

# CERPESC

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# SUDAN - THE COMPLEXITY OF THE DARFUR CRISIS

And the Diplomatic and Logistical Support of the European Union

UPDATED VERSION 2025 : HISTORY OF SUDAN (2008-2024)

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CERPESC - CENTRE EUROPÉEN DE RECHERCHE POUR LA PESCE  
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## Introduction

**T**he new phase of the crisis in Darfur, since February 2003, more violent than ever, is difficult to interpret without knowing the complexity and the antecedents of the different crises in Sudan. The African Union, for the first time since its creation, decided to set up a real civil-military mission, AMIS (AU Mission in Darfur, In French: MUAS).

Due to the insufficiency of its own financial resources, and the lack of experience of this type of mission, the AU was obliged to seek the support of the European Union, NATO, and other international partners. By resolution 1769 of the UN Security Council, AMIS was expanded and placed under the UNAMID mission (hybrid mission of the United Nations and the African Union in Darfur).

How to interpret the crisis in Darfur?

Is this a local conflict, or the next phase of the “traditional” center-periphery crisis between North and South Sudan or, in a context described by Huntington, a theater of civilization wars. To what extent, the role of Sudan in the Islamic revolution and its oil fields, international arms trafficking and other factors influence the role of the main actors of the international community in the conflict that raises the problem of responsibility and national interests. Why does the UN have difficulty dealing with differences? This explains the limits of the more robust political and military engagement of the international community in the theater. It preferred to transfer responsibility to the UN.

At the level of international negotiations in Africa, the analysis focuses on the problem of the intermediary role of different actors between the combatant parties who (especially the local parties) are themselves divided by internal conflicts. How to implement a ceasefire agreement that is neither signed by all the actors in the crisis nor respected by the signatories?

How to sign an agreement with all the fighting parties even if they are several dozen parties, sometimes very small (from inter-ethnic or inter-community conflicts) that multiply, separate and reintegrate according to events?

After analyzing the issues and challenges of the conflicts in Sudan, and interpreting the different frameworks of the conflict in Darfur, this report seeks the answer to one of the main questions: Why did the AU take charge of Darfur? What are the weak points and strengths of the mission, what is the assessment of the evolution of the operational capacity of the AU? How has the support of the EU and other partners succeeded in resolving the difficulties that have emerged from the mission? What measures should be taken to increase the effectiveness of AMIS? The issue is that AMIS III and then UNAMID are finally able to manage the crisis, and Resolution 1706 can be interpreted as proof of the ineffectiveness of AMIS. How should cooperation be established between AMIS troops and the UN troops intended to be deployed in Darfur?

According to our hypothesis, AMIS has succeeded in establishing trust more easily between the population and the troops deployed on site, because of the African elements, vis-à-vis the UN mission. One of the principles of the *Brahimi Report* strongly advises against the application of forces/personnel from border states in a possible conflict.

In Africa, where borders between states often cut into several elements of different tribes, the violation of international law by crossing one or more borders in order to help their “cousins” is a general phenomenon. On this point, the practice and measures taken by the AU must be examined, as well as the strengths and reliability of these African troops.



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As regards the diplomatic and operational support of the European Union, it is necessary to know what is the reason for the EU's presence in the negotiations and on the ground, in the concert of intermediary actors. The humanitarian objective, the evaluation of the experiences of police missions and the vital interests of certain Member States are called into question. The analysis will examine at which levels of the chains of command the EU is present and whether or not the presence has sufficiently strengthened the EU's diplomatic weight on the international scene.

In such a situation, are the measures taken by the EU to support the diplomatic process and the AU mission sufficient, effective (or, above all, possible) as regards the structure of AMIS? How did the EU's civil-military mechanism function in a civil-military support mission and how was it effective in managing a CMCO assistance from the Union. What difficulties have emerged in establishing cooperation with the African Union, NATO and other international factors?

And finally, from a more theoretical approach, the question raised is whether and if so how to differentiate between acts of violence arising from the center-periphery conflict or from inter-ethnic conflict? Let us admit that a police mission is capable of managing poorly organized skirmishes that can be categorized more or less as inter-ethnic conflicts. But it is obvious that the method of deploying police forces to "all hot spots" to prevent conflicts is unfeasible. And, in the other case, how is such a police force capable of acting during an air raid by the Sudanese government forces resulting from the center-periphery conflict?

A problem that has persisted for several decades must be challenged. How does international law, which prefers sovereignty and stability above all (this time in a structure that is based on several inequalities, resulting from colonization) and applies the principle of non-intervention (military), facilitate the violations without consequences of the

agreements signed by the warring parties, and contribute to the widening of a serious crisis against humanity.

Is the management of a civil crisis, by police units in such a situation sufficient or rather dangerous in itself?

How to act without real pressure force?

The peace process can be very easily abused by the adversaries in order to gain time for rearmament. If these agreements are not based on reality, we arrive at the same consequences as those that have been drawn from the Balkans for a good ten years.

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## I.

### **Issues and challenges of conflicts in Sudan.**

*How to interpret the conflict in the Darfur region?*

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**B**efore 2011, until the declaration of independence of the Republic of South-Sudan (Juba), Sudan was the largest country in Africa and the seventh most populous.<sup>1</sup> It was ruled by General Omar al-Bashir between 1989-2019.

The main religions in the country were Islam (70%), animism (25%) and Christianity (5%). The growth rate in 2003 was 6.1% with an inflation of 8.8% and an unemployment rate of 18.7%. According to the IMF, Sudan spent 4.9% of its GDP on its military apparatus.

The relations between the government and the Darfur rebels were manifested in a particularly complex network of conflict at the national level, and sometimes with international elements of destabilization. In Sudan there are conflicts between the different Arab and African ethnic groups throughout the country, and several divisions aggravate the internal politics of the country:

As in Chad the North-South conflict was predominant: After independence in 1956 the South of the country was under the control of the Catholic missions while the Northern, Islamic part was controlled by the military regimes which were supported by Iraq, by Libya and (sometimes as mediator) by Egypt.

The hostilities between the parties of traditional Islam and modern fundamentalists are other factors of destabilization.

## I.1. Sudan – Islamist Expansion, a Medium Oil Power and Several Internal Cleavages

The Muslim Brotherhood<sup>2</sup> has been massively present in Sudan since 1949. Unlike the Egyptian Brotherhood, the Sudanese Brotherhood was an integral part of the government party, the *Ummah*, and cooperated with **General Muhammad an-Nimeiry** (1977-85) and from 1989 with Omar al-Bashir until 1999.<sup>3</sup>

During these periods their leader, **Hassan al-Turabi** became the "No. 2" of Sudan. That is, the ideological & religious leader with a wide political influence, by affecting the sharia, on the measures taken by the government that sometimes added fuel to the fire of the various internal conflicts.

But, what is even more important, Turabi had the ambition to become leader of the Islamic Revolution at the world level. The movement has concentrated in Sudan the most important banks (international Islamic financial network) and NGOs (Arabization and Islamization of black African populations and mediators in inter-Muslim conflicts) of the Islamic world, created the CPAI (an international forum for meeting and coordination of Islamist organizations), hosted Osama bin Laden and set up training camps for fighters of the Islamist movement.

Its international relations are part of a network linked to Algeria, the Horn of Africa, Yemen in the North of Afghanistan, or Bosnia. This activity was based on the financial support of Kuwait and Saudi Arabia until 1991 (when Sudan supported Iraq) and after that of Iran.


Sudan has become the epicenter of the international Islamist movement. As a logical consequence of this activity, Sudan became a potential target of the United States (air raid in 1998) and Turabi's

<sup>1</sup> Territory: 2,505,813 km<sup>2</sup>; 32.6 million inhabitants (since 2011: 1,886,068 km<sup>2</sup>)

<sup>2</sup> Islamic organization founded by Hassan al-Banna in Egypt in 1928 that fights against the modernity of the West and reforms in the world of Islam that bring closer to Western standards and promote the purity of the Koran. They fought against Arab nationalism (Nasser).

<sup>3</sup> In the meantime (1986-1989, democratic period) the National Islamic Front founded by Turabi became the third political force in Sudan.

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increased power threatened President el-Bashir (Turabi was in favor of a law limiting the power of the head of state and he was against the re-election of el-Bashir), the latter dissolved parliament in 1999, imprisoned Turabi, and imposed a state of emergency in December 2005.<sup>4</sup>

The other most important factor in the region is the oil issue. Since the completion of the *Greater Nile Oil Pipeline* (Unity, Sector 1 – Heglig, Sector 2 - Port Sudan,<sup>5</sup> 1600 km) in 1999, and the Petrodar pipeline in April 2006 (Melut Bashin - Port Sudan, 1380 km) Sudan became a medium oil power thanks to the combination of two factors: It has oil and a sea gateway that are generally very favorable for oil exports. The problem is that the oil wells are located mainly in the territories of South Sudan and a lesser part in Darfur, two hotspots of the country.

Since 2006, production of 500,000 barrels per day brings in more than 2.5 billion dollars per year (and exploitation is gradually increasing). Among the hydrocarbon concessions, the Europeans (France, Austria and Sweden) were also present on site.<sup>6</sup>

How can we estimate the importance of the country's reserves compared to the whole of Africa, which produces 7.8 million b/d of oil and 11 % of world production? As for oil reserves, Sudan (a possible future member of OPEC<sup>7</sup>) is positioned after Libya, Nigeria, Angola and Algeria (11.3-36 billion

barrels), with Gabon and Congo (1.5-2 billion barrels).<sup>8</sup>

In addition to these internal divisions, the foreign elements that destabilize the central power in Sudan are mainly the instability on the border with Chad (refugees from Darfur), Uganda and Ethiopia. The border with Uganda is threatened by raids by the LRA (*Lords Resistance Army*).

The border regions with Eritrea (which supports the Sudanese rebel group, the Eastern Front, in Kassala) and with Ethiopia are violated by organized criminal gangs. Struck by the action of Sudanese Islamists, the refugees have found asylum in Eritrea.<sup>9</sup> Ethiopia and Eritrea served as a rear base for John Garang, former leader of the SPLA/SPLM,<sup>10</sup> since both countries supported the rebels of South Sudan against the government in Khartoum.

<sup>4</sup> MAULION, Fabrice, *L'Organisation des Frères Musulmans – Évolution historique, cartographie et éléments d'une typologie (I)*, Paris, Université Panthéon-Assas - Paris II., 2004, 200-233.

<sup>5</sup> The importance of the city, which has a population of around 600,000, is also increased by the fact that it is the starting point of a railway line connecting Port Sudan with the city of 'Atbara on the Nile, thus connecting sea freight transport with the river.

<sup>6</sup> As for the most important oil and gas concessions were in 2001: Sector 1 (Unity): Greater Nile Petroleum Operating Company / produces 90% of the oil and is owned by CNPC for 50%, Petronas for 30%, ONGC-Videsh (India) for 25%, Sudapet for 5%. Sector 2 (Heglig): Talisman Energy Inc. (Canada); Sector 4 (Kaikang) Petronas Carigali (Malaysia), Sudapet (Sudan), China National Petroleum Corporation (CNPC); Sector 3: Gulf Petroleum Corporation (Qatar); Sector 7 (Mellut) . Sudapet, CNPC; Sector 5a: Lundin Oil AB International Petroleum Corporation (IPC, Sweden), Petronas Carigali, OMV Sudan Exploration GmbH (Austria), Sudapet; Sector 5 (Central): TotalElfina (France); Sector 6 /in South Darfur/: CNPC Source : « Oil revenues allow Khartoum to purchase advanced MiG-29s from Russia » , *Sudanreves.org*, December, 26. 2001, <http://www.sudanreves.org/Sections-req-viewarticle-artid-410-allpages-1-theme-Printer.html>

<sup>7</sup> In October 2015, Sudan formally submitted an application to join, but it is not yet a member.

<sup>8</sup> MOLELI, Patrick-R. Monzemu, « Odeur du pétrole, Afriquespoir », [http://www.afriquespoir.com/Ae36/index\\_fichiers/petrol.htm](http://www.afriquespoir.com/Ae36/index_fichiers/petrol.htm) , (téléchargé le 18 janvier 2007)

<sup>9</sup> RODIER, Alain « La crise au Darfour », *Raids*, N° 223, décembre 2004, 20.

<sup>10</sup> IYOB, Ruth – KHADIAGALA, Gilbert, M. *Sudan – The Elusive Quest for Peace*, London, Boulder London, International Peace Academy Occasional Paper Series, 2006, 169.



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## 1.2. The Darfur region, different ethnic factors and the land question

The Darfur region is a region as large as France or Texas. As an organic part of the North, the Darfur region is divided into 3 parts: North (El-Fasher), West (Geneina) and South Darfur (Nyala). The total population of Darfur was 6 million, 40% of whom were non-Arabs. On March 1, 2005, 2.45 million inhabitants were affected by the crisis, of which 1.86 million are displaced persons.<sup>11</sup>

So far 450,000 people have been killed and 230,000 refugees are in refugee camps in Chad. The ethnic groups at the heart of the conflicts are: the *Zeeyadiyas*, the *Bani Fadls* (Arabs) and the *Zaghawas*, the *Bertis* (Africans) in North Darfur; the *Bani Huseins* (Arabs) and the *Zaghawas*, *Furs* and *Masalits* (Africans) in West Darfur; the *Bani Halbas*, *Taaishas*, *Habbaniyas*, *Rizeiqats*, *Baggaras* (Arabs) and *Furs*, *Bergias* (Africans) in South Darfur.

In the shadow of the “great national conflict” between the government and the rebels of South Sudan, the conflicts in Darfur have a perspective of 15-20 years during which the different problems emerged at the local level, resulting from climate change and hostilities between the different communities in the region:

In most local conflicts it is the land that counts, the *dar* which was based on the traditional **system of hakura**, a title granted by the sultan to his subjects.

The *hakura* managed access to land allocating a *dar* to most of the communities. (Darfur = Dar /home/ of the Fur people, in Arabic) The British colonizers maintained this system which was the guarantee of more or less peaceful coexistence between the different ethnic groups. Thus the sedentary tribes lived in coexistence with nomadic “shepherd” tribes, who were not part of the *dar* system based on land.<sup>12</sup>

The migration and camping areas of the shepherds are defined by negotiated agreements.<sup>13</sup>

Internal tensions in Darfur were escalating as a result of a natural reason: Climate change, drought, and severe degradation of ecological conditions resulted in the migration of many non-Arab communities and Arab camel herders from North to South Darfur.



Many *Zaghawa* and *Gimir* from the northwest resettled in South Darfur and in this case, **the dar system** worked: the host communities allocated land to the newcomers whose integration had begun. As for the nomads, the resolution was not so simple: *"Camels trample the fields and graze the trees in the orchards. The transhumance corridors are closed by vast empty fences (...) which block the herds."* The insecurity of the newcomers and local tribes increased, and violent clashes multiplied.<sup>14</sup>

<sup>11</sup> Union Africaine – Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité, 28<sup>ème</sup> réunion, 28 avril 2005, Addis Ababa, Ethiopie, 16.

<sup>12</sup> TANNER, Victor, « Darfour: racines anciennes, nouvelles virulences », *Politique étrangère*, 4/2004, 716-717.

<sup>13</sup> MARCHAL, Roland, *Le Soudan d'un conflit à l'autre*, Scienco Po – Les Études du CERI, N° 107-108., septembre 2004, 42.

<sup>14</sup> TANNER, Victor, « Darfour: racines anciennes, nouvelles virulences », *op. cit.*, 718-719.

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In South Darfur, four large groups among the Arabs (*Rizeigat, Taisha, Beni Halba* and *Habbaniyya*) alone have possessed the dar since the time of the Sultanate of Darfur (from the 17th century to 1916).

In North Darfur, only the *Beni Hussein* have the dar, which explains their neutrality in the conflict between the government and the rebels.<sup>15</sup>

## I.3. First Phase of the Conflict 1986-1994, Birth of Janjaweed Militia

From 1980 the Darfur region was administered by a regional government and an elected governor. In the 1980s, the conflict between the non-Arab African *Fur* and *Zaghawa* communities in West Darfur was renewed, and since 1984 famine has reinforced the differences.<sup>16</sup> Since 1973, Libya has armed the Chadian opposition through Darfur, but it was in 1986, as a result of two events, that the Arab groups began to be massively armed:

After the destruction of Ibn Omer's camps in Chad by French forces and its Chadian allies (Hissene Habré), as part of *Operation Épervier* (Sparrowhawk), Ibn Omer took refuge in Darfur. He was welcomed by **Sheikh Musa Hilal**, the newly elected leader of the Arabs of Mahamid Rizeigat in North Darfur.<sup>17</sup> Thus the Arabs of Darfur obtained several weapons. On the other side, it was Hissene Habré who armed the *Furs* because they entered into conflict against their *Zaghawa* rivals.<sup>18</sup>

In addition, that year, Sudanese Prime Minister, **Sadiq al-Mahdi** had Arab communities armed in South Darfur to send them to fight against the SPLA/SPLM of John Garang in South Sudan.

In Darfur, the first war between Arab communities and the Fur broke out in 1987 and lasted until 1989. During this war, the first *Janjaweed* militia organization was formed between the Arab groups. *"The Janjaweed come mostly from small Arab camel tribes in northern Darfur, impoverished and marginalized, who did not receive dar from the British colonial authorities and are today suffering*

<sup>15</sup> TUBIANA, Jérôme, « Le Darfour, un conflit pour la terre? », *Politique africaine*, Paris, Éditions Khartala, 116-117.

<sup>16</sup> « Sudan Civil War », *GlobalSecurity.org*, <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/war/sudan.htm>, (Accessed: January 15, 2007)

<sup>17</sup> *Steps towards the stabilization of Governance and livelihoods in Darfur, Sudan*, United States Agency for International Development, mars 2005, p. 19., [http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf\\_docs/Pnadc781.pdf](http://pdf.usaid.gov/pdf_docs/Pnadc781.pdf)

<sup>18</sup> "This strategy gradually turned against the Chadian leader because the Sudanese Zaghawa (...) mobilized at the end of the 1980s alongside Hassan Djamous' successor, Idriss Deby..." and in Chad, the arrival of Idriss Deby, a faithful and reliable ally of Omar el Beshir, had mechanically calmed the situation in Darfur. Source : MARCHAL, Roland, *Le Soudan d'un conflit à l'autre*, op. cit., 45-46.

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from climatic and ecological degradation."<sup>19</sup> The word *Janjaweed* means "devils on horseback" but they are rather called *fursan* "riders" *mujahideen* or *peshmerga* in reference to the Kurdish rebels.

The *Janjaweed* are recruited massively especially among the Arab groups without land rights with the promise of territory or a position in the administration.<sup>20</sup> They are armed with AK-47s, rocket launchers and the Belgian version of the Heckler & Koch G3 assault rifle often fitted to pickup trucks.<sup>21</sup>

President Bashir, after taking power in 1989, bridged the gap between Arab and non-Arab communities in the region: He disarmed the non-Arab communities, but continued to provide weapons to loyal Arabs. In 1991 an armed Arab group attacked the *Zaghawa*, *Fur* and *Massalit* to challenge the *dar* system. The government encouraged the establishment of an Arab Alliance to monitor non-Arab groups.<sup>22</sup>

## I.4. The Second Phase (1994-2002)

### I.4.1. Administrative Reform

Internal conflicts persisted but how and why the different non-Arab groups begin to unite, creating common fronts whose main common target finally became Khartoum and not the *Janjaweed*, the Arab military groups.

How did the central government policy add fuel to the fire of local conflicts in the region?

The reason for several center-periphery conflicts in Sudan is that Khartoum exploited peripheral regions of the Nile Valley: from the Red Sea to the east, the Southern Blue Nile, the Great South, Kordofan and Darfur. The *dar* system prevented the implementation of agricultural megaprojects.

Under the cover of decentralization, budgetary contributions for basic services were greatly reduced, administrative boundaries reorganized. The administration depriving traditional leaders, set up by the English, became systematically corrupted by the central government. The absence of investments in the field of water in addition multiplied the negative effects of the drought.<sup>23</sup>

Furthermore, in order to reduce the region's lobbying capacity, the **1994 constitutional reform** (implemented in 1996) establishing a pseudo-federalism<sup>24</sup> divided the Darfur region into three parts. As a result of the reform, **the territory of the Fur community was cut into three**, and became a minority in each part with a visible loss of influence.

The reform created several new positions in the local administration for Arabs and especially Arabs of Chadian origin. It must be added that a wave of

<sup>19</sup> TUBIANA, Jérôme, « Le Darfour, un conflit pour la terre? », *op. cit.*, 117.

<sup>20</sup> *Idem, ibidem*

<sup>21</sup> TUBIANA, Jérôme, « Le Darfour, un conflit pour la terre? », *op. cit.*, 113.

<sup>22</sup> Documenting Atrocities in Darfur (State Publication 11182, Released by the Bureau of Democracy, Human Rights, and Labor and the Bureau of Intelligence and Research, September 2004, <http://www.state.gov> )

<sup>23</sup> TANNER, Victor, « Darfour: racines anciennes, nouvelles virulences », *op. cit.*, 717.

<sup>24</sup> AYAD, Christophe, « Le Soudan entre guerre et paix », *Politique internationale*, N° 108 (été 2005), 153.

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Arab immigration<sup>25</sup> from Chad changed the lines of power between the communities for 20 years (1973-1994) in favor of the Arabs.<sup>26</sup> This reform lowered the rank of the sultans of the *Zaghawa*, the *Four*, and the *Masalits*, and of the tribal chiefs.<sup>27</sup> It completely disadvantaged, for example, the *Masalits*, on the Dar Masalit which was governed by a sultan with 5 *furshas*, heads of administration.

The government's intentions were undoubtedly to manage the transformed internal circumstances: The administration of the *furshas* was completed by 8 amirs (Arabs) who now participate in the election of the sultan with a reign now limited to 7 years. The new measures created the fear of a replacement of the Sultan Masalit by an Arab candidate.<sup>28</sup>

### I.4.2 From the Defense of Public Interest in the Capital to Armed Resistance in the Region

The defense of the organized public interest of Darfur began as early as 1964 with the emergence of the Front for the Development (or Advancement) of Darfur (FDD). But the first generation of the Darfur elite was trained in El-Obeid, in Kordofan, or directly in the capital, and focused on its interests rather in the capital.

The FDD *"intended to be a pressure group in favor of the region of origin of its members, rather than a political organization in the full sense of the term."* Within the FDD, a grouping of educated people, there are very few Arabs but paradoxically several of its members have had brilliant political careers within the Umma party,<sup>29</sup> which at the time aspired to maintain the monopoly of regional expression.<sup>30</sup>

After 1989, some claim that a good part of the security services of the new regime were recruited in the Darfur region. In 1999, the Darfurian delegates of the *Ummah* massively supported Hassan al-Tourabi, which gave him back the leadership of the government party for a few months. But the promises were not fulfilled: funding for regional universities remained minimal, funds for the El-Fasher – Khartoum road disappeared, and there was no investment, particularly in the health system.<sup>31</sup>

As a result of the loss of influence, administrative reform, state neglect, and disagreements with the Arabs, it was only in 1996 that the armed resistance (*maquis*) of the Fur began to be organized sporadically by A. W. Mohamed al Nur, A. Abdel Shafi and A. Abdalla Ismail. The center was the mountainous territory of Jebel Marra where military

<sup>25</sup> Mainly from the Chadian Mahamid and Mahariya sections of the Abbala Rizeigat of Darfur. See FLINT, Julie – DE WAAL, Alex, *Darfur – A short history of a long war*, London, Zed Books, 2005, 45.

<sup>26</sup> FLINT, Julie – DE WAAL, Alex, *Darfur – A short history of a long war*, *op. cit.*, 45.

<sup>27</sup> MARCHAL, Roland, *Le Soudan d'un conflit à l'autre*, *op. cit.*, 48.

<sup>28</sup> FLINT, Julie – DE WAAL, Alex, *Darfur – A short history of a long war*, *op. cit.*, 58.

<sup>29</sup> Par exemple, Ahmed Ibrahim Diraige (Four), premier président du FDD fut élu en 1968 au Parlement et fut gouverneur du Darfour de 1981 à 1983. Source: MARCHAL, Roland, *Le Soudan d'un conflit à l'autre*, *op. cit.*, 50.

<sup>30</sup> MARCHAL, Roland, *Le Soudan d'un conflit à l'autre*, *op. cit.*, 50-52.

<sup>31</sup> Idem, *ibidem*



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camps were set up. Khartoum was identified as the main enemy.

In 1999, the *Fur* opened up to the neighbouring *Masalit* who had been fighting Arab communities since 1995/96, but were reluctant to revolt against the government, although Khartoum launched army helicopters against the *Masalit* to avenge a local skirmish.<sup>32</sup> In 1998, Khartoum's mediation resulted in a peace agreement (with a state guarantee for compensation) whose implementation in practice remained very weak.<sup>33</sup> The *Fur* decided to maintain contact with *Masalit* activists but refused to identify themselves as a political movement.<sup>34</sup>

At this time, Abdel Shafi also sought to contact **John Garang's SPLA** in South Sudan, without success. The *Zaghawa* joined the "organised joint resistance" in 2001, as relevant allies of the *Fur*. Especially since the 1980s, *Zaghawa* were fighting against Arab nomads, increasingly supported by Khartoum. In 2001 the *Zaghawa* refused to pay taxes to Khartoum. The government's response by the *Janjaweed* – the attack on Abu Gamma – was the turning point: they overlooked the historical disagreements with the *Fur* to fight together against the government.<sup>35</sup>

In 2002, two large rebel movements emerged from non-Arab communities, from pre-existing local maquis. They kept very weak chains of command and were reinforced by exiled intellectuals and local activists including those close to the deposed Islamist leader, Hassan al-Tourabi: **The DLF (Darfur Liberation Front)**, supported by Eritrea, was born

with a strength of 4,000 people and fought for the secession of Darfur.<sup>36</sup>

The DLF was transformed into the **Sudan Liberation Movement/Army (SLM/A)** in March 2003, with the aim of a democratic Sudan. The leadership of the SLM/A was shared between President **Abdoulwahid Mohamed Nour** (*Fur*) and Secretary General **Minni Arcou Minawi** (*Masalit*). The SLM/A is part of the NDA (National Democratic Alliance) party in opposition to al-Bashir.

The **Justice and Equality Movement (JEM)**, supported by Chad, was also created in 2002 by 1,000 rebels. The leader of JEM was **Khalil Ibrahim Mohamed** (2002-2011).<sup>37</sup> *"The SLA and JEM preferred to highlight issues of national importance, for fear of seeing their struggle reduced to 'tribal' clashes"*.<sup>38</sup>

The internal conflicts resulting from the first phase explain the heterogeneity and the very strong fragmentation of the movements. Besides the SLM/A and the JEM there are countless small, non-integrated rebel groups. Some Arab groups remained rather neutral in the conflicts and there are non-Arab groups, more or less Arabized,<sup>39</sup> who for reasons of identity as well as strategy fight alongside the government.

What were the goals of the two largest rebel groups?

They want the *hawakir* system to be incorporated into Sudanese law, and therefore the traditional land law specific to Darfur (*dar*) to be recognized.<sup>40</sup> Some elements of these two forces in Sudan are supported

<sup>32</sup> FLINT, Julie – DE WAAL, Alex, *Darfur – A short history of a long war*, op. cit., 70-73.

<sup>33</sup> MARCHAL, Roland, *Le Soudan d'un conflit à l'autre*, op. cit., 48.

<sup>34</sup> FLINT, Julie – DE WAAL, Alex, *Darfur – A short history of a long war*, op. cit., 70-73.

<sup>35</sup> FLINT, Julie – DE WAAL, Alex, *Darfur – A short history of a long war*, op. cit., 73-76.

<sup>36</sup> Sudan Civil War <http://www.globalsecurity.org>

<sup>37</sup> His brother Gibril Ibrahim Mohammed became the leader after his death. Ibrahim has been Sudan's finance minister since February 2021. As leader of JEM, he remained neutral in the 2023 war in Sudan from April to November, when he allied with the Sudanese armed forces.

<sup>38</sup> TUBIANA, Jérôme, « Le Darfour, un conflit pour la terre? », op. cit., 114.

<sup>39</sup> Part of the Fellata, part of the Gimir, the Tama and the Kinnin (Tuareg from the West); see Jérôme Tubiana, op. cit., 112.

<sup>40</sup> TUBIANA, Jérôme, « Le Darfour, un conflit pour la terre? », op. cit., 112. and 124.

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by the Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army (SPLM/A) and by Eritrea.

It should be added that the members of the SPLM/A in the Sudanese parliament were of course very distrustful of several rebel groups in Darfur that have been recruited by the government to fight against South Sudan with the support of the air force (same strategy as in Darfur) for a long time.

The tactics of the movements were similar to those of the *Zaghawa* in Chad. They were organized in small bands of pickup trucks vehicles armed with high-caliber machine guns. (See Toyota war in Chad.) They attack military vehicles and isolated checkpoints to resupply and discredit the government administration.<sup>41</sup>

### **1.5. Third phase – the outbreak of a center-periphery conflict and the civil war**

The factor of peace in the South and towards the repression of the army (since 2003)

Curiously, the internal conflicts in Darfur have gone beyond inter-ethnic frameworks and have led to a more or less unitary massive rebellion against the government when the center-periphery conflict, between Khartoum and South Sudan began to be effectively controlled.

This center-periphery conflict, often considered as the struggle between the Muslim North and the Christian and animist South, has existed at the time for 21 years in Sudan. In figures, it is about 1.5 million dead, more than 4 million displaced and 600,000 refugees in neighboring states.<sup>42</sup>

At the end of the **first civil war (1955-1972)** the rebels succeeded in having a relative regional autonomy of the 3 southern provinces in a confederal framework and a total cultural and religious freedom.

The **second civil war (1983-2005)**<sup>43</sup> broke out because of the management of oil wealth and in the 1990s, in the eyes of Hassan al-Tourabi it was "*perceived as the internal front of the West's war against Islam.*" an undeniable element of internal stability to be able to start "*the international crusade.*"<sup>44</sup>

After several rounds of talks, the government and the SPLA/SPLM (Sudan People's Liberation Army/Movement) of Colonel John Garang<sup>45</sup> found the path of negotiations through the **Machakos Protocol (July 20, 2002, Kenya)** developed until the signing of the **Comprehensive Peace Agreement (CPA, Nairobi, Kenya, January 9, 2005.)**

<sup>41</sup> TANNER, Victor, « Darfour: racines anciennes, nouvelles virulences », *op. cit.*, 721.

<sup>42</sup> PRUNIER, Gérard, « Accord avec le Sud, guerre au Darfour », *op. cit.*, 17.

<sup>43</sup> *Idem, ibidem.*

<sup>44</sup> MAULION, Fabrice, *L'Organisation des Frères Musulmans*, *op. cit.*, 221.

<sup>45</sup> Died in July 2005, following a helicopter crash. See: IYOB, Ruth – KHADIAGALA, Gilbert, M. *Sudan – The Elusive Quest for Peace*, *op. cit.*, 169.

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What are the most important elements of these agreements that seem to be attractive even in Darfur?

As for the economic and financial aspect, the establishment of a **dual banking system** (Islamic in the North and classical in the South) and the **distribution of oil profits (1/3 for the South** of the 500 million dollars in 2001).

The political aspect of the treaties is that Colonel Garang became the vice-president with a veto power over the decisions of the head of state, al-Bashir. The government of the pre-interim period is composed of 28% members from the SPLA and 6% from the southern forces not members of the SPLA.

The security arrangements also provided for the establishment of the **JlUs (Joint Integrated Units)**: a new force of 40,000 men with a common headquarters, on an equal footing of SPLA and regular forces.<sup>46</sup>

The question is whether the crisis in Darfur since 2003 can be considered the third phase of the North-South conflict?

Essentially no, because the Darfur region is geographically part of the Northern bloc, in addition it is an entirely Muslim region with a mixed population: Non-Arab and Arab.<sup>47</sup> The common aspect with the South is the marginalization vis-à-vis the center, Khartoum. This marginalization has become widely known through the analysis and tables of the **Black Book** published in 2000 and 2002.<sup>48</sup>

While the **South has virtually no choice but war, Darfur has long kept faith in Khartoum's promises of rewards** - never realized. They revolted when the concrete benefits of twenty years of war

became evident, thinking that violence led to the opening of negotiations on the role of Darfur.<sup>49</sup>

Furthermore, the **Naivasha Agreement** is also proof that the recognition of customary rights in the South can be successfully challenged against the law of the Sudanese State. Thus the *Unregistered Land Act* (1970), which *de jure* outlaws the Dar land system in the South, by declaring that all land not registered by a private owner now belongs (since April 1970) to the State, can be subject to possible revision.<sup>50</sup>

The domino effect has been achieved: after settling the status of the 3 southern provinces, and the Mount Nuba region and the Abyei area, the Darfur problem remained to be challenged...

<sup>46</sup> PRUNIER, Gérard, « Accord avec le Sud, guerre au Darfour », *op. cit.*, 17.

<sup>47</sup> But these Arabs are very different from the Arabs of the Nile Valley.

<sup>48</sup> An example: in 1999 the Northern region (12.2% of the population) had 60.1% of the places in the federal government with 15 ministers, and the Western region (31.7%) 16.7% with 5 ministers. see *The Black Book: Imbalance of Power and Wealth in Sudan*, Table 10 and 12, <http://www.sudanjem.com/2009/02/the-black-book-imbalance-of-power-and-wealth-in-sudan/> (Accessed : January 15, 2007)

<sup>49</sup> PRUNIER, Gérard, « Accord avec le Sud, guerre au Darfour », *op. cit.*, 17.

<sup>50</sup> TUBIANA, Jérôme, « Le Darfour, un conflit pour la terre? », *op. cit.*, 122, 125.

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## I.6. Brief Analysis of the Crisis in Darfur (February 2003 - 2008)

*Pre-crisis* - After the signing of the first key document of the negotiations between Khartoum and the SPLM/A (North-South conflict), the Machakos Protocol,<sup>51</sup> the SLM/A (*Fur, Zaghawa, Masalit*) attacked government forces in Darfur at Golo in February 2003, demanding an end to the marginalization and discrimination of the region. Talks between local authorities and the SLM continued until the *Janjaweed* assassinated a Masalit leader.

*Escalation* - On 25 April 2003, the SLM and JEM attacked El Fasher airport, the administrative capital of the region, capturing a Sudanese general, destroying 5 military aircraft and 2 combat helicopters on the ground and killing about 100 soldiers.<sup>52</sup> The Government of Sudan (GoS) decided on a massive response by the *Janjaweed* militias supported by helicopters and fighter jets of the Sudanese Air Force.

The GoS, worried by Khartoum residents of Darfur origin, and by the JEM's links with Hassan al-Turabi, found itself in a delicate situation: It was uncertain whether the Sudanese (Arab) army was capable of fighting against their brothers. If the government does not want to lose control over the army, the strategy that has been very useful in the past should be reinvented: the use of armed militias: The *Janjaweed*.<sup>53</sup>

The most well-known leader of one of the *Janjaweed* groups in North Darfur was Sheik Musa Hillal<sup>54</sup> who was the head of Um Jalul clan of Mahamid. He had good contacts with the local administration and senior officers of the GoS. His immediate superior was Lt. Col. Abdul Wahid Said Ali Said.<sup>55</sup> But many militia leaders came from Libya, Chad, CAR, Mali, Niger, Burkina, Mauritania.<sup>56</sup> Musa Hillal's military base was in **Kebkabiya** and they systematically destroyed villages in this area, around the base. Another base was founded as a training camp, in Misterya in July 2003.<sup>57</sup>

We do not know how Musa organized his troops, perhaps by telephone. The form of an attack is variable: the mobilization is done by the *agids* (military leader) who carry a red flag and are in contact with the local government administration. The heavyweights of the GdS provide him with equipment.<sup>58</sup>

The tactic of the government armies was simple: In the early hours of the day the GdS helicopters attack villages with rockets and cannons. The air raid introduces or supports the attack of the *Janjaweed* militia: after the invasion of the horsemen the camel drivers follow them. They killed everything that moves.<sup>59</sup>

Obviously the GdS has given free rein to the armed militias rather than exercising control, in accordance with the Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement and the **Abuja Protocols**.<sup>60</sup>

<sup>51</sup> Kenya, July 20, 2002, Article 1.2 guaranteed Southern Sudan the right to autonomy and equal participation in the national government. Article 1.3 emphasizes the right to self-determination and provides for a referendum on future status. (Source : Machakos Protocol, IGAD - Secretariat on Peace in the Sudan, July 20, 2002)

<sup>52</sup> AYAD, Christophe, « Le Soudan entre guerre et paix », *op. cit.*, 153-154.

<sup>53</sup> See the use of irregular acandja cavalry by the Ottomans alongside regular forces.

<sup>54</sup> He was arrested in November 2017 and released after receiving a pardon granted by the Sovereign Council, on 11 March 2021.

<sup>55</sup> « SUDAN Entrenching Impunity – Government Responsibility for International Crimes in Darfur », New York, Human Right Watch, Volume 17 No.17(A), May 12, 2005, 9-22.

<sup>56</sup> TANNER, Victor, « Darfour: racines anciennes, nouvelles virulences », *op. cit.*, 723.

<sup>57</sup> « SUDAN Entrenching Impunity – Government Responsibility for International Crimes », *op. cit.*, 9-22.

<sup>58</sup> *Idem, ibidem*

<sup>59</sup> « Opération Dorca – Le „bataillon d’acier” aux portes du Darfour », *Raids*, N° 223, décembre 2004

<sup>60</sup> UA – CPS, 28<sup>ème</sup> réunion, *op. cit.*, 8.



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But some differences were evident at the tactical level concerning North and West Darfur:

In the West they occupy the terrain, and the displacement of the indigenous populations was complete.

In the North the objective of the attacks was the neutralization of the alleged economic base of the rebels: The *Janjaweed* have committed attacks, looting and massacres, but have not remained in place.<sup>61</sup>

Despite this dilemma, armed forces of Khartoum and especially the air force were engaged: the Antonov An-24 RV Coke and An-26 which are in principle tactical transport aircraft were transformed to be able to carry bombs during several air raids against the cities of Darfur.<sup>62</sup>

They destroyed practically all the larger cities in Darfur. The Chinese J-7 fighter jets (copies of the MIG-21 Fishbed) and other Shenyang and Russian Mi Mil-24 Hind and Mi-17 combat helicopters were also at the disposal of the armed force to support the *Janjaweed*.<sup>63</sup> The problem of the MIG-29 will be taken up again later.

The management of the air raids is far from high technology: the pilots (and the navigators including women and Egyptians) communicated on FM radios: the *Zaghawas* have already learned how to warn the population in advance by listening to the radio.<sup>64</sup>

*Détente* - In September 2003, Chadian President Idriss Déby was tasked with mediation. The **N'Djamena Ceasefire Agreement** (violated upon signing) was signed on 8 April 2004.

A major problem was that police stations have become targets for militias and other groups, opening the possibility of easy acquisition of weapons.<sup>65</sup> There was a complete loss of confidence in government security institutions, particularly in GoS police.<sup>66</sup> On 24 September 2004, Khartoum reinforced its commitment to the United Nations not to station its police in areas controlled by the SLM/A and JEM.<sup>67</sup>

According to a UN report in September 2004, 1.5 million of the region's 6 million inhabitants have been forced to move.<sup>68</sup> The GdS forces occupied the areas of Marla, Ishma and Labado, Graidia through an offensive in December 2004 and the CCF/AMIS Ceasefire Commission requested the evacuation of the forces in early January 2005 and the forces were withdrawn until March 2005.<sup>69</sup>

One of the most significant attacks was on 7 April 2005 when 350 *Janjaweed* soldiers (the armed militia of the Miseriy tribe of Niteaga) on camels ransacked and destroyed Khor Abeche in retaliation for the theft of 150 cattle: The tracks led to Khor Abeche. In addition, allegedly, the SLM/A forces there refused to return the bodies of 2 *Janjaweed* men from the previous aborted attack on Khor Abeche.<sup>70</sup>

<sup>61</sup> TANNER, Victor, « Darfour: racines anciennes, nouvelles virulences », *op. cit.*, 724.

<sup>62</sup> Sudan: Aid Efforts Plundered, <http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/sudan/articles/20060805.aspx> (Accessed: January 14, 2007)

<sup>63</sup> R. Smith, Charles, « Made In The USSR - Soviet Era Weapons Re-Appear Around The World », *Newmax.com*, August 5, 2004, <http://www.newmax.com/archives/articles/2004/8/5/100057.shtml> ; The F-5s and C-130s were likely out of service due to the embargo.

<sup>64</sup> CHIN, Sally – MORGENSTEIN, Jonathan, *No power to protect – The African Union Mission in Sudan*, Washington, Refugees International, November 2005,

<http://www.refugeesinternational.org/policy/in-depth-report/no-power-protect-african-union-mission-sudan>

<sup>65</sup> A very similar situation in Albania, during the crisis in 1997.

<sup>66</sup> UA – CPS, 28<sup>ème</sup> réunion, *op. cit.*, 8.

<sup>67</sup> UA – CPS, 17<sup>ème</sup> réunion, *op. cit.*, 11.

<sup>68</sup> UA – CPS, 17<sup>ème</sup> réunion, *op. cit.*, 19.

<sup>69</sup> UA – CPS, 28<sup>ème</sup> réunion, *op. cit.*, 14.

<sup>70</sup> PTo deter such attacks, AMIS planned to deploy troops to Niteaga and Khor Abéché, but the deployment was cancelled, see UA – CPS, 28<sup>ème</sup> réunion, *op. cit.*, 10.

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On 5 July 2005, the **Declaration of Principles for the Resolution of the Sudanese Conflict in Darfur** was drafted and on 5 May 2006 the Darfur Peace Agreement was born in Abuja. (Khartoum and the SLA/Minni Minawi signed the agreement, the others opposed it).

*Internationalization of crisis* – Massive waves of refugees have crossed the Chadian-Sudanese border as a result of the crisis in Sudan in the Darfur region. 230,000 Sudanese have been accommodated in 12 refugee camps in the Ouaddaï prefecture (Chad) opposite the West Darfur prefecture (Sudan). A French operation<sup>71</sup> (**Operation Dorca** from 31 July to 12 September 2004) was designed to support the UNHCR and NGOs in Darfur and consisted of an airlift between N'Djamena, the capital of Chad, and Abéché airport in the Ouaddaï prefecture in order to provide food, water, medical kits and cholera kits for the refugee camps in and near Goz Beida. The airlift was carried out by 5 C-160 Transall aircraft, 3 of which belonged to the French participation in Chad (*Éléments Français au Tchad* - EFT) and 2 as reinforcements from the mainland France.<sup>72</sup>

During the negotiation process between the different parties to the crisis in Darfur, anger in the theatre continued to intensify, and the crisis in Darfur was extended across the 1,360 km long border between Chad and Sudan: Already in December 2003, the Janjaweed attacked Agan, a Chadian town located 7 km from Adré and the Sudanese air force bombed the Chadian towns of Birak and Tiné.<sup>73</sup> Sudan and Chad accused each other of supporting rebels, each other's adversaries.

In addition, President Déby's position was threatened by several demonstrations and coup attempts by groups demanding intervention in Sudan alongside the Zaghawas. On 18 December 2005, the Rally for Democracy and Freedom, a rebel group from Chad, attacked Adré. Déby reinforced Adré (the strategic key to Chad's defence) and Abéché. Chad declared a state of war with Sudan on 23 December 2005, and the concentration of troops on both sides of the border began.<sup>74</sup> A Congolese-Libyan mediation was set up on this inter-state conflict.

*Impact: Deadlock (Impasse)*- During the negotiation process, the killings continued (the attack on the El Geer refugee camp near Nyala, a major offensive in December 2004 by government forces) despite the mutual signing of the ceasefire agreement and the AU and UN missions intended to monitor its compliance.

Emerging from the deadlock of the Abuja peace process on 5 May 2006, the lines of forces between the rebels were changed and the divisions of the past were violently rekindled. The SLA/Minni Minawi (Masalit) section which signed the peace agreement began to cooperate with the GoS, while on 30 June 2006, the **National Redemption Front (NRF)** was born in Asmara (Eritrea) by elements of the SLM/A (Khamis Abdalla Abakar, Four), the JEM (Khalil Ibrahim Mohamed) and the SFDA (Sudan Federal Democratic Alliance) co-chaired by Sharif Harir and Ahmed Ibrahim.

The NRF is "*an instrument for the coordination of military, political, diplomatic and media initiatives.*" The parties have established a rotating presidency and general secretariat within the NRF. They call on

<sup>71</sup> Since 2003, the French operation Boali has also been present in Bangui, the capital of the CAR. Through attacks on cities in the North-East of the CAR, the Central African rebels continually threaten the Sudanese border (South Darfur and South Sudan regions).

<sup>72</sup> « Tchad, opération Dorca », <http://www.defense.gouv.fr/operations/tchad/actualites/11-09-04-tchad-operation-dorca> (Accessed January 13, 2007)

<sup>73</sup> GONDJÉ, Laoro, « *Guerre au Darfour, périls au Tchad* », CEFOD

<http://www.cefod.org/Tchad%20et%20Culture/Tc225/guerre.darfour.htm>

<sup>74</sup> Foreign observers in N'Djamena assume that the oil wells in South Darfur were also an attractive element towards Chad.

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all marginalized organizations of other communities to join<sup>75</sup> them in order to provide an effective response to the increased attacks by the Janjaweed and the GoS. The Front claims above all democratic values (pluralism, the rule of law, human rights, etc.), equality before public services, the establishment of the federal system in its entirety and the guarantee of regional autonomy.

The NRF attacked cities, particularly in Kordofan, outside the Darfur region. Despite a partial disarmament of the Janjaweed by the government in Kas on June 22,<sup>76</sup> the conflict continued and is far from being resolved. For example, at the end of July 2006 an air raid by the government air force against the village of Hassan was reported. The bombings are controlled by radars (of Russian and Chinese origin) located inside Sudan.<sup>77</sup> In 2007, violent attacks against AMIS increased. On July 31, 2007, UN Security Council Resolution 1769 authorized the deployment of a hybrid mission of the African Union and the UN. **UNAMID** took over on January 1, 2008, although the number of troops deployed has not yet reached the total planned strength.

<sup>75</sup> « Founding Declaration of Darfur's National Redemption Front », *Sudan Tribune*, June 30, 2006, <http://www.sudantribune.com/spip.php?article16455>

<sup>76</sup> Union Africaine – Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité, 63<sup>ème</sup> réunion, le 18 septembre 2006, New York, 5-7.

<sup>77</sup> « Sudan: Aid Efforts Plundered », *Strategypage.com*, August 5, 2006. <http://www.strategypage.com/qnd/sudan/articles/20060805.aspx>

## II.

### **The Darfur Peace Process – A Diplomatic Draw Far from the Violence on the Theater**

*“It was simpler and less expensive to mitigate the  
effects of the massacres by humanitarian means  
rather than trying to end them by force of arms”*

Alan Gouty



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**A**fter analyzing the evolution of a regional conflict that has expanded to a center-periphery conflict with a progressive internationalization, the diplomatic approach, mediation and active support of several international actors, their immediate interests in the conflict must be examined in more detail. Gradually, mediation has taken over at increasingly high levels, first the President of Chad, then the African Union, then the UN and other international actors.

However, the question raised is why a debate on the crisis in Darfur, whether or not it is a genocide, when **the conflict between South and North Sudan was never considered a genocide**, and in Africa where several tens of thousands of victims of a conflict do not seem exceptional?

Moreover, why did the crisis become widely known in 2004, after a year of its outbreak?

The categorical input (“genocide”, broad manifestation of the actors) led to an anemic output, an AU mission that is far from being able to control the situation during the permanent violation of the ceasefire. What are the “black box” elements that block the peace process? The European Union felt pressured to act: what logic and thread of conduct?

We will see if the diplomacy of the Member States and the Union was coordinated or if the “cacophony” remained dominant. The humanitarian issue has become an asset of Khartoum and the fact deserves to be examined as well, why and how and Sudan could easily take the risk and win several games of *chicken run* vis-à-vis the divided international community without real consequences?

Khartoum perfectly played the card of the North-South peace process to block the talks on the Darfur issue. And finally, what is also in the background, a pacified Sudan or, paradoxically, a Sudan divided by internal conflicts, threatens more strongly the regional context or the interests of the West.

The negotiations among the different partners of the conflict, the region and the international scene are facing several serious difficulties. Despite the

changes in the role in steering the negotiations, the talks between the belligerents through different intermediaries and the different simultaneous mediations of the actors of the peace process, a chaotic upheaval results. However, the peace process has completely lost contact with the events on the theater where the violence is not correlated with the signed agreements, even if it concerns the signatory parties.

During the negotiations between the different partners, with a different culture and methods, the Western culture of crisis management by a series of treaties, without the capacity for rear pressure, and based on such a principle of international law as the *pacta sunt servanda*, has once again failed. The ultimate solution was the transfer of responsibility from the African mission to the hybrid mission of UNAMID.

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## II.1. From Chad's Mediation to the African Union's Mediation

While the North-South peace process was led by IGAD,<sup>78</sup> it was Chadian President **Idriss Déby** who in September 2003 took charge of **mediating peace in the Darfur conflict**.

### Why Chad?

The factor of Chadian interference is obvious: Chadian President Idriss Déby was supported by the Khartoum regime and he has recruited largely among the *Zaghawa* of Darfur, the ethnic group split in two by the border between Chad and Sudan.

Chadian *Zaghawa* soldiers were ready to fight alongside their cousins in Darfur and this fact has significantly damaged relations between Khartoum and N'Djamena and also Déby's *Zaghawa* entourage.<sup>79</sup>

The Darfur rebel groups, JEM, and the SLA, politically inexperienced, have solicited observers from the Western world to ask for their help during the talks. The initial debate between international observers focused on their mandates, so the Chadian mediation decided to allow observers to attend humanitarian sessions and exclude them from political sessions.<sup>80</sup>

As for the talks in N'Djamena in 2004 facilitated by Chad, it became clear that JEM seemed better organized politically than SLM/A which had problems with shared leadership between its two essential elements: The relationship between its president, Abdoulwahid Mohamed Al-Nour (*Fur*) and its secretary general, (*Masalit*) had deteriorated considerably and each of them was working with his supporters and this made decision-making within the Movement difficult.<sup>81</sup>

In April 2004, Idriss Déby asked the African Union to assist his mediation. On April 8, 2004 a ceasefire agreement was signed by the belligerents in N'Djamena. A Ceasefire Commission (CCF) was established and the African Union Mission in Sudan (AMIS, in French: MUAS) took charge of its monitoring. The EU Presidency welcomed this agreement and commended Chad's mediation.

Despite the undeniable results, the Parties failed to agree on other important provisions such as: the development by the Ceasefire Commission of a plan for the separation and relocation of forces; the neutralization and disarmament of the *Janjaweed* and other militias; concrete measures to build confidence between the Parties.

The Government of Sudan requested that JEM elements be regrouped in clearly identified locations when Movements called for the creation of a no-fly zone, the withdrawal of Sudanese forces and their replacement by AU forces and the establishment of an international investigation into accusations of genocide and crimes against humanity in Darfur.

Thus the positions hardened, Idriss Déby personally affected by the conflict became marginalized, the African Union took over the mediation<sup>82</sup> while the crisis began to attract the attention of the international community.

<sup>78</sup> Intergovernmental Authority on Development (Soudan, Érythrée, Djibouti, Ethiopie, Somalie, Kenya, Ouganda)

<sup>79</sup> AYAD, Christophe, *Le Soudan entre guerre et paix*, op. cit., 156.

<sup>80</sup> IYOB, Ruth – KHADIAGALA, Gilbert, M. Sudan – *The Elusive Quest for Peace*, op. cit., 152.

<sup>81</sup> UA – CPS, 28<sup>ème</sup> réunion, op. cit., 6.

<sup>82</sup> IYOB, Ruth – KHADIAGALA, Gilbert, M. Sudan – *The Elusive Quest for Peace*, op. cit., 151-154.

## II.2. Debate over Genocide and Objectives of US Diplomacy in 2004

At the time, when the Darfur crisis broke out, the international community was very involved, in Iraq, Afghanistan, or Ivory Coast (etc.). The European Union launched the first ESDP operations. The Darfur issue remained neglected. While in 2003 the conflict appeared "at the level of diplomatic papers", in 2004 it became mediatized for the whole globe: The tenth anniversary of the Rwandan genocide cast a shadow over the massacres in Darfur and comparisons were made.

The starting point of the real international debate on Darfur dates back to March 2004, when the UN coordinator, Mukesh Kapila, announced that Darfur is *"the worst humanitarian crisis in the world"*.<sup>83</sup> In the United States, on July 22, 2004, Congress declared that in Darfur it is a genocide by Janjaweed militias supported by the government.

In Europe, on September 16, 2004, the European Parliament resolution, by cutting the Gordian knot, described the violence perpetrated by government forces on the civilian population as *"tantamount to genocide"* (Art. 16.). But the decisive blow of the debate was the election campaign of the Bush Administration which considered the Darfur crisis as genocide.<sup>84</sup>

The debate concerning the issue of genocide focused on the question of whether or not it is a genocide on the ethical basis or the crimes have another socio-economic reason. Some claim that civilians were driven from their lands in Darfur on an ethnic basis, and most of the victims belong to about

fifteen non-Arab ethnic groups<sup>85</sup> including the *Fur*, *Zaghawa*, *Massalit*, *Djebel* and *Aranga* communities.<sup>86</sup>

Thus the international community has encountered the problem of defining the violent events in Darfur. Even if it is not legally a genocide<sup>87</sup> (jurists speak rather of crimes against humanity), the political position taken by the American hyper-power has been the subject of international talks. It must be added that *"the death in Darfur without the label 'genocide' would be just another African massacre, that is to say, not much."*<sup>88</sup>

Why did the United States consider the crisis as genocide and Kofi Annan, Secretary General of the UN, categorically denied it?

The three priorities of the Bush administration in Africa are the fight against terrorism, the strengthening of the strategy of containing Islamism and oil investments.<sup>89</sup> As for the American crusade against terrorism after September 11, it is necessary to recall the important role of the National Islamic Front in the Islamic resistance and Bin Laden who transferred his operations from Saudi Arabia to Sudan in the period 1990-96. Sudan could easily become a target of the United States although Hassan al Tourabi, the head of the NIF (National Islamic Front) was imprisoned in 1999 and, after an attempted coup, in March 2004 by President el-Bashir.

<sup>83</sup> „the world's worst humanitarian crisis”

<sup>84</sup> Colin Powell, September 2004

<sup>85</sup> mainly: the Fours, the Zaghawa, the Masalit, the Tounjour, the Berti, the Dajjo, the Meidob and the Bergid; see: TUBIANA, Jérôme, « Le Darfour, un conflit pour la terre? », *op. cit.*, 112.

<sup>86</sup> UA – CPS, 28<sup>ème</sup> réunion, *op. cit.*, 23.

<sup>87</sup> Convention pour la prévention et la répression du crime de génocide en 1948

<sup>88</sup> PRUNIER, Gérard, *Le Darfour – Un génocide ambigu*, Paris, La Table Ronde, 2005(b), 256.

<sup>89</sup> Philippe Hugon, « L'Afrique entre boom pétrolier et trappes à pauvreté et à conflits », Pascal Boniface (dir.), *L'Année stratégique* 2007, Paris, Iris/Dalloz, 2006., 376.

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This context explains the deep antipathy of the American population, the media, NGOs and the Bush administration. A divided, weakened Sudan and the conflict between al-Bashir and Turabi are thus very preferable for the United States and Khartoum could fear, and avoid becoming a target in the future, like Afghanistan and Iraq, the members of the "*Axis of Evil*".<sup>90</sup>

The aim of the international debate around the issue of genocide is that the United States avoids immediately taking responsibility for an intervention but puts the UN under pressure to act and opens several avenues for diplomatic intervention.

Even if it was the United States that did not hesitate to consider the events in Darfur as a genocide, President Bush and his team played on the different ambiguities of the situation.

The problem of Darfur was difficult to interpret by the 2 paradigms of American diplomacy that were based on the North-South conflict in Sudan: the "*Garang lobby*" (senators, humanitarians and auxiliaries of Congress) and the "*group of realists*" (State Department, CIA, DIA).

Finally, "the US administration's interest in Sudan in general and Darfur in particular declined considerably after Bush's re-election and the signing of the CPA in early 2005."<sup>91</sup>

Why this ambiguity regarding US relations with Sudan?

Without being able to discuss all aspects, namely that the exchange of information between US intelligence and the Sudanese **Mukhabarat**<sup>92</sup> dates back to the mid-1990s, or much earlier. In 1993, the Clinton administration put Sudan on the terrorist list - but it did not remove the CIA station from Khartoum until late 1995.

Although Khartoum has been seeking reconciliation since 1996, the mission of the CIA-FBI task force failed in 2000. This may be one of the reasons why US intelligence was poorly informed about the background to 9/11. In 2003 the Mukhabarat transmitted information, considered very important by the State Department concerning the formation of pro-Hussein networks.<sup>93</sup>

But if the Sudanese Mukhabarat is ready to cooperate, moreover it is capable of providing very useful information in the fight against terrorism, what is the real interest of the United States which plays several double games on the theater, under pressure from the Sudanese government which has been trying to stop following the Turabian path since 1999? Especially since the Sudanese secret service could "*serve as the eyes and ears of the CIA*" in Somalia...

<sup>90</sup> TANNER, Victor, « Darfour: racines anciennes, nouvelles virulences », *op. cit.*, 721.

<sup>91</sup> PRUNIER, Gérard, *Le Darfour – Un génocide ambigu*, *op. cit.*, 229-232.

<sup>92</sup> The CIA and FBI sometimes maintained a more friendly relationship with the Mukhabarat than with their French counterparts.: « *They've not only told us who the bad guys were, they've gone out and gotten them for us. Hell, we can't get the French to do that.* »

<sup>93</sup> Ken Silverstein, « Official Pariah Sudan Valuable to America's War on Terrorism – Despite once harboring Bin Laden, Khartoum regime has supplied key intelligence, officials say », *Los Angeles Times*, April 29, 2005.



### II.3. Double Challenge of Humanitarian Aid

Compared to the United States, the diplomacy of the European Union and/or its Member States concerning Sudan seems to be occasional, ad hoc, isolated, sometimes divided and somewhat embarrassed without having a consensus of objectives on the international scene. The Irish Presidency of the European Union declared an embargo (arms, munitions and military equipment) on 28 January 2004 against Sudan.<sup>94</sup>

And as a consequence of the fact that the lowest common denominator for a soft consensus within the EU was humanitarian, the EU General Affairs Council has repeatedly asked the Sudanese government, as on 26 April 2004, to allow completely free access to the region for the UN and for the various humanitarian organisations.<sup>95</sup>

In order to prevent diplomatic pressure that would have forced it to take undesirable political and military measures, Khartoum has applied with considerable efficiency the blackmail by blocking humanitarian missions.<sup>96</sup>

Undoubtedly in a situation where positions have hardened between the combatants, Khartoum has tested the resolve of the international actors. From this diplomacy that resembles with restrictions a political *game of chicken run*, the diplomacy of the EU (fragmented by the autonomous diplomacy of the Member States) without pressure capacity can only have negative results.

Concerning the path of humanitarian aid, several aspects deserve to be mentioned: The belligerents profit remarkably when the access of the population is systematically controlled. How?

In South Sudan, for example, rebels forced humanitarian organizations to set up next to their military bases to prevent government air raids. They often loot food stocks or divert them before distribution. The distribution of aid is only authorized by, or under the coordination of "local committees." The government for its part can veto humanitarian action at any time, for example, by the UN OLS (Operation Lifeline Sudan), which is almost absent from government-controlled areas.<sup>97</sup>

The example of **SRRA** (Sudan Relief and Rehabilitation Association), the "**humanitarian arm**" of the **SPLA in South Sudan**, shows that the combatant parties themselves create and have recognized their own NGOs and humanitarian organizations in order to guarantee for themselves a logistical base for supplies. SRRA even signed an agreement recognizing the OLS, although it is the branch of a belligerent party.

The SPLA was not able to guarantee the supply of its troops by air without such intermediaries. Sometimes this aid was the basis of counter-offensives, when several thousand inhabitants died of hunger. Indeed, on the theater, several humanitarian organizations are far from neutral: the **DI** (*al Da'wa al Islamiya*) and the **IARA** (*Islamic African Relief Agency*), NGOs linked quite strongly to the government and on the other side it is mainly **CFI** (*Christian Fellowship International*) and **CSI** (*Christian Solidarity International*) who fight against conquering Islam.<sup>98</sup>

<sup>94</sup> Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the EU concerning the imposition of an arms embargo on Sudan, January 28, j 2004

<sup>95</sup> Remarks by Minister Brian Cowen at the General Affairs and External Relations Council press conference in Luxembourg, April 26, 2004

<sup>96</sup> PRUNIER, Gérard, *Le Darfour – Un génocide ambigu*, op. cit., 235.

<sup>97</sup> LAVERGNE, Marc – WEISSMANN, Fabrice, « Soudan Qui profite l'aide humanitaire? », WEISSMANN, Fabrice (dir.), *A l'ombre des guerres justes*, Flammarion, Paris, 2003., 160-162.

<sup>98</sup> LAVERGNE, Marc – WEISSMANN, Fabrice, « Soudan - Qui profite l'aide humanitaire? », op. cit., 164-165.

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The third part is the responsibility of governments with regard to humanitarian aid. Below it will be presented in more detail, how the union is the largest contributor of humanitarian aid in the Darfur region.

The role of the EU must be questioned. Why?

The delivery of humanitarian aid to the United States, for example, offers an ideal approach for financing one or the other belligerent, avoiding long debates in the US Congress. On the other hand, humanitarian aid in Africa has its own history with regard to corruption (the linking of sources to donor countries) and secret diplomacy. The European Union should be very attentive on this point. But paradoxically, blackmail through humanitarian aid can serve as an instrument of peace: The warring parties can be forced to negotiate by cutting off humanitarian supplies.<sup>99</sup>

## II.4. European Union: Minimum Consensus with a Divided and Embarrassed Diplomacy

Beyond the consensus on humanitarianism, the biggest problem at the European level was (is) that the EU did not speak with one voice (nor did the Council and the Commission), the opinions and goals of the Member States remained diverse and they preferred to play the bilateral card.

At the time, within the UN, France opposed the adoption of sanctions against Sudan.<sup>100</sup> For Paris, in the words of Mr. Gérard Prunier, *"the only thing that mattered was to save Private Déby"*, that is to say to continue the doctrine of "preserving the stability" of existing regimes (in this case, Chad threatened by the conflicts in Darfur in Sudan) for the simple reason that they exist.

Relations between the Sudanese government and France had been quite close since the 1990s because of common interests (notably the fight against Ugandan leader Yoweri Museveni, the **Carlos affair**,<sup>101</sup> relations at the level of the intelligence services).<sup>102</sup> During the negotiations between Tourabi and Pasqua, France's role as mediator between Sudan, the EU, the United States, and the IMF was also called into question.

France, which provided AML 90 light armored vehicles, Puma helicopters, and 155 mm self-propelled guns for the Sudanese army, is often accused of defending Sudan, especially in Europe, by the IMF of **supporting the Khartoum government with Spot satellite images of the position of the SPLA forces in South Sudan** and for the intervention in the DRC and CAR for a right of passage for Khartoum's troops in order to take the SPLA<sup>103</sup> guerrillas from behind. It is difficult to

<sup>99</sup> LAVERGNE, Marc – WEISSMANN, Fabrice, « Soudan - Qui profite l'aide humanitaire? », *op. cit.*, 167-168.

<sup>100</sup> « France opposes UN Sudan sanctions » (08/07/2004) <http://news.bbc.co.uk>

<sup>101</sup> Ilich Ramírez Sánchez (born 12 October 1949), also known as Carlos the Jackal is a Venezuelan who conducted a series of assassinations and terrorist bombings from 1973 to 1985. In 1994 he was ultimately captured in Sudan and transferred to France, where he was convicted of multiple crimes.

<sup>102</sup> MARCHAL, Roland, *Le Soudan d'un conflit à l'autre*, *op. cit.*, 8.

<sup>103</sup> JULLIARD, Jacques « Soudan : le marché de la honte », *Le Nouvel Observateur*, September 1, 1994

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ignore these facts when looking for the causes of French opposition.

Berlin deplored human rights violations in rhetorical exchanges, the Scandinavians and the Dutch remained silent even though Sweden preferred to negotiate alone with the AU on the use of financial aid for AMIS.<sup>104</sup> London intends to follow Washington, which was initially difficult because of the ambiguity of the US policy. Later, the two Anglo-Saxon countries harmonized their efforts for a decision within the UN CoS to accelerate the expansion of the UNMIS mandate for Darfur.

In August 2004, in order to rehabilitate his image shaken in the debate on Iraq, Tony Blair launched the idea of deploying a British military force of 5,000 men from the *12th Mechanized Infantry Brigade* with 2,000 people in support (logistics, experts etc.) via Djibouti (French base) in Darfur, which was not officially withdrawn until June 2005.<sup>105</sup>

However, some claim that the political will for military intervention existed but that the European Union would have been incapable of acting without the help of the United States and/or NATO.<sup>106</sup> According to a striking criticism concerning European diplomacy in Sudan, *"the EU has (...) adopted too timid a discourse towards the belligerents and the AU. The Council was and remains too cautious, not demanding enough in terms of the financial support provided. The EU has only given advice but never made demands (...). The result is that the advice given by European staff has been dismissed, the lack of firmness of its authors destroying all credibility."*<sup>107</sup>

## II.5. Khartoum's Rearmament and Abuja Peace Process

In August 2004, the Sudanese Ministry of Defense announced the purchase of 12 MIG-29 UB of Russian origin,<sup>108</sup> a contract confirmed by Russia.<sup>109</sup> Although the MIG-29s are intended for air-to-air combat, this aircraft also has an air-to-ground capability. Thus, the air capacity of the Sudanese government has been considerably reassessed in the face of the Darfur conflict and in relation to Chad. The MIG-29s can be deployed on the El Obeid air base (Northern Kordofan, next to the oil pipeline). These combat aircraft complement the air potential of the Mil-24 Hind cannons and the ground-to-ground missiles deployed by Khartoum in early 2004 against rebel forces whose arsenal is incapable of responding.<sup>110</sup>



It is in this sub-chapter that we must discuss another delicate matter concerning Russia and... Lithuania, a candidate country for membership of the European Union at that time. Despite the inter-

<sup>104</sup> MOLINIÉ, Marie, « La coopération entre l'UE et l'UA au Darfour », Tourillon, September 22, 2006, [www.tourillon.org](http://www.tourillon.org)

<sup>105</sup> WILLIAMS, Paul D., « The African Union mission in Sudan », *Peacekeeping*, volume 13, Number 2, June 2006. 173.

<sup>106</sup> PRUNIER, Gérard, *Le Darfour – Un génocide ambigu*, op. cit., 232-234.

<sup>107</sup> MOLINIÉ, Marie, *La coopération entre l'UE et l'UA au Darfour*, op. cit.

<sup>108</sup> « MiG-29 Fulcrum High Performance Combat Aircraft, Russia », *Airforcetechnology.com*, <http://www.airforce-technology.com/projects/mig29/> (Accessed: February 10, 2007)

<sup>109</sup> « Russia Arms Producers See Sudan as Major Client », *MosNews.com*, October 22, 2004. <http://www.mosnews.com/money/2004/10/22/sudanarms.shtml>

<sup>110</sup> A nearby refinery supplies 10,000 bars/day of aviation fuel. This fuel is supplied by the oil companies Talisman (Canada), Petronas (Malaysia) and China National Petroleum Corp. Source : SMITH, Charles R., « Russian MiGs in Sudan », *Newsmax.com*, January 4, 2002, <http://www.newsmax.com/archives/articles/2002/1/4/155909.shtml>

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national embargo against Sudan and the EU's reluctance (but well before the embargo declared by the Commission in 2004), **Yuri Borisov**, founder of the company **Avia Baltika**, blackmailed Rolandas Paksas, elected head of the Lithuanian state in January 2003, whose presidential campaign was mainly financed by this Russian businessman: Already in 2002, Avia Baltika exported at least one military aircraft, and Borisov was also suspected of having sold spare parts for military helicopters to Sudan.

What is the role of President **Rolandas Paksas** in this affair?

In return for his financial assistance, Borisov (then under the name: Borisovas) requested tax breaks for his company and a title of advisor to the president, as well as honorary decorations, but he only received Lithuanian citizenship.<sup>111</sup> Further proof that the old relations between Russia and the COMECON countries have been maintained and exploited by the Russian networks in the management of the country's foreign policy.

In a paradoxical situation, in the shadow of this event in August, and the permanent violation of the ceasefire agreement signed in N'Djamena, without consequences, the new president of the African Union since July 2004, Olusegun Obasanjo (Nigerian) started the Abuja peace process.

The UN set up the **JIM (Joint Implementation Mechanism)** but expressed its refusal of a robust military action. The mediators proposed to discuss these humanitarian, security, political and economic issues while the parties preferred the humanitarian and security aspects. The rebels were against the neglect of the political dimension of the conflict which was rather favorable to Khartoum.

The Sudanese government proposed the revision of the terms of the N'Djamena Ceasefire Agreement and the mutual disarmament of the militias and the Janjaweed, while the rebels mainly supported the unilateral disarmament of the *Janjaweed* and favoured the humanitarian and security aspects.<sup>112</sup>

In Abéché and Abuja, the Europeans supported the two most important demands of the rebel groups: the idea of establishing a no-fly zone over Darfur (to prevent Sudanese air raids against the civilian population) and the establishment of an international commission of inquiry.<sup>113</sup>

In the second round of negotiations in Abuja on 23 August 2004, the special representatives of Canada, the United States, Norway, the European Union (Dutch presidency), the United Kingdom and France also participated. Negotiations with European partners on substantive issues were conducted under the chairmanship of the African Union Special Envoy, **Hamid Algabid**, with the support of Chad and the co-mediation of Nigeria and Libya.<sup>114</sup> Canada declared itself ready to offer equipment and 1,500 well-equipped soldiers to assist the African Union in Darfur, and committed to seconding a large contingent of Canadian soldiers to form part of this force.<sup>115</sup>

However, in September 2004, the Abuja process was disrupted when Khartoum openly stated that the Naivasha security talks (peace process between North and South Darfur) would be blocked if it were put under pressure on the Darfur issue.<sup>116</sup> By taking advantage of the election campaign in the United States, this blackmail could well have had no consequences.

<sup>111</sup> Antoine Jacob, « Accusé de liens avec les milieux mafieux russes, le président de Lituanie est menacé de destitution », *Le Monde*, November 29, 2003. 5.

<sup>112</sup> IYOB, Ruth – KHADIAGALA, Gilbert, M., *Sudan – The Elusive Quest for Peace*, op. cit., 153-154.

<sup>113</sup> PRUNIER, Gérard, *Le Darfour – Un génocide ambigu*, op. cit., 234.

<sup>114</sup> UA – CPS, 17<sup>ème</sup> réunion, op. cit., 3-4.

<sup>115</sup> Chambre de commun, Ottawa, Canada 38<sup>e</sup> Législature, 1<sup>re</sup> Session, November 25, 2004

<sup>116</sup> « Dispelling the Myths: Genocide in Darfur », *Waging Peace*, October 2006, [http://www.wagingpeace.info/files/20061025\\_Dispelling\\_the\\_Myths\\_Web.pdf](http://www.wagingpeace.info/files/20061025_Dispelling_the_Myths_Web.pdf)



## II.6. Hesitant UN and Initiatives of EU and African Actors

To understand the role of the UN in the conflict, we must go back to the summer of 2004. In June 2004, Kofi Annan appointed **Jan Pronk as Special Representative**, and launched UNAMIS, a preparatory mission in Sudan by Resolution 1547.<sup>117</sup>

After the establishment of a National Commission of Inquiry by the Sudanese government in May 2004, but following attacks by the Janjaweed against Yassin, Hashaba and Gallab, the UN decided, with the very favourable opinion of the EU - to set up an international commission of inquiry by Resolution 1564 (18 September 2004) of the CoS.

The Commission of Inquiry, chaired by Antonio Cassese of Italy who was the first President of the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY),<sup>118</sup> recommended that those responsible be brought to justice before the ICC (International Criminal Court).<sup>119</sup>

On 29 September 2004, **Gutbi al-Mahdi** was welcomed by Mr Solana in Brussels.<sup>120</sup> The official communiqués do not allow us to know the details of this meeting which, in our opinion, should have been very interesting: Gutbi al Mahdi, at the time advisor to President al-Bashir, was one of the "fathers" of the Mukhabarat.<sup>121</sup> He also promoted cooperation between the Mukhabarat, the CIA and the FBI.<sup>122</sup>

On 9 January 2005, the Luxembourg Presidency of the EU expressed its strong concern about a possible negative influence of the North-South peace process in Sudan, the Darfur crisis, and by the same logic, it welcomed the decision of Mr Garang (president of SPLM/A) to attend the Abuja process.<sup>123</sup>

Then the Presidency condemned the bombing of Darfur by the Sudanese air force between 13 and 26 January and warned Sudan that EU-Sudan relations depend on the respect of the N'Djamena Ceasefire Agreement.<sup>124</sup> To regularise the disagreements within the SLM/A, European Union suggested convening a meeting for reconciliation.<sup>125</sup>

On 11 April 2005, at the EU-Africa Summit, the European Union reinforced its decision to continue supporting AMIS according to the list of priorities drafted by the African Union. Both sides stressed the importance of the civilian component of the mission and the rapid complementation of the police component of the mission.<sup>126</sup>

It was only in the spring of 2005, when the UN virtually took over from the AU in the role of mediator after the SLM refused to continue attending the negotiations until AMIS assumed enhanced protection of civil society in Darfur. By Resolution 1593, the UN CoS decided "to refer to the

<sup>117</sup> le 11 juin 2004

<sup>118</sup> UA – CPS, 17<sup>ème</sup> réunion, *op. cit.*, 22. In March 2005 the United States and its allies proposed that the International Criminal Court deal with the crimes in Darfur.

<sup>119</sup> Déclaration de la présidence au nom de l'Union européenne sur le rapport de la Commission internationale d'enquête sur le Darfour Bruxelles, February 7, 2005, 6072/2/05 REV 2 (Presse 19) P 008/05

<sup>120</sup> Agenda Archive, September 29, 2004, <http://www.consilium.europa.eu>

<sup>121</sup> « Profile : Gutbi al-Mahdi », *History Commons*, February 5, 1998 [http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=gutbi\\_al-mahdi](http://www.historycommons.org/entity.jsp?entity=gutbi_al-mahdi)

<sup>122</sup> Ken Silverstein, « Official Pariah Sudan Valuable to America's War on Terrorism – Despite once harboring Bin Laden, Khartoum regime has supplied key intelligence, officials say », *Los Angeles Times*, April 29, 2005, <http://articles.latimes.com/2005/apr/29/world/fg-sudan29>

<sup>123</sup> Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on Sudan – Signing of the comprehensive peace agreement on 9 January 2005 in Nairobi

<sup>124</sup> « The Council condemns the bombings of villages in Sudan », *EU2005.lu*, January 31, 2005, <http://www.eu2005.lu>

<sup>125</sup> UA – CPS, 28<sup>ème</sup> réunion, *op. cit.*, p. 7.

<sup>126</sup> European Union-Africa Ministerial Meeting, Final communiqué, April 11, 2005

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*Prosecutor of the International Criminal Court the situation in Darfur since 1 July 2002.*"<sup>127</sup>

The resumption of the talks was aggravated by mediation initiatives by Libya and Egypt, which were reminiscent of North African initiatives for South Sudan. In May 2005 Libya persuaded the representatives of the SLM and JEM that negotiation with the government was important without preconditions. Libya, by bringing together the heads of state of Chad, Gabon, Nigeria, Egypt and Sudan, managed to transfer the negotiations to Abuja (Nigeria).<sup>128</sup>

Taking into account the criticisms of its mediation, the African Union tasked **Salim A. Salim**, former Secretary General of the OAU, with leading the mediation in Abuja.<sup>129</sup> The European Union guaranteed its full confidence in the AU mediation. But the discussions resumed on 10 June focused on secondary issues, on the observer status of the representatives of Chad, accused by the JEM of supporting Khartoum, and of Eritrea, accused by Khartoum of supporting the rebels. In addition, the **internal rivalry within the SLM increased between President A. W. M. al-Nur and Mr. Minawi**. The latter's supporters refused to recognise al-Nur as their representative.<sup>130</sup>

On 29 June 2005, the EU confirmed its confidence in the African Union's mediation of the Abuja process and threatened with sanctions provided for in CdS Res. 1591 all those who obstructed these negotiations. The Union also called on the

adversaries to assist the EU mission and not to disturb the mission of humanitarian organisations.<sup>131</sup>

In July 2005, Libya organised a reconciliation conference, without success. But on 5 July, in Abuja, the parties signed the Declaration of Principles for the Resolution of the Sudanese Conflict in Darfur. The British Presidency of the EU was convinced that only "*political dialogue and reconciliation will bring an end to the conflict and the large-scale humanitarian crisis in Darfur.*"<sup>132</sup>

On 18 July 2005, the Council of the European Union appointed **Pekka Haavisto** as **EU Special Representative in Sudan**. Mr Haavisto is also the Head of the UNEP Great Lakes Force. The EUSR is mandated for 6 months, he leads all EU activities concerning Sudan, facilitates the implementation of the Peace Agreement between the Government of Sudan and the SPLM/A and coordinates EU support for AMIS and in supporting the political process in Abuja, facilitates the implementation of the agreements between the parties, maintains the relationship with Khartoum and promotes South-South dialogue.

The EUSR works under the authority of the SG/HR and is accountable to the Commission for expenditure. Contact with the Council is ensured by the PSC. For the coordination of EU support to AMIS, the EUSR must be supported by the political, military and police advisers of the **ACC (EU Ad Hoc Coordination Cell in Addis Ababa)**.

However, according to Article 4 of the Council Joint Action, this "*police adviser and the military*

<sup>127</sup> Résolution 1593 du CdS de l'ONU (31/03/2005), Article 1er; Sudan has not (yet) ratified the Rome Statute which established the ICC on 17 July 1998 and which entered into force on 1 July 2002.

<sup>128</sup> IYOB, Ruth – KHADIAGALA, Gilbert, M. *Sudan – The Elusive Quest for Peace*, op. cit., 156.

<sup>129</sup> Déclaration de la présidence au nom de l'Union européenne sur la reprise des pourparlers d'Abuja, Bruxelles, June 29, 2005 10680/05 (Presse 176) P 067/05

<sup>130</sup> IYOB, Ruth – KHADIAGALA, Gilbert, M. *Sudan – The Elusive Quest for Peace*, op. cit., 156.

<sup>131</sup> Declaration by the Presidency on behalf of the European Union on the resumption of the Abuja talks, *Conseil de l'Union européenne*, June 29, 2005,

[http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms\\_Data/docs/pressData/.../85528.pdf](http://www.consilium.europa.eu/ueDocs/cms_Data/docs/pressData/.../85528.pdf)

<sup>132</sup> Déclaration de la présidence au nom de l'Union européenne concernant la signature, le 5 juillet, d'une déclaration de principes pour le règlement du conflit soudanais au Darfour Bruxelles, July 8, 2005, 11022/05 (Presse 184) P 070/0

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*adviser shall not receive instructions from the EUSR regarding the management of expenditure relating respectively to the police and military components of the EU supporting action referred to in paragraph 1. The EUSR shall have no responsibility in this respect. »<sup>133</sup>*

In the autumn, the UN accused the SLM of the massacre of around 100 civilians and three AMIS personnel and the kidnapping of AU personnel. After the unsuccessful talks, the debate resumed at the end of November 2005. The statement of the British EU Presidency proposed that the opponents sign another, more specific ceasefire agreement. The EU Special Representative attended two sessions of the seventh round of negotiations in Abuja.<sup>134</sup>

On 22 December 2005 the EU Presidency welcomed the progress on wealth sharing since the beginning of the session. However, there was very little progress on power sharing and security arrangements. The EU doubted the willingness of the SLM/SLA and JEM negotiators to discuss these issues seriously.<sup>135</sup>

## II.7. The biggest challenge facing the peace process: Debate around the AU presidency

In January 2006, the debates on the presidency of the African Union revolved around the following question: how to avoid such a delicate situation that Omar al Bashir, President of Sudan, becomes President of the African Union. An organization that fulfills the role of mediator in the conflict in Darfur.<sup>136</sup> Chad (in a state of belligerence with Sudan) declared its official opposition to the Sudanese presidency.<sup>137</sup>

The international community sought to find an alternative to the AU mission by a peace mission of 20,000 men with the support of NATO. Khartoum of course strongly opposed these initiatives and took advantage of the support of its faithful friends, Russia and China within the Security Council.<sup>138</sup>

It should be added that at the time Sudan's main suppliers were China (20.1%) before Saudi Arabia (7.5%) then India (5.1%) and Khartoum's main customers were also China (53.3%), Japan (13.4%) and South Africa (4.9%). In addition, China had significant oil concessions in Sudan and it is the Chinese who are building the pipeline and refinery located north of Khartoum.<sup>139</sup>

They buy 70% of the oil produced in Sudan and this oil covers 10% of their needs. Since 1969, the Chinese have been selling weapons (fighter planes, tanks, helicopters, anti-tank mines, ammunition) to Sudan and are investing massively in Sudan's military industry. Some observers claim to have seen several Chinese missiles launched by government troops in Darfur. This may explain China's opposition

<sup>133</sup> Council Joint Action 2005/556/CFSP of 18 July 2005 appointing a Special Representative of the European Union for Sudan

<sup>134</sup> EU Presidency statement on Darfur, December 21, 2005

<sup>135</sup> Déclaration de la présidence au nom de l'Union européenne sur les pourparlers de paix qui se tiennent à Abuja concernant le Darfour Bruxelles, le 22 décembre 2005, 16058/1/05 REV 1 (Presse 371) P 155/05

<sup>136</sup> OTTLIK Judit, « Szudáni javaslat árnyéka vetül az Afrika csúcsra », *Magyar Nemzet*, January 23, 2006, <http://www.mno.hu>

<sup>137</sup> *Chad and the Darfur conflict intertwined*, Human Right Watch, February 2006,

<http://www.hrw.org/backgrounder/africa/chad0206/2.htm>

<sup>138</sup> IYOB, Ruth – KHADIAGALA, Gilbert, M. *Sudan – The Elusive Quest for Peace*, op. cit. 159.

<sup>139</sup> « Disputed Oil Production in Southern Sudan » (Kristina Bergmann, *Neue Zürcher Zeitung*, Zurich, Switzerland), *World Press Review*, July 2001, Vol. 48, No.7

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to the peace process. President Hu has always expressed his disagreement when it comes to a decision on an embargo or sanctions against Sudan in the UN Security Council until April 2006 when China abstained.<sup>140</sup>

As for the AU presidency, the AU parties eventually found a compromise among themselves: Denis Sassou-Nguessou (of Congo) became the AU chair who pledged to elect al-Bashir as president in 2007. (But in 2007, John Kufuor, the president of Ghana, became the AU chair.) And to end the tensions between Chad and Sudan, the new African Union chair and Libyan leader Muammar al-Qaddafi took charge of mediation, and the adversaries signed the Tripoli Agreement on February 8, 2006.

As for relations between Sudan and Libya as mediator, it should be recalled that Qaddafi provided weapons to Arab militias, as well as to those who came from Sudan to fight against the regime of Hissène Habré (1978-1990), although this abundance of weapons no longer exists and at the time Libya was one of the mediators in the conflicts between Sudan and Chad.<sup>141</sup>

## II.8. DPA, a stillborn peace agreement – Takeover plan of UNMIS in Darfur

In 2006, during the last months of Kofi Annan's term, UN diplomacy intensified. According to paragraph 3 of resolution 1591 (2005), the UN Security Council imposed sanctions (asset freezes and travel bans) for the first time against four Sudanese leaders,<sup>142</sup> and Pekka Haavisto stated that tensions between the UN and the Government of Sudan were hampering humanitarian activities in the Darfur region. Omar al-Bashir opposed the visit of Jan Egeland, the UN *emergency relief coordinator* in Darfur. An official from the Sudanese embassy in Washington referred to anti-UN demonstrations in Darfur.<sup>143</sup>

On 5 May 2006, as a culmination of the AU mediation, the Parties signed the **Darfur Peace Agreement (DPA)** and the **Declaration of Commitment (DoC, 8 June)**. The **DDDC (Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation)** system was established under the auspices of the AU, UN, EU and LAS.

In addition, representatives of civil society and tribal leaders are also members of the Preparatory Committee (PrepCom). The DDDC was a consultative mechanism, its decision-making power was limited to special areas. The DDDC was responsible for popularizing and implementing the Agreement, inter-communal and inter-tribal reconciliation, facilitating the return of refugees,

<sup>140</sup> (Russia and Qatar also abstained. US diplomacy was mainly trying to pressure China.) Kristina Nwazota, « China-Sudan trade relations complicate Darfur crisis », *Online NewsHour*, April 25, 2006.

[http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/china-darfur\\_04-25-06.html](http://www.pbs.org/newshour/updates/china-darfur_04-25-06.html)

<sup>141</sup> AYAD, Christophe, « Le Soudan entre guerre et paix », *op. cit.*, 152.

<sup>142</sup> General Gafar Mohammed Elhassan, Commander of the Sudanese Armed Forces Western Military Region; Sheikh Musa Hilal, leader of the Janjaweed Jalul Tribe of North Darfur and on the other side Adam Yacub Shant, commander of the SLA and Gabriel Abdul Kareem Badri, Commander of JEM; Source : S/RES/1672 China, Russia and Qatar abstained; More generally, China said it was against the principle of sanctions; Source: Darfour : le Conseil de sécurité impose pour la première fois des sanctions à quatre Soudanais <http://www.un.org/apps/newsFr/storyF.asp?NewsID=12261&Cr=soudan&Cr1=conseil>

<sup>143</sup> "We think that having U.N. troops now in Darfur is going to be part of the problem rather than part of the solution," said Salah. "You have seen here demonstrations in Nyala, which is the capital of Darfur. There are demonstrations in many places in Sudan. So in such a hostile environment is it wise at this time to have U.N. troops in Darfur? If anything happens to these troops isn't it the government of Sudan who is going to be blamed?" Source : Meredith Buel, « EU Concerned About Tension Between Sudan, UN Aid Workers », *Voice of America*, April 5, 2006,

<http://www.voanews.com/english/news/a-13-EU-Concerned-About-Tension-between-Sudan-UN-Aid-Workers.html>



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human security, preserving the multi-ethnic character of Darfur (etc.).<sup>144</sup>

Those who opposed the Agreement were in the refugee camps where the majority of the population supports SLA/Abdulwahid El Nour. The parties of the **National Salvation Front (NRF)** formation stood against the supporters of the Agreement, the Khartoum government and SLM/A - Minni Minawi. The talks were particularly aggravated by the progressive fragmentation of the rebel groups. (G19 etc.)

However, the EU and NATO have guaranteed the continuity of strategic airlift, and Canada has guaranteed the continuity of tactical airlift, for the AMIS mission. The mission, despite significant logistical reinforcement, has continued to face significant financial and communication difficulties.

In addition, torture has become common practice and the AU mission is not mandated to intervene in the internal affairs of the movements.

Even AMIS (like humanitarian organizations) has obviously become the target of the non-signatories of the DPA: the JEM has threatened to shoot down AMIS aircraft and the non-signatories accused AMIS of being biased towards the signatories of the DPA. The worst is that the signatories refused to deal with the violations reported by the non-signatories and since the rupture the CFC has ceased to function normally.<sup>145</sup>

Kofi Annan's statement in October 2006 was proof that AMIS, expanded several times, was proving to be ineffective alone in controlling the situation in Darfur: *"It has now been three months since the*

*Darfur Peace Agreement was signed, but instead of reconciliation and the restoration of confidence, we are witnessing a resurgence of violence and greater polarization.*"<sup>146</sup>

This is why, according to Resolution 1706, *"UNMIS will be reinforced by military personnel of up to 17,300 troops and by a corresponding civilian component of up to 3,300 civilian police and up to 16 formed police units."*<sup>147</sup> The plan to launch this "expanded UNMIS" for Darfur, which is more robust than AMIS, was therefore at the time very recent.

The big problem was that Khartoum opposed to the implementation of UN resolutions, even though it agreed in October 2006<sup>148</sup> to UNMIS's logistical and technical support for AMIS, as provided for in CoS Resolution 1590 (24 March 2005). The diplomatic skirmish entered a new phase when on 23 October 2006 the **Sudanese Foreign Minister unilaterally declared that the mission of the UN Special Representative, Jan Pronk, had "ended"** and asked him to leave the country within 72 hours.

On 21 November 2006 Kofi Annan declared that Sudan had decided to authorise the UN-AU "hybrid" mission in Darfur.<sup>149</sup> But the talks ended without any concrete results: once Sudan had given its authorisation, it withdrew it the next day. In 2007, violent attacks against AMIS increased and caused significant losses. Khartoum's reaction as the mission's patron was also typical: It had a village destroyed by the Janjaweed when the population was massacred.

The reaction of UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon remained moderate. In February, new waves of population displacement began as a result of

<sup>144</sup> DPA Chapter Four: Darfur-Darfur Dialogue and Consultation, Article 31

<sup>145</sup> Union Africaine – Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité, 63<sup>ème</sup> réunion, September 18, 2006, New York, 8-9., 13.

<sup>146</sup> « L'insécurité n'a jamais été aussi grande, estime Kofi Annan dans son dernier rapport sur le Darfour », *Centre d'Actualités de l'ONU*, le 05 octobre 2006, <http://www.un.org/apps/newsFr/storyF.asp?NewsID=13038&Cr=soudan&Cr1=darfour>

<sup>147</sup> S/RES/1706 (August 31, 2006)

<sup>148</sup> « Darfour: Kofi Annan salue la réponse positive du Soudan à l'initiative de l'ONU d'appuyer la force de l'UA », *Centre d'Actualités de l'ONU*, October 6, 2006, <http://www.un.org/apps/newsFr/storyF.asp?NewsID=13047&Cr=darfour&Cr1=annan>

<sup>149</sup> « Annan describes Sudanese agreement to hybrid force in Darfur as 'turning point' », *UN News Centre*, November 21, 2006, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=20687&Cr=sudan&Cr1>

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persistent attacks by government militias and the SLA/MM faction led by Minni Minawi. Aerial bombardments by government forces have resumed.<sup>150</sup>

The ICC has declared Ahmad Muhammad Harun, former Deputy Minister of Interior in the Sudanese government, and Ali Kushayb, leader of the *Janjaweed* militia, responsible for the concert of crimes against the civilian population in Darfur.<sup>151</sup>

However, in 2007, the important changes on the international scene regarding the Darfur crisis were the result of the following factors:

## 1.

Firstly **Chinese diplomacy was activated** regarding Sudan to improve its image in the run-up to the 2008 Beijing Olympic Games. Chinese President Hu Jintao began his third official visit to Africa and after Cameroon and Liberia he arrived in Sudan on February 2 to convince al-Bashir to accept the sending of a joint UN-AU peacekeeping force to Sudan. On the subject, Chinese policy remained active throughout 2007. But China *"which exports weapons to Sudan, maintains however that it does not send them to war regions"*.<sup>152</sup>

On **31 July 2007**, UNAMID, the hybrid UN-AU mission was finally **authorised by UNSC Resolution 1769** after being approved by the Government of Sudan on 12 June. The planned strength was 19,555 military personnel, 6,432 police officers, and a significant civilian component, meaning that this mission will be **the largest mission in the history of the UN** since its creation.

One of the two components of the mission was the **Light Support Package** deployed in July 2007 whose personnel (105 military officers, 34 police advisers and 48 civilians) are tasked with strengthening the management capacity of AMIS.

The **Heavy Support Package** was the UN component intended to reinforce AMIS with 2,250 military personnel, 721 police officers and 1,136 civilians. The deployment was planned for the second half of 2007, but on December 31, 2007 there were only 9,065 personnel in theater.<sup>153</sup> All this reminds us of the difficulties of AMIS, which will be discussed later, and makes us skeptical about the effectiveness of the mission. Moreover, among the most important contributors<sup>154</sup> were neighboring countries like Kenya (which would need help from the international community because of the recent riots; with military personnel), Uganda, and Egypt (with police personnel) which violated the principles of the Brahimi Report, often cited by the UN and the EU. We still find China there, but Russia did not want to participate.

## 2.

A second important factor is the election of President Nicolas **Sarkozy in France**, in May 2007. In his electoral program, the crisis management in Darfur was a relevant element from the beginning. Thanks to the new momentum of the President and his Minister of Foreign Affairs Bernard Kouchner, the idea of a European operation to stabilize the Darfur/Chad/CAR region was born in July 2007. **EU Joint Action No. 677 on the EUFOR Chad/CAR**

<sup>150</sup> « Soudan : les violences font 46.000 déplacés supplémentaires au mois de janvier », *Centre d'Actualités de l'ONU*, February, 22 2007, <http://www.un.org/apps/newsFr/storyF.asp?NewsID=13701&Cr=soudan&Cr1=OCHA>

<sup>151</sup> « CPI : un ministre et un chef de milice soudanais seraient responsables de crimes contre l'humanité au Darfour », *Centre d'Actualités de l'ONU*, February 27, 2007, <http://www.un.org/french/newscentre/>

<sup>152</sup> « Hu Jintao en tournée en Afrique pour consolider la présence économique chinoise sur le continent », *Le Monde*, February 2, 2007, [www.lemonde.fr](http://www.lemonde.fr)

<sup>153</sup> UNAMID, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unamid/index.html>

<sup>154</sup> Military personnel contributors: China, Gambia, Kenya, Nigeria, Rwanda, Senegal, South Africa; and those who have not deployed forces as of 31 December 2007: Bangladesh, Burkina Faso, Egypt, Ethiopia, Ghana, Malawi, Mali, Nepal, Netherlands, Pakistan, Thailand; Police personnel contributors: Bangladesh, Canada, Egypt, Finland, Gambia, Germany, Ghana, Jordan, Madagascar, Malaysia, Nepal, Nigeria, Sierra Leone, South Africa, Sweden, Tanzania, Turkey, Uganda, and Zambia

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operation was born on October 15, 2007, based on UN Security Council Resolution 1778.<sup>155</sup>

According to the mandate, this force of 3,000-4,000 people was intended to stabilize the border region between Chad, CAR and Sudan/Darfur<sup>156</sup> and secure the Darfur refugee camps (250,000 refugees in Chad; 30,000 in CAR, these two countries were engaged rather alongside the SLM/A) and the UN mission in Chad and CAR (MINURCAT).

Between the mandate and the objectives of the operation there is an important difference: **French military documents emphasize that the most important objective is to secure Chad** which is in contradiction with a purely humanitarian mission.

It seemed to us that lessons learned from EUFOR DRC will be used. Although the OQG/OHQ (Lieutenant General **Patrick NASH**, Irish) and the FQG/FHQ (French General **Jean-Philippe Ganascia**) were established by two nations which was strongly advised against by General **Christian Damay**, commander of EUFOR DRC forces.<sup>157</sup>

The FHQ and the OHQ was also in Paris at Mont Valérien.<sup>158</sup> The deployment of EUFOR Chad/RCA has been delayed and has not been completed during the writing of this report.

(We wrote in 2006) it is still premature to know whether UNAMID can become effective or not. We knew that even the considerably reinforced MONUC was encountering insurmountable difficulties in the DRC where the European presence was essential to secure certain regions.

We assumed that if in the near future the deployment of EUFOR Chad/RCA can be completed, the forces will be fully occupied with the stabilisation

of Chad and perhaps the CAR, even if the exchange of information between the different missions (UNAMID - MINURCAT - EUFOR Chad/CAR) will be essential for the effective stabilisation of the region.

<sup>155</sup> September 25, 2007.

<sup>156</sup> In Chad: Wadi Fira, Ouaddai, Salamat in CAR: Vakaga, Haut-Kotto

<sup>157</sup> Duffort, Benoit, « L'Opération EUFOR RD Congo », *Revue du CERPESC*, December 5, 2007, 1-3., <http://pesd.visuuart.eu/?q=revuecerpesc>

<sup>158</sup> Turke, Andras, *A darfuri krízis. Az Európai Unió tapasztalatai és tervei a térségben és az induló EUFOR Csád/KAK művelet*, Newsletter, Hungarian Institute of International Affairs, December 7, 2007, (*The Darfur crisis, the experiences and projects of the EU in the region is EUFOR Chad/CAR*), [https://europavarietas.org/files/MKI\\_hirlevel\\_2007-10TurkeDarfour.pdf](https://europavarietas.org/files/MKI_hirlevel_2007-10TurkeDarfour.pdf)



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## III.

### **Operational management of Darfur crisis**

*« African solution to African problems » - with  
international methods and resources*



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The analysis mentioned the presence of many actors around the diplomatic management of the crisis in Darfur and an ambiguous result (except the humanitarian intervention) which is manifested by an intervention of the AU on the theater with the massive support of the international community.

Compared to the debate on the international scene, this part is devoted to the practice on the theater: what has been achieved, what was the concrete effect of the negotiations on the Darfur theater. How has the cooperation on the ground worked?

Was the idea of deploying AMIS on the theater really the only possible solution? Between the real circumstances in 2004? Or rather a relief of international diplomacy behind the slogan *African solution to African problems*?

The issue of the gradual strengthening of AMIS can be interpreted differently. Is it really about the considerable commitments?

Or is the credibility of several international actors, influenced by public will, at stake?

It is then necessary to act but without risking too much what is an essential element of *Realpolitik*.

What was the role of European diplomacy in this orchestra and at what levels is it present?

Is the structure and activity of the chain of command in harmony with the effectiveness of the troops in Darfur?

What was the weight of the EU compared to other actors and is its representation directly proportional to its influence on the peace process.

How is the EU's financial support channelled? Are the different actors cooperative or not?

Why and how did NATO also take charge of tactical air transport?

And finally, should the future of AMIS be questioned, the reinforcement of the mission or its integration into UNMIS, the UN mission in South Sudan.

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## III.1. AMIS, African Union's First Civil-Military Mission

The African Union, the legitimate successor of the Organization of African Unity (OAU), has launched very ambitious projects for the African continent especially in 2003, since the Nigerian presidency of Olusegun Obasanjo and his Malian Secretary General, Alpha Konare.

Konare envisaged a strategic plan of the African Union of 1.7 billion dollars, to create a Pan-African Parliament (in South Africa), a permanent international court, a permanent fund for peace and a professional army.

The plan was developed, and but it was disenchantment, there was still a budget of 158 million dollars, although **the first budget of the AU in 2003, was 43 million dollars of which 26 million were not paid by the member states.** The AMIS operation must be examined in this context.<sup>159</sup>

After the establishment of the first full mission **AMIB (African Mission in Burundi, 04/2003)**, a military mission par excellence with a limited civilian component (3335+40), the AU launched AMIS under a UN mandate (Res. 1564). AMIS was the first quasi-civilian-military operation of the African Union.<sup>160</sup>

In June 2004 it was a relatively small and immobile international observation mission to verify the ceasefire of 8 April 2004. It is obvious that such a mission was not mandated to prevent atrocities against civilians. Since the second phase, tactical transport and reconnaissance have been guaranteed by the European Union and NATO. The operation was 100% financed by foreign donors.<sup>161</sup>

Given the modest capabilities and varied experiences in a more easily controlled theatre, why did the AU take on the responsibility of crisis management in this theatre? The answer must be sought in the troubled international scene at the time.

In the summer of 2004, the international community faced a dilemma: how to intervene in Darfur? the United States, the United Kingdom and other powers were engaged elsewhere, as we saw in the previous chapter. The African Union was the only one capable of intervening, with the financial and logistical support of the international community.

**Article 4(h) of the new AU charter**, adapted in 2002 (unlike the OAU) **authorized the Union to intervene in each of its member states to stop war crimes, crimes against humanity and genocide.** Thus the culture of non-intervention is replaced by the **culture of non-indifference** and several scenarios have been examined: from military advice for a political mission (Scenario 1) to AU intervention (Scenario 6).<sup>162</sup>

As for the UN Security Council, it put Khartoum under diplomatic pressure to facilitate the transport of humanitarian aid. In October 2005, IGAD was ready to send a force of 10,500 people to Sudan, but it lacked the necessary experience, financial resources and capacities.

As for the AMIS mandate, the AU proposals were too ambitious: the establishment of a full peacekeeping force, intended to protect civil society, neutralize the *Janjaweed* and facilitate humanitarian missions. But Khartoum was absolutely against a strong mandate.<sup>163</sup>

<sup>159</sup> PRUNIER, Gérard, *Le Darfour – Un génocide ambigu*, op. cit., 238-239.

<sup>160</sup> With African ambitions to develop it into a real CIMIC mission. Source: CIMIC in UN and African Peace Operations: Modules , ACMC Programme, ACCORD 2006, South Africa

<sup>161</sup> MONACO, Annalisa – GOURLAY, Catriona, « Support for the African Union in Darfur : a test for EU-NATO strategic partnership », *European Security Review*, ISIS Europe, Nr. 26, June 2005, 2.

<sup>162</sup> WILLIAMS, Paul D., « The African Union mission in Sudan », *Peacekeeping*, vol. 13., Nr. 2, June 2006, 173.

<sup>163</sup> IYOB, Ruth – KHADIAGALA, Gilbert, M. *Sudan – The Elusive Quest for Peace*, op. cit., 154.

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## III.2. Oversized Chain of Command, with European and International Elements.

*The European Union CMCO structure and its role in the conflict*

After seeing the generous proposals of the AU, the implementation must be examined. By conjecture, a mission financed from outside claims the remote control of the contributors and a rather executive role of the African Union. The main problem is that at the starting point, the capacities of the AU were insufficient to coordinate the different financial aids and the different diplomatic initiatives of the actors.

In addition, without any experience (from the planning stage) how to manage a mission with civilian and then military elements.

Let us now examine what a particularly complicated structure of international cooperation has been put in place.<sup>164</sup>

Of course, with the respect of the requirements of the AU, Khartoum and the mediators/contributors (on 4 levels) to orchestrate all this construction. In parallel, the complex structure of the EU and its connection points will also be presented.

### *The Political Strategy Level*

The African Union Organs at this level, the Peace and Security Council (**AU PSC**, 2003) which was founded on the model of the UN CoS, is the most important decision-making organ. **The AU Commission** fulfills the role of the secretariat of the Council. It was responsible for the management of daily affairs, and in the case of AMIS, the development of plans for strengthening the mission.<sup>165</sup>

The Commission has established the Directorate of Peace and Security (**DPS**) whose most important part is the AU Conflict Management Division (**CMD**).

This division has 2 sections:

- Operation and Support Section (SOS)
- and the Conflict Management, Resolution and Post-conflict Section.

These two sections are intended for the development of policies and operations to support the vocation of prevention, management and assistance to inter- and intra-state conflicts.<sup>166</sup>

With regard to international bodies juxtaposed with the African Union bodies at this level and in particular at the CMD, the European Union and in particular the European Commission plays an important role:

The Commission is part of the **Liaison Group** which controls relations between donors and the AU and with the DITF. In addition, it is the European Commission which chairs the **Partnership Technical Support Group (PTSG)** which brings together all donors, the EU and its Member States, the UN, the G8 and bilateral partners. This group coordinated interactions between donors and the AU peace and security initiatives (see DPS).<sup>167</sup>

As regards the EU Civil-Military Support Mission for AMIS, the decision was taken by the EU Council (*Joint Action*) at the end of the CMP (*Crisis Management Procedure*): The planning was completed by the PSC with CIVCOM, EUMC and EUMS in cooperation with the other elements of the CRCT.<sup>168</sup> Based on Article 15 paragraph 3 of the TEU, the PSC exercises political control and strategic direction of the operation.

<sup>164</sup> Note: The structure presented is already simplified.

<sup>165</sup> Victoria K. Holt - Moira K. Shanahan, *African Capacity-Building for Peace Operations: UN Collaboration with the African Union and ECOWAS*, The Henry L. Stimson Center, February 2005, 16.

<sup>166</sup> Victoria K. Holt - Moira K. Shanahan, *op. cit.*, 17.

<sup>167</sup> The EU and Africa: Towards a Strategic Partnership Volume I: Report, London, House of Lords – European Union Committee, July 7, 2006, 69.

<sup>168</sup> Suggestions for procedures for coherent, comprehensive EU crisis management, Council of the EU 03/07/2003, 11127/13. 2-4.; CRCT: Crisis Response Coordination Team

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The documents do not mention the role of the CivMilCell, recently established (May 2005) at the time. This cell is at the heart of the planning although institutionally it is linked to the EUMS. The planning phase of the first EU civil-military operation undoubtedly brings several conclusions for the role of this cell which increasingly becomes the key element of the CMCO, as regards the coordination between the PSC, PMG, CIVCOM, CGS and DG VIII/IX and the EUMS.

Accountable to the Council, the PSC practices the daily control and strategic direction of the EU Joint Action. The SG/HR, Javier Solana (on the basis of Article 18 and 26 of the TEU<sup>169</sup>) and the EUSR, Pekka Haavisto were the mediators between the African Union and the PSC.

*Military Strategy Level* (OHQ – Addis Ababa) - Subordinate to the DGS, at the military strategy level the Darfur Integrated Task Force (**DITF**) was established by the AU Commission in January 2005,<sup>170</sup> at the AU Headquarters (Addis Ababa) to assist in planning, force generation, procurement, logistics, administrative support and liaison with partners.

Some of these members had no previous experience in planning and managing peace support operations at the strategic level. Despite the difficulties that emerged in the first period, and thanks to the support of the EU mission advisors (5 officers and 4 technical experts from the EU), the DITF is coping and has succeeded in establishing liaison mechanisms with partners, finalizing support contracts, and rotating Rwandan troops.<sup>171</sup>

The ACC (EU Ad Hoc Coordination Cell in Addis Ababa) acted under the authority of the EUSR and comprises a Senior Political Advisor, a Military Advisor and a Police Advisor. This Coordination Cell is responsible for the day-to-day coordination between EU staff and the Administrative Control and Management Centre (**ACMC**) under the DITF. The ACC was linked to the EU Council Secretariat through SG/HR.<sup>172</sup>

**MHQ Level** (Khartoum) – Under the Chief Administrative Officer (CAO), the EU Mission Advisors are also present at the Mission Headquarters in Khartoum in a Logistics Cell but the command (J1/J4) is closed to international partners.<sup>173</sup>

Above this Logistics Cell is the ACC and below the JLOC in El Fasher. In this structure, officers from the donor country staff support AU officers as deputies.<sup>174</sup>

The Swedes (J4 Supply), the Spanish (J4 Movement) and the Canadians (J8) assisted the various CIVPOL offices.

*Operational level (FHQ - El Fasher)* - At the operational level, the FHQ is located in the capital of Darfur, El Fasher. Linked to FHQ, the international support elements are represented in **JLOC** (*Joint Logistics Operation Center*).

The **Humanitarian Ceasefire Agreement on the Conflict in Darfur** (April 2004) established 2 commissions:

- the Ceasefire Commission (CCF/AMIS)
- and the Joint Commission (CC).

<sup>169</sup> Council Document 10919/05, July 13, 2005.

<sup>170</sup> *Sudan: Imperatives for Immediate Change – The African Union Mission in Sudan*, Human Right Wach, January 12, 2006, <http://www.hrw.org/en/reports/2006/01/19/sudan-imperatives-immediate-change>

<sup>171</sup> UA – CPS, 28<sup>ème</sup> réunion, *op. cit.*, 13.

<sup>172</sup> 2005/557/PESC, Article 5.

<sup>173</sup> Union Africain – Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité 28<sup>ème</sup> Réunion, le 28 avril 2005, p. 38. ; Col Reinhard Linz – AMIS Briefing (powerpoint) slide-35

<sup>174</sup> *The EU/AU Partnership in Darfur: Not yet a winning combination*, International Crisis Group - Africa Report, Nr. 99., October 25, 2005, 10-11., <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan/099-the-eu-au-partnership-in-darfur-not-yet-a-winning-combination.aspx>



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The CCF Headquarters in El Fasher consisted of 11 people: a chairperson (AU), a **vice-president delegated by the European Union**, a representative of the AU, 2 from the Chadian mediation, 2 representatives from Khartoum, 2 representatives from the SLM/A and 2 representatives from the JEM. The CCF HQ was responsible for coordinating investigations of ceasefire violations, verification and monitoring, consultations with all Parties and with humanitarian agencies. The CCF also dealt with detainees from the Darfur conflict.

However, some disagreements have emerged within the HQ in developing a plan for the separation and relocation of forces and defining observation tasks.<sup>175</sup>

On 13 August 2006 Khartoum forced representatives of the non-signatories to the Peace Agreement to leave the CCF HQ in El Fasher. The non-signatories were accused of collecting information within the CCF that is used to attack the forces of the signatories.<sup>176</sup>

The CC comprised 2-2 high-level members from each Party, the Chadian co-mediation, the AU, the United States and the EU. The CFC regularly reported to the CC.<sup>177</sup>

*The tactical level* - This level included 3 RHQs and 8 SHQs. Each sector consisted of 4 Military Observer Groups (MILOBs), elements of the civilian police and the protection forces. The EU had delegated advisors (mobile groups) to each sector through the AMIS II support mission.

The conclusion to be drawn from the EU representation in the chain of command is that the Union was present at all levels, it chaired important bodies, even if its voice was too low and its influence remained quite modest. In terms of political strategy, it was the Commission that was represented and

charged with the role of coordinator, when at other levels it was the Council and the bodies/institutions, linked rather to the Council with the mediation of the SG/HR, which attended the activities of AMIS.

<sup>175</sup> UA – CPS, 17<sup>ème</sup> réunion, *op. cit.*, 5, 7-8., 11.

<sup>176</sup> Union Africaine – Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité, 63<sup>ème</sup> réunion, September 18, 2006, New York, 7.

<sup>177</sup> AU CONF/PLG/2 (I)

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## III.3. AMIS I (09/06/2004 – 10/2004) – a mission based on UN Chapter VI

After examining the "hydrocephalic" chain of command, the volume and effectiveness of the mission elements in the theater must be addressed. Indeed, how many people and what mission were piloted by this oversized chain of command?

On June 9, 2004, the first AMIS elements were installed in El Fasher. The deployment conditions were often very rustic: in most villages there is no electricity or telephone and the nearest police station is a day's walk away.<sup>178</sup>

The head of the mission in Addis Ababa is Ambassador Baba Gana Kingibé, the special representative of the president of the AU Commission who is assisted by two deputy special representatives in Khartoum and El Fasher.

The mission had 3 key elements: the CCF (Ceasefire Commission), 60 military observers (MILOBs) insufficiently distributed on the ground, and 300 soldiers with light equipment to ensure their protection. Among the final strength (138) of AMIS I MILOBs, the European Union was represented by 11 personnel and the United States by 37 personnel.

Initially, AMIS created five sectors in Darfur (current sectors 1-5) and one in Abéché (Chad, former sector 6) and 15 main bases. In October 2004, each sector had 2 teams of military observers (19/20 personnel); 4-4 vehicles and the El Fasher and Nyala sectors had 2-2 helicopters.<sup>179</sup>

**Troops from Rwanda and their Nigerian colleagues (the mission's "framework nations") interpreted the mission's mandate differently:**

The Nigerian government shared Khartoum's view that AMIS refused to authorize the use of force to protect civilians.

When Rwanda encouraged its troops to use force in this case.<sup>180</sup>

As for the mission's provisions, materials and logistical services, the US government signed an agreement based on subcontracting with PAE, directly paid by the United States.<sup>181</sup>

The total budget for one year of AMIS I was a sum of USD 221.7 million which covers salaries, allowances, travel and transportation expenses, purchase of vehicles and office equipment, communications, uniforms, fuel, medical services (etc.).<sup>182</sup>

<sup>178</sup> Union Africain – Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité, 28<sup>ème</sup> Réunion, April 28, 2005, 38. ; Col Reinhard Linz – AMIS Briefing (powerpoint) slide-9

<sup>179</sup> Half a year later, the AU report on AMIS II mentions 328 vehicles on the ground, 18 helicopters, 2 transport planes, long-range VHF fixed stations, mobile radios, V-SAT systems (etc.) Source : UA – CPS, 28<sup>ème</sup> réunion, *op. cit.*, 12.

<sup>180</sup> Paul D. Williams, *op. cit.*, 175.

<sup>181</sup> UA – CPS, 17<sup>ème</sup> réunion, *op. cit.*, 8

<sup>182</sup> UA – CPS, 17<sup>ème</sup> réunion, *op. cit.*, 24-25.

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## III.4. AMIS II (10/2004 – 05/2005)

### – Consequence of the ineffectiveness of AMIS I

AMIS I was proving ineffective in the theatre, which is why, following the request of the AU Peace and Security Council (PSC), the AU Commission developed the AMIS II plan with the UN (DPKO<sup>183</sup>), the CCF, the EU and other partners for the strengthening of the mandate and strength of AMIS.

On 18/19 October, the OPLAN was finalized by the AU MSC (AU Military Staff Committee) and accepted on 20 October by the AU Peace and Security Council.<sup>184</sup>

Thus the decision was taken to strengthen the mission by deploying 8 additional battalions (3-3 from Rwanda and Nigeria and 1-1 from Senegal and South Africa<sup>185</sup>) during a first phase, until the end of May 2005.

The AU report specified that under the leadership of a Special Representative of the AU Chairman, *"AMIS will comprise a strength of 3,320 personnel including 2,341 military personnel including 450 observers (but among them there are no longer Europeans and Americans), up to 815 civilian police officers as well as appropriate civilian staff."* The civilian police officers were the new elements of the mission.

The reinforced mandate for an initial period of one year contained new elements: assistance in restoring confidence and contribution to the establishment of a secure environment to allow the delivery of humanitarian assistance.

The enhanced AMIS also had the role of *"protecting civilians facing imminent threat and in their immediate vicinity"*.<sup>186</sup>

For the structure of AMIS II, MILOB elements, CCF Civilian Police, Force Protection and remarks, see Annex 2. The largest contributors to the expanded mission are Nigeria (635), Rwanda (421), South Africa (381), Senegal (269), Gambia (245) and Ghana (146).<sup>187</sup>

AMIS II increased the number of sectors from 6 to 8 with new sectors in Kutum, Zalinje and El Daien. The presence in Abéché (formerly the 6th sector in Chad) was reduced to a military observer group.<sup>188</sup> The Civilian Police were tasked with supporting and observing the local police. It was to contribute to the development of proactive confidence-building measures and to develop security plans for the IDP camps.<sup>189</sup>

Since January 2005, AMIS has intensified its activities in securing roads through increased air and road patrols on major routes and these operations have significantly reduced theft and banditry. However, the series of unprovoked attacks on AMIS personnel and equipment by unidentified gunmen has increased.<sup>190</sup>

According to African Union reports in Sector 2 (Nyala) ceasefire violations by the signatory parties were "coloured" by tribal hostilities sometimes fuelled by the parties to the conflict.<sup>191</sup> In Sector 3,

<sup>183</sup> Department of Peacekeeping Operations

<sup>184</sup> Union Africain – Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité 28ème Réunion 28/04/2005. 38. ; Col Reinhard Linz – AMIS Briefing (powerpoint) slide-10

<sup>185</sup> Paul D. Williams, *op. cit.*, 177.

<sup>186</sup> UA – CPS 42, 1-5.

<sup>187</sup> Col Reinhard Linz – AMIS Briefing (powerpoint) slide-13, June 27, 2005

<sup>188</sup> « AMIS History and Background », <http://www.amis-sudan.org/history.html>, (Accessed: January 15, 2007)

<sup>189</sup> UA – CPS, 17ème réunion, *op. cit.*, 23.

<sup>190</sup> UA – CPS, 38ème réunion, *op. cit.*, 9.

<sup>191</sup> However, the report underlines that *"the links between the different actors of the violence sometimes make it difficult to differentiate between ceasefire violations and ordinary criminal activities."*

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the increase in attacks on humanitarian agency vehicles made it almost impossible to deliver humanitarian aid to IDP camps in isolated areas. At the time (2005) the unanimous opinion of AMIS and the UN mission, UNAMIS, was that if the IDPs decided to return to their homes, where AMIS is not present, they – especially women – would become the target of attacks.<sup>192</sup>

### III.5. AMIS II-E (06/2005 – 09/2005) and AMIS III – What is the ideal number of personnel for the mission?

On 28 April 2005, the AU, on the recommendation of the Military Staff Committee, decided on the second phase of the reinforcement of AMIS II (from 3,320 to 7,731 personnel) before the end of September 2005, with additional troops offered by Rwanda, Nigeria, Senegal and South Africa. The mission's strength can reach up to 12,500 personnel (AMIS III). It should be noted that it was only since this phase that the AMIS mandate includes in principle the protection of civilians. The role of the civilian police component, in areas where the Khartoum police is not present, has also been revised.

But the question arises, what would be the "ideal" strength of such a mission? There are different calculation methods to answer this question: One counts 2-10 troops per 1,000 inhabitants in the crisis zone. The population of Darfur was 6 million so the ideal strength of AMIS should be between 12,000-16,000 people. The other is based on the calculation with the smallest and largest protection forces: 60,000 out of 200,000 people of the government army are deployable.

For such a mission, 40,000-45,000 personnel would be ready for immediate deployment. The *Janjaweed* force at the time had a strength of 10-20,000 personnel. Thus, AMIS should have had 10,000 (min) to 45,000 personnel.<sup>193</sup> According to other opinions that are in agreement with the AU, the strength of AMIS should have been at least 20,000 personnel, satellite intelligence and the establishment of a no-fly zone.<sup>194</sup>

<sup>192</sup> UA – CPS, 28<sup>ème</sup> réunion, *op. cit.*, 7-8.

<sup>193</sup> WILLIAMS, Paul D., « The African Union mission in Sudan », *op. cit.*, 168-183. ; In Darfur, 1% of the population is armed in a territory 16 times larger than Albania. (In Albania, European calculations for an effective peacekeeping force: A country of 29,000 km<sup>2</sup> with 3 million inhabitants, 10% of whom are armed, requires a force of 30-40,000 people. Source : Aldo Rizzo, « Que font les italiens dans cette galere ? » /La Stampa, Turin/, *Courrier international*, May 15, 1997

<sup>194</sup> « Darfur on the brink of disaster », *The Guardian*, September 20, 2006, 27.



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AU reports on AMIS mention that the deployment of the civilian police encountered some difficulties due to the following 2 factors:

1, because of the more complex generation of the civilian police vis-à-vis the military component of the mission, in October 2005 AMIS had only 41% of the total authorized strength since October 2004 with a little over 25% of the deployed strength.

2, The other difficulty emerged in the deployment plan, developed after that of the military component.

The initial plan envisaged co-location with the Sudanese police in the IDP camps and in the towns, but for the reinforced AMIS force, the logistics plan did not include accommodation arrangements. After a reconnaissance of the area in January 2005, to ensure security (!) and for logistical reasons, co-location of the civilian police with the military component seemed inevitable.

## III.6. The weaknesses of AMIS, a “mission impossible”

The conclusion of the different phases of AMIS is that the actors favor the development of AMIS over the start of a new mission under the aegis of the UN or other actors. The consequence of the first part of this analysis where the course of the conflict was presented and the second part where the diplomatic talks were examined, is that despite the peace process and the signing of treaties between the Parties, violence does not cease in Darfur, and that AMIS in the theater has encountered difficulties, particularly in defending itself.

But what were the greatest weaknesses of AMIS that have hindered the accomplishment of its mission?

**The weakness of AMIS is characterized by the lack of trust-building, the difficulties of patrols, and subjugation to the Sudanese government.**

Theoretically, and as AU reports suggest, the establishment of trust through these predominantly African elements is one of the important achievements of the AU mission compared to its UN counterparts. The establishment of the sectors has been positively received by the local population<sup>195</sup>: *“The head of the Civilian Police component, as well as his team, quickly established good working relations with the local police commanders and their respective political hierarchies. The Civilian Police component includes about twenty women, whose presence is imperative to establish relations of trust with the displaced women and villagers.”*<sup>196</sup>

A certain symbiosis has been established between some AMIS sectors and women collecting firewood: AMIS is kept informed of the direction of the women’s journey and conducts patrols in these areas.

<sup>195</sup> UA – CPS, 28<sup>ème</sup> réunion, *op. cit.*, 11-12.

<sup>196</sup> UA – CPS, 28<sup>ème</sup> réunion, *op. cit.*, 12.

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As a result, the number of recorded rape cases has fallen sharply.<sup>197</sup>

Reports from international organizations cast a shadow over this optimistic picture. *Refugees International* says that building trust is particularly hampered by the fact that the majority of the population has no information about the AU mission.

**AMIS has not launched an information campaign** and there are no brochures to distribute on the ground that outline the mission's objectives. The population of Darfur has also criticized the fact that the mission's white SUVs are virtually indistinguishable (despite the "AMIS" inscription on the vehicles) from the Toyotas of the militias or other armed forces. The uniform poses similar identification problems.

The **lack of female personnel** often hampers investigations and the number of interpreters (Libyans and Egyptians speak Arabic) in the theatre is far from adequate. Even asking relevant questions for an investigation is often problematic.

The criticism of international organizations is that AMIS escorting convoys increases the risk of attack against them. Cooperation with international organisations has encountered administrative difficulties because the establishment of AMIS sectors did not respect the administrative boundaries in the Darfur region.<sup>198</sup>

In 2004, "A" Company (Rwanda) was tasked with supporting the El Fasher, Nyala and Kabkabiyah sectors while "B" Company (Nigeria) took over the rest and its deployment was ensured by Memoranda

of Understanding with the Governments of Rwanda and Nigeria.<sup>199</sup> It must be realised that each main base was capable of operating within a radius of 60-70 km (expanded over time to 200 km) by land.<sup>200</sup>

Consequently, as of April 2005 (AMIS II), there were still large areas outside the AMIS radius of action that could only be reached occasionally.<sup>201</sup> The state of AMIS even in the fall of 2005 allowed only 2 patrols per day over a territory that was too large. The AMIS II-E vehicles even lacked radio contact and often fuel.

Sometimes the troops were left without drinking water and without pay.<sup>202</sup> The military observers are accompanied by a dozen elements of the armed forces. This force is of course far from being able to control the disarmament of the belligerents who sometimes even take them hostage. (During the "black weekend" of the mission, October 8-9, 2005, five Nigerian soldiers and two civilian personnel were killed by the SLA and the next day a complete patrol of 18 people and a group of American observers were kidnapped by the JEM.<sup>203</sup>)

Regarding organization and cooperation, the cultural difference is evident between the troops of different nations. The lack of interoperability and incompetence are obvious. The officers of the protection force are equipped with pistols, the protection forces with AK-47s<sup>204</sup> and RPG-7s for every 10 people.

The third factor of the mission's difficulties results from the total dependence on Khartoum. The troops were obliged to inform the CCF (Ceasefire

<sup>197</sup> UA – CPS, 28<sup>ème</sup> réunion, *op. cit.*, 18.

<sup>198</sup> CHIN, Sally – MORGENSTEIN, Jonathan, *No power to protect*, *op. cit.*, 8-9.

<sup>199</sup> UA – CPS, 17<sup>ème</sup> réunion, *op. cit.*, 7-8.

<sup>200</sup> UA – CPS, 17<sup>ème</sup> réunion, *op. cit.*, 23.

<sup>201</sup> UA – CPS, 28<sup>ème</sup> réunion, *op. cit.*, 29.

<sup>202</sup> « Darfur on the brink of disaster », *op. cit.*, 27.

<sup>203</sup> CHIN, Sally – MORGENSTEIN, Jonathan, *No power to protect*, *op. cit.*, 2.

<sup>204</sup> The Darfur Armed Forces' PKM (or PKB, 7.62 mm) has a rifle range 3 times longer (more than 1 km) than AMIS' AK-47s, and can penetrate an armoured vehicle from 500 m; RPG – Rocket Propelled Grenade launcher Source: CHIN, Sally – MORGENSTEIN, Jonathan, *No power to protect*, *op. cit.*, 12.

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Commission) about their routes or the delegates from Khartoum and the Movements who were also represented. The representatives could have refused to visit certain territories. The conversations between the members of AMIS (if they have them) were regulated by radio, without decoding and they are easily picked up by the combatants.

In short, the patrols were not only unable to cover the sector, but also their movements were penetrable and easy to follow. The worst is that this activity was further limited by Khartoum: the mission had helicopters but the pilots had to be recruited from civilians and were obliged to travel every two months to Khartoum to undergo a check. The delivery of some equipment was delayed by Khartoum with hypocritical but sometimes fair arguments: because of the hostage-taking, this high-tech equipment would be easily recoverable by "rebels".<sup>205</sup>

## III.7. The establishment of the EU mission to support AMIS II (18/07/2005 - 31/12/2007)

*A civil-military support mission for capacity-building*

The role of the EU diplomacy around the Darfur crisis management and its presence in the divergent chain of command has been presented in detail above. This time, the concrete support to the AMIS mission, its character, its mandate, its volume will be addressed. And then how the already divided diplomacy of the EU and its Member States has continued to fragment through the different financial mechanisms.

Since January 2004 the European Union intended to support (financial, political, and personnel assistance) the African Union in the stabilization of the Darfur region. Since April 2004 the EU has participated in the African Union reconnaissance mission in Darfur, with 10 observers.<sup>206</sup> The EU proposal for more concrete support for AMIS took a more concrete form in **Javier Solana's speech in Addis Ababa on 26 May 2005**.<sup>207</sup> The European Union is one of the most important contributors, along with the UN, the United States, Canada, Norway and NATO.<sup>208</sup>

The EU SG/HR announced that *"conflict prevention and resolution in Africa are first and foremost in the hands of Africans themselves. It is on this basis that together, the European Union and the African Union, we are building an effective strategic partnership."* And *"there is indeed no military solution to the Darfur conflict."* The financial contribution through the Peace Facility, complemented by the presence of European Union experts working on a daily basis with African Union men on the ground, bear witness to this.<sup>209</sup>

<sup>205</sup> CHIN, Sally – MORGENSTEIN, Jonathan, *No power to protect*, op. cit., 5.

<sup>206</sup> EU Council Secretariat – Factsheet DAR/03, October 26, 2004

<sup>207</sup> EU Council Secretariat – Factsheet – AMIS II, July 2005

<sup>208</sup> EU Council Secretariat – Factsheet – AMIS II/2, October 2005

<sup>209</sup> Nota bene: French participation in ARTEMIS cost 46 million euros (1/13), and in ALTHEA 80 million euros (1/7).

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Mr. Solana stated the strengthening of the EU contribution on the military level by strengthening the AU planning capacity, strategic airlift, logistical support (vehicles, communication equipment, mobile generators, tactical transport aircraft) and the aerial observation capacity with European elements. The EU was ready to send additional monitors and provide support in terms of information strategy. In the field of police, EU support included technical assistance to the chain of command in Addis Ababa, Khartoum and El Fasher as well as in the sectors of deployment. Sharing of experiences and personal training are also proposed.<sup>210</sup>

The European Union's support for AMIS II was materialised by Joint Actions 556 and 557/2005 of the CFSP, on 18 July 2005. The mandate of the EU civil-military mission represented a new trend in European operations that is similar to the UESEC's RSS (Security Sector Reform) action in the DR Congo. Previously, civil and military operations had a different political and legal mandate, in a Joint Action. The novelty was that a single mandate contains both civil and military elements. The planning resulting from such a mandate should be carried out in the future by the new CivMil Planning Unit established in May 2005.<sup>211</sup>

The **military aspect** of the EU participation mandate consisted of technical and (operation and logistics) planning support at all levels of the AMIS II chain of command, in Addis Ababa (DITF), Khartoum (Mission HQ) and El Fasher (FHQ). The sending of military observers, the training of African troops, training of observers, strategic and tactical transport, aerial observation, if the African Union claims it.

The reinforcement of the **civilian aspect**<sup>212</sup> of the mission (AMIS II-E CIVPOL) was the most ambitious element of the EU participation in conflict management, with a budget of 57 million EUR in 2005 (salaries, supplies of soldiers, fuel and insurance.) The civilian mission consisted of 3 elements:<sup>213</sup>

- **Support of the police chain of command:** Since mid-August 2005, 23 senior police advisors (in Addis Ababa at the AU; in Khartoum at the AMIS mission command, in El Fasher, at the Police Commissioner, at the 3 regional HQs and the 8 sector HQs) and 1 political advisor assisted the decision-making of AMIS inter-alia, supported the liaison with the military elements of AMIS and contributed to the liaison with humanitarian actors.

- **Training of African Union personnel:** From 1 September 2005, 5 EU trainers have been training El Fasher trainers, and mobile groups of 10 people have been contributing to the training of personnel already deployed in the sectors, to strengthen the AMIS II police force (1,560 people). Thus, three training courses have been set up:

- 1, Training in the management of command personnel
- 2, Training of trainers
- 3, Post-deployment courses for all CIVPOL personnel in the eight sectors.

The Council Secretariat Fact Sheet highlighted the importance of the training of the Senegalese battalion (July 2005) and Nigerian personnel (mid-June 2005) and the pilots of the offered transport aircraft.<sup>214</sup>

- **Supporting the development of the police unit at the African Union Secretariat:** The European Union has decided to strengthen the long-term

<sup>210</sup> S0196/05, Speech by Javier Solana, Addis Ababa, May 26, 2005

<sup>211</sup> Gerrard Quille – Giovanni Gasparini – Roberto Menotti – Nicoletta Pirozzi: *Developing EU Civil Military Co-ordination: The Role of the new Civilian Military Cell*, ISIS Europe - CeMiSS, June 2006, 19., [www.esdpm.org/pdf/reports\\_10.pdf](http://www.esdpm.org/pdf/reports_10.pdf)

<sup>212</sup> GAERC Conclusions on EU civilian-military supporting action to AU mission in Darfur, July 18, 2005, [http://europa-eu-un.org/articles/pl/article\\_4921\\_pl.htm](http://europa-eu-un.org/articles/pl/article_4921_pl.htm)

<sup>213</sup> MONACO – GOURLAY, 2005. 2.

<sup>214</sup> EU Council Secretariat – Factsheet – AMIS II, juillet 2005



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capacity of the AU in the areas of planning and management of police operations. For this, an EU police officer assisted, among other things, in general planning, doctrinal and recruitment work.

The EU has taken charge of training the civilian police and in each sector a group of EU civilian police advisors has been deployed to support the AMIS civilian police and 9 mobile training groups have been sent to Darfur. These groups, visiting each AMIS unit, have given courses in basic behaviour, management, capacity building and training of trainers.<sup>215</sup>

On 21-27 August 2005, the EU (and NATO<sup>216</sup>) supported the DPKO in the development and execution of **MAPEX 2005** (map exercise) for FHQ AMIS.<sup>217</sup> This training program sought to increase the capacity of AMIS personnel in the control of complex peacekeeping operations. It focused in particular on effective planning and coordination, including the sharing of key operational information.<sup>218</sup>

The EU strength comprised 16 police officers, 19 operational and logistics planners, 11 military observers (as of spring 2006). The EU decided to send 50 police advisers, but only 16 have been deployed. Why?

At the European level, the availability of experts has caused problems. In Africa, in several cases and in several areas, the AU has resisted integrating EU personnel into AMIS in order to appease Khartoum which has shown sensitivity towards non-African personnel.<sup>219</sup>

An other bigger problem was that the African Union neglected EU reform proposals, and, in case of disagreements, it relied on other partners. The creation of a competitive atmosphere among supporters is the tactic of African leaders. In March and December 2005, EU assessment missions proposed the reorganization of the AMIS structure and the procedures for logistical support – without success.<sup>220</sup>

The EU proposals were as follows: the establishment of a **JOC (Joint Operating Concept)** and an integrated logistics structure.<sup>221</sup> This was especially true for the French, who had experience in negotiating with African partners; the EU was not yet there, according to General Perruche, the former head of the EUMS.

It should be noted that Africans refused the first gesture that came from the EU. The method that should be followed was as follows: **Make Africans believe that this or that idea comes from them:** through conversations *off the record*, “at the end of corridors”, it was necessary to consider a few more

<sup>215</sup> Sally Chin – Jonathan Morgenstein, *op. cit.*, 10.

<sup>216</sup> NATO has also planned – as a second part of its assistance – the training of the African Union forces which started on 1 August 2005. It included command and control processes, operation planning, reporting system, battle resolution, information retrieval and analysis, force generation, reaction preparation, improvement of HQ procedure standards. NATO has also organized orientation exercises and simulations of cholera and killing scenarios for AMIS officers in El Fasher. NATO officers have accompanied their colleagues to AMIS several times to help them in daily affairs. And within the framework of the third part, at the request of the AU, NATO was ready to assist in the field of intelligence with training. Sources: “NATO diversifies aid to African Union”, NATO official website, September 11, 2005, <http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2005/08/050811a.htm>; Sally Chin – Jonathan Morgenstein, *op. cit.*, 10.

<sup>217</sup> « NATO continues to offer logistical Support to African Union », October 2005, <http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2005/10/051006c.htm>

<sup>218</sup> *SUDAN Entrenching Impunity – Government Responsibility for International Crimes in Darfur*, Human Right Watch, Vol. 17, No.17(A), December 8, 2005. 30-31., <http://www.hrw.org/node/11496>

<sup>219</sup> *The EU/AU Partnership in Darfur: Not yet a winning combination*, International Crisis Group - Africa Report, Nr. 99, October, 25 2005, 11., <http://www.crisisgroup.org/en/regions/africa/horn-of-africa/sudan/099-the-eu-au-partnership-in-darfur-not-yet-a-winning-combination.aspx>

<sup>220</sup> Pierre-Antoine Braud, « Implementing ESDP Operations in Africa », Anne Deighton – Victor Mauer (ed.), *Securing Europe? Implementing the European Security Strategy*, Züricher Beiträge zur Sicherheitspolitik, Center for Security Studies, ETH Zurich, 2006, 78., <http://www.gees.org/documentos/Documen-01777.pdf>

<sup>221</sup> Author's interview at the CMUE

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reliable African partners. They are the ones who can persuade their African counterparts on a case-by-case basis, making them believe that the idea came from their heads. In front of the plenum, the idea is condemned to death.<sup>222</sup>

The biggest problem of the European support mission was therefore that it did not have a single legal status. This resulted in several problems. In addition, **no plan for a possible evacuation at the European Union level was developed.**

For example, Hungary had to try to contact the United States to sign a bilateral agreement on the possible evacuation of the Hungarian observer by Americans in the event of a crisis.<sup>223</sup>

## III.8. Financing of AMIS and the EU Support Mission for AMIS

The different aspects of the European Union support operation were based on different sources of funding: the civilian component was funded by the CFSP budget, the military common costs by the **Athena mechanism**, the sending of experts by the General Secretariat of the Council and the operational expenditure by the various contributing Member States.<sup>224</sup>

To better interpret the scale of the amounts below, it must be said that the budget of an average humanitarian organization, present in Darfur, the French section of *Médecins Sans Frontières* had a sum of 150 million EUR in 2005.<sup>225</sup>

The full mobilisation of EU financial resources for Darfur (up to May 2005) was EUR 570 million (445 million euros for humanitarian assistance, including food, of which 258 million came from Member States and 28 million for Darfur refugees in Chad). Three million were dedicated to supporting the political process and the EU contributed 129 million to the Ceasefire Commission of the AMIS mission.<sup>226</sup>

1. **The civilian component financed by the CFSP** – The civilian component of the operation was financed from the total common budget of the CFSP which was EUR 62.6 million in 2005, and EUR 150 million in 2006. The cost of the civilian component of the Joint Action was EUR 2.12 million in 2005 and EUR 2.2 million in 2006.<sup>227</sup>

<sup>222</sup> Author's interview with the Defence Committee of the WEU Assembly

<sup>223</sup> Author's interview at the CMUE

<sup>224</sup> *La France et la gestion des crises africaines: quels changements possibles?*, Sénat; Rapport d'information n° 450 (2005-2006) de MM. André DULAIT, Robert HUE, Yves POZZO di BORGO et Didier BOULAUD ; July 3, 2006

<sup>225</sup> Pierre-Antoine Braud, « Implementing ESDP Operations in Africa », *op. cit.*, 72.

<sup>226</sup> EU Council Secretariat – Factsheet DAR/05 (update 5), May 2005

<sup>227</sup> DG EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION - POLICY DEPARTMENT, Note: prepared for SEDE meeting of 26 January 2006 on the Financing of ESDP, Bruxelles, – Table 1, 8.

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2. **Mandate of EUSR** was financed by EUR 0.675 million in 2005 and EUR 0.6 in 2006 from the common budget of the CFSP.
3. **Peace Facility**<sup>228</sup> (*Facilité pour la Paix*, PFP)
  - After funding the AU mission in Burundi (AMIB) with 25 million euros under the 9th European Fund, in March 2004, the European Commission set up a program, which is at the heart of the EU-AU partnership, the Peace Facility for Africa for the period 2004-2007. This was 250 million euros allocated by the European Development Fund (EDF/FED).<sup>229</sup> (*This programme should have gone hand in hand with logistical and technical support of the ESDP*).

What did this programme finance?<sup>230</sup>

200 million euros were allocated to peacekeeping operations: daily allowances for soldiers, communication equipment, medical equipment, depreciation costs of civilian equipment, transport and logistics. (The following types of expenditure are excluded: ammunition, weapons and special military equipment, spare parts for weapons and military equipment, salaries and military training for soldiers.)

- > 1 million euro was earmarked for the audit
- > 2 million euro for evaluations.
- > 12 million euro was earmarked for contingencies
- > and 35 million euro was earmarked for capacity building

The EU support mission for AMIS in Darfur was the first mission under the Peace Facility.<sup>231</sup> The European Commission made available to it an amount of 92 million euro (over 50 million euro was disbursed in December 2005; and 242 million euro in September 2006).

Through the PF the Commission financed the daily allowances and troop allowances, food rations, fuel and insurance for the peace mission in Darfur.<sup>232</sup> At the third FfP meeting in Addis Ababa on 29 September 2006, the EU extended the FfP for a further three years (2008 - 2010) and provided, in line with the Strategy for Africa, funding of EUR 300 million.<sup>233</sup>

1. Bilateral contributions to AMIS from Member States were over 30 million euros in October 2005.<sup>234</sup>
2. **Common costs of the military component of the ATHENA support mission** - In order to strengthen the rapid reaction capacity of the ESDP, the Council of the European Union established ATHENA in September 2003.<sup>235</sup> This mechanism of "early financing process" is intended to facilitate the rapid deployment of military personnel and, as for the mission in Sudan, covers the costs of the Communication and Information System (CIS), medical evacuation (MEDEVAC) and accommodation for EU officers (etc.).<sup>236</sup> The budget of ATHENA was approximately 60 million euros in 2005 and

<sup>228</sup> Not to be confused with the European Peace Facility (EPF, financing instrument of the EU, set up in March 2021).

<sup>229</sup> The creation of the PF and a European Water Fund (500 million euros: double the PF) was also validated at the ACP/EU Summit in Gaborone on 6-7 May 2004. Source: L'aide européenne à la Zone Franc Source: « Réunion des ministres de la zone franc à Paris », *IZFnet*, September 2004. , <http://www.izf.net/pages/aide-ue-zf/4256/>

<sup>230</sup> *Securing peace and stability for Africa – The EU-funded African Peace Facility*, European Commission, DE 125, July 2004, 7.

<sup>231</sup> The FP also contributes to the Multinational Force in the Central African Republic (FOMUC).

<sup>232</sup> Travaux de la délégation française à l'Assemblée de l'Union de l'Europe occidentale - Seconde partie de la 51<sup>ème</sup> session ordinaire de 2005; N° 142 SÉNAT SESSION ORDINAIRE DE 2005-2006, Annexe au procès-verbal de la séance du 20 décembre 2005

<sup>233</sup> Within the framework of the 10th EDF (2008-2013) Source: « 3e Réunion du Comité de coordination conjoint de la facilité pour la Paix en Afrique », *APA- Agence de Presse Africaine*, October 2006, <http://www.apanews.net>

<sup>234</sup> EU Council Secretariat – Factsheet – AMIS II/2, October 2005

<sup>235</sup> EU-24 without Denmark

<sup>236</sup> Council Joint Action 2005/557/CFSP, July 18, 2005

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45 million in 2006 (excluding the budget of EUFOR DR Congo) of which the EU mission to support AMIS II had 1.1 million euros (30 June 2006).<sup>237</sup>

3. The most important pillar of the ESDP budget – traditionally the contribution of the Member States – for the operational expenditure of the individual Member States, amounts to 196 million euros.<sup>238</sup>

4. The sending of the experts was financed by the General Secretariat of the Council.

5. **The financing of humanitarian aid (ECHO)** was a real success of EU support. DG ECHO has provided an amount of 20 million euros of humanitarian aid for the whole of Sudan (Darfur included) for the year 2004,<sup>239</sup> and 51 million for Darfur in 2005, supplemented by 15 million following the events. A sum of 12 million euros has been provided for the refugee camps of Darfurian peoples in Chad. ECHO's local offices were in Khartoum and Nyala (Darfur).

vulnerable populations, through integrated vital services.

It must be added that the reason why the EU does not have an autonomous mission and acts "behind AMIS" is that the contribution of European experts is paid by the African Union (financed as we have seen previously, by the EU).

The experiences in practice are sad. The letters of the Hungarian military observer testify that when he arrived there, he had practically no accommodation (i.e. a room with a ceiling), water and food. He tried to contact Addis Ababa to fill the gaps.

In El Fasher, the high-ranking military personnel rented accommodation outside the mission camp, which was in complete disarray. Often, the laptops and salaries of the European observers did not arrive from the African Union. Thus, several camps are affected by waves of strikes by observers, military personnel or interpreters...<sup>242</sup>

In the programming for 2006 (December 2005), 40 million euros were allocated for the whole of Sudan.<sup>240</sup> Probably because of the increase in violence after the DPA, the programming of 21 August 2006 resulted, which provides 40 million euros for Darfur (+Chad)<sup>241</sup>:

- 26 million from Specific Objective 1: Reduce malnutrition and food insecurity among highly vulnerable populations, through food distribution.
- 14 million from Specific Objective 2: Reduce excess mortality and excess morbidity among highly

<sup>237</sup> EU Council Secretariat – Factsheet Financing of ESDP operations, June 2006

<sup>238</sup> DG EXTERNAL POLICIES OF THE UNION - POLICY DEPARTMENT, Note: prepared for SEDE meeting of 26 January 2006 on the Financing of ESDP, Bruxelles, le 25 janvier 2006. – Table 1, 8.

<sup>239</sup> Aide humanitaire aux populations les plus vulnérables du Soudan – Plan global 2004 (Commission européenne – Direction générale de l'aide humanitaire – ECHO; ECHO/SDN/BUD/2004/01000)

<sup>240</sup> *Idem, ibidem*

<sup>241</sup> Aide humanitaire aux victimes du conflit du Darfour (Commission européenne – Direction générale de l'aide humanitaire – ECHO; ECHO/SDN/BUD/2006/02000)

<sup>242</sup> Author's interview at the EUMC and the European Observer Reports written for the EUM



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## III.9. The aspect of logistical assistance for AMIS II

*The logistical aspect of the first EU civil-military operation and the first NATO operation in Africa.*

African continent has aroused strong opposition from France and Belgium.<sup>245</sup>

### Cooperation or competition?

Strategic and tactical airlift was the essential element of the military support for AMIS. This aspect was also a key element of future EU operations outside Europe. Was it an orchestrated and autonomous European airlift or rather *ad hoc* offers from each Member State?

How was the cooperation with NATO and what was NATO's role in crisis management?

EU airlift support was a very important but not essential element *vis-à-vis* contributions of US, Australia (C-130),<sup>243</sup> Canada and especially NATO. A good opportunity to assess the coordination capacities and planning with responsibility sharing.

The European Union's logistical assistance is carried out with minimal cooperation with NATO, the two assistance operations **remained independent and outside the framework of Berlin Plus**.

Although the EU and NATO administration refuted the disagreements and emphasizes that the Berlin Plus agreements would not have been adaptable, because it is a simple technical and logistical support for the African Union and not an operation,<sup>244</sup> the first operation of the transatlantic organization on the

The negotiations between the EU and NATO on a chain of command and a joint action plan have failed. Under the general leadership of the African Union, the **EU and NATO planned and implemented their mission completely separately with two different chains of command**.

To ensure the necessary minimum relationship, within the framework of a "flexible coordination" a **coordination cell** was established in **Addis Ababa (DITF)** to which both parties sent their delegates and cooperation is without problems. The DITF was responsible for air movements and controls the movements of troops arriving on the ground.<sup>246</sup>

Thus it was the choice of each State, in which framework it conducts its action and the path of a common European action is difficult to identify. The multitude of variations flourishes: French, Italian, German and Greek air transport was carried out by the EU, when that of the United Kingdom in parallel by NATO and by the EU.

France, another major contributor to NATO, provided the EU with around ten planning officers, 1,200 hours of flight time on large aircraft (especially the transport of the Senegalese contingent by C-160) and aerial surveillance resources, with a Mirage F1-CR, an Atlantique-2 and a C-135 tanker.<sup>247</sup>

Italy's contribution was under the aegis of the Atlantic Alliance, but it also contributed with the EU

<sup>243</sup> Paul D. Williams, *op. cit.*, 177.

<sup>244</sup> Interview with Luc de Rancourt, COL, FAF EAC Cos, November 16, 2006

<sup>245</sup> Christophe Ayad, *op. cit.*, 157.; The NATO administration denies the disagreements with the EU, while General Henri Bentégeat, Chief of Staff of the Armed Forces in France, stated: *"The rivalry between the European Union and NATO is now well known and is currently mainly exercised in Sudan, where NATO is engaged, while the European Union had been present for more than a year to carry out identical missions, namely troop training, transport and planning operations. The two organisations ultimately shared the task in these three areas"* Source : *La France et la gestion des crises africaines: quels changements possibles?*, Sénat; Rapport d'information n° 450 (2005-2006) de MM. André DULAIT, Robert HUE, Yves POZZO di BORGO et Didier BOULAUD ; 03/07/2006 ; Annexe 2)

<sup>246</sup> NATO continues to offer logistical Support to African Union, <http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2005/10/051006c.htm>

<sup>247</sup> « Au Darfour, surenchère militaire entre l'Otan et l'UE », *Libération*, May 27, 2005

<http://www.libération.fr/monde/0101530595-au-darfour-surenchere-militaire-entre-l-otan-et-l-ue>

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through personnel and trainers for the CIS (Communication and Information Security).<sup>248</sup>

NATO has taken charge of airlifting soldiers from AU supplier countries to Darfur and the first airlift was carried out on 1 July 2005 and the mandate is currently extended until the end of September 2006.<sup>249</sup> In 2005, NATO managed the transport (transport and repatriation) by C-130 of almost 5,000 African soldiers (3 AMIS battalions<sup>250</sup>; 49 members of the civil police force).

NATO's strategic airlift was planned at SHAPE (AMCC- Allied Movement Coordination Cell) and the responsible organisation on the EU side is the **SALCC (Strategic Airlift Co-ordination Centre)**<sup>251</sup> in Eindhoven which already coordinated airlift and in-flight refuelling between member countries.

As for the tactical transport of AMIS troops, the SALCC was in no way able to coordinate, but this organization was intended to relay to the Russian Salis company the transport needs of the nations of the **SALIS (Strategic Airlift Interim Solution)**<sup>252</sup> consortium. In setting up strategic air transport for AMIS, NATO and the EU leased under the SALIS project for a renewable period of three years six Russian and Ukrainian An-124-100s that were capable of carrying 120-tonne cargo.

The SALIS contract included 15 countries<sup>253</sup> and provides for the permanent chartering of two

AN-124-100 aircraft (in Leipzig-Halle), two others on six days' notice, and two additional aircraft on nine days' notice. These aircraft were used as an interim solution pending the delivery of several Airbus A400M aircraft from 2010.<sup>254</sup>

In practice, the SALIS consortium purchased annually a quota of An 124-100 hours to meet its own needs. In the framework of strategic air transport, the European Union has committed to transporting 7 African battalions, 150 CIVPOL under the aegis of coordination with African contributing states and NATO and another 280 CIVPOL only by the EU in October 2005.<sup>255</sup>

The EU tactical air transport "par excellence" (and mentioned in EU documents) consisted of the costs of renting two An-2 aircraft and two C-212s on site from private companies to ensure the mobility of personnel in the theatre. Two African battalions (deployment, logistics equipment, support) were delivered by two to four rotations per week.<sup>256</sup>

The An-2 and the Aviocar C-212s (probably 300M) Casa are the light transport aircraft: the first is capable of delivering 12 passengers and the second 18 and light vehicles with a capacity of 2820-2950 kg. Even the Sudanese Air Force has the C-212.<sup>257</sup>

Two examples to illustrate the complexity of coordinating strategic air transport. The final report of the second troop rotation highlights that due to 2 elements, the rotation was delayed 2 weeks: Rwanda

<sup>248</sup> MONACO – GOURLAY, *op. cit.*, 2.

<sup>249</sup> « Assistance de l'OTAN à l'Union africaine pour le Darfour », <http://www.nato.int/issues/darfur/index-f.html> (Accessed: January 9, 2006)

<sup>250</sup> « NATO extends logistical Support to African Union », <http://www.nato.int/shape/news/2005/09/050926a.htm> (Accessed: March 9, 2006)

<sup>251</sup> SALCC is part of the EAC (European Airlift Centre) created on July 5, 2004 (successor to the EACC – European Air Coordination Cell, 2001) and officially presented to the press on May 9, 2006. Source: L'European Airlift Center à Eindhoven, May 10, 2006

<sup>252</sup> Interview with Luc de Rancourt, COL, FAF EAC Cos, November, 11 2006

<sup>253</sup> Germany (pilot country) Canada, Denmark, Spain, France, Hungary, Luxembourg, Norway, Netherlands, Poland, Portugal, Czech Republic, Slovakia, Slovenia, Sweden and Turkey

<sup>254</sup> « OTAN – Transport aérien stratégique », <http://www.nato.int/issues/strategic-lift-air/index-fr.html> (Accessed: January 9, 2006)

<sup>255</sup> EU Council Secretariat – Factsheet – AMIS II/2, October 2005

<sup>256</sup> « GAERC Conclusions on EU civilian-military supporting action to AU mission in Darfur », European Union & United Nation, 18 juillet 2005, [http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article\\_4921\\_en.htm](http://www.europa-eu-un.org/articles/en/article_4921_en.htm) (Accessed: January 9, 2006)

<sup>257</sup> « Aviocar C-212 Casa », <http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/world/europe/c-212-specs.htm> (Accessed: January 9, 2006)

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refused the TU-154B2 proposed by Ukraine and finally its troops were transported by a DC-9 from Kenya, rented by the AU and financed by the United Kingdom. As a result of the coup attempts in Chad, the N'Djamena airport became unusable. France transported Gambian troops via this airport from Banjul to El Fasher by a German airbus. The supply of these troops was actually carried out by a charter flight of Gambian Airline Company Slok Air, financed by Germany.<sup>258</sup>

### III.10. Results, credibility, strengths and weaknesses of AMIS

1. Regarding the AMIS (in 2006), after several reinforcements it was obvious that the mission was still unable to fulfill its role. It was regrettable that AMIS was deployed in Darfur and UNMIS in South Sudan, relatively more peaceful (except Kassala), and not the other way around. Its mandate raised the problem that there was not sufficient restriction in space. That's what we thought at the time AMIS III (if one day reaches the ceiling of 12,000 personnel planned) and the expanded UNMIS, in the form of a possible hybrid mission, will probably be able to more or less manage ethnic conflicts but unable to observe alone the whole territory of Darfur without sufficient equipment.

These troops were able to fight against sporadic attacks by *Janjaweed*, reinforce the elements of the local police, but they would be insufficient to prevent an attack by the Sudanese air force, and of course they are not mandated for that. (They lacked SA-7b Grail "MANPAD" or other portable missile launchers to fight against a Hind or a Fulcrum).<sup>259</sup> Even their self-defense capacity against a possible attack that can never be excluded, remained doubtful. The presence of European observers would facilitate limiting these risks.

2. AMIS has overloaded itself by blowing up its inexperienced troops. Troops who at the beginning interpreted their mandate differently in a situation that is far from being pacified. The EU missions visibly had taken less risk and a conclusion to be drawn from AMIS is that this trend must be continued: AMIS mandated to control a territory as large as France (currently with 7000 people) vis-à-vis the European ARTEMIS mission in the DRC (1200 people) better equipped had a mandate only for the control of the airport and the city of Bunia. In addition, MONUC has already suffered greatly in the

<sup>258</sup> Interview with Luc de Rancourt, COL, FAF EAC Cos, November 16, 2006

<sup>259</sup> Sally Chin – Jonathan Morgenstein, *No power to protect – The African Union Mission in Sudan*, op. cit., 13.

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DRC from recognition problems (no doubt the French bases in the border states have an effective capacity) even if AMIS communication with the local population is relatively less problematic than that of MONUC personnel in the DRC.

3. What are the avenues for progress for AMIS with respect to AMIB?<sup>260</sup> It is highly doubtful that AMIS was based on the conclusions drawn from AMIB. As for AMIB, the deployment was decided despite the UN's scruples about mandating an operation in a case where the Parties have not signed a complex ceasefire agreement.

It is important to highlight the important differences: The population of Burundi, as large as that of Darfur, lives on a much smaller territory (27,800 km<sup>2</sup>) and the State is more centralized.

The mission had more resources and the actors were more structured. In Darfur, when AMIS was deployed, the Ceasefire Agreement in N'Djamena already existed but it was not signed (and respected) by all the combatant Parties. As for AMIB, its financing was guaranteed only by the non-African AU partners, the United Kingdom and the United States and that of AMIS is much more complex.

The AMIB mission was finished and replaced by ONUB on 31 May 2004. AMIS I. for its part proved ineffective and was reinforced in 2 stages (AMIS II, II-E), but since autumn 2006 the immediate support of the UN by the enlargement of the mandate of MINUS (Darfur included) would be essential.

Both missions encountered the **greatest difficulty in DDR tasks**, although AMIB succeeded in disarming 20,000 combatants. AMIS, which was not tasked with DDR tasks, is even unable to observe the implementation of disarmament by the Khartoum government.

In Darfur, the situation is worse and the implementation is particularly aggravated when the attacks and air raids continue to stop.

Disarmament is essential for peace, but the AU missions are/would be unable to disarm the militias alone. It seemed both missions must be reinforced or replaced by other missions (e.g. UN missions), the results are obviously negative. And the (future) AU missions should secure an area rather than an entire region.

4. The essential condition for the restoration of peace and the security of international missions in the theater is the neutralization of the armed forces and in particular the Sudanese air force.

5. It should be added that some police elements deployed by different African states would be almost irreplaceable in their country of origin, particularly in South Africa where, due to general insecurity, police stations are defended by private guards.<sup>261</sup>

To finish with positive elements, it must be said that AMIS has effectively reacted to a major general problem of peace missions mentioned by the *Brahimi Report*: In the AMIS contingent, **the countries of the framework nations did not border the target country**, Sudan. Only Egyptian, Chadian, Ugandan and DRC observers come from neighboring countries.

6. Through their presence, the AMIS and MINUS forces, because of the African elements, could have facilitated the DDR dialogue to find local solutions to inter-ethnic conflicts. The two international organizations were able to monitor the implementation of regional economic projects, financed mainly by foreign countries intended to reduce the negative effects of changes in natural space.

<sup>260</sup> Festus Agoagye, *The African Mission in Burundi – Lessons learned from the first African Union Peacekeeping Operation* [www.iss.co.za](http://www.iss.co.za) (Accessed: January 9, 2006)

<sup>261</sup> « Afrique du Sud », *Le Monde*, December 28, 2004, 12.



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## III.11. UNAMIS, UNMIS - An example before AMIS or the same problems on another level?

In the vicinity of AMIS in Darfur, a UN mission, UNMIS, deployed in the final phase of the North-South peace process, between the more peaceful frameworks sought to facilitate reconciliation in South Darfur. Since the expansion of this mission to Darfur was questioned, it is necessary to know how UNMIS operated, with what efficiency, based or not on another more effective method, to be able to estimate the outcome of such a solution.

Resulting from **Resolution 1590. (March 24, 2005.)** of the UNSC, **UNMIS (United Nations Advance Mission in Sudan) was deployed in South Sudan** to monitor the implementation of the Comprehensive Peace Agreement signed on January 9, 2005 in Nairobi between the government of Sudan and the SPLA /SPLM intended mainly to monitor the re-establishment of North-South reconciliation.<sup>262</sup>

With an initial mandate of 6 months, UNMIS was authorized to have a strength of 10,000 military personnel and 715 civilian police personnel. Cooperation with the AU mission was also provided for by providing AMIS with logistical support and technical assistance. (Art. 5.)

Article 4 of resolution 1590 specifies the mandate of UNMIS, the important elements of which were as follows:

- Observe and monitor the movements of armed groups and redeployment.
- Assist in the implementation of the DDR program
- Assist the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement in the association of all parties, in

restructuring the police, in developing a police training and development program, in promoting the rule of law and the defense of human rights.

- Offer the parties to the Comprehensive Peace Agreement advice in the preparation of elections and referendums; facilitate and coordinate the return of refugees and displaced persons, humanitarian assistance, protection of different vulnerable groups.

- Assistance in the field of mine action through humanitarian aid activities in the field of demining, technical advice and coordination.

Under Chapter VII of the Charter of the United Nations, by Article 16 of the said resolution *"UNMIS is authorized to intervene in the sectors where its forces are deployed and to the extent that it judges that its means allow it to protect United Nations personnel, premises, installations and equipment, ensure the security and free movement of United Nations personnel, humanitarian workers, ... (etc.) . "*

The strength of UNMIS as of 31 August 2006 was 10,275 personnel, including 8,914 military personnel; 695 military observers and 666 police from the 70 participating States. The largest contributors are India (2,656), Pakistan (1,631) and Bangladesh (1,579), Kenya (856) and Egypt (836),<sup>263</sup> but for example such actors as Bosnia and Herzegovina (2; see its relations with Turabi) and Vanuatu (5) were also represented.

Thus the orchestra of participants was extremely wide when the United States and European countries also continued to follow the trend of being present barely in a UN mission: The participation of the Member States of the European Union remained very moderate (104 people): Germany (41), Austria (2),

<sup>262</sup> Darfour : le Conseil de sécurité autorise le déploiement d'une force de l'ONU forte de 17 300 hommes », Centre d'Actualités de l'ONU, August 28, 2006, <http://www.un.org/apps/newsFr/storyF.asp?NewsID=12871&Cr=Conseil&Cr1=Soudan>

<sup>263</sup> India, Pakistan and Bangladesh were also the largest contributors to MONUC's strength in the DRC, which had 18,536 personnel at the time of writing this analysis: 16,642 military personnel, 773 military observers and 1,121 police personnel. With the increased participation of Kenya and Egypt, the UN principle also highlighted in the Brahimi report in 2000 that discourages the participation of units from border states that may have an interest in the conflict is partially neglected. For example, the ownership of the **Hala'ib triangle** in northwestern Sudan is for example the subject of debate between Egypt and Sudan, especially since oil was recently found there.

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Denmark (6), Finland (4), Greece (6), Netherlands (28), Poland (2), United Kingdom (3), Sweden (12).

Sometimes even the UN mission found itself in a delicate situation. Resolution 1590, after having vigorously condemned all violations of human rights, in the persistence of killings directed against civilians and sexual violence against women and girls, had to also declare its serious concern because of the allegation and sexual abuse brought against members of the personnel of ongoing UN operations, and to underline the principle of zero tolerance in this subject.<sup>264</sup> Such problems indicate the inadequacies of the UN force and make it difficult to build trust with the local population.

By resolution 1706, the mandate of UNMIS<sup>265</sup> was extended until the end of April 2007,<sup>266</sup> its military strength will increase to 27,300 personnel and the police strength to 4,015 personnel.<sup>267</sup>

The UN contingents (1,000-1,200 personnel) in each of the 3 sectors of the Southern regions patrol 1-1 territory as large as Romania but with 2.2-4 million inhabitants. The mission was also present in another conflict zone in Kassala, by an RCHQ. (For the distribution of UNMIS forces by sectors, see Annex-3.)

The expansion of the mission through Darfur would lead to a total presence in the conflict border regions from the Red Sea to the Libyan Desert (Chad). Even if the mission proved incapable of controlling all along the border alone, which could serve as the basis for long-term pacification in the entire region, the international presence would probably slow down the escalation of local conflicts, and would also ensure a *cordon sanitaire* around the oil sectors.

At the time of the first version of this analysis, the question remained to what extent UNMIS will combine (see MONUC alone in permanent difficulty despite its expanded mandate in the DRC) the effectiveness of AMIS if some of the same problems exist in both missions: UNMIS also has few interpreters and the *Refugees International* delegation states that in the fall of 2005 only 20% of UNMIS personnel were identifiable and deployed.<sup>268</sup>

For the period from 1 July 2006 to 30 June 2007, the UNMIS budget was 1,126.3 million USD,<sup>269</sup> almost 2.5 times more than the AMIS budget in the previous 12 months.

<sup>264</sup> S/RES/1590 (24 mars 2005), see Brahimi Report, MONUC, in the Balkans, the same problems persist with UN personnel

<sup>265</sup> MINUS strength, October 30, 2006: Force Protection – 8743; Officers – 184; Military Observers – 706; Total: 9633 personnel  
Source: UNMIS Public Information Office

<sup>266</sup> « Annan welcomes Sudan's acceptance of UN help for African Union mission in Darfur », *UN News Centre*, October 6, 2006, <http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=20164&Cr=Sudan&Cr1=>

<sup>267</sup> Sudan – UNMIS – Facts and figures, <http://www.un.org/Depts/dpko/missions/unmis/facts.html> (Accessed: March 20, 2006)

<sup>268</sup> Sally Chin – Jonathan Morgenstein, *op. cit.*, 22. The author of this analysis was also unable to obtain more precise information from the MINUS information service on the number of MINUS personnel already deployed by sector.

<sup>269</sup> Sudan – UNMIS – Facts and figures, *op. cit.*

## IV.

### Conclusions (2008)

« *“A comprehensive peace for Sudan meant buying a fragile agreement in the South at the cost of very real massacres in Darfur.”*<sup>270</sup>. »

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<sup>270</sup> Gérard Prunier, 2005b, *op. cit.*, 238.

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## IV.1. Assessment of the general situation in Darfur

1.

**T**he Darfur crisis in its current state (*note: this is the state at the time of this report's creation in 2006*), when almost all the larger towns and villages were destroyed or heavily damaged, and the attacks by government forces and the Janjaweed did not stop despite the signing of the DAP, are all evidence of the incapacity of the African Union forces on the ground and the inadequacy of international diplomacy.

There are some similarities with the crisis in Croatia in 1991, even though the independence of Darfur is out of the question. Fifteen years later, the general method of crisis management at the diplomatic and operational level shows the same flaws, although it is necessary to emphasize the commitment of the wider international community than in the case of Rwanda or Srebrenica, and an international commission of inquiry for Darfur has already been set up.

It seems, however, that the consequences of such events in the Balkans have not yet been drawn to avoid genocide. In this case it was the Serbian government that supported the Serbian militias in Croatia by giving them support through the federal army, was always ready to sign new ceasefire agreements<sup>271</sup> to ignore them as soon as the ink was not yet dry.

However, the killings in Croatia were explained by the Serbs as the exasperated struggle of the Serbian minority against the Croatian authority. That the air force of the Yugoslav federal army (under Serbian control) assisted the militias did not prevent the international community from maintaining confidence in the diplomatic management of the crisis for a long time. Serbia withdrew its forces from "distant"

Slovenia (demonstrating its commitment to peace) to "legitimize" its intervention in Croatia. And in Darfur? The peace agreement with South Sudan is born, the fruitless negotiations on the Darfur issue are being forced aside, the very detailed agreements on federation and respect for human rights are already signed while the attacks continue and the AU mission is desperately trying to manage the consequences of serious ongoing violence.

2.

From the international aspect, regarding the crisis in Darfur, the presence of the international community has been particularly strong since 2004. (The AU, UN, NATO, EU, NGOs; Australia, China, Malaysia etc. are also ready to lend a hand for the AU in the peace-making process.) The question arises: Khartoum more or less respects the Peace Agreement with SPLM/A in the South is why these hands remain free in Darfur? It seems that the actors do not dare to risk the results of the peace process between the government and South Sudan.

The number of victims, more than 400,000 dead, will probably increase if this diplomatic and operational resolution that carefully avoids diplomatic pressure and excludes military intervention (example Kosovo) continues.

It is here that we must emphasize the simple fact that the simplistic management of the humanitarian crisis mainly by financial aid is ineffective but it seems much less expensive even in a long perspective than an intervention to stop the immediate causes of the crisis.

On the other hand, the serious consequences of the interventions in the Balkans, Rwanda and Somalia explain the precautions of the actors of the peace process, although several of these actors increase their participation in Lebanon in UNIFIL.

<sup>271</sup> For example, a hundred during the war between Croatia and Serbia.



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3.

The disagreements of the major powers and international organizations remain maximally exploitable by Parties that are not ready to respect a ceasefire. (Even the African Union often applies the *divide et impera* method towards contributors.) The worst is often the case when the UN Security Council is divided. Thus the embargoes declared by the EU also remain stillborn.

It should also be taken into account that by the umpteenth multiplication of signed agreements and the establishment in series of different committees, commissions and teams will not necessarily increase their credibility and their values. The Darfur Peace Agreement that very rightly calls for the meticulous respect of human rights is perhaps premature in such a situation when even the N'Djamena Ceasefire Agreement was never respected.

4.

The Darfur crisis must be interpreted as a phenomenon of destabilization for the entire region.<sup>272</sup> It has a negative effect on political stability in Chad and the different groups in the CAR, DRC, Ethiopia, Eritrea (etc.) are often in interaction.

The EU must take appropriate measures *"in the face of new threats, the first line of [European] defence will often be abroad. (...) State failure and organised crime spread if we neglect to address them, as we have seen in West Africa. This means that we must be ready to act before a crisis occurs. It is never too early to prevent conflicts and threats."*<sup>273</sup>

Thus, regular consultation between the different elements of the European missions in the DRC and Sudan (and with the French elements in Chad, the

CAR, etc.) would be very useful: The organisation of colloquiums with the simultaneous participation of some elements of these missions would contribute to the development of a European strategy for Africa based on the regional approach.

5.

First of all, it should be realized that crisis management, which avoids digging to the roots of the problems, is insufficient and too expensive. International organizations can delegate 5-10 more experts to the joint organizations with the AU of AMIS, or massively increase the contingent and equipment of AMIS or UNAMID to secure some areas, but it is impossible to sustain this massive deployment for decades. Currently the "draw" of diplomacy favors of course not voluntarily but indirectly "a final solution" which is based on the principle that after ethnic cleansing and extorted migration the problem will resolve itself. The responsibility of the international community is that all the delay and hesitation gives one more chance of this solution.

6.

During the peace process, several NGOs proposed beautiful and good things, the strengthening of the capacity of AMIS, the perfection of its planning cell, the strengthening of cooperation between the AU and the DPKO, the increase of the budget and that AMIS/ UNAMID be charged with DDR tasks. The last one is an unrealistic goal: the disarmament of militias especially in an unresolved situation seems to be unrealizable especially by AMIS (and even probably by UNAMID whose mandate prescribes the monitoring, verification and promotion of disarmament).

<sup>272</sup> This regional approach has already been demonstrated in the Contribution of the SG/HR of the EU to an EU Strategy for Africa (S377/05, 21/11/2005) « *The EU should adopt a regional approach to conflicts in Africa. We are doing so in the Great Lakes region ; we developed a West Africa strategy but implementation is lagging behind. Sudan should also be seen in a regional context.* »

<sup>273</sup> European Security Strategy, Brussels, December 12, 2003

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In addition, the disarmament of militias and rebels is demanded at the same time as international diplomacy is incapable of obstructing the rearmament of the Sudanese government army or other belligerents. How should the diplomatic and operational component of the international community evolve to resolve problems of this kind? The control of arms trafficking in the region where the borders are almost uncontrollable remains a very big challenge. And indeed without the reinforcement of the control of the Sudanese borders the DDR type duties would be difficult to achieve.

Such a disarmament will remain illusory until the deployment of military forces to guarantee the *status quo ante*. (*Nota bene*: In West Darfur the *Janjaweed* occupy the land.) The deployment that arrives late by ineffective forces to guarantee the status quo, and not the status quo ante can only aggravate the situation. (Several dangerous precedents in the management of the crisis of the Former Yugoslavia in the 90s are bad examples of the management of a similar center-periphery conflict.)

The deployment of an effective, well-equipped military force is essential in a situation where the total loss of trust between the combatant parties is general: What other method to guarantee the security of a party that continues in good faith phases of vis-à-vis its adversary who tries to violate the signed agreements.

7.

In the final phase, the key element of international management of intra-state crises, the establishment of an artificial federation, seems highly ambiguous. Countless works and analyses on the subject affirm that a federation cannot be artificial, reinforced. The actors are convinced that the result is to force nations to abandon the ambitions of independence to create their own state (the case of the former Yugoslavia, Kosovo) or to create a federated entity by bringing together very different groups, often nomadic and living in circumstances that sometimes recall the

Middle Ages with slavery, sometimes the 21st century (the case of Africa, Sudan). But it should be known that the essential elements of establishing a federation are several coherent entities, more or less equal and well organized at the federated level. The dissolution of Yugoslavia should serve as a bad example to avoid whose important elements were the predominance of one entity in the federal administration and army and its profit from the redistribution on which it practiced a more significant influence, the loss of civil control of federal bodies above the army and the lack of an effective system of the blocking minority.

In addition, the less close, confederal cooperations that were born "from the friendship" of states in Africa without the proper form of implementation (Union of Arab Republics, Libyan-Tunesian Union) did not exist for long. That is to say, in Darfur the enlargement of new bases of federation by a simple "copy-paste" of the acts between the government and SPLM/A in the South, should be elaborated more preciously and not prematurely, although several elements of the rebel movements themselves hasten this solution.

8.

As for the North-South conflict, it is still far from being definitively resolved while the crisis in Darfur has made it background. The population of South Sudan must be attentive: the forces of the governments are engaged in the nearby Darfur theater.

## IV.2. Conclusions on EU diplomacy and support mission (2006)

1.

The first civil-military support mission that was charged with reduced risks was certainly a useful experience regarding the conclusions of the planning of the operation, (see the role of CivMicCell) of the mobilization for a real civil-military operation (CMCO) in the future.

The most important lessons to be learned are that the mobilization of experts should be better coordinated and the diplomatic support of the European participation should be more precise.

2.

On the other hand these positive elements of the ESDP, the decisive role of the EU in conflict management, remains the economy, the "**€-diplomacy**": the financing of crisis management that by civil-military elements serve neither the means of a final resolution of the crisis in Darfur nor an effective temporary stabilization. The role of treasurer without demands, a second-rate actor (without the *peace enforcement* capacity) with a minimum of respect and little recognition.

Couldn't the EU spend more efficiently?

Even at this point, consensus can be established between European states, and unlike political or operational management, humanitarian intervention remains the smallest common multiple. It must be emphasized once again that without political consensus, without a real common prior strategy, the applicability of the common force of the ESDP remains within its real capacity.

3.

The European Union should take more precautions regarding the African Union, an organization that has ambitious projects with very modest financial

resources and the solidarity between heads of state prevents neutral mediation in such a conflict as Darfur.

The European Union should especially avoid the role of an actor in all honor who, out of ignorance of history and the reality on the theater, unintentionally assists in the worsening of a crisis. Even if the EU personnel on the ground are small, it facilitates a *sine ira et studio* assessment of the real situation, and the interpretation of new waves of violence.

All this is very important when the EU meets the global aspect of the Darfur conflict (cf. Iraq and Afghanistan) and must answer the question the doctrine "preserving stability" and "non-intervention for the respect of sovereignty" is called into question. These doctrines take part in an indirect legitimization and free hand to the genocides of regimes sometimes called "rogue".

4.

In 2006 there were 8 different levels of financing of the different components of diplomacy and the European support mission. Without doubt it is difficult to overcome the coordination of these expenses without simplification and integration. The application of European financial resources must be carefully controlled as well as regular assessments of effectiveness. EU support should be questioned in a situation where the partner absolutely ignores the EU proposals.

5.

The question must be asked at European level whether the "financial infusion" for the African Union serves European interests sufficiently or not. Even if these payments help to achieve a tangible result on the theatre, the question arises whether a European mission on the ground really contributes to the EU's objectives in the region. Until May 2005 the EU mobilized 600 million euros for crisis management in Darfur. *Nota bene*: the French

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participation in ARTEMIS cost 46 million euros (1/13), in ALTHEA 80 million euros (1/7). In the summer of 2004 UK planned to deploy troops in Darfur and in 2003 the ARTEMIS led by France proved that the mobilization was also possible without NATO support.

6.

It would be desirable to manage political tensions between the member states more effectively in the event of a NATO or EU intervention without NATO. The disagreements between NATO and the EU regarding strategic airlift (*NATO's first mission in Africa*) are a worrying phenomenon.

From the perspective of possible European operations, the fact that some states preferred to act within the framework of Berlin Plus and others without NATO, brings negative consequences to the search for a common voice.

Moreover, NATO with the *peace enforcement capacity* by military means at its rear is much more appreciated by the AU while NATO's financial and diplomatic support for AMIS is much less significant than that of the EU.

7.

Goodwill proposals if they do not foresee the method of implementation (e.g. creating a no-fly zone over Sudan - but how to guarantee and monitor it; European embargo even if Sudan's most important partners are not part of it, etc.) are worth little and at the same time destroy the credibility of EU diplomacy which thus begins to find itself on the UN track.

European initiatives to fight SALW<sup>274</sup> should also be re-examined and brought closer to reality by taking into account the overall feasibility and the international control capacity.

8.

To effectively manage the crisis in Darfur a possible military engagement of the international community and/or the EU with a more robust mandate should be examined. The possibility of such operations is long very little in the diplomatic context presented above.

The **EU Strategy for Africa** (2005)<sup>275</sup> even foresees "*the possible deployment of EU battle groups*" and proposes to "*strengthen the EU's response capacity to disasters and humanitarian emergencies*". Prevention and the establishment of an early warning system should be more emphasized to manage crises such as that of Darfur.

As for the civilian aspect of a possible operation, in accordance with the Civilian Headline Goal<sup>276</sup> "*the EU must be able to conduct different types of observation missions, as well as provide support to the European Union Special Representatives*".

The SSR (security sector reform) and DDR (disarmament, demobilization and reintegration)<sup>277</sup> duties are priorities.

Thus a broader commitment to the CMCO domain to assist AMIS/UNAMID which is not responsible for managing DDR-type tasks would be strongly recommended with the feasibility restrictions that have been mentioned above. In a possible case if the European military forces were deployed the EU civilian mission can be deployed "*in close liaison*".

<sup>274</sup> Small arms and light weapons (SALW) see « Contribution by EU High Representative Javier Solana to the EU Strategy for Africa », November 21, 2005, S377/05, 5. [http://doku.cac.at/contribution\\_solana\\_eu\\_strategy\\_for\\_africa.pdf](http://doku.cac.at/contribution_solana_eu_strategy_for_africa.pdf)

<sup>275</sup> « L'UE et l'Afrique: Vers un partenariat stratégique », Conseil européen, Bruxelles, December 15-16, 2005. Conclusions de la présidence, Article 4b

<sup>276</sup> Conseil européen, Bruxelles, December 16-17, 2004.

<sup>277</sup> See « L'UE et l'Afrique: Vers un partenariat stratégique » – Conseil européen, Bruxelles, December 15-16, 2005. Conclusions de la présidence, Article 4c



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*with military operations" and must "be able to call upon military capabilities."*

As for the aspect of establishing a no-fly zone, it must be added that during Operation Dorca in Chad the observation and intelligence of the five F-1CR squadron 2/33 "Savoie" guaranteed shots about twenty kilometers inside the Darfur theater and that France had also offered F-1CRs for the African Union.

The French Minister of Defense did not exclude that the French combat aircraft present in the region could notably support such a mission, although some French military believe that OPEX has already reached its limits.

The interests of the good relationship between Chad and Sudan and French relations with Sudan continue to reduce the feasibility of such an operation. In addition, there are a series of problems to overcome: establishing a no-fly zone in Darfur, or border security patrols (the latter is one of the important tasks of French troops in Chad), which go beyond the framework of the Petersberg missions.

## IV.3. Proposals for the restoration of peace in Darfur (2006)

1.

The starting point should be the harmonisation of the external activity of European diplomacy at national level and on the Union stage. More effective ad hoc forums should be created, with objectives in question between the SG/HR, the EUSR and national officials. It is better to channel European diplomacy in a way that avoids the special interests of Member States represented by national officials, and currently communicated through bilateral voices, seeming to be neglected and threatened.

2.

For this, the EU should quickly develop a real regional strategy (or a white paper) for Africa (which was part of a global strategy) especially to reduce its energy dependence, and to achieve other goals (stabilization, democratization in Africa, etc.).<sup>278</sup>

The strategy should list different scenarios for hypothetical cases and contain proposals for the case if several energy resources remained blocked. The main elements would be to be debated with African partners and especially with the AU. The place and role of Sudan, the crisis in Darfur and its international aspect should be (re)interpreted in this framework in relation to the surrounding crisis zones.

3.

Examine the possibility of progressive Europeanization especially the African policy of France (in the region itself) and UK: Multilateral programs<sup>279</sup>, bilateral agreements, intelligence and

<sup>278</sup> "Africa is a continent where the EU can assert itself as a security actor while its visibility in other regions (Middle East, Asia) may prove more difficult." (translated by the author) Thierry Tardy, *L'Union européenne en Afrique : Un partenaire stratégique dans les opérations de paix*, Rapport du séminaire GCSP et l'International Peace Academy, July 7, 2006. 4.

<sup>279</sup> Le document « Contribution by EU High Representative Javier Solana to the EU Strategy for Africa » quotes the French RECAP: « ...ont he proposal made by France to « Europeanise » RECAP » (4.)

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knowledge capabilities, and their bases and capacities in Africa should be better made available to the common objectives of the union, whether a diplomatic intervention or an external operation.

### 4.

After realizing the needs, capabilities, common goals of the EU and the realities in the region, to concretely manage the crisis in Darfur, the activities of the EU should focus on the issue, what initiatives to take so that the international situation in the Darfur issue, which has reached a standstill, changes.

The role of China and Russia should be questioned. On the international scene, it would be desirable for the EU to convene a conference on Darfur with the participation of the United States, the EU, Russia and China. The stakes of this conference would be the following:

- It is necessary to find the common voice (especially) among the members of the UNSC to avoid the possibility of being played against themselves in a bad way by Khartoum. Define common goals to have a common point of view towards Khartoum and the African Union. It is necessary to find the smallest common multiple even if for example the respect of democratic values is also doubtful in Russia and China. By this fact strengthen the role of the UN in conflict management.

- It would be necessary to find the interest of Russia and China in the restoration of peace. Both states prefer good relations with Khartoum to the restoration of peace in Darfur. But for investments (and as we have seen for global recognition in relation to the Olympic Games in 2008) and for the exploitation of China's oil in Sudan, a general peace would probably be more

favorable. As for Russia, it is obvious that this country is fighting against the loss of its role in international diplomacy. It has proposed to send troops to Lebanon. The role of Russia, as a mediator, would bring a positive effect to Russian diplomacy.

- The most delicate problem is the supply of weapons by the Russians and the Chinese for Sudan. Since April 2006 a Russian military contingent (122 soldiers, 15 military observers) has been part of UNMIS.<sup>280</sup>
- The challenge of such coordinated diplomacy would be a common platform vis-à-vis Khartoum: either a light diplomatic pressure, but it would rather give prospects for Khartoum regarding the restoration of peace in Darfur, for example through investment and massive innovation in the region.

### 5.

This common line of conduct should be harmonized and discussed with the African Union and other partners.

After the first phase, more important measures should be taken regarding the theater:

### 6.

The establishment of a no-fly zone over Darfur, despite the serious difficulties mentioned above, would be the key element in eliminating Sudanese air raids. (Neither UNAMID nor EUFOR Chad/RCA are calculating with this.) The elements for this air control (AWACS) should be guaranteed by NATO without or with the EU and, if feasible, deployed in Chad, in N'Djamena, taking advantage of French

<sup>280</sup> II-76, An-22 and An-124 Ruslan aircraft made about 40 flights to airlift the contingent with all the required equipment and weapons (20 vehicles, 4 Mi-8MTV helicopters). Source: « Russian peacekeeping force to arrive in Sudan by end-April », *Sudan Tribune*, March 4, 2006, <http://www.sudantribune.com/Russian-peacekeeping-force-to-14349>

bases. Such an opportunity with a mandate strictly limited in space and time could serve as a test phase for the capacity of the European Union.

## 7.

Other proposals to be made during this phase in the theatre:

- > Strengthen the border guard by setting up mixed units, to control the movement of armed groups and illegal arms trafficking.

- > DDR by mixed government units and elements of an international military mission (Russian and Chinese participation would also be desirable)

- > In addition to these two components, AMIS/ UNAMID should be tasked with strengthening the local police, with increased participation by the AU.

Continue the Abuja process for the strengthening of democracy led by the AU.

## 8.

In interaction with this process, the Darfur area should be secured gradually through economic investments, innovation in infrastructure, programs against unemployment, the creation of irrigation channels.

The European Union Strategy for Africa (2005)<sup>281</sup> reflects on a fundamental problem widely present in Darfur, when it underlines the importance of *"facilitating the access of populations to water and sanitation"* for example would contribute greatly to peace between the different sedentary or nomadic groups. It is therefore essential to develop and launch programs aimed at managing the negative consequences of drought, by reducing the causes of inter-ethnic conflicts for a long-term stabilization.

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<sup>281</sup> « L'UE et l'Afrique: Vers un partenariat stratégique », *op. cit.*, Article 7b

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## V.

**Sudan after 2008  
(2025)**



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## V.1. The last decade of president Bashir (2008-2019)

On 10 May 2008, the Darfur rebel group, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), attacked Khartoum and Omdurman, killing more than 220 people. It was the **first time that the Darfur conflict had reached the capital**, marking a significant escalation in a conflict that had already claimed up to 300,000 lives and displaced 2.5 million people since 2003.

On March 4, 2009, the ICC (International Criminal Court) **issued an arrest warrant for Omar al-Bashir** for war crimes and crimes against humanity (and then genocide in 2010). In retaliation, thirteen NGOs were expelled from Sudan. All of this did not prevent al-Bashir from winning the next presidential elections.



On February 8, 2010, a **reconciliation between Idriss Déby (Chad) and Omar al-Bashir (Sudan) began** after 4 years of broken relations. Chad broke diplomatic relations with the Sudan several times in 2006 because it was estimated that the Sudanese government financially supported the rebels of the UFDC (United Front for Democratic Change, in french **FUC**, *Front uni pour le changement démocratique*) with arms, in the guise of reprisals for the military support of Chad to the MJE rebels in Darfur. On August 11, 2006, Chad and Sudan resumed relations at the request of Libyan President Mouammar Gaddafi.

On 15 April 2010, Omar al-Bashir won the presidential elections. In South Sudan, **Salva Kiir** was re-elected as leader of the semi-autonomous region in elections. On December 30, 2010, Sudanese parliament approved a law that would have **allowed**

**the people of Abyei to decide whether to join the South or the North in a referendum.** However, by the time the referendum began, they could not agree on whether the nomads could vote, so the vote on Abyei's affiliation was postponed indefinitely.

On 9 January 2011, the referendum on the independence of South Sudan and the future of the Abyei region (whether or not to be part of South Sudan) was held. Independence was demanded by 99% of voters.

In office since independence day July 9, 2011, Salva Kiir (« *The man in black hat* ») is the President of the Republic of South Sudan. On July 27, 2011 the country becomes the 54th member country of the African Union. In December 2011, the forces of Sudan and South Sudan already clashed on a

disputed border section by **Jau** (Ruweng area).

(To read about the history of South Sudan after its independence, see the following analysis: A. I. Türke: « *Born to be Wild* » - South Sudan after the Independence, *CERPESC Analyses*, 18/AF/07/2025)

In January 2012, South Sudan stopped its oil production, denouncing the exorbitant prices applied by Sudan for transit, transport and processing. (It was not until September 2012 that the resumption of oil production in South Sudan was concluded after an agreement on prices.)

In **June 2012, Sudan and South Sudan accused each other of supporting rebel movements active in their countries** and of exacerbating inter-communal tensions: According to Khartoum, Juba actively supported the **SPLM-North** (see below) which operated in present-day Sudan. The authorities in Juba denied these accusations. El Bashir declared

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that he would stop transporting South Sudanese oil within sixty days.<sup>282</sup>

The creation of the **National Consensus Forces (NCF)** coalition, bringing together the National Umma Party (NUP) of Sadik al-Mahdi, the Popular Congress of Hassan al-Turabi and the Sudanese Communist Party, dates back to July 2012.

On October 23, 2012, eight **Israeli F-15 fighter bombers bombed the Yarmouk arms factory** near Khartoum, where Iranian specialists allegedly manufactured missiles, as a rehearsal for a strike against Iran.

The planes covered the 4,000-kilometer distance in four hours, the journey was so long because the planes approached the target from the Red Sea, avoiding Egyptian radar. Israel accused Sudan of supplying weapons to Palestinian extremists and the Lebanese Shiite Hezbollah.<sup>283</sup>

On 22 November 2012, the **failed coup against President al-Bashir** began as an attempt to overthrow the government due to severe conflict, upheaval (mainly the 2011-2013 Sudanese protests) and deteriorating living conditions. 13 people were arrested during the coup attempt.

In January 2013, the Sudan Revolutionary Front (SRF) and the National Consensus Forces (NCF) signed a joint statement with civil society actors and a year later the president of Sudan announced a “National Dialogue”. Shortly after in May 2014, Sadik al-Mahdi was arrested.

In **mid-April 2013, serious clashes** broke out between the army and paramilitary forces. At that time, tensions had been simmering **between the**

**army (SAF)** and the **Rapid Support Forces (RSF, al-Quwat al-Da'm al-Sari' in Arabic)** for months, as the paramilitary units were to be integrated into the national army in the interests of the country's democratization. While the government forces were to give it two years, the RSF asked for a ten-year extension for integration. Egyptian soldiers from the RSF also helped in the coup.

The RSF attacked several army bases and announced that they had captured Khartoum International Airport, the presidential palace, and the Merove military base in the north of the country.

The RSF headed by Mohamed Hamdan Dagalo (« **Hemedti**») **has its roots in the Janjaweed militias** and was formed on August 2013 having about 5,000–6,000 soldiers. But during 2016–2017, 40,000 RSF members participated in the Yemeni Civil War and in 2019, about 1,000 RSF soldiers were present in Libya, supporting the Libyan National Army led by commander Khalifa Haftar. RSF had been accused of human rights abuses, including the massacre of more than 120 protesters in June 2019.<sup>284</sup>

In December 2014, several political and civil society leaders signed the “**Sudan Appeal**,” calling for democratic reforms and an end to ongoing conflicts. Two human rights activists who signed the agreement were arrested and then released in April 2015 after Omar al-Bashir's re-election.

<sup>282</sup> “Soudans : l’UA enquête sur des accusations de soutien à des rebelles”, *Jeuneafrique.com*, July 23, 2013 armés <https://www.jeuneafrique.com/169546/politique/soudans-l-ua-enqu-te-sur-des-accusations-de-soutien-des-rebelles-arm-s/>

<sup>283</sup> According to observers from the Satellite Sentinel Project, satellite images showed 6 large craters, each 16 meters in diameter. Actors George Clooney and John Prendergast launched the SSP on December 29, 2010, with the goals of deterring a return to full-scale civil war between northern and southern Sudan and deterring and documenting threats to civilians along both sides of the border. The Project worked to focus global attention on mass atrocities in Sudan and used its imagery and analysis to generate rapid responses on human rights and human security concerns. Source: The Senty, <https://thesentry.org/>

<sup>284</sup> “Men With No Mercy” Rapid Support Forces Attacks against Civilians in Darfur, Sudan, HRW Report, September 9, 2015. <https://www.hrw.org/report/2015/09/09/men-no-mercy/rapid-support-forces-attacks-against-civilians-darfur-sudan>

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## V.2. Transition (2019-2021) and the presence of Wagner Group in Sudan

In 2018 Sudan was ravaged by a severe economic and financial crisis. After the crisis worsened, the president in power for 30 years, Omar al-Bashir, was overthrown by a **popular uprising on 11 April 2019**.

**Abdel Fattah al-Burhan** became the Chairman of the Sovereignty Council of the Republic of Sudan.<sup>285</sup> Unlike his predecessor, he is not considered Islam like a "pillar" of the regime and has no known links to the Islamic Movement. The **Transitional Military Council (TMC)** was the military junta governing Sudan that was established on 11 April 2019, after the 2019 Sudanese *coup d'état* that took place during the Sudanese Revolution.

Al-Burhan visited Russian President Vladimir **Putin in Sochi in October 2019**, with whom he agreed, among other things, that **Moscow would establish a naval base in Port Sudan**. This would extend Russia's influence to one of the most strategically important ports in the Red Sea, after the Mediterranean port of Tartus in Syria.

According to the agreement signed on December 1, 2020, Russia will establish a logistics center in Port Sudan for the maintenance and supply of Russian naval ships, where maintenance and supply activities will be carried out.

The 25-year agreement will be automatically extended every ten years after its expiration - if neither party objects. Russia can simultaneously host up to 4 military ships, including a nuclear-powered one and a maximum of 300 crew members and civilian personnel serve at the base.

Russia can also use Sudanese airports and seaports to transport weapons, ammunition and equipment needed to operate the military port. In exchange for using the military port, it will supply the African Arab country with weapons, military equipment and help build a civilian nuclear reactor in Sudan.<sup>286</sup>

In 2017, the 300 members of the **Wagner Group** in Sudan became the main allies and supporters of the junta's second-in-command, the commander of RSF "Hemetti" (or "Hemedti") in controlling mines and managing border conflicts. The RSF may have received missiles from the Wagner Group.

Hemetti got involved in gold mining and sent it to Moscow. The main company in this field is Meroe Gold, which is a subsidiary of Yevgeny Prigozhin's M Invest Group. (Prigozhin was the leader and « manager » of the Wagner PMC.) Meroe Gold was renamed Al Solag Mining due to American sanctions. An important supplier of the company is Esnaad Engineering, which is owned by the Hemetti family.<sup>287</sup>

Gold smuggling (90% of Sudan's gold) was carried out using military aircraft, Meroe Gold used the Khartoum military air base for this purpose. Russian geologists from Meroe Gold arrived in Sudan together with Wagner in 2017 and delivered a number of construction materials, mining machines and military trucks, amphibious vehicles and 2 military transport helicopters. In February 2022, when the invasion of Ukraine began, Hemetti arrived in Moscow with \$30 million worth of gold and new mining concessions.<sup>288</sup>

Aleksandr Sergeevich Kuznetsov (callsign "Ratibor"), has directed Wagner's access to Sudanese gold mines in 2020, helping to process and transit the

<sup>285</sup> Since 2021: Chairman of the **Transitional Sovereignty Council** of the Republic of Sudan (*de facto* head of state of Sudan).

<sup>286</sup> « Sudan's silence about Russian base reflects divergences in Khartoum - Agreeing to Russian military presence could clash with US interests. » *The Arab Weekly*, November 20, 2020. <https://the arabweekly.com/sudans-silence-about-russian-base-reflects-divergences-khartoum-0>

<sup>287</sup> Türke, A. I.: « Musicians » in Africa In: Besenyő, J. - Türke, A. I. - Szénási, E. : WAGNER GROUP Private Military Company - Vol I. Establishment, Purpose, Profile and Historic Relevance 2013-2023, Warwick: Helion, 2024. 32.

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gold. He commander of the 1st Attack and Reconnaissance Company within the Wagner Group, took command in 2014. In September 2019, he was reportedly injured while fighting alongside LNA in Libya.

The Wagner group also cooperated with the Sudanese Army and the National Intelligence and Security Services (NISS). In fact, according to some information, they also actively participated in the eradication of mass demonstrations in Sudan. The organization maintained good relations with the military government after the fall of the Bashir regime, so its people are still active in the country to this day.<sup>289</sup>

In June 2020, Egypt (president Abdel-Fattah el-Sisi), Ethiopia (president Sahle-Work Zewde) and Sudan agreed in Cairo, with the mediation of the AU, to restart stalled negotiations on the pace of filling the **Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam** reservoir.

Ethiopia began building the \$4.6 billion dam on the Blue Nile in 2010. The project has led to many disputes with Egypt and Sudan, which are located on the lower reaches of the Nile.

Ethiopia threatened to start filling the 74 billion cubic meter reservoir in July 2020 with the onset of the rainy season. Cairo considered this unacceptable and illegal.

Ethiopia wants to become Africa's most significant energy exporter through the Nile Power Plant, while for Egypt the Nile plays an indispensable role in agriculture, industry and meeting domestic freshwater needs. Egypt and Sudan agreed to share water resources in 1959, before the construction of the Aswan Dam, but Ethiopia was not a party to that agreement.<sup>290</sup>

In **October 2020** in **Juba** (South Sudan!) the **agreement** between the Sudanese government and representatives of the Sudan Revolutionary Front, an alliance of five rebel groups, was initialed.

However, the differences between the two non-signatory rebel groups and the Khartoum authorities have become increasingly deep. These include

- > the Sudan People's Liberation Movement-North (SPLM-N) led by Abdel Aziz al-Hilu

- > and the Sudan Liberation Movement of Abdel Wahid al-Nur

Khartoum authorities oppose these two non-signatory rebel groups on the issue of the separation of state and religion to make Sudan a secular state. In addition, the SPLM-N has called for the end of the old regime and the return of civilians to power.<sup>291</sup>

**On 25 October 2021, General al-Burhan staged a new military coup in Sudan**, arresting government officials and dissolving the Sovereignty Council, and a state of emergency was imposed across the country. Protests and strikes followed, leading to negotiations.

Finally, on 11 November 2021, al-Burhan became the Chairman of the Transitional Sovereignty Council of the Republic of Sudan (*de facto* head of state). A 14-point agreement reached in November reinstated Prime Minister Abdalla Hamdok, but civilian groups rejected it, and Hamdok resigned in January 2022 amid ongoing protests.

<sup>289</sup> Türke, A. I.: « Musicians » in Africa In: Besenyő, J. - Türke, A. I. - Szénási, E. : WAGNER GROUP Private Military Company - Vol I. Establishment, Purpose, Profile and Historic Relevance 2013-2023, Warwick: Helion, 2024. 32.

<sup>290</sup> Grand Ethiopian Renaissance Dam Agreement within Reach, Under-Secretary-General Tells Security Council, as Trilateral Talks Proceed to Settle Remaining Differences, SC/14232, June 29, 2020.

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## V.3. The recent civil war (2023-)

**On April 2023, conflict broke out between the Sudan Armed Forces (SAF) and the Rapid Support Forces** (already 100,000-strong RSF), with clashes in Khartoum and Darfur.

Shooting between the two sides began on 15 April 2023 following days of tension as members of the RSF were redeployed around the country in a move that the army saw as a threat.<sup>292</sup> The conflict resulted in RSF being designated as a rebel group by the SAF.

In the early hours of the morning of 15 April 2023, the RSF initiated a series of assaults on key installations in Khartoum (*Battle of Khartoum*), including the Khartoum International Airport, captured the presidential palace, the residence of former Sudanese president al-Bashir, state television and attacked more military bases (Merowe, Soba).

After the SAF attacked RSF positions from the air at the airport, several civilian planes have been reportedly damaged. SAF initiated major ground offensives on three fronts. (Khartoum, Bahri). The RSF had encircled both the Signal Corps in Khartoum North and the General Command of the Armed Forces, its headquarters just south across the Blue Nile river.<sup>293</sup>

Significant clashes were reported throughout the day in Al Fasher in North Darfur, El Obeid in North Kordofan, Nyala in South Darfur, and Kassala in Kassala State.<sup>294</sup> Since then, the civil war has killed around 26,000 lives, displaced at least 12 million people (January 2025).

The SPLM-N led by Abdelaziz al-Hilu and other rebel groups joined the war. This **SPLM-Nord** was founded by the South Sudanese-dominated Sudan People's Liberation Movement/Army organizations that remained in Sudan territory after South Sudan's vote for independence in 2011. Despite the Comprehensive Peace Agreement, a low-intensity conflict has continued to rage in the Republic of Sudan. The conflict with central authorities led al-Bashir to ban the party.

South Sudan has also been accused of supporting the SPLA-N's operations in Sudan, just as Sudan supports anti-government groups in South Sudan.

The SPLA-N has suffered from factionalism. Two factions, the **SPLM-N (Agar)** and the **SPLM-N (al-Hilu)**, clashed and fought the government of Sudan, from approximately 2017 to 2019.

As of 2023, the al-Hilu faction was fighting the SAF, while the leader of the Agar faction was appointed to the military-led government.

On 12 September 2023, Volker Türk, UN High Commissioner for Human Rights, deplored the deaths of hundreds of people in ethnically motivated attacks by the RSF and allied militias in West Darfur.

Since 26 September 2024, SAF launched a major offensive to recapture Khartoum and the state. In January 2025 SAF reported it had broken the siege on its Khartoum headquarters by RSF, the arrival of the forces from Bahri completely lifted the siege on the command, and added that it had "expelled" the RSF from the Jaili oil refinery north of the capital, the country's largest.<sup>295</sup>

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This offensive operated in conjunction with **Bahri offensive** (September 2024 – 17 February 2025) to recapture strategic areas of Bahri (Khartoum North).<sup>296</sup>

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## Image sources

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Annexe 2 - The structure of AMIS II

	Région	MILOB s	Police civile	Pers . Int./ CCF	Force de Protecti on	Remarq ues	Territoire / Population / AMIS
QG	Nord-Darfour	105	7 19	37	104	772	296.000 km2 1,43 million (2002)
QGF		43			206	249	
Secteur 1 El-Fashir							
Secteur 4 Kabkabiya h		48			196	244	
Secteur 6 Kutum		47	19		241	288	
Secteur 2 Nyala	Sud-Darfour	53	29		207	260	127.300 km2
Secteur 8 Ed Daein		43	24		196	239	~ 2,5 millions
Secteur 3 Al Junaynah	Ouest-Darfour	43	29		143	186	79.460 km2 1,7 million (2002)
Secteur 5 Tine		46	20		196	242	
Secteur 7 Zalingei		47	18		195	242	
Abeche	(Tchad)	12	-		40	52	



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Total		487	245 / 526	37	1724	2774	503180 km2  6-7 millions
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Tableau -1 Source : Union Africain – Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité 28eme Réunion 28/04/2005 p.38. ; Col Reinhard Linz – AMIS Briefing (powerpoint) slide-13 ;  
FAO Report 2000

## Annexe -3 - Distribution of UNMIS forces by sectors

	Wilayats (États-membres)	Km2	population	Σ territoire / Σ population	
HQ UNMIS Khartoum		22.142	4.700.000	22.142 / 4.700.000	Rwanda
RCHQ Kassala		36.710	1.400.000	36.710 / 1.400.000	
Secteur 1 -Région Equatoria <b>Juba</b>	Western Equatoria (*) Eastern Equatoria (*) <b>Bahr al Jebel (Central Equ.)</b>	79.319 82.542 22.956	2.230.000 (*) 869.000	184.817 / 3.126.000	Bangladesh, Inde
Secteur 2 -Région B. Al Gh. <b>Wau</b>	Warab Buheyra (Lakes) <b>Western Bahr Al Ghazal (*)</b> Northern Bahr Al Ghazal (*)	31.027 40.235 93.900 33.558	307.000 628.000 2.896.000 (*)	198.720 / 3.831.000	Bangladesh

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Secteur 3 - Région Upper N. <b>Malakal</b>	Jongli (Jungoli) Unity State <b>Upper Nile</b>	122.4 79  35.95 6  77.77 3	406.000  486.000  1.312.000	236.208  / 2.204.00 0	Inde, Pakistan
Secteur 4 <b>Kadugli</b>	Abyei (Nord-East) <b>Southern Kordofan</b> Western Kordofan /S.-East/	~6000  79.47 0  ~28.0 00	Abeyei :  12.000  W-K :  1.100.000	~113.470  + ~50.000  / 2.212.00 0	Egypte, Inde
Secteur 6 <b>Abyei</b>	Western Kordofan /South- West/ <b>Abyei (1)</b>	~28.0 00  ~22.0 00	S-K :  1.100.000		Zambie, Inde
Secteur 5 <b>Ed Damazin</b>	<b>Blue Nile</b>	45.84 4	600.000	45.844  /600.000	Pakistan

(1) Sectors 1-3 : 3 regions of South Sudan ; In each sector the number of UNMIS staff fluctuated - Average strength per sector: 1200 people (estimated)

## Annexe - 4. The different phases of AMIS

	Éléments				Total	Budget	Mandat
	MILOB s	Pers. militai re	Pers. police	Pers. appui au soutien			
AMIS /09.06-10.2004/	60	300	X	X	360	? US\$	- observation  - sécurité des observateurs (Ch. VI)

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
AMIS II /10/2004 – 05/2005/	450	1891	815	164	3320	US\$ 220 million	- aide à la restauration de la confiance  - instauration d'un envi-ronnement sécurisé
AMIS II-E /06-09.2005/	6171		1560		7731	US\$ 441 million	- assurer la protection des populations civiles  - observer le désarmement /GdS/ (« vers Ch. VII »)
	686						
AMIS III /09.2005-/ (11/2006)	(608)	(5012 )	(1425)	(101)	12.500  (7146)	US\$ 466 million (*)	- fin du mandat : 31/12/2006 ( ?)  - intégration à la MINUS ( ?)

(\*) 01/07/2005 – 30/06/2006

Sources : Rapports de l'Union Africaine – Conseil de Paix et de Sécurité ; website of AMIS ([www.amis-sudan.org](http://www.amis-sudan.org))

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## Annexe -5. Distribution of oil resources between North and South Sudan





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## Abstract

*The new phase of the crisis in Darfur, since February 2003, more violent than ever, is difficult to interpret without knowing the complexity and the antecedents of the different crises in Sudan. The relations between the government and the rebels of Darfur are manifested in a particularly complex network of conflict at the national level, and sometimes with international elements of destabilization. In Sudan there are conflicts between the different Arab and African ethnic groups throughout the country, and several cleavages aggravate the internal politics of the country.*

*This analysis seeks to answer basic questions, how to interpret the crisis in Darfur? Is it a local conflict, or the next phase of the "traditional" center-periphery crisis between North and South Sudan. Or in a context described by Huntington, a theater of civilization wars. To what extent does the role of Sudan in the Islamic revolution and its oil fields, the international arms trade and other factors influence the role of the main actors of the international community.*

*The first civil-military support mission that was carried out with reduced risks was certainly a useful experience in terms of conclusions for planning the operation, for mobilization for a real civil-military operation in the future.*

*The public release of the analysis was blocked by the EUISS in 2007, fearing that sensitive details about some EU member states would cause the institute to lose its annual funding.*



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