l'Union européenne et la République de Chypre relatif à la participation de la République de Chypre à la force de l'Union européenne (FUE) en République démocratique du Congo, op. cit.

¹¹⁸ « Communiqués de presse » sur le site <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/artemis.htm> (21.12.2003.)

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Entebbe airport¹¹⁹. Presumably the authorization of the aerial crossing over Algeria and Lebanon was not granted.

Until June 13, 400 soldiers arrived in Bunia; Belgian and Canadian aircraft were on site¹²⁰. The first clashes took place the following day. Europeans have "*struck hard at the first opportunity*" and answered every provocation or militia attack.

They put an end to the looting and violence in the city and on June 21, they obtained the withdrawal of the UPC who controlled the sector with about 2,500 men¹²¹.

General Neveux went to Entebbe and Bunia from 21 to 23 June and from August 13 to 15 to control elements of ARTEMIS' force. He found the smooth running of the transition process between the elements of the European force and MONUC Task Force 2.

On 27 June 2003, the French defense minister and General Bentégeat, Chief of Staff (ECS) met with the French General Neveux and the OHQ staff in Paris. That day, the EU Presidency notes with satisfaction that there are no visible weapons in Bunia since June 24, 2003. At the same time, the EU condemned the military confrontations in North Kivu, and particularly the offensives by RCD/Goma in violation of the cease-fire. The EU recalled the signing of the Commitment of Bujumbura (19 June 2003) by the government of the RCD, RCD-Goma and RCD-ML¹²².

On 2 July 2003, the EU welcomed the formation of the Transitional Government of National Union in the Democratic Republic of Congo. The EU considered it as a fundamental step in the peace process, which crowns the path indicated by the Inter-Congolese Dialogue and the Sun City and Pretoria Agreements.

The EU "*invited the new Transitional Government to implement the actions necessary to achieve the objectives of the transition period anticipated in the Pretoria agreements of 17 December 2002, including the holding of free and transparent elections at all levels, for the establishment of a democratic constitutional regime and the formation of restructured and integrated national army*"¹²³."

July 8, Bunia has been secured and declared "*unarmed city*" by the European brigade and patrols were conducted beyond the city. On 11 June, the European soldiers have invested a Hema militia camp, considered too close to Bunia¹²⁴. Many of the 200,000 refugees have returned home and economic life was taken¹²⁵.

By cons, European forces have not systematically disarmed the militia, they were content to prevent them from acting in a radius of 10 km around Bunia. This was a political decision and even in December 2005 the international community has not fully solved the problem of disarmament in the region of Ituri¹²⁶. In short, the EU military operation was charged with "*a single D*" for demilitarization, for DDR spots (demilitarization, disarmament, reintegration).

¹¹⁹ DUFFIT, Olivier - SÉRÉ, Thomas, « Misson Artemis », op. cit., p. 6.

¹²⁰ « EU Sends Peace-Keepers To Democratic Republic Of Congo: Code Name "Artemis". » 13.06.2003 <http://www.europaworld.org/>

¹²¹ *L'Union européenne et le maintien de paix en Afrique*, Document A/1880, op. cit., p. 16.

¹²² Commission Pressrom P/03/77 Bruxelles, le 27 juin 11016/03 : "*The EU reiterates its urgent appeal to the governments of the DRC, Rwanda and Uganda to refrain from any actions which could further destabilize the situation in North Kivu. It urges all parties to fully respect the Lusaka, Luanda and Pretoria Agreements as well as the Kampala and Harare disengagement plan. The governments concerned must exert their influence on the armed groups in the East, to urge them also to respect these agreements, to cooperate fully with MONUC and ensure access for humanitarian organizations.*"

¹²³ Déclaration de la Présidence du 2 juillet 2003, P/03/80 11072/03.

¹²⁴ *L'Union européenne et le maintien de paix en Afrique*, Document A/1880, op. cit., p. 16.

¹²⁵ FARIA Fernanda, *La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne – Le rôle de l'Union européenne*, op. cit., p. 52.

¹²⁶ *Le maintien de la paix en Afrique sub-saharienne : une approche concrète*, Document A/1913, op. cit., pp. 25-26.

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On July 10, the PSC officially visited the General Staff of ARTEMIS (OHQ) in Paris; Javier Solana has been assisted by the EU Military Committee in Brussels, whose president is Army General Gustav Hagglund. From July 31 to August 2, the French and Belgian Ministers of Defence visited Entebbe. They moved to Bunia. At the end of the visit Michèle Alliot-Marie said: *"Today we demonstrate in Macedonia with NATO, and especially in Ituri autonomously that the European defense exists."*

September 1, Operation ARTEMIS ended its mission in Bunia. It took place a symbolic ceremony of transfer of responsibility between the General Thonier and General Isberg, acting commander of MONUC's Ituri Brigade.

September 6, 2003 the last soldiers of the Multinational Interim Force left Bunia and were placed under national authority the next day. This transfer of authority to a considerably strengthened MONUC by troops from India, Pakistan, Bangladesh, Nepal and Indonesia, formally marks the end of the operation, and the end of the responsibility the EU.

The return of French personnel from the support base Entebbe was planned until September 25. After the military withdrawal, the EU remains committed to supporting the DRC peace and reconstruction process.

Conclusion & lesson learned - a successful military exercise, an ambiguous crisis management

1, ESDP Evolution - The autonomous EU military operation is a logical phase of a process that began in Paris in 1997, with the Declaration of the WEU Council of Ministers, continued to Saint-Malo in 1998, pursued by the decision on the Helsinki Headline Goal (HHG) and by the Mission CONCORDIA in 2003, again under NATO supervision, in the framework of the ESDP.

The greatest significance of this event is that the EU itself can achieve such an operation. However, it can be regarded rather as a French operation¹²⁷ in close cooperation with EU organizations. It was also a test of the capacity of the latter in practice, even if there is very little information on their activities.

We must not underestimate the effectiveness and importance of this action in the future ESDP, but do not overestimate the effectiveness and importance of this crisis management in the international system.

2, Deployed Capabilities - As for international relations, the ambitions of the European Union and its ability to manage such an operation became widely known. But it was a very risky operation with 1,800 people compared to Afghanistan for example, where 50,000 troops have been deployed. These types of missions rather reinforce the need for *battle groups (GT-1500, groupement tactiques in French)* proposed by the United Kingdom and France during the Franco-British summit of 24 November 2003 (citing the success of the ARTEMIS), that the 60,000 people of HHG. The EU Rapid Reaction Force (RRF) was declared operational in May 2003, although it still lacked a third of the projected enrollment¹²⁸. *"The goal of*

¹²⁷ Military rather share this opinion, because the OHQ was in Paris and not in Brussels. (L'OPÉRATION ARTEMIS EN RDC - Thierry TARDY, 13 décembre 2005, séminaire organisé par C2SD à l'Ecole Militaire)

¹²⁸ FARIA Fernanda, *La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne – Le rôle de l'Union européenne*, op. cit., p. 58.

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
this policy is not currently set up a European army in replacement of the national armies, but to develop capacities to allow the Union to act if joint action is decided. ESDP is thus governed by the principle of voluntary cooperation: the capability commitments are presented by the Member States on a voluntary basis and the participation of all EU-led operations is based on a sovereign decision¹²⁹."

3, Results on the theater - The positive conclusion is that after the operation, the Bunia population increased from 40,000 to 100,000 inhabitants, markets were reopened and a reinforced MONUC contingent was deployed¹³⁰. Bunia, its airport and the refugee camp were secure and disarmed. On 2 September 2003, the European

Union has signed a cooperation program with the DRC (EUR 205 million) over a period of 5 years. Europeans also support the DDR process by a multi-country and multiregional program led by the World Bank¹³¹.

The operation has had a robust mandate, but it was very limited in space and in time. It was the key to success. But the result is ambiguous. According Brigadier General Thonier, ARTEMIS units on site received information on the massacres, measurement of Srebrenica, 5 km from Bunia, but the European forces were neither ready nor authorized to stop the violations¹³².

This reminds us of the inefficiency of UNPROFOR in the former Yugoslavia, but on a European theater. In the Balkans such a massacre



¹²⁹ BAGAYOKO, Niagalé, *L'opération Artémis, un tournant pour la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense ?*, op. cit., p. 105.

¹³⁰ *L'Union européenne et le maintien de paix en Afrique*, Document A/1880, op. cit., p. 4.

¹³¹ FARIA, Fernanda, *La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne – Le rôle de l'Union européenne*, op. cit., p. 54.

¹³² Entretien avec le général de division Bruno Neveux, commandant de l'opération ARTEMIS in : *RAIDS*, octobre 2003, pp. 16-17.

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could not stay long in the shadows. The French soldiers were surprised worried by the fact that they had to fight against the militias of which 60% consisted of child soldiers. Some of their leaders feared a new "Dien Bien Phu": Rwanda could imprison them and they prepared the operation against the heart, at the request of President Chirac and the African Unit at the Elysee¹³³.

And finally, if the transaction received no political mandate, for example, to conduct negotiations with the militia, its deployment was however an indirect stabilizing effect which allowed indirectly the formation, on June 30, the National Transitional Government in Kinshasa¹³⁴.

4, The theater after the operation - Regarding past events after the operation - not, of course, the immediate consequences of the action - the situation is rather disturbing. DRC stabilization proved fragile. The EU condemned the massacres that took place again in Ituri, Monday, October 6, in the village of Katchele. These events demonstrate the persistence of elements opposing the peace process in the DRC, despite progress in recent months. The European Union has confirmed its commitment to end impunity for the perpetrators of these killings and noted the decision of the International Criminal Court to examine the investigations into the events in Ituri¹³⁵.

The EU Council has adopted a decision in January 2004 which strengthens the EU's commitment to a situation "after - ARTEMIS" between the frames of the first two paragraphs:

"(1) The primary responsibility for the prevention, management and resolution of conflicts on the African continent lies with Africans themselves.

(2) The UN Security Council has, under the UN

Charter, the primary responsibility for maintaining peace and international security. "

The paper also focuses on the dialogue between the EU and the Organisation of African Unity (OAU) (8). The EU continues to consider, case by case, the deployment of own operational means for conflict management and crisis prevention in Africa (6). It has done successfully with ARTEMIS, in the province of Ituri in the DRC¹³⁶.

5, The relationship between the EU and the UN - As for the international aspect, the relationship between the UN and the EU strengthens with this operation. Strengthening the UN seems to be very important for the EU, which is understandable on the part of a great power still unable to control its interests through its own institutions, but has (mostly indirectly through its member states) good positions in international organizations.

So the EU intends to become one of the most important executive organization of the United Nations through its emerging army, that gradually will correspond to requirements of crisis management in the twenty-first century. At the highest level of multinational command, but also in accordance with international law. It is also clear that the EU wants to set a good example to expand its moral dominance to the detriment of the United States.

The cooperation has been effective between MONUC and the EU. The scenario gives for the future: the EU secures the area with a rapid, but limited and short intervention, during that a UN mission prepares. But for future missions, it is a competition or complementarity? Instead of strengthening the UN mission (European elements are very "discreet" in such UN missions) an

¹³³ GRIGNON, François, *The Artemis Operation in the DRC. Lessons Learned for the Future of EU Peacekeeping in Africa*, op. cit., p. 3.

¹³⁴ TARDY, Thierry, « L'Union européenne, nouvel acteur du maintien de la paix : le cas d'Artemis en République démocratique du Congo » op. cit., p. 11.

¹³⁵ Commission Pressroom: P/03/127 13526/03 (Presse 301) <http://europa.eu.int/rapid/start/docs>

¹³⁶ Position Commune, 2004/85/PESC du Conseil

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operation led by a regional organization (the EU), unlike the Brahimi Report recommendations, with not truly neutral countries (like France, Belgium) is responsible for a mission that would report to the UN... (and now we ignore the African regional or sub-regional organizations.)

September 24, 2003, in New York, Kofi Annan and Silvio Berlusconi signed a declaration on cooperation between the UN and the EU¹³⁷ on crisis management. The preface mentions successful cooperation in the Balkans and the DRC. It is said that the safety of the world is the main responsibility of the UN Security Council. Article 3 says mutual intention to create a consultative mechanism in the following areas:

- Planning (improved contact between planning units)
- Training (for civilian and military personnel)
- Communication (enhanced cooperation "desk-to-desk" between New York and Brussels)
- Best practice (regularized systematic exchange of information and experiences)

It is obvious but not really "honest" by the US security experts when they consider the most important aspect of the operation the political side, competition with the United States. Embezzlement and violations of the law by the Americans at the time of the second (1991)¹³⁸ and the third Gulf crisis (2003)¹³⁹ do not give them the moral authority to argue against EU¹⁴⁰, although this analysis lack irrelevant on several points: *"It must be clear: the current mission of the EU is not a*

*humanitarian action to guarantee peace and protect the population. The European powers who are conducting this operation have interests in the region. According to a very traditional method the suffering of the civilian population are used to justify this international action. ... In addition they want to send a signal ... (that) the United States is not the only world power. (...) The European adventurism in Congo can only serve to aggravate the conflict between the great powers*¹⁴¹."

6, The "framework nation" concept and planning - The idea of the framework nation (*nation cadre*) or "pilot countries" concept was developed over five years by the Paris Declaration in 1997. The document states that the *"framework concept is in the context of autonomous WEU operations, of which it is a special case and should allow the establishment of a European headquarters within timeframes compatible with the operational requirements, from national or existing multinational resources, especially in extreme emergencies*¹⁴²." At the time, in April 1997, Operation ALBA of the WEU has not yet taken advantage of this opportunity. The concept has been incorporated in the Luxembourg Declaration of the WEU Council of Ministers (22 and 23 November 1999)¹⁴³.

This framework nation concept has led to the rapid response of the EU, especially the political will has not failed: France alone was able to deploy the first troops (June 5, 2003) one week after adoption of resolution 1484 of the UN Security

¹³⁷ Joint Declaration on UN-EU Co-operation in Crisis Management New York, 24 September 2003 12510/03 (Presse 266)

¹³⁸ Falsification of satellite images.

¹³⁹ N New manipulations of satellite photos, and "photocopying" reports by Colin Powell at the Pentagon violating the jurisdiction of the UNMOBIT in Iraq. Source: *Háború Irak ellen ?*, 2003. RESZ – Euroatlanti Estek, www.resz.hu

¹⁴⁰ Especially knowing the case of US torture.

¹⁴¹ REISS, Andreas, *European Union sends troops to Congo - First independent EU military mission*, op. cit.

¹⁴² Déclaration de Paris du Conseil des ministres de l'UEO, 13. mai 1997., Titre V, paragraphe 3,

¹⁴³ « Il peut être utile de recourir plus largement au concept de nation-cadre et au partage des tâches entre les pays afin d'améliorer les capacités opérationnelles. » « Recommandation pour renforcer les capacités européennes pour les opérations de gestion de crise », in : Déclaration de Luxembourg du Conseil des Ministres de l'UEO (les 22 et 23 novembre 1999).

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Council (30 May), while the European 'strategic' headquarters was fully operational since June 16, and 900 troops was on site in two days, (June 18). (Plus the French reconnaissance mission started on May 20) But all the military forces were deployed after 36 days of the resolution (July 6).

This design results in a more flexible and rapid response that respects the progressive development of the establishment as "a 7/14 scenario": the rapid initial deployment of the framework nation (in a week) and the relatively longer consultation mechanism with other European partners for the establishment of a multinational operation (in two weeks)¹⁴⁴.

Planning has followed the same scenario: strategic planning was carried out in 6 days and operational planning in 12¹⁴⁵.

This method of fast planning was crucial *"because the UN were facing the looming threat of another tragedy such as the Srebrenica, since the peacekeepers, poorly equipped and limited in their action (...) had proved unable to prevent violence ..."*¹⁴⁶.

Without this method, the fears of Commission's officials could have achieved: They thought the military point of view, placing the operation under the EU banner give more harm than benefit, because the process of EU decision-making could delay the launch of the owner of the operation¹⁴⁷.

By cons, there are some who believe that *"the French predominance is also likely to question the concept of framework nation"*¹⁴⁸.

It is also remarkable that four years later, in summer 2007, the lessons learned from Operation ARTEMIS are not always applied to the planning of the EUFOR Chad/CAR: Council document stresses that the planning of an operation should start at European level, where at least with the participation of interested Member States¹⁴⁹. In the case of EUFOR Chad/CAR, the applied pattern was the same as that of the ARTEMIS: a previous French planning and, later, the EU decision-making process.

Other problems emerged around the "framework nation" concept consist considerable financial burdens of lead nation, cooperation difficulties with the participating States, and the 'autonomous' management (and thus faster) aspects. Partners remained uninformed or subsequently informed. Thus the key domains are:

- planning (see above)
- information management of the national military intelligence and communication services
- The SOFA (Status of Forces Agreement) between the EU and Uganda was based on a Franco-Ugandan bilateral SOFA already existed, which was signed without consultation with the EU¹⁵⁰.

¹⁴⁴ L'Union européenne et le maintien de paix en Afrique, Assemblée de l'UEO, Document A/1880, op. cit., p. 17.

¹⁴⁵ HEBRARD, VA (French Defence Staff Director of Operations), *Lessons Learned from a recent MN Operation : Lead / Framework Nation Perspective* (Powerpoint)

¹⁴⁶ *Le maintien de la paix en Afrique sub-saharienne : une approche concrète*, Document A/1913, op. cit., p. 25.

¹⁴⁷ FARIA, Fernanda, *La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne – Le rôle de l'Union européenne*, op. cit., p. 50.

¹⁴⁸ TARDY, Thierry, *L'Union européenne en Afrique : Un partenaire stratégique dans les opérations de paix* (Rapport du séminaire GCSP et l'International Peace Academy, 7 juillet 2006.) p. 13.

¹⁴⁹ *Political, political-military and institutional lessons identified from Operation ARTEMIS*, Brussels 20/01/2004, Council of the EU, DG E VIII 5213/04, 1 A Rapid reponse, p. 4., p. 21. „Framework Nations should welcome EU planning assistance teams to help convert national military planning into EU planning that is coherent with the overall EU objectives and other employed measures.”; et entretien de l'auteur auprès du CMUE.

¹⁵⁰ *Political, political-military and institutional lessons identified from Operation ARTEMIS*, op. cit., p. 16.

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- The costs of the operation was financed by the framework nation (see below).

7, Gaps, problems, successes - Multinationalisation of the military staffs was sometimes a bit "chaotic". Only Sweden, the UK, South Africa and Belgium, through their medical teams, engaged terrestrial components. By cons, multinationalization of tactical and strategic air transport has not had the slightest flaw. The Canadian, South African and Brazilian units were integrated within the ARTEMIS force¹⁵¹.

We need to develop more homogeneous European communication capabilities, because the lack of interoperability of information systems resulted recourse to the presence of liaison officers and traditional telephony¹⁵².

Moreover, *"forces coming from other country than France were (in relative terms) much more numerous in command centers than in the field. In fact, none of the other contributors have offered to send large contingents, and it is not certain that France would have accepted such an item, which would, in all probability, have complicated coordination on the ground, and could weakening the strong position taken by France against the UPC's escalation strategy..."* This means that the command structures were rather multinational, and the forces on the theater more homogeneous.

The framework nation concept takes up the role

of a European headquarters in Tervuren that arouses less enthusiasm and interest. So without a fixed location, the HQ would settle in the framework nation, that would allay the fears of those who are against creating a European HQ¹⁵³.

8, Benefits compared to the Berlin Plus frame - Strategic planning was carried out by the EUMS and operational planning by France. Unlike the long delays of planning during Operation CONCORDIA, under Berlin Plus Agreement, with a parallel command structure (EU/NATO) decision-making procedures in politico-military level (PSC-EUMC relations) can allow the adoption of quick decisions¹⁵⁴, although the small size of the EUMS result a real weakness of EU operational planning.

Some have proposed the establishment of an autonomous European Military Planning Unit within the EU Military Staff¹⁵⁵. (Without completely filled this gap, since 2005, the EU was responsible for sending planning expert for the mission of the African Union in Darfur, whose feasibility left some question marks.

9, Strategic Airlift - Gaps in airlift became visible again: The commissioning of the Airbus A400M, routing would be directly in Bunia, without a stop in Entebbe¹⁵⁶. (We're not 100% sure that by the application of the A400M, the strategy could overlook the airlift between Entebbe and Bunia mainly because of infrastructure poverty locally and grouping method different elements¹⁵⁷.) The problem is that the payload of the Airbus is 4

¹⁵¹ *L'Union européenne et le maintien de paix en Afrique*, Document A/1880, op. cit., p. 17.

¹⁵² Ordre de mission de l'opération ARTEMIS, exposé du Général Thonier lors de la journée d'étude de la Fondation pour la recherche stratégique (FRS) tenue à Paris le 14 janvier 2004, cité par *L'Union européenne et le maintien de paix en Afrique*, Document A/1880, op. cit., p. 18.,

¹⁵³ FARIA, Fernanda, *La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne – Le rôle de l'Union européenne*, op. cit., p. 51. et p. 59. (Entretien au Secrétariat général de Conseil)

¹⁵⁴ BAGAYOKO, Niagalé, *L'opération Artémis, un tournant pour la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense ?*, op. cit., pp. 109-110.

¹⁵⁵ FARIA, Fernanda, *La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne – Le rôle de l'Union européenne*, op. cit., pp. 59-60.

¹⁵⁶ *L'Union européenne et le maintien de paix en Afrique*, Document A/1880, op. cit., p. 18.

¹⁵⁷ Our interview at the EUMC reinforces these doubts: Strategic / tactic planning relies on a airbase, relatively close to the theater without the threat of attack : mostly civilian cargo aircraft (never negligible) does not bear the risk of an attack above the territory of the conflict. The lack of infrastructure on site is decisive. The tire of the first C-130 of Belgium was punctured at the first landing in Bunia.

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times less (20 tonnes) than the Antonov (80 tons). Thus the route between Entebbe and Paris would be multiplied by 4 (160 X rotations 6200 km) or 200 rotations (X300km) between Entebbe and Bunia could be reduced to 160.

10, Liability and feasibility - Only France, the United Kingdom and possibly Germany are able to master such an operation, deployed forces and provide air cover and reconnaissance. But a number of capability shortfalls were identified: deficiencies in collecting and sharing strategic, operational or policy intelligence have been identified, the obsolescence of certain equipment was denounced¹⁵⁸.

There is no question that France could have acted alone, without the help of its partners. But despite the difficulties initiated within the multinational HQ, the "European helmet" and the "coalition" has facilitated the sharing of responsibility for such an operation¹⁵⁹.

11, Costs - The costs of the first ESDP operations have steadily increased: for CONCORDIA 2 millions €, for ARTEMIS 46m €, (and for ALTHEA 80m €) only for France. In 2003, it is the states that fund their troops, and not the union. Furthermore, ARTEMIS was an exception, France has also supported the transportation costs, and the costs of the ARTEMIS Force's Command Center¹⁶⁰. The possibility of the lack of funding of the ESDP (eg Denmark) challenges the cohesion policy and the intergovernmental nature of the CFSP. Common funds should be increased to help finance such operations like ARTEMIS. One of the reasons for non-use of 20,000 troops of European RIF (*Rapid Intervention Force*) could be the deficiency of sufficient financial basis.

12, Should better analyze and take advantage of the conclusions, lessons learned from this

operation and of the Operation CONCORDIA for example. Because it does not seem that benefit analyzes and reports during the planning of new EU operations and missions (eg EUFOR Chad/RCA)¹⁶¹. We add that the development of a possible evacuation scenario (or the sharing of information with European partners in this area) is also an Achilles heel of the mission.

13, Final Conclusion - The first EU operations in the relationship of NATO and EU forces are more like the operations of a second power. In the nineteenth century, the Kingdom of Piedmont-Sardinia followed a similar diplomacy by participating in the Crimean War to ensure its diplomatic position and French support. And in 1860 it unified Italy! Perhaps the European activity will experience a similar efficiency. For more effectiveness and long-term resolution, additional measures in the region would be essential: the mandate of the EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC DR Congo does not touch the Ituri region, theater of Operation ARTEMIS.

Sources of images

- p. 1/1. - ARTEMIS - MONUC handover; Source : ECPAD
- p. 1/2. - An ERC-90 Sagaie in DRC; Source : unknow
- p. 10. - The regions in DRC; Source : <http://congoandit.tripod.com/>
- p. 11. - The Kaya region ; Source : http://commons.wikimedia.org/wiki/Image:Map_Sudan_BaD_Kaya.png
- p. 23. - ARTEMIS Air Assets & OPRES; Source : General Briefing of EUFOR ARTEMIS (CMUE/EUMC)
- p. 24. - Organigramme OHQ ARTEMIS - Source : <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/ema/artemis.htm>
- p. 25. ARTEMIS OHQ Structure - Source : Lessons Learned from a recent MN Operation : Lead / Framework Nation Perspective (VA HEBRARD French Defence Staff Director of Operations)
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- p. 33. ARTEMIS Planning Process - Source : Lessons Learned from a recent MN Operation : Lead / Framework Na-




¹⁵⁸ BAGAYOKO, Niagalé, *L'opération Artémis, un tournant pour la politique européenne de sécurité et de défense ?*, op. cit., pp. 112.

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¹⁶⁰ FARIA, Fernanda, *La gestion des crises en Afrique subsaharienne – Le rôle de l'Union européenne*, op. cit., p. 60.

¹⁶¹ Author interview at EUMC.

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Abstract

Operation ARTEMIS is considered the first military operation led by the EU, the first autonomous EU operation, the first rapid response mission of the EU, first operation outside Europe, first operation applying the principle of framework nation and first example of "relay" operation, conducted in cooperation between the EU and the UN.

Operation ARTEMIS can be considered a global commitment to international security in a situation described by former Secretary of State of the United States, Madeleine Albright as "*Africa's first world war*." Is it important for the European security or is it just an "exercice" how to manage possible future crises closer to Europe?

The first EU operations in the relationship between NATO and EU forces are more like the operations of a secondary power. For more effectiveness and long-term resolution, additional measures in the region would be essential: the mandate of the EUPOL Kinshasa and EUSEC DR Congo does not touch the Ituri region, theater of the Operation ARTEMIS.



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