The National Interest

Akula-class submarine primer: Russia’s Akula-class submarines may be nearing their third decade in service. However, these nuclear-powered attack submarines continue to sail the seas effectively - and make the U.S. Navy worry.

During the end of the Cold War, the USSR began developing this series of fourth-generation SSNs, which included several sub-classes of Project 971 Shchuka-B.

Both the USSR and U.S. were vigorously competing to produce more advanced submarines in the 1960’s to gain an edge over the other.

When the USSR launched the first Akula-Class in 1985, U.S. officials were reportedly “shocked” since Western intelligence indicated that the Soviets were at least ten years out from achieving such technology.

The Akula-class submarines were constructed by the Amur Shipbuilding Plant Joint Stock Company at Komsomolsk and by Sevmash at the Severodvinsk shipbuilding yard.

Each submarine was designed as a double hull system consisting of an inner pressure hull and an outer hull. This layout enables more freedom in the exterior hull’s shape, allowing the submarine to reserve more buoyancy than its Western counterparts.

Each Akula submarine is powered by one OK-650B pressurized water reactor, the same system incorporated onto many Soviet predecessors.

When the OK-650 was introduced to service in the 1970s, it was considered more advanced and reliable than previous submarine reactors. This reactor has also been installed on the Sierra I, Sierra II, the Oscar I, Oscar II, and Typhoon class submarines.

The first seven boats that make up the Akula I class are the Puma, Delphin, Kashalot, Kit, Pantera, Bars and Narvel. An improved Akula-class variant known as Project 971U includes the Volk, Morzh, Leopard, Tigr and Drakon.

In terms of armament, the Akula class was quite formidable. Each submarine was designed to carry S-10 Granat (designated by the West as SS-N-21 Sampson) cruise attack missiles. The S-10 Granat is comparable to the American-made Tomahawk. Subsequent Akula-class variants were fitted with six additional 533mm external torpedo tubes.

The submarine class also sported more advanced sensors than previous submarines. Specifically, the Akula’s surface search radar is the Snoop Pair or Snoop Half.

As detailed by Naval Technology, “]T]he submarine is fitted with the MGK 540 sonar system which provides automatic target detection in broad and narrow-band modes by active sonar. It gives the range, relative bearing and range rate. The sonar system can also be used in a passive, listening mode for detection of hostile sonars. The sonar signal processor can detect and automatically classify targets as well as reject spurious acoustic noise sources and compensate for variable acoustic conditions.”

Only one Akula II variant was ever completed- the Vepr (K-157).

In 1990, her keel was laid down and she officially launched four years later. In 1995, the Vepr commissioned. Two additional Akula II-class variants were planned in the late 1990s. However, neither boat was completed.

Notably, the hull sections from the Rys (K-333) and the Kuguar (K-337) were later incorporated in the constructions of the Alexander Nevsky and Yury Dolgorukiy. The Akula II submarines measured at 110m long and could displace up to 12,770t.

Each submarine in this class had a top speed of 35 knots submerged and a maximum diving depth of 600m. Although construction of the Akula II began back in 1991, it was suspended for nearly a decade due to a shortage of funds.

A unique leasing opportunity arose when Moscow granted the Indian Navy the ability to “rent” the Akula II submarine.

The SSN, renamed INS Chakra by New Delhi in 2023, was expected to enter service with the Indian Navy in 2007. However, several delays postponed this deadline. At first, issues with installing new systems and technologies onboard set engineers back in schedule. In 2008, a fatal gas leak that broke out on the submarine led to the deaths of 20 civilian crew members, further pushing the submarine’s entry to service back.

Ultimately, New Delhi would sail the INS Chakra for under nine years before returning the submarine to Russia in 2021. Reports suggested that the submarine was returned to Moscow early due to issues with its nuclear propulsion system.

The Akula II SSN was more formidable in armament than its sister variant. Armed with four 533mm torpedo tubes, the submarine could deploy Type 53 torpedoes, RPK-6 or RPK-2 missiles.

Additionally, this vessel could sport naval mines, the RPK-7 missile and four 650mm torpedo tubes.

In 2022, NATO naval forces monitored the Vepr when it transited from the Northern Fleet to the Baltic. The boat is expected to remain in service with the Russian Navy for another few decades.

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

All images are Creative Commons. 

This week, the International Court of Justice begins consideration of whether the devastation and deprivation that Israel is inflicting on the Gaza Strip constitute genocide. The impetus for the ICJ taking up the case is a filing by the government of South Africa, a country that knows a thing or two about what it means for one ethnic group to oppress another. The South African initiative has received explicit support from several other governments, the fifty-seven-member Organization of Islamic Countries, numerous nongovernmental organizations worldwide, and even some concerned Israelis.

The eighty-four-page filing is carefully constructed, exhaustively documented, and judiciously worded. It places the current crisis in context with regard not only to the jurisdiction of the court but also to the entire history of Israeli subjugation of Palestinians. It describes in excruciating detail the various facets of what Israel has imposed on Gaza, including the killing of thousands of civilians, the injuries, the destruction of homes and infrastructure, the forced dislocation, and the deprivation of food, water, sanitation, and medical care. It then documents the numerous statements from Israelis themselves—from the president and prime minister on down—indicating that their lethal actions are targeted not just against Hamas or some other group that has done Israel harm but against Palestinians in general.

Despite the voluminous evidence of what has been happening in the Gaza Strip during the past three months, there exists significant resistance to invoking the concept of genocide. Some reasons for this resistance are general and apply to almost any case in which that concept has been mentioned. Other reasons are more specific to the case of Israel and the Palestinians.

One general reason is anxiety about comparisons with historical cases that were even more egregious than whatever case is at hand. The highly egregious case that immediately comes to mind is the Nazi Holocaust, and there is legitimate concern about debasing historical understanding of that event if the concept of genocide begins to be applied too frequently elsewhere.

Another general reason to worry about follow-on implications is if the ICJ makes a formal legal judgment that genocide has occurred. The relevant legal framework is the 1948 Genocide Convention, to which 152 nations (including Israel, South Africa, and the United States) are parties. The convention calls for criminal prosecution of persons who have committed any of the acts the convention covers. If a national court fails to discharge that responsibility, then an international tribunal—such as that other standing tribunal that meets in The Hague, the International Criminal Court—may do so. 

Reasons specific to the Israeli-Palestinian case include all the political factors that, especially in the United States, but also to a lesser extent in parts of Europe, have led to Israel being given a pass for most of what it has done to the Palestinians. 

Now, with the United States having supplied thousands of tons of munitions that Israel has employed in the devastation of Gaza and having used its veto power to block international calls for a cease-fire, the United States has assumed a share of the responsibility for the devastation. This makes relevant Article III of the Genocide Convention, which lists as punishable acts not only genocide itself but also, among other things, “complicity” in genocide.

It thus is not surprising for the Biden administration’s public response to South Africa’s initiative at the ICJ to be, in the words of National Security Council spokesman John Kirby, that the South African submission “is meritless, counterproductive, and completely without any basis in fact whatsoever.” It is unsurprising but highly inaccurate as a characterization of a filing filled with well-documented and relevant facts. The U.S. response is only slightly farther off the rails than Israel’s hysterically-toned official assertion that the South African action is “blood libel,” a response that no doubt reflects genuine concern in Israel that the South Africans have a strong case.

A concept that is also applicable to what Israel is doing to Gaza but is a bit milder than—and without the same legal implications as—genocide is ethnic cleansing. There is no “ethnic cleansing convention,” although some actions that generally have been placed under the label of ethnic cleansing constitute violations of international law, including the laws of war. There is some, though not all, of the same hesitation to apply that label as to apply the label of genocide, and for some of the same reasons, mostly involving attempts to protect one’s own government and its clients from accusations of nefarious behavior.

In an article in the current issue of Political Science Quarterly, Meghan Garrity of George Mason University argues for discarding the term ethnic cleansing. One reason is that the term originated with some of the perpetrators, especially in the former Yugoslavia, who applied the term with non-pejorative intent to their own actions. Another reason is conceptual confusion resulting from commentators referring to different specific behaviors when talking about ethnic cleansing.

Garrity proposes, in the interest of descriptive and analytical precision, replacing that term with four more specific components of the kind of ethnic oppression to which the term is usually applied. Those components are: 1) control, intended to subjugate the target population; 2) coercive assimilation, intended to eliminate a unique cultural identity; 3) mass expulsion, intended to remove the target population; and 4) massacre, intended to annihilate that population.

Garrity wrote her article before the current Israeli assault on Gaza, but her typology corresponds to different aspects and different phases of Israeli policy toward the Palestinians. Assimilation into Jewish-dominated Israeli life has never been part of that policy. Still, denial of a unique Palestinian national and cultural identity certainly has been, dating back to early rationalizations of the Zionist project as “a land without a people for a people without a land.” Subjugation through control has been the dominant continuing aspect of Israeli policy in the half-century since Israel’s conquest of Palestinian territories in the 1967 war. Expulsion—involving the displacement of some 750,000 Palestinians—was a central feature of the Nakba or “catastrophe” associated with the 1948 war in Palestine. Now, the Israeli minister of agriculture (and former head of the security service Shin Bet) openly declares that Israel is “rolling out the Gaza Nakba.” As for massacres, the mostly civilian Palestinian death toll from the current carnage in the Gaza Strip—now approximately 23,000 and still rising—is the largest of all the rounds of Israeli-Palestinian violence.

In current Israeli policy, massacre and expulsion are complementary. Israel is pressing countries from Egypt to the Congo to accept Palestinians from the Gaza Strip. Israel euphemizes such relocation as “voluntary,” even though the only alternative for the Palestinians involved would be more Israeli-inflicted death and destruction inside Gaza.

So, how does the concept of genocide fit into this picture? Garrity observes that it is part of the same conceptual and semantic confusion that has afflicted references to ethnic cleansing. She notes that some analysts and commentators consider genocide a subtype of ethnic cleansing, some treat the two phenomena as separate, and some consider them as overlapping. 

Garrity has scholarship in mind and suggests that her substitution of the four dimensions of control, assimilation, expulsion, and massacre facilitates rigorous research into why, for example, a regime chooses one of these methods over another. Indeed, the Israeli-Palestinian case provides ample material for such research, such as dissecting the Israeli decision to rely heavily at this time on the combination of expulsion and massacre.

The policy lesson in all this should be that substance matters more than semantics. As the South African case proceeds at the ICJ, expect Israel and its defenders to try to turn the proceeding into one of semantics—to define genocide narrowly. To the extent this tactic succeeds, it will deflect attention from what is actually happening in the Gaza Strip, including the immense human suffering involved.

Such use of semantics to deflect attention from substance is reminiscent of Donald Trump’s supporters repeatedly shouting “no collusion” to try to deny the nature of Trump’s ties with Russia. An absence of the kind of master plot hatched in a back room that might meet someone’s idea of “collusion” does not negate the fact that during the 2016 election, Trump and his campaign encouraged, facilitated, exploited, and provided cover for Russia’s interference in the election to his benefit, nor does it negate continued reasons to be concerned today about the nature of Trump’s relationship with Russia.

Just as the use or non-use of the C-word does not make the Trump-Russia problem go away, neither does the use or non-use of the G-word—by the ICJ or anyone else—cause the humanitarian catastrophe in Gaza and the policies that have generated it, to go away. Control, cultural denial, expulsion, and massacre are all despicable policies for one ethnic group to apply against another and should be opposed, regardless of whether a court or anyone else applies a particular overarching term or label to such policies.

Paul R. Pillar retired in 2005 from a twenty-eight-year career in the U.S. intelligence community, in which his last position was as the National Intelligence Officer for the Near East and South Asia. Earlier, he served in a variety of analytical and managerial positions, including as chief of analytic units at the CIA, covering portions of the Near East, the Persian Gulf, and South Asia. His most recent book is Beyond the Water’s Edge: How Partisanship Corrupts U.S. Foreign Policy. He is also a contributing editor for this publication.

Image: Anas Mohammed / Shutterstock.com.

The federal government’s outstanding financial obligations now total some $34 trillion, about 123 percent of the nation’s gross domestic product (GDP), near a historic record. Meanwhile, the latest Congressional Budget Office estimates announce deficits of over $1.5 trillion a year in the coming years, between six and seven percent of GDP. While this flow of red ink promises to add significantly to the already massive pile of outstanding debt, Washington seems not to have paused to consider the potential damage implicit in these trends, much less to entertain ways to arrest them. The prospects are far from encouraging.

There are some—in Washington certainly, but also on Wall Street and in academia—who dismiss such concerns. Essentially, these analysts take what might be called a “trader’s view.” The bond-buying public seems to be coping well with the flow of new government obligations. Wall Street takes all that each Treasury auction has to offer. Rates and yields on Treasury debt show neither investor fears of excess nor any ugly economic consequences. The ten-year bond, for instance, sells presently at a yield slightly above 4 percent, only a little higher than inflation. If there were reason to fear the fate of federal finances, these optimists argue, buyers would demand much higher rates, perhaps closer to the 8 percent yield they demand from junk bonds, where there is reason to fear trouble. Those who hold this perspective might point to Japan, where government debt amounts to 263 percent of the country’s GDP, and there has been no upheaval, at least not yet.

Comforting and easy as such reasoning is, it can only go so far. As with all things in trading, it is immediate by nature and short-term at best. It makes sense only if one assumes that bond buyers will remain as they are today indefinitely. However, the willingness of investors to take Treasury debt at manageable rates is neither constant nor reliable. It depends on their confidence that the real economy can expand enough to support outstanding obligations—in other words, whether national income and wealth can keep up with the debt burden. The debt question then comes down to a matter of relative growth prospects. There is little in the way things are going in the U.S. economy and federal finances to offer confidence on this crucial point. 

In contrast to the United States today, a reliably fast-growing economy, say a well-managed developing one, could easily carry a relatively heavy debt burden such as this country faces today. Rapid real growth, perhaps in double digits a year, would promise to push up incomes and government revenues fast to discharge such obligations easily. If the debt reflects spending and tax policies designed to promote growth, investors—both domestic and foreign—would confidently buy bonds secure in the knowledge that they will be repaid. That was the case in the United States in the 1790s, when Treasury Secretary Alexander Hamilton could point to the promise of a rapidly developing economy and quickly sell new U.S. debt in Europe.

But today’s American economy is neither in the rapid early development stage of growth nor especially well managed. Deficits and debt are outrunning the economy. The budget is burdened primarily by entitlement spending—Social Security, Medicare, Medicaid—with little in it that promotes growth. At best, the real economy only grows 3 percent or so a year, and then only in a good year. If not tomorrow or the next day, these sorry trends will ultimately undermine investors’ willingness to hold U.S. government debt.

The first signs that such a day is coming will appear when the yields on Treasury bonds rise relative to other sorts of debt. If investors begin to suspect that there is inadequate real substance behind the bonds, they will demand higher yields to compensate them for the risk involved, as they do today on junk bonds. That will strain the budget even more by raising the expense of servicing the debt. As that pressure intensifies, Washington will have four choices, none of them pleasant.

The first and the least palatable is the default. Such an event would destroy financial markets and plunge the economy into recession, likely a depression. 

Second, Washington could cut spending to stem the flow of red ink and try to convince everyone that it has put its finances on a better path. Such a response, however, carries complications. Because the budget is dominated by defense and entitlement spending, most of what the government can cut without political and social danger will come out of that small portion of today’s spending that promotes growth. Such an action might convince bond buyers that matters will only deteriorate further. 

Washington’s third option is to raise taxes. That might stem the flow of red ink, but an enlarged tax burden might also convince bond buyers that growth will suffer, making it harder for Washington to shoulder its debt obligations. 

Fourth and finally, Washington can turn to inflation, which, by reducing the real buying power of existing debt, will make it seem more manageable. Such a policy, however, would heavily burden the public and, by stealing the real value of all the bonds purchased in the past, would significantly erode trust.

The only hope to set against these ugly prospects is for Washington to act now before confidence is gone and this kind of intense pressure develops. Spending cuts and judicious tax adjustments could help with the immediate accounting. But since the debt fundamentals depend so crucially on growth and growth prospects, the best policy would re-orient spending and tax priorities more toward growth promotion than at present. Continued steps to control inflation would reassure those financing U.S. debt that their assets will offer secure real buying power. By making such adjustments now before the pressure becomes too intense, the needed shifts could happen gradually and so cause less dislocation.

Milton Ezrati is a contributing editor at The National Interest, an affiliate of the Center for the Study of Human Capital at the University at Buffalo (SUNY), and chief economist for Vested, the New York-based communications firm. His latest books are Thirty Tomorrows: The Next Three Decades of Globalization, Demographics, and How We Will Live and Bite-Sized Investing. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

The war in Ukraine is all about artillery. The “King of the Battle,” as French Emperor Napoleon Bonaparte called artillery, is single-deadliest weapon in Ukraine right now, accounting for about 80 percent of the casualties. 

Artillery is the cornerstone of the fighting in Ukraine. Both sides use it profusely for both offensive and defensive operations. The vast majority of the war’s 500,000 casualties have been a result of artillery fire.

When it comes to artillery, there is everything in Ukraine. Artillery rocket fire, cluster munitions, standard 155mm howitzers, heavy mortars, and thermobaric weapons are all joined in a deadly dance of fire and counterfire. 

In the recent counteroffensive, during the days of heaviest fighting, the Ukrainian military was going through over 7,000 artillery shells a day, or more than 210,000 rounds a month. That is a large number of munitions but not nearly enough to what the Russian forces are putting out. 

For most of the war, Russia has enjoyed a great artillery advantage in numbers. Indeed, there have been long periods of time when the Russian military could afford to fire upwards of 20,000 artillery shells a day. The Russian stocks—and standards—are higher than Ukraine’s. But even Moscow has had to go to pariah states like Iran and North Korea for munitions. 

To be sure, with the West’s assistance, the Ukrainian military has a qualitative superiority in artillery over the Russian forces. But that alone isn’t enough to change the course of the war. At the end of the day, a less advanced howitzer that can fire consistently more rounds is better than one more advanced artillery piece that can fire fewer rounds. 

Fire superiority will be key for the success or failure of future Ukrainian counteroffensive operations. Although the Ukrainian military can probably achieve a temporary fire superiority over a stretch of the contact line with some good logistical decisions and tough sacrifices, it will probably not be enough to support a large-scale counteroffensive that is seeking an operational breakthrough. As such, Ukraine needs a reliable, steady stream of artillery ammunition, as well as barrels to replace worn-down artillery pieces that have been firing thousands of shells. 

Since the start of the war, the U.S.-led international coalition has been going through its stocks of munitions in an effort to meet Kyiv’s demands. Last year, as the Ukrainian military was gearing up for its large-scale counteroffensive, the European Union promised to give Kyiv 1 million artillery shells to fuel its offensive and defensive operations. 

However, these stocks are running dangerously low, and the production lines aren’t up to par to meet the demand by themselves. Although there has been an effort to jumpstart production and produce more munitions, it is still unclear if Ukraine would be able to support further counteroffensive operations properly. 

Napoleon, himself an artillery officer, saw in artillery a powerful weapon that could shape the battlefield and change the course of wars. More than 200 years later, his assessment rings true.

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

All images are Creative Commons. 

The F-35 Lighting II stealth fighter jet is the most advanced combat aircraft in operation right now. 

But to get there hasn’t been easy or cheap. With a projected cost over its lifetime of approximately $1.7 trillion and years in the making, the F-35 Lighting II is a big investment for the United States military and its counterparts. 

So, how is the program progressing? What milestones has it achieved recently?

As of January, the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter program has achieved quite a lot. 

More than 990 aircraft of all three versions have been delivered to air forces around the world. The operational fleet has logged over 773,000 hours of flight in about 469,000 training and operational sorties. In terms of training, almost 2,300 pilots have qualified to fly the stealth fighter jet, and close to 15,500 maintainers have qualified to service and support the aircraft. 

Right now, the program is comprised of 17 participants (Italy, Canada, Australia, Denmark, Norway, Israel, Japan, South Korea, Belgium, Poland, Singapore, Finland, Switzerland, Germany, the Netherlands, the United Kingdom, and the United States), though several others (for example, the Czech Republic and Greece) are waiting for the green light to join in. Out of the current participants, 14 services are flying the aircraft, 12 have declared initial operating capability, and there are eight operational missions by service.

Overall, the 17 participants have ordered close to 3,500 aircraft of all three types. The F-35A is by far the most popular, with 2,558 orders, followed by the F-35B with 575 orders, and by the F-35C with 340 orders. As far as the largest individual customer, the U.S. military alone has ordered almost 2,500 F-35s for the Air Force, Navy, and Marine Corps. 

As for the F-35B and F-35C versions of the stealth fighter jet that can operate from aircraft carriers and amphibious ships, 12 warships in the U.S. Navy, Royal Navy, and Italian Navy have been activated to support the advanced aircraft; nine additional warships are slotted to qualify for F-35 operations by 2028.

The F-35 Lighting II is a fifth-generation, multi-role fighter jet that can conduct several different mission sets. 

There are three versions of the aircraft: The F-35A is the conventional iteration; the F-35B is the short take-off and vertical landing (STOVL) type that can take off and land like a helicopter; and the F-35C is the aircraft carrier version of the stealth fighter jet. 

In terms of mission sets, the F-35 Lighting II can conduct competently Air Superiority, Close Air Support, Strategic Attack, Electronic Warfare, Intelligence Surveillance, and Reconnaissance, and Suppression Enemy Air Defense (SEAD)/Destruction Enemy Air Defenses (DEAD). 

Besides its stealth capabilities, performance, and advanced weaponry, it is the F-35’s sensors that make the fighter jet so valuable to the joint force. Its AN/APG-81 Active Electronically Scanned Array (AESA) radar and other sensors allow the F-35 Lighting II to act as a quarterback, guiding friendly aircraft, warships, smart munitions, and ground troops to a threat with precision. 

Stavros Atlamazoglou is a seasoned defense journalist specializing in special operations and a Hellenic Army veteran (national service with the 575th Marine Battalion and Army HQ). He holds a BA from Johns Hopkins University and an MA from the Johns Hopkins School of Advanced International Studies (SAIS). His work has been featured in Business Insider, Sandboxx, and SOFREP. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org.

All images are from Shutterstock. 

If you’ve been to the Boise Airport, you’ve probably noticed the distinctive aircraft lining the southern edge of the field. Brownish grey, with straight wings and engines located above the rear fuselage – the A-10 Warthog is hard to miss, especially if you happen to notice the Gatling gun protruding from the nose of the airframe.

The Boise A-10s, assigned to the Idaho Air National Guard, are some of the last 281 A-10s in service – which is why you probably won’t be seeing the A-10 donated to Ukraine anytime soon, even though the A-10 was explicitly designed to kill Russian tanks advancing across the planes of eastern Europe.

Russia has spent the first two years of the Russo-Ukraine War advancing tank columns across the planes of eastern Ukraine – much as war planners envisioned when they commissioned the design and production of the A-10 Warthog in the 1970s.

At the height of the Cold War, common wisdom held that should the conflict turn hot, the Russians would deploy their stockpiles of tanks to execute a land grab in Eastern Europe.

The projections have proven accurate, as Russia has leaned heavily on its tank technology.

Although, Russia’s tank-dependent efforts have not gone well; the Ukrainians have destroyed over 2,600 Russian tanks, often with relatively low-tech defense systems like the FGM-148 Javelin.  

If the handheld FGM-148 could wreak such havoc upon Russian tank forces, one might imagine that the A-10’s impact could have been biblical.

The modern A-10 is a cantilever low-wing monoplane with a wide chord. The A-10 maneuvers fantastically at low speeds – essential for battle space loitering and close air support – thanks to a large wing area, high wing aspect ratio, and large ailerons.

Able to loiter and operate under 1,000-foot ceilings, the A-10 has proven to be, perhaps, the world’s best close-air support jet.

Another benefit of the A-10’s wing dimensions is the ability to takeoff and land from short-distance airfields, which enables operation from obscure and austere airfields (as are often found near ongoing conflicts). Further, the A-10 was designed to be refueled, rearmed, and serviced with minimal equipment.  

The A-10 wasn’t just built to operate from austere environments, but also to survive in hostile environments. Remarkably, the A-10 can survive direct hits from armor-piercing and high-explosive projectiles (up to 23mm).

The A-10 features double-redundant hydraulic flight systems – and should the hydraulic system fail, the A-10 has a backup mechanical system. Also, the A-10 can remain airborne with extensive structural damage; A-10s have remained airborne with just one engine, half of the tail, one elevator, and half of a wing missing.

The pilot is protected, too; the A-10’s cockpit is encased within a 1,200-pound titanium armor shell, known as a “bathtub.”

The titanium plates thickness ranges from 0.5 to 1.5 inches deep and makes up almost six percent of the A-10s empty weight.   

Between the ability to loiter and provide close air support, the ability to operate from austere airfields, the minimalist maintenance requirements, and the remarkable survivability, the A-10 seems well suited for engaging frontline Russian targets.

Yet, the A-10 has a drawback – a fatal drawback – which would render the jet useless in the skies above Ukraine.

Despite the A-10s strengths – the A-10 is poorly equipped to help the Ukrainians against the Russians.

Why? Ukraine does not have control of the airspace above the conflict – meaning the A-10 would be a sitting duck in contested airspace, vulnerable to air-to-air Russian fighters like the Su-35 and MiG-31.

The A-10 has been successful in past conflicts, like Desert Storm 1.0, Desert Storm 2.0, and Afghanistan – but only after the US had secured the airspace above the conflict zone. The A-10 is a second-phase sort of weapon to be used once air superiority is established.

What the Ukrainians need right now are the tools to establish air superiority – which is where the forthcoming F-16 donations would come into play. But the likelihood of the Ukrainians ever fully establishing air superiority over the conflict is low, meaning the A-10 likely won’t have much value during the conflict.

Yet, even if the Ukrainians were able to secure air superiority, the US is unlikely to donate the A-10. The A-10 is slated for retirement and is no longer being produced. The A-10 is a political football (inspiring heated advocacy both for and against the jet’s retirement).

The Americans are unlikely to maintain A-10 related infrastructure for the purpose of training and enabling Ukrainian pilots to fly the jet.  

Harrison Kass is a defense and national security writer with over 1,000 total pieces on issues involving global affairs. An attorney, pilot, guitarist, and minor pro hockey player, Harrison joined the US Air Force as a Pilot Trainee but was medically discharged. Harrison holds a BA from Lake Forest College, a JD from the University of Oregon, and an MA from New York University. Harrison listens to Dokken. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Main image from Shutterstock. All other images are from Creative Commons. 

In December 2023, the Royal Navy's largest warship returned to Portsmouth and received what could only be described as a hero's welcome, as more than 2,000 friends and family gathered to greet HMS Prince of Wales. The vessel departed from the UK at the beginning of September for an autumn dedicated to expanding the boundaries of naval aviation with the Royal Navy's two Queen Elizabeth-class aircraft carriers.

The return was bittersweet, however, as the ship's crew also bid farewell to Commanding Officer Captain Hewitt OBE RN, who has overseen a successful 2023. Captain Will Blackett has since assumed command of HMS Prince of Wales.

She is the eighth vessel to be named for the title of the UK's heir apparent, and the first since the King George V-class battleship that was launched in 1939 and sunk less than two years later during the Second World War.

Her commission date marked the 78th anniversary of the sinking of her predecessor.

HMS Prince of Wales is one of the most powerful surface warships ever constructed in the UK, and in addition to serving as a deterrent, the aircraft carrier will be used for humanitarian relief, high-intensity warfighting, and combating terrorism.

Two years ago, in January 2022, HMS Prince of Wales took over the role of command ship for NATO's maritime high readiness force from the French Navy.

The vessel is one of the most powerful surface warships ever constructed in the UK, with a flight deck that is 70 meters wide (230 feet), and 280 meters (918 feet) long. The warship isn't equipped with catapults and arrestor wires and instead was designed to operate with Short Take-Off and Vertical Landing (STOVL) jets from a ski-jump ramp.

The flattop can embark up to thirty-six Lockheed Martin F-35B Lightning II fifth-generation stealth fighters and four Merlin helicopters. 

In surge conditions, the carrier is capable of supporting up to seventy F-35Bs, while she has accommodation for 250 Royal Marines and the ability to support them with attack and transport helicopters.

The carrier operates with a crew of 679 but can accommodate up to 1,600 personnel – including full airwing, Royal Marines, and even refugees if required.

In addition to its aircraft, which serve as its primary offensive and defensive systems, HMS Prince of Wales is armed with three Phalanx CIWS (close-in weapon system) turrets to deal with incoming threats from the sea and air. Comprising a radar-guided 20mm Vulcan cannon mounted on a swiveling base, the Phalanx has a dual fire rate of 3,000 or 4,500 shots per minute and is capable of hitting targets up to a mile away.

The carrier has a top speed of 25 knots and a range of 10,000 nautical miles.

The 65,000-tonne carrier has also had its share of problems since even before officially entering service.

The warship required a lengthy maintenance period in 2020 to address a leak that was reported to cause serious flooding to some lower compartments, which resulted in damage to several systems that cost £3.3million to repair while an additional £2.2million was spent fixing the pipes on both of the Royal Navy's two brand new carriers.

The carrier was also sidelined for several months after she broke down off the Isle of Wight just one day after departing from Portsmouth in September 2022 to begin a planned four-month deployment to the United States. Divers were even called in to inspect the hull of the 930-foot-long flattop after damage was reported to the starboard propeller shaft.

The disabled flattop had to be towed to Rosyth, Scotland, for repairs, which reportedly cost the UK taxpayers upwards of £25 million ($30.5 million USD). One reason for the sky-high repair bill was that an inspection identified a problem with the Prince of Wales' port shaft, and Royal Navy officials have decided to overhaul that one as well. The carrier's return to service was further delayed due to the availability of parts – which highlighted troubles the Royal Navy could face in a major crisis.

It was a major embarrassment for the UK's senior service, as the breakdown came just months after HMS Prince of Wales took on the duties of NATO flagship. That was also a headache for the UK's ruling Conservative government as it gave ammunition to Labour's shadow cabinet – which took aim at the slow pace of the progress.

"At a time when threats are rising, we need our Navy's ships at sea keeping us safe, not stuck in dock for repeated repairs," John Healey, Labour's shadow defence secretary, said earlier this year.

However, HMS Prince of Wales is back in service and recently completed F-35 training operations with the United States Navy, and ready to prove that she is the finest the Royal Navy has to offer. That shouldn't be too tall of an order.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

North Korea has been on a different course in recent years than the path it seemed to follow in earlier decades. The transition from the Clinton-Bush administrations’ slow, drawn-out negotiations, interrupted by the North with bursts of provocation—sinking ships, shelling islands, shooting down helicopters, testing nuclear weapons—eventually evolved into something entirely different. Over the last three years, the North has shown no interest in protracted negotiations with the United States. Instead of provocations designed to draw attention and create bargaining chips, it has settled on steady, determined testing of long-range ballistic missiles to deter any attempt at regime change and acquiring fissile material for an expanded nuclear weapons arsenal to threaten “first use” of nuclear weapons in the event of a conflict.

The transition came after nearly a decade of a U.S. policy of “benign neglect” at the end of the Bush administration and over the Obama years. This was termed, at one point, “strategic patience,” but considered by many observers as just another version of containment: no negotiations, continued sanctions, and cultivation of our essential alliance relations. Then came the Trump administration, which started with a sharp rise in tensions, exchanges of threats and insults but rapidly evolved into summitry, marked by expressions of warm feelings that made it seem as though the two leaders could, indeed, “meet for lunch” and settle all that troubled relations between their two countries. That did not work out: the Trump administration was not up for “patient engagement,” and the North would eventually see that it was not. 

So, the Biden team faced a wary North Korean leadership and a rapidly changing international scene. Asia was widely perceived as marked by a rising China and a fading America. Europe was the scene of a resurgent Russia, with only Ukraine to hold it back—the rest of Europe and the United States apparently prepared to accept Russian aggression if military assistance was not enough to prevent it. In this new world, the third generation of Kim leadership in North Korea has chosen to maintain relations with Beijing, embracing its essential role as a Chinese buffer state while aggressively improving its relations with Moscow, becoming a sort of arsenal of dictatorship.

Before reaching the unhappy conclusion that, since the prerequisites for diplomacy seem absent, we should expect “more of the same” in the coming year, it might be prudent to consider the possibility that we may not be so lucky. We should at least entertain the thought that nuclear war could break out in Northeast Asia in 2024.

How could that happen? Let’s count the ways. First, there’s everybody’s favorite crisis, the Taiwan contingency. Imagine a Beijing-perceived Taiwanese provocation leading to Chinese moves and prompting U.S. countermoves, with neither side certain how far the other is prepared to go. Yet, both sides intend to signal their determination not to back down. This is, roughly, U.S. policy. In this scenario, North Korea, with or without encouragement from China, acts to support China by issuing nuclear threats against U.S. assets and allies in Northeast Asia, posing for the United States the prospect of facing two nuclear weapons states in one theater—unless Russia chooses to make it three. Japan and South Korea have no nuclear weapons. They would depend on U.S. extended deterrence in this scenario, even though Seoul, at least, has no interest in becoming involved in a Taiwan contingency. This scenario requires serious thought because nation-states can be as opportunistic as their leaders.

In a less complicated scenario, imagine the North Korean leadership decides to use its nuclear weapons arsenal and delivery vehicles to compel South Korean compliance with the North’s political and territorial directives and to assure deterrence of U.S. intervention to honor its alliance with Seoul. It is essential in this scenario—and any others one might think of—that we understand what the United States would actually do is not the critical calculation. It is rather what the North Korean leadership believes it would do. The North may think that its developing ICBM capability will serve to not only deter a U.S. attempt at regime change but also undercut the credibility of U.S. extended deterrence to its allies in Asia. That calculation might well determine whether or not nuclear war breaks out.

If we are truly concerned about the possibility of nuclear war, it is not enough to think through how deterrence might fail as North Korean and Chinese nuclear arsenals grow. One should consider the other ways a nuclear war might start, which have nothing to do with the failure of deterrence. Consider the possibility of an accidental or even an unauthorized launch of nuclear weapons by the North Korean military. They are, after all, relatively new to this “game” as compared to the other states with nuclear weapons. And North Korean rhetoric on its willingness to use its nuclear weapons should not give us confidence that this would be such a low-probability event.

Suffice it to say that the growing nuclear weapons arsenals in Northeast Asia, in the context of a competitive and even hostile political environment, should give us pause. At least, we should consider the risks we run when we make diplomacy a policy of last resort.

But suppose the United States wished to have another run at diplomacy with North Korea. Is there a way forward? Arguably, yes. However, in the last year of the Biden administration, with a seriously contested election in the offing, it is hard to argue that the timing is just right. 

That said, it is not wrong to consider what it would take to attract Pyongyang to discussions with Washington. The answer is simple but not easy. The United States must genuinely seek normalization of relations and keep denuclearization as a longer-term goal rather than a first step in the process. On the table for initial discussion would be sanctions relief, the character of military exercises with the ROK, and improvements in the North’s human rights policies— something in which Pyongyang has shown interest in the past and is essential to normalization. Simple, perhaps, but not easy.

Ambassador Robert Gallucci is currently a Distinguished Professor in the Practice of Diplomacy at Georgetown University’s Walsh School of Foreign Service. He previously served as U.S. Ambassador-at-Large and Special Envoy for the U.S. Department of State, focused on the non-proliferation of ballistic missiles and weapons of mass destruction. He served as the chief U.S. negotiator during the North Korean nuclear crisis of 1994, as Assistant Secretary of State for Political-Military Affairs, and as Deputy Executive Chairman of the UN Special Commission following the first Gulf War. Upon leaving public service, Ambassador Gallucci served as Dean of the School of Foreign Service at Georgetown University for thirteen years before he became president of the John D. and Catherine T. MacArthur Foundation.

The main image and intext images are from Shutterstock. 

India rents nuclear submarines from Russia - At the end of 2023, Russia and India took steps to expand their military cooperation. Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov met with his Indian counterpart Subrahmanyam Jaishankar in Moscow a few days after Christmas, asserting that such a partnership would benefit both countries in addition to helping preserve security on the Eurasian continent. When the U.S. and its North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) allies imposed heavy sanctions on Moscow following its Ukraine invasion, Russia had few allies to turn to for aid.

The Islamic Republic of Iran has notably the Kremlin via swaths of weapons transfers including lethal unmanned aerial vehicles (UAVs). India has also evolved to become one of Moscow’s primary economic partners since February 2022. In fact, according to Jaishankar, Indian-Russian trade is expected to top $50 billion this year.

New Delhi and Moscow’s military cooperation is not new. In the late 1980s, the Soviet Union lent a nuclear-powered submarine when it granted India the Charlie-class nuclear cruise missile submarine.

New Delhi said the vessel was delivered to an Indian envoy in Vladivostok in 1988 for training purposes.

At the time, India possessed 10 diesel-powered submarines and two aircraft carriers. While the Soviet submarine was highly desired, its lease came with strict restrictions.

When the K-43 submarine entered service with the Indian Navy as the INS Chakra, it became subject to incessant Soviet inspections and maintenance sessions, was largely prevented from operating in offensive wartime missions, and could not be loaded with certain weapons.

Additionally, Indian crews were now even permitted to man certain areas of the INS Chakra, including the submarine’s reactor.

While New Delhi planned to lease the submarine for ten years, the INS Chakra was returned to the Soviet Union in 1990. Analysts assert that the Soviet’s strict restrictions associated with the lease were in part to blame for the shortened agreement.

According to former Russian Naval officer Alexander Ivanovich Terenov, other issues surrounding the K-43 surfaced. In his book ‘Under three flags- The saga of the submarine cruiser K-43/Chakra,’ Terenov explained that there were

"[M]any incidents of submarine malfunction. The outboard pipes and equipment corroded fast due to the high air temperature, humidity and salinity. The main suction line was not renewed during the last refit in the Soviet Union which caused flooding and fire. A major emergency at sea was experienced and it took 3 months to repair the submarine. Other issues included poor documentation, false data and poor discipline in the supply of spares from the Soviet Union. In one instance, the Indian navy refused to take supplies of the batteries due to their poor condition. The batteries had to be set right in India itself."

Initially designated as K-43 by the Soviet Union, the Charlie-class nuclear-powered cruise missile submarine entered service in the mid-1960s.

The vessel measured just over 300 feet with a beam of 10 feet and a draft of 26 feet long. Powered by a VM-5 pressurized water reactor and one five-blade propeller, the K-43 could reach up to 15 knots when surfaced and 23 knots when submerged.

Regarding armaments, the vessel was equipped with 8 SS-N-7 Starbright nuclear capable anti-ship missiles, in addition to six torpedo tubes that could carry 12 Starfish anti-submarine missiles or 12 torpedoes.

Although the K-43 submarine lease did not work out as intended, it would not mark the end of the Indian-Russia military partnership.

In 2010, Moscow leased one of its newest nuclear-powered submarines to New Delhi. In this new ten-year-long lease, the NATO-designated Akula-class submarine would elevate India’s underwater capabilities. The Nerpa (later renamed the INS Chakra) was constructed back in 1993, but was put on hold due to lack of funding. India then sponsored the completion of the submarine, which would later enter service with the Russian Navy as the N-152 Nerpa in 2009.

Notably, while the submarine was carrying out sea trials in the Sea of Japan, 20 civilian specialists were killed onboard when a fire suppression system was accidentally activated.

As part of the arrangement, India would pay roughly $670 million to sail the submarine over a 10-year-long period. By 2012, the ship was commissioned at Bolshoy Kamen where she commenced her home voyage under Indian control to its base at Visakhapatnam.

Like the K-43’s experience, the INS Chakra’s journey with the Indian Navy was cut short. The submarine was returned to Moscow in 2021 due to “increasingly unreliable power plant and maintenance issues.” 

Maya Carlin, National Security Writer with The National Interest, is an analyst with the Center for Security Policy and a former Anna Sobol Levy Fellow at IDC Herzliya in Israel. She has by-lines in many publications, including The National Interest, Jerusalem Post, and Times of Israel. You can follow her on Twitter: @MayaCarlin. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Educational wargaming is underutilized and possesses the potential to teach warfighters intricate modern doctrine and force capabilities. Historically, analytical wargaming has functioned as a critical tool for military leadership, offering insights into force capabilities and aiding decision-making through experiential learning. Yet, within the US Navy and Marine Corps, the potential of digital or electronic wargaming as an educational platform for junior officers and Midshipmen remains largely untapped. Traditional tabletop wargames, once favored by older generations, fail to engage the younger, digitally-raised cohort and instead cater to a niche community. Statistics speak volumes— about 80 percent of Generation Z and Millennials play video games and average around seven hours of weekly gametime—highlighting the opportunity for a new generation of wargames. This data underscores a missed opportunity in leveraging simulator-based educational wargaming for the 21st-century Navy and USMC. The capacity to craft a sophisticated, educational, and enjoyable physics-based simulator exists, and it is incumbent upon the Navy and USMC to embrace this modern technology for Professional Military Education (PME) and junior officer training.

In the Fall of 2023, the University of Southern California’s Naval ROTC program embarked on a year-long initiative to introduce Midshipmen to the complexities of the Taiwan problem set. This scenario-focused education requires a significant understanding of naval and amphibious operations and is ideal for incorporating wargames. USC’s educational program blends discussions, lectures, and essential reading materials, such as James R. Holmes’ Red Star Over the Pacific: China’s Rise and the Challenge to U.S. Maritime Strategy (2018), which enabled the students to have an in-depth discussion with Dr. Holmes via Zoom regarding Taiwan. However, it is worth noting that this initiative provides only an introductory-level education for Midshipmen and would benefit immensely from the addition of fleet-integrated educational wargaming.

Historical instances, such as the development of War Plan Orange prior to the Second World War, demonstrate how effective analytical wargaming can be when mixed into scenario decision-making. Yet, no standardized efforts were made to prepare junior officers similarly. The Naval War College and officer training pipelines did not see the value in educating junior officers like senior officers. However, even though junior officers do not require the same analytical gaming experience as fleet commanders, they can benefit enormously from exposure to educational wargaming to introduce them to various topics. As a learning tool, wargames can train the participants in force capability and doctrine, provide terrain familiarization, and offer opportunities for decision-making development. Additionally, they challenge the participants mentally, stimulating and driving sophisticated problem-solving and decision-making. As a tool, variables can be added or subtracted to increase/decrease game complexity, allowing for infinite theoretical scenarios.

Updating the naval officer training curriculum should not be difficult. The United States Naval Academy (USNA) and Naval Service Training Command (NSTC) promulgate curriculum guiding Professional Core Competencies (PCCs) roughly every three years that govern “the foundational standards of ‘officership’ by delineating core competencies required of all officer accession programs.” Whispers of a new competency for basic instructional wargaming exist, but even if included in the 2024 PCCs, this will require significant time and resources to train unit Officer Instructors to run educational games proficiently. Additionally, few ROTC courses have extra time, and an already burdened weekly schedule leaves little for adding extra training on top of current requirements for Midshipmen. To the collective groan of students and instructors alike, adding wargaming to officer training will necessitate a standalone time slot in weekly schedules, rather than shoehorning wargaming into existing time. Furthermore, Officer Instructors will need professional training to standardize implementation and enable cross-unit competition.

The Brute Krulak Center for Innovation and Future Warfighting at Marine Corps University (MCU), who are pioneering educational gaming for MCU students, example one potential source of training for Officer Instructors. MCU could integrate with the biannual three-week Teaching in Higher Education (TiHE) course for incoming NROTC instructors, and allow them to reach the hundreds of Sailors and Marines who commission through NROTC each year. Moreover, standardization of training and the games played across ROTC programs is paramount to enable cross-unit integration and competition. Competition in wargaming events would incentivize performance and further stimulate Midshipmen education. The Government Accountability Office recently recommended that the Navy and Marine Corps “evaluate the costs and benefits of developing standard wargaming education and qualifications for wargaming personnel.” Consequently, the services must establish wargaming as an Officer Instructor (OI) qualification to standardize and enhance training pipelines through educational gaming. This qualification could mimic the newly introduced Warrior Toughness program, which has gradually become part of the Fleet through accession pipelines. After rotating through ROTC the cadre returning to the Fleet could broaden wargaming initiatives at the unit level, gradually fostering a culture shift towards embracing wargaming more extensively across the services.

However, if the Navy and Marines want to capture the attention of a new generation, they must develop an educational but entertaining multi-dimensional physics-based simulator to maximize the application of 21st-century technology. Tabletop wargaming, while valuable, is not sufficient. Tabletop gaming offers an immediate but temporary avenue for educational learning at a remarkably affordable investment. Straightforward tabletop problem-solving games can be completed within a brief timeframe, ranging from twenty to thirty minutes. An illustrative example is the microgame “Call Sign,” which concentrates on carrier combat and introduces singular variables, showcasing how these games can efficiently impart knowledge and skills, but these games are insufficient to meet the needs of the ROTC curriculum and lack the potential of digital games.

The Office of Naval Research (ONR) sponsored a study on the value of video games, which concluded that “people who play video games are quicker at processing information” and that only “ten hours of video games can change the structure and organization of a person’s brain,” therefore tying informational learning to entertainment has a remarkable potential to increase retention. Most importantly, education must be balanced with entertainment, meaning accurate force capabilities and doctrine must coincide with quality graphical rendering of the action and include regular updates. Simulating forced decision-making with minimal time and minimal information provides invaluable experience for future military decision-makers. Furthermore, an in-depth military simulator would require knowledge of blue force design and doctrine, cultivate warrior skillsets, and increase tactical acumen. A competitive gaming culture amongst recruits and service members will ensure the longevity of such a program.

Effective strategy games blend a minimal initial learning curve but increase in depth and complexity while remaining re-playable due to variety. Like traditional board wargames, turn-based games necessitate a fundamental understanding of force design and doctrine. Conversely, real-time strategy (RTS) games demand swift decision-making, compelling players to act within a restricted timeframe. Modern games often integrate these two approaches, allowing players to oversee larger forces strategically in a turn-based mode while enabling detailed control over individual units during confrontations. This amalgamation of turn-based and RTS elements harnesses the educational advantages of understanding force dynamics while providing experiential learning through decision-making, offering a holistic approach to strategic gaming.

One potential commercially available wargame is Command: Modern Operations. However, this game suffers from being overly complex, detracting from the entertainment value of the equation as it requires many hours of instruction to play. Unfortunately, no commercially available modern strategic video game fits this balanced role, and most avoid contemporary conflict scenarios and instead focus on fictional Cold War scenarios. For example, naval-centric Cold Waters (2017) and land-centric WARNO (2022) display well-researched military simulators exhibiting the capabilities of Cold War-era forces. The success of Cold War-era simulators remains undeniable, as the developers of Cold Waters have showcased an upcoming impressively modeled new game, Sea Power: Naval Combat in the Missile Age. The cost of developing a modern video game ranges from $10,000 to millions. However, the DoD could drastically cut this cost by leveraging an already created modern simulator, such as WARNO, funding this successful team and providing experts to modify a pre-created simulator to reflect modern force capabilities.

Furthermore, the official Navy/USMC stamp on a military simulator would draw outsized attention from the private market, serve as a potent recruitment tool, and create a competitive outlet for Midshipmen and officers. The Navy has already worked to capitalize on the popularity of video games by creating an E-Sports team, which is run by the Navy Recruiting Command. Yet, an official strategy simulator would draw further interest through military recognition by connecting to modern youth in the popular video game dimension. In the US alone, the strategy game market revenue reached $14.88 billion in 2022, exhibiting a significant market share of overall games. Ultimately, the success of a military simulator hinges on player enjoyment and support; popular strategy games such as Starcraft II maintain over a five million monthly player count despite being a decade old. In comparison, WARNO only sold 213,000 copies so far, as it lacks competitive depth.

Unfortunately, the People’s Liberation Army (PLA) has outpaced the US in competitive digital wargaming, recognizing its potential for education since the early 2000s. Notably, since 2017, the PLA has organized national wargaming competitions, boasting more than 20,000 participants in 2019 alone. Emphasizing the educational aspect, the PLA actively encourages military simulator usage to instruct on force design changes and to promote military affairs to the civilian population. Initially, the PLA benefitted enormously from mimicking US civilian market military simulators, but has since shifted to domestic-made strategy games, such as Mozi Joint Operations Deduction System, which enables military members to fight simulated battles with Chinese equipment. Additionally, the PLA copied popular US titles, such as Call of Duty, to create their own first-person shooter, Glorious Mission, to “improve combat skills and technological understanding” in military members. Wargaming has evolved into an integral part of PME for the PLA, gaining widespread popularity even amongst the civilian population. This exemplifies a dimension where the PLA initially imitated the US military, strategically leveraged the US private sector, and ultimately leapfrogged US capabilities to outperform the US military in PME.

Damien O’Connell, the founder of the Warfighting Society, recently penned an article, “Progress and Perils: Educational Wargaming in the US Marine Corps,” on The Maneuverist blog, which delineated implementation issues for fleet-wide educational gaming. He outlines five obstacles to greater implementation of wargaming in the operating forces: “(1) confusion about what educational wargaming is and is not, (2) skepticism of its value, (3) ignorance of its successful use, (4) limited time, (5) aversion to nerd culture, and (6) ignorance of how to integrate wargames into training and education plans.” The Navy and USMC must not conflate educational gaming with analytical wargaming. Decision-making opportunities and force design instruction found in basic wargames will answer any confusion surrounding wargaming and its value and demonstrate its successful use to any observing critics. However, overcoming issues related to time and integration will demand a substantial initial investment and revised time requirements through curriculum standardization. Aversion to “nerd culture” stems from a historical stigma against board gaming, shared even by video gamers; this dislike can be easily solved by tapping into the voracious appetite for video games.

A secondary benefit of creating wargame literate junior officers would positively boost the ability of time-proven analytical gaming and thus improve force design and doctrine. The early introduction of wargames will create “a bigger pool of individuals who are exposed to the principles of wargaming, allowing the DOD to cast a wider net when looking for qualified individuals to build, run, and analyze games,” and in turn, increase the performance of future professional analytical wargaming. Furthermore, the over-reliance on civilian-run wargames has created a capability deficit among military personnel, because fewer are trained in how to run and manage wargames. This culture change could imitate the drastic success of the Prussian officer corps, which spawned avid wargamers such as General von Moltke—the Prussian army chief of staff—who expanded the use of wargaming under his leadership. As a result, the Prussian military dominated the European continent in the 19th century and forged a dominant military doctrine that lasted a century. Unsurprisingly, “many countries attributed the battlefield success of Moltke and the Prussians to the integration of wargaming in their army.”

Junior officer education needn’t be limited to monotonous PowerPoint displays or exclusive to PME. Wargaming presents a straightforward remedy for a complex educational challenge and should not be dismissed as an after-school activity. If the US military aims to regain the edge against the PLA in critical thinking and education, it must create a finely tuned educational military simulation video game. Furthermore, the potential for training will exponentially grow as technology such as virtual reality becomes more readily available. The Navy and USMC must stay ahead of the educational curve, set the foundation for a future sophisticated Ender’s Game-like military simulation or Star Trek’s morality-testing unwinnable game, the Kobayashi Maru, and turn science fiction into reality. Existing tabletop games may temporarily suffice but must be formally integrated into the curriculum and eventually replaced by digital simulations. The value of multi-domain educational learning from wargaming cannot be overstated. Moreover, increased interaction with younger generations through a popular Navy-endorsed video game could help draw in technology-oriented recruits. The Navy and USMC must embrace 21st-century technology and adapt it to benefit instruction for foreseeable near-peer threats. No military aviator argues against the extensive use of flight simulators in modern instruction; this attitude must be broadened to the entire Fleet.

LT Jack Tribolet flew the MH-60S Knighthawk with HSC-26 out of Norfolk. He currently serves as an Officer Instructor teaching at the University of Southern California and is the nationwide NROTC Course Coordinator for the class Seapower & Maritime Affairs.

This article was first published by CIMSEC.

Why Don't Wend Send the F-35 Stealth Fighter to Ukraine? Ukraine has defied expectations, staunchly holding off the Russian invaders for two years. And while the Ukrainians have fought doggedly, their resistance is dependent, in large part, upon the donation of Western cash, intelligence, and military equipment.

Frankly, the Ukrainians are unlikely to have been able to resist the Russian advances without the steady influx of military assistance from the NATO powers, most especially the United States.

To date, the West has provided Ukraine with vital equipment, including surface-to-air missile systems like the PATRIOT and anti-tank equipment like the FGM-148.

Ukraine is eagerly awaiting the donation of fourth-generation F-16 fighters, which would help mitigate the Russian advantage in the skies above Ukraine. But the donation of F-16s raises questions: why donate F-16s when superior, fifth-generation fighter technology, i.e., the F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, is available?

Answers may range from the practical to the abstract, but the simple fact is that the US is unlikely to donate F-35 to Ukraine.

Ukraine surprised the world in denying their airspace to the Russians. Yet, the Russians hold a distinct advantage in the skies, running their Su-35s and MiG-31s up against the Ukrainian’s Su-27s and MiG-29s.

The Russian aircraft is newer, with higher-powered radar and more sophisticated missiles. The advantage here is that the Russian aircraft can locate and engage with Ukrainian aircraft further away than the Ukrainian aircraft.

So, in effect, the Russians can engage the Ukrainians from beyond the range of the Ukrainian fighters. In contrast, the Ukrainians must sneak within the range of the Russians to engage – a dangerous place to be.

Ukraine has compensated their weaker aircraft with donated surface-to-air systems, like the IRIS-T, NASAMS, and PATRIOT – but the SAMs are just a stopgap until Ukraine can receive more capable fighters.

The inbound F-16s, with advanced radar and modern missiles like the AIM-120, would offer Ukraine a significant upgrade over their Su-27s and MiG-29s, allowing the Ukrainians to engage Russian aircraft from greater distances.

But the F-16 is a fourth-generation fighter, first built in the 1970s and no longer on par with today’s cutting-edge aircraft. So, why not give the Ukrainians today’s cutting-edge aircraft?

Amongst the NATO powers, only America has developed fifth-generation technology – the F-22 and the F-35.

The F-22 Raptor remains the world’s preeminent air superiority fighter – but America has never exported the F-22 and never will. Production has already ceased on the F-22 and the US will hold onto each of their remaining F-22s.

The F-35 Lightning II, on the other hand, has been exported to US allies around the world, including NATO nations. One might expect a US-backed Ukraine to receive a jet that the US has already exported to places like Singapore and Norway – especially given how helpful the F-35 would be to the Ukrainian’s cause.

Consider the effectiveness of the F-16: “Kyiv’s allies hope the [F-16] can push Russian aircraft farther from the frontlines, target radar transmitters more effectively and hunt down more cruise missiles,” Reuters reported. “But [the F-16s] will address a problem that has persisted from the start of the invasion I February 2022: Russia’s more modern combat aircraft have been difficult for Ukraine’s military to counter with its own aging fighters.”

Now, consider that the F-35 is more effective than the F-16. Indeed, concerning radar, situational awareness, data fusion, and interconnectivity, the F-35 is the world’s standard-bearer – offering an edge over Russian Su-35s and MiG-31s.

Ukraine should not expect F-35 donations. For one, the F-35 is expensive – almost twice as much per unit as an F-16 (about $100 million v. $63 million).

And the F-35 program, in total, is the most expensive weapons program in human history ($1.7 trillion).

American taxpayers, fatigued from bankrolling a foreign conflict that is entering its third year, are unlikely to support the donation of a $100 million dollar aircraft from a $1.7 trillion dollar program.

The US may be hesitant to send one of their preeminent weapons systems into combat, at the hands of relatively green, foreign pilots, against one of America’s primary rivals. A downed F-35 would be inevitable. And a downed F-35 could provide Russia with the chance to reverse engineer the fifth-generation jet.

Granted, Russia already has a fifth-generation fighter design (the Su-57, of which only ten or so exist), but any insights into the F-35 would be a win for Russia.

Lastly, consider that the longer Russia is engaged in a conflict, the weaker Russia becomes with respect to military resources and political capital.

A weaker Russia benefits the US. So, logically, it follows that the US would prefer for Russia to remain engaged in conflict indefinitely.

So, providing Ukraine with game-changing weapons systems may not ultimately be in the US’s best interest. Now, that’s a somewhat abstract, hypothetical, and cynical take – and may not reflect the strategy of the US war planners. But it’s something to think about.

Regardless, don’t expect the Ukrainians to receive any F-35s.      

When Henry Kissinger asked for his opinion about the influence of the French Revolution, Chinese premier Zhou Enlai purportedly replied that two hundred years on it was “too early to tell.” Something similar might be said about today’s key economic question. Was 2022’s burst of inflation to over 9 percent due to transitory factors like the Covid-19 pandemic and Russia’s invasion of Ukraine? Or was it primarily due to the excessively expansive stance of budget and monetary policy?

The answer to the inflation question has considerable policy implications for the Federal Reserve.

If the burst in inflation was due to transitory factors, maybe the Fed did not need to slam on the monetary policy brakes as hard as it did last year to regain inflation control. Inflation would have slowed as the temporary supply disruptions wore off. If, on the other hand, 2022’s inflation was due to the Fed keeping interest rates too low for too long and allowing the money supply to balloon, maybe then the Fed’s current insistence on keeping interest rates high and allowing the money supply to contract will precipitate a recession and risk a bout of deflation.

Those arguing that 2022’s inflation was a transitory phenomenon can point to the supply chain disruptions caused by the COVID-19 pandemic and the spike in food and energy prices that occurred due to Russia’s war with Ukraine. They would note that a large part of inflation’s acceleration was due to gasoline prices increasing to well over $4 per gallon and to used car prices going through the roof as a result of disruptions to the automobile supply chain.

They would argue that inflation’s downward movement last year towards the Fed’s 2 percent inflation target was largely the result of supply chain repairs and international oil price decreases as the result of a slowing world economy. According to this view, the Fed was not responsible for 2022’s inflation surge, and the Fed should not now be taking undue credit for inflation’s recent sharp deceleration. They would also note that inflation is coming down even though unemployment remains close to its all-time post-war low. 

The alternative view of inflation’s recent gyrations takes Milton Friedman’s famous dictum as its starting point: inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon. According to this view, 2022’s inflation surge should have come as no surprise given the 40 percent cumulative increase in the broad money supply between the beginning of 2020 and the end of 2021. That unprecedented money supply burst directly resulted from the Fed keeping interest rates too low for too long and expanding its balance sheet by over $4 trillion to finance the government’s substantial Covid-related budget deficits. 

According to this inflation view, the Fed is now risking both sending the economy into recession and inviting a bout of deflation. It is doing so partly by keeping inflation-adjusted interest rates too high in the context of a slowing economy. More importantly, it is doing so by allowing the broad money supply to contract for the first time since the Fed started publishing these numbers in 1959.

Fortunately, unlike Zhou Enlai, we will not need to wait two hundred years to get an answer to our inflation question. Rather, we should have an answer by the end of this year. By then, we will know whether or not the economy experienced a meaningful recession and whether or not the deflation worries resurface. If we do experience meaningful deflation, the monetarists will be entitled to take a victory lap. If, on the other hand, we get a soft economic landing, those in the transitory inflation camp will be vindicated.

Unfortunately for the Fed, it will have to conduct monetary policy without a clear answer to the inflation question. It will have to hope that the monetarists are proven wrong and that it would not have endangered the economy by keeping interest rates too high and ignoring money supply developments. 

Desmond Lachman is a senior fellow at the American Enterprise Institute. He was a deputy director in the International Monetary Fund’s Policy Development and Review Department and the chief emerging-market economic strategist at Salomon Smith Barney.

Image: Shutterstock. 

The A-10 Warthog is not meant to be pretty or stealthy and does not pretend to be anything other than what it is: a plane designed to provide air cover and kill things like enemy armor.

And while many say this plane could not survive a war against a modern foe like China or Russia, the plane will not go away anytime soon. Why is that?

On 10 May 2022, the Fairchild Republic A-10 Warthog (officially the Thunderbolt II, named for the original P-47 Thunderbolt of WWII, which was flown by America’s top two highest-scoring air aces of the European Theatre, Francis “Gabby” Gabreski and Robert S. “Bob” Johnson) celebrated her 50th birthday, or as its pilots & crew chiefs (such as the Idaho Air National Guard’s 124th Fighter Wing) and legions of fans prefer to say, its 50th “BRRRT-Day,” in humorous and reverent homage to this golden warbird’s most salient—not to mention deadliest—feature, its tank-busting 30mm cannon.

So then, let’s examine just what makes this particular warplane so special.

 To give readers a sense of historical perspective about the Warthog’s roots, as noted by Guns.Com columnist Chris Eger, “Nixon was in office, Roberta Flack’s ‘First Time Ever I Saw Your Face’ was on the top of the charts – which is a beautiful coincidence considering the love the public has for the A-10 – and a gallon of milk cost 52 cents.” 

Moreover, at this time, the Soviet Union possessed roughly 50,000 tanks, while the American M1 Abrams main battle tank (MBT) was still eight years away from debuting. Though Dick Nixon’s détente policy was already underway, the fear of the USSR sending its massed troop and tank formations through the Fulda Gap still weighed heavily on U.S. policymakers’ minds. Therefore, the need for a tank-killing close air support (CAS) platform like the A-10 was genuine.

With 20/20 hindsight, we know now that the dreaded WWIII scenario never happened, thanks to, among other things, Nixon’s aforementioned détente, the Reagan Doctrine of rollback, and Mikhail S. Gorbachev’s glasnost and perestroika. However, even before the Cold War officially ended, the Warthog would still get her baptism of fire on a far different battlefield than its designers originally envisioned: the desert sands of Iraq and Kuwait.

The A-10 Warthog was officially “blooded” during Operation Desert Storm in 1991, destroying more than 900 Iraqi tanks, 2,000 other military vehicles and 1,200 artillery pieces.  Two particular A-10A pilots, then-Captain Eric Solomonson and Lieutenant John Marks of the 76th Tactical Fighter Squadron/23rd Tactical Fighter Wing set a record of sorts by killing 23 of Saddam Hussein’s tanks in a single day!  Moreover, as I noted in my piece on the J-20 sometime back, during that same conflict, the Warthog laid claim to the last known air-to-air gun kill (as opposed to a missile kill) in aviation combat history. Thus the living legend of the Warthog was born and cemented.

What makes the Warthog so deadly?

Well, for starters, there are the AGM-65 Maverick missiles. Still, more significantly, there’s that aforementioned “BRRRT” factor, the GAU-8A Avenger cannon, a 30mm electric Gatling gun that delivers seven times the ballistic energy per round as the 20mm M61 Vulcans carried by other U.S. warplanes, doling out its deadly depleted uranium shells at a buzzsaw-like 4,200 rounds per minute.  Yes, the airplane is built around the gun.

Since then, the A-10 has served with distinction, from Bosnia to Kosovo to Afghanistan to Libya to Iraq Part Deux (Operation Iraqi Freedom). And while the Warthog drivers in these latter conflicts may not have racked up the MBT kill tally that their Desert Storm predecessors did, they certainly added to the other aspect that makes the beast so legendary: its incredible durability and survivability.

To cite just one example, then-Captain (now retired USAF Colonel) Kim “K(iller)C(hick)” Campbell, during a mission over downtown Baghdad on 07 April 2003, was hit by enemy ground fire that completely knocked out her airplane’s hydraulics and damaged one engine, in addition to disabling the flight controls, landing gear & breaks, and horizontal stabilizer, not to mention leaving hundreds of holes in the airframe. Amazingly enough, Campbell was able to put the plane into manual reversion and fly the crippled Hog safely back to base an hour away. For her heroic actions, she was awarded the Distinguished Flying Cross.

Given this fantastic track record of being able to take punishment and dish it out, it is no wonder that many experts are decrying efforts to phase out the A-10. We can only hope that these voices of reason will be heeded by the senior decision-makers in the Pentagon.

Christian D. Orr is a former Air Force officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon).  Chris holds a B.A. in International Relations from the University of Southern California (USC) and an M.A. in Intelligence Studies (concentration in Terrorism Studies) from American Military University (AMU).  He has also been published in The Daily Torch and The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

The F-14 Tomcat is clearly a fighter based on Cold War needs and designs. It is also clearly not stealth like the F-22, F-35, or upcoming NGAD platform. And yet, the public just can't get enough of this old fighter jet. Why is that exactly? Why are we so fascinated by it?

In my recent article on the SR-72 spy plane, I mentioned the mysterious plane’s Hollywood-embellished appearance in Top Gun: Maverick, the long-awaited sequel to the original 1986 box office blockbuster.

Not surprisingly, the sequel has also regenerated interest in the venerable F-14 Tomcat, the warbird in which a then-young Pete “Maverick” Mitchell, played by Tom Cruise, earned his combat spurs and took our breath away.

Though not quite as impressive as the F-15 Eagle’s mind-blowing 104:0 air-to-air kill ratio, the Tomcat has a very respectable air-to-air combat performance history.

Perhaps the greatest irony of the Tomcat’s kill tally is that the majority of its scores were achieved not by American pilots, nor even the pilots of a U.S. ally, but rather by the pilots of an adversary nation.

Not just any U.S. adversary, either, but one deemed by then-President George W. Bush to be a member of the “Axis of Evil:” Iran. (Granted, Iran’s F-14s are carryovers from when that nation was actually still a U.S. ally.)

No American Tomcat drivers attained ace status (5 or more aerial victories), but at least one Islamic Republic of Iran Air Force pilot did. IRIAF pilot Col. Mostafa Roustaie, who scored five kills against Iraqi opponents during the Iran-Iraq War, described his beloved plane as “the last word in the fighter business.”

All in all, IRIAF pilots claimed 130 victories versus only 4 losses. However, as noted by aviation expert Tom Cooper in Smithsonian Magazine, “It is impossible to tabulate, for example, how many air-to-air victories were scored by Iranian F-14s because air force records were repeatedly tampered with during and after the war for political, religious, or even personal reasons.”

As for those lucky few Iraqi pilots who managed to kill a Tomcat – rare birds, indeed – the admittedly scanty evidence indicates that two of them did so in a MiG-23 Flogger, while one kill apiece is credited to a Dassault Mirage F1 and a MiG-21 Fishbed.

Iran remains the only nation flying active F-14s. According to estimates in 2019, Iran’s air force maintains 24 F-14 Tomcats from the original batch of 79.

As for the total kills scored by U.S. Navy Tomcat fliers, that tally is 5: two Libyan Sukhoi Su-22 Fitter jets downed during the 1981 Gulf of Sidra incident; two Libyan MiG-23 Floggers killed during the 1989 Gulf of Sidra incident; and one Iraqi Mi-8 Hip helicopter downed during Operation Desert Storm in 1991.

No U.S. Navy-flown F-14s have ever been lost in aerial combat, though one F-14 was lost to enemy ground fire during Desert Storm. Its pilot, Lt. Devon Jones, was rescued the next day, while his radar intercept officer, Lt. Lawrence Slade, ended up as a prisoner for the remainder of the war. (Unlike the ill-fated Goose from the original Top Gun film, Mr. Slade lived to tell the tale.)

The F-14 made her maiden flight on Dec. 21, 1970, and officially entered service on Sept. 22, 1974, with the U.S. Navy aboard the USS Enterprise. The aircraft was finally retired from service on the 32nd anniversary of its debut, Sept. 22, 2006.

Crew: 2 (Pilot and radar intercept officer)

Length: 62 ft 9 in (19.13 m)

Wingspan: 64 ft 1.5 in (19.545 m)

Swept wingspan: 38 ft 2.5 in (11.646 m) swept

Height: 16 ft (4.9 m)

Wing area: 565 sq ft (52.5 sq m) wings only

1,008 sq ft (94 sq m) effective area including fuselage

Maximum speed: Mach 2.34 (1,544 mph, 2,485 km/h) at altitude

Combat range: 500 nmi (580 mi, 930 km)

Service ceiling: 53,000 ft (16,000 m)-plus

Armament: 1× 20 mm (0.787 in) M61A1 Vulcan 6-barreled Gatling cannon, with 675 rounds; AIM-54 Phoenix (the Tomcat’s most unique and exclusive feature) , AIM-7 Sparrow, AIM-9 Sidewinder

Christian D. Orr is a former Air Force officer, Federal law enforcement officer, and private military contractor (with assignments worked in Iraq, the United Arab Emirates, Kosovo, Japan, Germany, and the Pentagon).  He has also been published in The Daily Torch and The Journal of Intelligence and Cyber Security.

Earlier this month, eight of the legendary U-2 "Dragon Lady" spy planes were lined up in an "Elephant Walk" at Beale Air Force Base (AFB), California as part of the United States Air Force's efforts to showcase the joint airpower of the multiple wings stationed at the facility. It may not have been the largest such "elephant walks," the term for taxiing numerous aircraft before takeoff – yet it was likely a sight to behold.

In addition to the close formation on the ground, it can involve a minimum interval takeoff.

The first elephant walks occurred during the Second World War when large fleets of allied bombers massed for attacks – and observers on the ground noted that as the aircraft lined up, it resembled the nose-to-tail formations of elephants walking to a watering hole.

Today, the U.S. Air Force employs elephant walks to show the capability of a unit as well as the teamwork that is required to conduct such an operation. It also can help pilots prepare for the launching of fully armed aircraft in a mass event if needed.

So what was the largest "Elephant Walk" ever conducted? The answer could be a bit tricky – as it could involve not only the number of aircraft but the size and capabilities as well.

It was last spring that 4,000 student Airmen from the 82nd Training Wing shared the runway with 80 training aircraft from the 80th Flying Training Wing at Sheppard Air Force Base (AFB), Texas, in possibly the largest and most unique "elephant walk" in Air Force history. It was conducted to shine a light on the importance of training and partnerships.

"The key to airpower is exceptional Airmen, and the key to exceptional Airmen is exceptional training," said Brig. Gen. Lyle K. Drew, 82nd TW commander. "That's what we do here at Sheppard [AFB], and this elephant walk was our message to the world that the U.S. and its international partners remain committed to delivering the best-trained Airmen in the world."

Sheppard AFB is home to three of the eight technical training groups in the Air Force as well as Euro-NATO Joint Jet Pilot Training, while it is also home to the service's largest Noncommissioned Officer Academy.

"No other base could bring this many training aircraft and student Airmen to bear like this," said Col. Brad Orgeron, 80th FTW commander. "The fundamental technical and pilot training missions that happen here every day affect literally every base and every combat sortie in the Air Force – not to mention the impact on our global partners."

Another contender for the largest elephant walk was one conducted at Seymour Johnson Air Force Base, N.C., on April 16, 2012, involving nearly seventy F-15 Strike Eagles from the United States Air Force's 4th Fighter Wing – with aircrews assigned to the 4th Fighter Wing's 333rd, 334th, 335th, and 336th Fighter Squadrons.

The fourth-generation aircraft had lined up on the runway during a Turkey Shoot training mission, in which the more than five dozen aircraft successfully destroyed in excess of 1,000 targets on bombing ranges across the state to commemorate the 4th's victory over the Luftwaffe on April 16, 1945.

Another contender for the most impressive elephant walk occurred in January 2020, when the United States Air Force's Active Duty 388th and Reserve 419th Fighter Wings conducted the Combat Power Exercise at Hill AFB, Utah, with 52 Lockheed Martin F-35 Lightning II 35As – the conventional takeoff and landing variant of the U.S. military's Joint Strike Fighter.

The elephant walk of the F-35 Lightning IIs was employed to demonstrate the "ability to employ a large force of F-35As" as well as to test the air wing's readiness for personnel accountability, aircraft generation, ground operations, flight operations, and combat capability, according to a Hill statement from the time.

Though the U.S. Air Force's press photos may have looked to many like little more than a number of aircraft lined up, the exercise had been planned for months. As TheDrive.com reported, "The amount of hardware on the runway in terms of billions of dollars is staggering."

It was also likely quite an expensive show of force. If each of the 52 F-35 fighters in the elephant walk flew for just a single hour, it was still a $2 million-plus exercise. Yet, it could be described as truly priceless.

The ability to launch 52 of the fifth-generation F-35 stealth fighters was as much to send a message to detractors of the program within the United States as it was to reaffirm the capabilities of the U.S. Air Force to near-peer adversaries such as China and Russia.

While it may not have been the largest elephant walk in terms of the number of aircraft, last November eight Northrop Grumman B-2 Spirits lined up on the runway at Whiteman AFB, Missouri, at the culmination of the recent Spirit Vigilance 22 training exercise.

Aircraft from the 509th and 131st Bomb Wings took part in an “elephant walk” before a series of training and readiness drills. The Spirits lined up in close formation on the runway before taking off at short intervals. The routine showcased the availability of the aircraft and served as a demonstration of power.

Given that just twenty B-2s are in service, the display included about 40% of the total Spirit fleet. With eight bombers on the runway at roughly $2 Billion a piece, it drew approximately $16 Billion in stealth bombers to a single location.

That is might no other nation on earth could showcase.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. Email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Mines have a long history of reshaping naval warfare, both by damaging individual ships and by countering the actions of entire fleets. Remarkably, though, one way to make them even more effective is to take a “back to the future” approach in which vintage mine technologies, even some dating a century or more, are employed alongside modern capabilities. 

Even relatively unsophisticated mines have been used to prevent ship movements from Vietnam to the English Channel, while also thwarting amphibious assaults from the gates of Istanbul to the coasts of Korea. From 1988 through 1991, mines damaged three U.S. warships and many civilian ones in the Persian Gulf.

Most recently, Ukraine has used naval mines to help invasion of Odesa. Mines can help to negate the superior power of enemy fleets not only by directly damaging their ships, but by inducing them to avoid key waters or to engage in mine-countermeasures efforts that delay and disrupt their plans. For example, naval mines could help to stymie a potential Chinese invasion of Taiwan, hindering China’s ability to rapidly deliver a massive force ashore. In locations across the globe, naval mines could also be used to trap hostile submarines in port. They can also be used to impose “sanctions with a bite” by precluding an aggressor from using specific waterways until certain conditions are met. 

The U.S. military is working to develop its currently vestigial naval mining capabilities. It has a handful of air-dropped bottom influence mines, which sit on the seafloor and detonate when they sense a ship’s characteristic sounds or magnetism overhead. The U.S. is working on mines that can be delivered clandestinely or can be released from aircraft at long ranges from the target area. In addition, the U.S. is developing mines that can launch torpedoes when they detect a ship’s presence, a capability that it first developed towards the end of the Cold War. 

Burnishing capabilities from the 1980s, though, could be only the beginning. A very effective way of complementing today’s advanced mines is by employing mine technology that dates back a century or even more. Moored contact mines that detonate on impact, like the “spiky balls” used in World War I, require different modalities of mine countermeasures (MCM) from bottom influence mines. Sonar searches for moored and bottom mines have to be conducted sequentially, while moored contact mines are immune to ship emulating MCM gear that attempts to prematurely detonate influence mines. 

For the U.S., scattering a few moored contact mines among a larger number of bottom influence mines would require additional MCM efforts to counteract both, protracting clearance timelines. If an adversary did not undertake MCM against moored contact mines, because it was not aware of their usage, it would likely lose ships and then have to belatedly address that secondary threat. Throughout these protracted and perhaps confused MCM operations, MCM forces and other ships would be vulnerable to U.S. targeting. 

Similarly, old-fashioned drifting mines can be tremendously disruptive to an adversary’s fleet actions or its MCM efforts against fixed mines. Under international law, drifting mines must neutralize themselves within one hour of release. However, under the right circumstances, they can do a lot of mischief within that single hour. Slightly submerged drifting mines could be released from uncrewed undersea vehicles or low-visibility uncrewed surface vehicles just up current from a fleet or from MCM forces tackling a fixed minefield. 

The technology involved is very old: the U.S. first used drifting mines that detonate on contact in 1777. Drifting mines could help to disrupt a fleet as it was trying to maintain formation or adhering to channels where MCM had previously been conducted. Available tactics against drifting mines are mostly risible, consisting of having people try to spot incoming mines, then trying to avoid and/or shoot them. The result is that ships would be continually damaged by an invisible threat, with no meaningful capacity to counter it. 

A third approach is to use remotely controlled mines that have a hard-wired connection to a facility on land. Controllers at that facility can decide whether to detonate a mine when a ship approaches one of them or could simply activate (or de-activate) a set of influence mines that respond to ship signatures. Again, the U.S. has been here before: at the turn of the 20th century it protected ports with remotely controlled minefields. Today, coastal nations such as Taiwan and the Baltic states could employ such minefields to better protect their shores from hostile fleets. Having numerous, distributed links between individual mines and various shore locations can reduce vulnerability to both the severing of cables and the targeting of the control facilities themselves. Remotely controlled mines are relatively impervious to typical MCM tactics, while any MCM assets would be highly vulnerable to various shore-based defenses. 

Overall, while naval mine warfare benefits from technological development, employing a few old-style mines can be a useful complement to modern capabilities. The low costs associated with naval mines may be further reduced by constructing some with century-old technology. Some other nations already use seemingly antiquated mines: Russia’s M08 moored contact mine is named for the year of its development—1908. By using moored contact, drifting, or remotely controlled naval mines in combination with advanced counterparts, the U.S. and other nations can inexpensively help to counter prospective aggressors as part of a range of naval defenses. 

Dr. Scott Savitz is a Senior Engineer at the nonprofit, nonpartisan RAND Corporation.

This article was first published by RealClearDefense.

First Columbia-class Submarine Stern Delivered - Progress is moving forward on the future USS District of Columbia (SSBN-826), the lead boat of the Columbia-class ballistic missile submarine. This week HII's Newport News Shipbuilding (NNS) announced that it had delivered the stern for the sub by barge from Newport News to Electric Boat's facility in Quonset Point, Rhode Island.

"This is a major milestone in the ramp-up of Columbia-class module production here at NNS," said Brandi Smith, NNS vice president of Columbia -class submarine construction. "Our shipbuilders have worked with pride to accomplish this milestone, and we look forward to continuing our commitment to this important national security program."

NNS is a major shipbuilding partner in the Columbia-class program, constructing and delivering six module sections per submarine under contract to Electric Boat.

The U.S. Navy will spend around $132 billion for the procurement of the dozen submarines, while the total lifecycle cost for the entire class is estimated at $347 billion. That figure includes all projected costs to develop, buy, and operate the 12 submarines through 2042.

In its Fiscal Year 2019 (FY19) request, U.S. Navy officials asked for $3.7 billion for the Columbia class program – a 97 percent increase over 2018, making it the second-most expensive program in the 2019 Pentagon budget request, next to the Lockheed Martin F-35 Joint Strike Fighter, which is operated by the U.S. Air Force, U.S. Navy and U.S. Marine Corps.

The new SSBNs will be the largest submarines ever built by the United States. Each of the planned dozen boats will be 560 feet in length and have a beam of 43 feet.

The Columbia -class will be equipped with sixteen SLBM tubes, as opposed to twenty-four SLBM tubes on Ohio-class SSBNs. That will also reduce construction, operations, and maintenance costs. In addition, the new boats will utilize the joint American-British developed Common Missile Compartment (CMC), which will also be installed on the Royal Navy's new Dreadnought-class submarines. It was designed to launch the Trident II D5 intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM). The joint effort has been reported to save each nation hundreds of millions of dollars.

The new submarines will be longer, heavier, and feature a complex electric drive propulsion system and associated technology.

Unlike the preceding Ohio-class, the new ballistic missile submarines are being constructed with a life-of-ship reactor, which will result in a shorter mid-life maintenance period, and each was designed to serve a forty-two-year service life.

This will further allow the dozen Columbia-class SSBNs to replace the existing fourteen Ohio-class boats – and reduce overall upfront procurement costs.

The program has also been utilizing techniques that were refined during the construction of the Virginia-class to maximize the efficiency of assembling the complex hulls while meeting a timeline with razor-thin margins.

The new Columbia-class is now being constructed by General Dynamic subsidiary Electric Boat for the U.S. Navy in collaboration with NNS.

The defense contractor cut the first steel for the lead boat in May 2019 – while construction of the submarine officially began in October 2020, while on June 4, 2022, Rep. Eleanor Holmes Norton (D-D.C.) declared the keel laid for the future USS District of Columbia (SSBN-826).

It was reported in May that the shipbuilder had not conducted a schedule risk analysis of the lead submarine's construction schedule, an issue that was first identified by the Government Accountability Office (GAO). The D.C.-based watchdog laid out several recommendations to keep the program running on track.

However, another issue was noted by the Congressional Budget Office (CBO) in October 2023 – which found that the program risks running at least 20 percent over budget, or about $20 billion.

"CBO estimates that total shipbuilding costs would average about $34 billion to $36 billion (in 2023 dollars) over the next 30 years, which is about 16 percent more than the Navy estimates. Compared with its estimates for the 2023 plan, CBO's estimates increased by between 5 percent and 10 percent in real (inflation-adjusted) terms, depending on the alternative," the nonpartisan government watchdog group warned.

The United States Navy has designated the Columbia-class its top acquisition priority, as the boats will replace the fleet of again Ohio-class ballistic missile submarines, and take over the role of the nation's sea-based strategic deterrent – seen as the most survivable leg of the nation's strategic triad.

Originally known as the Ohio Replacement Program (ORP) or SSBN(X), until 2016, the lead boat of the class (SSBN-826) will be named to honor the District of Columbia, while the second sub of the class will be named USS Wisconsin (SSBN-827).

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org 

Russia's Naval Chief Wants a New Aircraft Carrier – He's Not Dreaming, He's in Fantasy Land - The head of the Russian Navy has suggested that a new aircraft carrier could be in the works – yet, the Kremlin has struggled with the refit for its sole flattop. However, Commander-in-Chief Admiral Nikolay Yevmenov told the state-run Krasnaya Zvezda daily news outlet that plans for a new aircraft carrier are underway.

"The issue of the expediency of creating a prospective naval aircraft carrying complex has been addressed. Its engagement will increase the effectiveness of various operational tasks," suggested Yevmenov, as reported by Tass.

He further suggested that the main "brown-water force" comprises warships that combine antisubmarine and attack capabilities. These include corvettes such as the Russian Navy's Steregushchy and the Gremyashchy and small missile ships like the Grad Sviyazhsk.

Blue-water warships comprise frigates, patrol ships, and universal amphibious assault ships that can provide over-the-horizon assault landing, the naval chief added. The development of minesweepers made of composite materials with modern mine searching and sweeping means will continue.

Yevmenov gave no timeline on when such a future carrier could enter service, or even where it could be built. Russia has struggled to refit the flagship Admiral Flota Sovetskogo Soyuza Kuznetsov, and during it now odyssey-long time undergoing a modernization, which involved a crane falling on the flight deck, while it further suffered multiple fires, and seen its completion date pushed back on numerous occasions.

There has been increased scrutiny, and some Western observers have doubted the carrier will ever be returned to service. The problem-plagued warship was meant to be a symbol of pride for Moscow, but it has often been the butt of numerous jokes – often with good reason. At one point, the Kremlin did consider a replacement, yet likely, the warship will never sail.

Yevmenov's calls for a new carrier aren't the first time that such a project has figuratively been floated – even though no actual warship has moved past the decisions stage. As previously reported, in 2018, it was announced that the Russian Navy had begun to explore options for a new aircraft carrier.

According to GlobalSecurity.org, one option was focused on a conventionally powered vessel with a displacement of around 70,000 tons – slightly larger than the 58,600-67,500 tons full load Project 1143.5 Admiral Kuznetsov. Another option called for a nuclear-powered carrier, with a larger displacement. That would be bigger than the 42,000-ton French Navy flagship Charles de Gaulle – the only non-U.S. Navy nuclear-powered carrier – yet not likely as large as the 100,000-ton American supercarriers.

The new "Shtorm" aircraft carrier – a.k.a. Project 23000E – was to be included in Russia's armament program for the 2019 to 2025 period.

To say that little to no progress has been made on the Shtorm is a vast understatement, and there is little to no chance that Moscow will be launching a new carrier anytime in the next decade.

It was also just a year ago that some Russian lawmakers suggested that Moscow should turn to Beijing to buy back the unfinished Soviet-era flattop that Ukraine sold to China following the dissolution of the Soviet Union.

While no official request has been made, it would also likely best be described as a dead in the water.

It seems that some in the Kremlin are like children with wish lists for Santa Claus that vastly exceed the means of their parents. They're likely to be as disappointed as those children when their dreams aren't fulfilled, but unlike children, they should understand the reality of the situation.

As it stands, Moscow will be hard-pressed to see Admiral Kuznetsov even return to service, at least as a capable warship. It is therefore simply a fantasy to believe that the Russian Navy will ever be a true blue water force with a capable aircraft carrier that isn't the mockery of the world.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author: Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Image Credit: Shutterstock and Creative Commons. 

The future of commercial supersonic flight will be unveiled on Friday at the famed Lockheed Martin Skunk Works in Palmdale, California. Lockheed Martin and NASA executives, along with subject matter experts, and California and Federal Government officials will be present as the NASA X-59 is rolled out.

Designed and built by Lockheed Martin at its famed Skunk Works facility, the X-59 is specifically shaped to quiet the perceived sound of a sonic boom that reaches the ground to that of a gentle thump, similar to a car door shutting in the distance.

"This is the big reveal," said Catherine Bahm, manager of NASA's Low Boom Flight Demonstrator project, who is overseeing the development and build of the X-59. "The rollout is a huge milestone toward achieving the overarching goal of the Quesst mission to quiet the sonic boom."

The X-59 is the centerpiece of NASA's Quesst mission, which has the goal of collecting community response data from flights over representative communities across the United States. NASA will employ that data to recommend an acceptable commercial supersonic noise standard to regulators to possibly repeal the current ban on supersonic flight over land and thereby change the future of commercial aviation, reducing flight times by half of what they are currently.

"Watch the unveiling of @NASAAero's X-59 aircraft, set to fly this year to test quieter supersonic flight technology. The Quesst mission could help bring a return to supersonic air travel over land. Livestream starts Friday, Jan. 12 at 4pm ET (2100 UTC)," @NASA announced on X, the social media platform formerly known as Twitter, earlier this month.

Last year, the X-plane completed a series of ground tests at Lockheed Martin's Fort Worth, Texas, facility to ensure the aircraft's ability to withstand the loads and stresses of supersonic flight – or flight at speeds faster than Mach 1. During the tests, the X-59's fuel systems were also calibrated and tested at Lockheed Martin's Ft. Worth facilities. Since the airplane wasn't actually flying, tests were conducted with the aircraft sitting on hydraulic jacks that were connected directly to the structure.

In addition, structural and fuel calibration tests were completed on the aircraft in preparation for final integration and taxi testing back in Palmdale.

However, because the aircraft couldn't fly to the facilities, there had been logistical challenges to complete the tests. While the aircraft was built in California, it had to be shipped by truck to Texas in December 2022.

NASA's goal is to collect and provide data to U.S. regulators to help establish an acceptable commercial supersonic noise standard and to lift the ban on commercial supersonic travel over land, which could reduce cross-country flight times drastically.

The United States banned supersonic travel over land for non-military aircraft in 1973 due to public concern about sonic booms over populated areas, CBS News reported. NASA has continued to study transoceanic supersonic flight, which could in theory shuttle passengers from New York City to London in less than two hours.

"We're definitely ready to write a new chapter in the history of supersonic flight, making air travel over land twice as fast, but in a way that is safe, sustainable, and so much quieter than before," Peter Coen, NASA's Quesst Mission Integration Manager, said in a statement in April.

The advanced is scheduled to take flight this year. Once fully operational and tested, NASA plans to fly the aircraft over select U.S. cities in 2026 and gather feedback from the public on the sound it produces.

Peter Suciu is a Michigan-based writer. He has contributed to more than four dozen magazines, newspapers, and websites with over 3,200 published pieces over a twenty-year career in journalism. He regularly writes about military hardware, firearms history, cybersecurity, politics, and international affairs. Peter is also a Contributing Writer for Forbes and Clearance Jobs. You can follow him on Twitter: @PeterSuciu. You can email the author at Editor@nationalinterest.org. 

Three months after a genocidal, anti-semitic terrorist group slaughtered 1,200 of its citizens in a barbaric fashion, Israel sits in the docket of the International Court of Justice, accused of committing genocide because it hasn’t defended itself from future attack as pristinely as the world demands.

The court is holding hearings this week on an application that South Africa filed in late December, asking the court to begin proceedings against Israel for committing genocide against Palestinians in Gaza.

“Acts and omissions by Israel,” South Africa wrote, “... are genocidal in character, as they are committed with the requisite specific intent... to destroy Palestinians in Gaza as a part of the broader Palestinian national, racial and ethnical group,” putting Israel “in violation of its obligations under the Genocide Convention.”

It is a quintessentially Orwellian affair, a spectacle of the victim as the perpetrator, and it fits within a longstanding pattern of the global community holding the singular Jewish state to a singular human rights standard. No one should buy it.

In its “Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide,” the United Nations General Assembly defined genocide as action “committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious group.”

Ironically, it is Hamas, created in 1987 as the Palestinian branch of the Muslim Brotherhood movement, which has set out to commit that very crime—against Israel and the Jewish people.

In its covenant of 1988, Hamas states, “Our struggle against the Jews is very great and very serious...  The Movement is but one squadron that should be supported by more and more squadrons from this vast Arab and Islamic world, until the enemy is vanquished and Allah's victory is realised [sic].”

“The Islamic Resistance Movement,” it continues, “is one of the links in the chain of the struggle against the Zionist invaders,” and it “aspires to the realisation of Allah's promise... The Day of Judgement will not come about until Moslems fight the Jews (killing the Jews), when the Jew will hide behind stones and trees.”

Some thirty-five years later, the group has lost none of its genocidal luster. After October 7, when Hamas’ terrorists beheaded men, slaughtered babies, raped women, desecrated bodies, and, in some cases, took videos of their deeds. The group's deputy foreign minister, Ghazi Hamad, vowed to repeat such attacks until Israel is destroyed.

Where does Israel fit into this maelstrom?

The Jewish State unilaterally withdrew from Gaza in 2005, leaving it to the Palestinian Authority. Two years later, Hamas seized Gaza in a violent coup and ruled its two million residents with an iron fist, brooking no dissent and murdering those who work with or seek peace with Israel.

Israel responded to the barbarism of October 7 as one might expect, vowing to destroy the terrorist group so it could never again attack the Jewish state. What Israel is promising is nothing more than any responsible government would pursue in the aftermath of such an attack by such a group.

Israel’s military campaign is multi-faceted, arduous, and, yes, bloody. What began with heavy bombing has morphed into a harrowing firefight. But, notwithstanding the charge of genocide that Israel’s critics around the world are so quick to level, who’s really trying to boost civilian casualties?

While searching for Hamas operatives, Israel’s military has dropped leaflets, made phone calls, and sent texts, warning Palestinians to flee areas where it plans to mount operations. That is no different than what Israel has done for years during its multiple wars and skirmishes with Hamas.

Hamas, as usual, embeds its fighters and weaponry in schools, hospitals, and mosques, purposely boosting civilian casualties to swing global public opinion against Israel. Hamas has told Palestinians to ignore Israel’s warnings to flee or has prevented them from doing so. One Hamas official suggested that civilians serve as human shields, sacrificing themselves to protect Hamas’ assets.

This week’s spectacle in The Hague is part of a larger international picture, marked by an obsession with the Jewish state.

With war raging in Ukraine and elsewhere and autocrats brutalizing their people all over the world, the General Assembly last year condemned Israel fourteen times and the rest of the world just seven.

Meanwhile, the UN’s Human Rights Council remains a cesspool of anti-Israeli activity that has 1) made Israel its only permanent agenda item and 2) condemned and subjected it to more special sessions and commissions than any other country. The council has passed no resolutions to condemn human rights abuses in such nations as Algeria, China, Cuba, Egypt, Iraq, Pakistan, Turkey, and Zimbabwe.

Are innocent Palestinians dying in Gaza? Yes. Is Israel seeking to wipe out the Palestinians, as per the charge of genocide? No. The allegation is either rooted in willful blindness or moral bankruptcy—or both.

Lawrence J. Haas is a senior fellow at the American Foreign Policy Council and the author of, most recently, The Kennedys in the World: How Jack, Bobby, and Ted Remade America’s Empire (Potomac Books).

Image: Creative Commons.