NEUM, Bosnia and Herzegovina, 12 June 2016 – The OSCE Mission to Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) organized a two-day alumni meeting for over 20 students who attended the OSCE-organized Youth and Security Summer School when it was held for the first time last year. The peace and security studies students of the Universities of Sarajevo, Mostar and Banja Luka discussed current security challenges and ways to promote youth participation in the development of a comprehensive security policy for BiH.
“The meeting is an excellent opportunity for enhancing the knowledge and capacity of future security professionals. It provides a platform for them to actively participate in developing and implementing security policy,” said Jonathan Moore, Head of the OSCE Mission to BiH. “The recommendations they produced will be forwarded to the BiH Council of Ministers’ Inter-Ministerial Working Group on Monitoring and Implementation of Security Policy.”
Damjan Jugovic, student at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Sarajevo and member of the OSCE’s Youth Advisory Group said: “This is a chance for us to get more acquainted with the work of different security and intelligence agencies in BiH and support the co-operation between students from different universities.”
The students also expressed hope that affiliation with the summer school would help them in their future careers. “Having met peers from Mostar and Banja Luka, I realized that we all think alike. We want change and a better future. I am sure the practical knowledge we gained from the school will increase our chances for employment,” said Jovana Bilinac, student at the Faculty of Political Sciences in Sarajevo.
The main goal of the Summer School on Youth and Security of the OSCE Mission to BiH is to promote the development of democratic institutions through education of young security experts. The school provides a forum for them to discuss a wide range of security- and policy-related issues and increases their participation in political life as well as decision-making processes.
The organization of the alumni meeting was supported by the Hungarian Embassy in BiH.
Related StoriesThis report is for media and the general public.
The SMM observed more ceasefire violations in both Donetsk and Luhansk regions compared to the previous day. Several explosions occurred in the vicinity of the SMM near Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons; it also noted armoured combat vehicles, an anti-aircraft gun and an unmanned aerial vehicle in the security zone. The SMM continued to monitor the humanitarian situation and observed a demonstration against discussions surrounding an armed OSCE presence in Donetsk. It also monitored a series of demonstrations in Dnipro, Odessa and Kyiv. Armed “DPR” members kept the power supply to SMM’s repeater in Donetsk city disconnected and the SMM faced one additional restriction on its freedom of movement, in an area not controlled by the Government.*
The SMM observed more ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region as compared with the previous reporting period.
Whilst in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk) on the evening of 9 June, the SMM heard 56 undetermined explosions 6-10km west-south-west of its position within 22 minutes. The SMM heard 22 recoilless gun (SPG-9) explosions (11 assessed as outgoing and 11 impacts) during the remainder of the reporting period in Svitlodarsk.
Whilst in government-controlled Mariupol (102km south of Donetsk) on the evening of 9 June, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions at an undetermined distance east of its position. The SMM did not record any ceasefire violations on 10 June around Mariupol.
Whilst in a “DPR”-controlled area 6km north-west of Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard nearly 80 undetermined explosions in just more than two hours over noon time, 2-9km north-east and north-west of its position. Shortly after noon, whilst in government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk city), the SMM heard at least 20 undetermined explosions and continuous bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire in just over 30 minutes 2-3km east of its position.
Whilst in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard more than 100 undetermined explosions 2-6km south and south-east of its position over a two-and-a-half-hour period. During this time, the SMM also heard an additional 26 explosions from mortar rounds, two assessed as 120mm impacts and 24 assessed as outgoing rounds (82mm, 120mm and undetermined), 1-2km south and south-east of its position and saw and heard two airbursts, assessed as 82mm mortar rounds, 3-5km south-east of its position.
Over approximately the same time period, whilst in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard more than 100 undetermined explosions in directions 1-7km south, west and north of its position. The SMM continued to record ceasefire violations later in the afternoon, including 25 undetermined explosions over an eight-minute period and 18 undetermined explosions over a five-minute period; both instances were accompanied by continuous bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, all 2-7km west of its position.
Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve (58km north-east of Donetsk) in the afternoon, the SMM heard 26 explosions assessed as caused by mortar rounds of unknown calibre and saw four more explosions assessed as caused by impacts of rounds from unknown weapons, all 4-5km west, in less than a 30-minute time period.
In the early evening of 10 June, whilst two patrols were positioned approximately 150 metres north and just to the south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (south of Stanytsia Luhanska, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard hundreds of bursts and single shots of small-arms and heavy-machine-gun fire 250-600 metres north-east and south-east of its positions. At the same time, the SMM observed an unmanned aerial vehicle (UAV) flying from government-controlled towards “LPR”-controlled areas in a southern direction. The SMM then heard two explosions caused by impacts 100 and 400 metres south-south-east of its position north of the bridge. This was followed by a grenade impact 70 metres south-east of its position north of the bridge and another explosion caused by an impact 300-600 metres south-east of its position, again north of the bridge. The UAV made four loops between government-controlled and “LPR”-controlled positions, as firing from the ground continued, and eventually it returned to government-controlled areas. The firing and explosions ceased shortly after the UAV left the area. Both SMM patrols moved to a safer location and continued to monitor the situation. Later in the evening, a Ukrainian Armed Forces representative from the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination (JCCC) told the SMM that the sides had agreed to cease fire around the bridge. Dozens of civilians were present at the crossing route during the episode, and continued to cross the bridge when the explosions occurred.
The SMM again followed up on the SMM long-range UAV lost on 2 June over “DPR”-controlled Korsun (31km north-east of Donetsk) (see SMM Spot Report, 3 June 2016). Several residents of Korsun, including two elderly women, told the SMM that recently they had seen a bright flash in the sky and heard a loud sound, which they assumed was the result of “DPR” members shooting down a UAV, and indicated that an impact had occurred to the north of the village. They added that three-four days later a group of men was seen driving around the area and questioning people about UAV fragments. The SMM was unable to reach the area of the possible crash site due to the danger of mines. The JCCC has still not provided the SMM with more details on the whereabouts of the downed UAV.
In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of measures the SMM observed, beyond the respective withdrawal lines and outside storage sites, 21 tanks (three T-72 and 18 T-64) at “LPR” training areas in Kruhlyk (31km south-west of Luhansk) and Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk).
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons foreseen in the Minsk Package of Measures. The SMM has yet to receive the full information requested in the 16 October 2015 notification. The SMM revisited locations known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they do not comply with the specific criteria set out for permanent storage sites in the notification.
In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such locations and observed 15 anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) and noted that 18 were missing, as first observed on 8 February.
The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles, one anti-aircraft gun, and a UAV in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM observed one armoured personnel carrier (APC; BRDM-1) near Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk) and two APCs (BTR-70) in Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk). In “DPR”-controlled areas, the SMM observed one military-type truck mounted with an anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) in Donetsk city and one infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-1) near Debaltseve. The SMM observed a UAV flying south from government-controlled areas to “LPR”-controlled areas over Stanytsia Luhanska bridge before returning to government-controlled areas.
In “DPR”-controlled Debaltseve, a man wearing military-style attire told the SMM that he was from the Russian Federation and had been fighting for the “DPR” for two years.
The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repairs to infrastructure and the recovery of human remains. The SMM monitored adherence to the ceasefire near government-controlled Sokilnyky (42km north-west of Luhansk) to facilitate the recovery by a Ukrainian volunteer organization of two bodies buried in the area. Also present, supervising the work, were members of the Ukrainian Armed Forces. The SMM saw that the grave had been marked with a sign which identified both men as being from government-controlled Lysychansk (75km north-west of Luhansk), which had been the site of fighting in the summer of 2014. The sign also mentioned the term, “Novorossiya”, and indicated that both men died on 19 February 2015. The SMM observed as the bodies were exhumed: one was dressed in a military-type uniform and the other was wearing a military uniform with Russian Federation military insignia on it. The SMM observed as the bodies were taken to a morgue in Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk).
In Shchastia, the SMM monitored and facilitated adherence to the ceasefire as six employees of the State Emergency Service worked with diving equipment and metal detectors to remove unexploded ordnance from water canals next to a coal power plant. Near government-controlled Artemove (42km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM monitored and facilitated adherence to the ceasefire throughout the day in order to facilitate repair and demining work at a factory.
The SMM monitored a border area not controlled by the Government, at the “DPR”-controlled Novoazovsk (102km south-east of Donetsk) border crossing point. The SMM observed 15 commercial trucks with Russian Federation licence plates waiting to leave Ukraine. The drivers did not wish to disclose any information regarding the content of their cargo which was not visible from the outside.
The SMM continued to monitor the humanitarian situation. In “DPR”-controlled Komuna (56km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM spoke with seven people (three of them women) who said that the village’s pre-conflict population of 600 people had shrunk to 300-400. They went on to say that trauma among children is widespread and psychological services are lacking. One woman told the SMM that she had three children (two, four and six years of age) and that her four-year-old son had stopped speaking during intense fighting around Komuna and Debaltseve, and has not spoken since. The SMM noted that the woman’s six-year-old daughter behaved aggressively and the woman said she had behavioural disorders due to trauma induced by the conflict.
The SMM monitored a series of public gatherings. In Donetsk, the SMM observed 15,000-20,000 people participating in a demonstration against discussions surrounding an armed OSCE presence in the area. Before the demonstration began, the SMM noted 73 buses parked at the Donbas Arena and approximately 200 people waiting in the area. The SMM observed as crowds of people were directed by men in civilian clothes who had also arrived on the buses, towards various gathering points in the vicinity of a central public square. “Senior” “DPR” members spoke at the gathering and the demonstrators carried placards with slogans in English and Russian. The demonstrators began to disperse and return to the buses at approximately 11:00. More than 600 armed men and women (ten per cent women) were providing security for the gathering.
The SMM monitored a demonstration at the Russian Federation Consulate General in Odessa. Approximately 80 self-defence activists (18-55 years of age, approximately 15 women) attempted to deter people from entering the Consulate General. Shortly before 18:00 some protestors threw eggs at the façade of the building and at the police. A small scuffle broke out between protestors and the police, but ended quickly. By 18:00 the protestors began to disperse.
In Dnipro, approximately 50 people demonstrated near a district court against a public official whom they accused of using his connections to avoid prosecution for an alleged crime. The demonstrators called for greater transparency of the courts in Dnipro. Two police (one woman and one man) were present at the gathering.
Outside the Constitutional Court in Kyiv, the SMM observed approximately 50 activists and 20 journalists listening to a speech by the head of the Civic Lustration Committee, who warned the audience that the Constitutional Court was reviewing the lustration process and was planning to put a stop to lustration. At least two Parliamentarians from the Self-Reliance (Samopomich) party and one from Bloc Poroshenko were present at the demonstration. There was no visible police presence.
*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.
Delay:
[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.
Related StoriesVIENNA, 11 June 2016 – On the 15th anniversary of the murder of Serbian journalist Milan Pantić, OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media Dunja Mijatović called on authorities in Serbia to step up their efforts in investigating this and other journalist killings.
“The authorities have a duty to ensure that perpetrators and masterminds behind attacks against journalists do not go unpunished,” Mijatović said. “Fifteen years on after the horrific murder of Pantić, justice has still not been served.”
Pantić, a journalist with the daily “Vecernje Novosti” was killed by unknown assailants on 11 June 2001 in front of his home in the city of Jagodina. He had received several death threats.
The Representative recalled other unsolved cases in Serbia, including the murder of Slavko Ćuruvija in 1999, the death of Dada Vujasinović in 1994, and other attacks on journalists not being investigated. She also reiterated her support for the 2014 initiative by the authorities establishing a commission to speed up investigations into the deaths of Serbian journalists.
“The authorities must intensify their efforts to solve and effectively prevent crimes against members of the media, and investigate all attacks on journalists,” Mijatović said. “I will continue to closely monitor progress on the investigation of the murder of Milan Pantić and all other cases of journalists killed in OSCE participating States.”
The OSCE Representative on Freedom of the Media observes media developments in all 57 OSCE participating States. She provides early warning on violations of freedom of expression and media freedom and promotes full compliance with OSCE media freedom commitments. Learn more at www.osce.org/fom, Twitter: @OSCE_RFoM and on www.facebook.com/osce.rfom.
Related StoriesVIENNA, 10 June 2016 - On the basis of the holiday ceasefire agreement of 29 April 2016, the Trilateral Contact Group (TCG) and representatives of certain areas of Donetsk and Luhansk regions of Ukraine have today conducted a video-conference, in order to discuss recent ceasefire violations along the line of contact.
The participants have agreed that a full and objective investigation of these violations is needed which will be discussed at the next meeting of the TCG in Minsk on 15 June 2016, with the participation of the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine and the Joint Centre for Control and Co-ordination.
The participants further agreed to immediately take all necessary measures for a complete ceasefire, in order to facilitate the investigation.
Related StoriesThis report is for media and the general public.
The SMM observed fewer ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared with the previous day and some ceasefire violations in Luhansk region compared with none the previous day. Whilst at Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, incoming fire impacted about 100 metres from SMM’s position. The SMM observed craters and damage caused by shelling in Donetsk city and other areas. The Mission continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons, and noted heavy weapons in violation of the withdrawal lines; it also noted armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft weapons in the security zone. Armed “DPR” members continued to keep the power supply to SMM’s repeater in Donetsk city disconnected; and the SMM faced four additional restrictions of its freedom of movement, mainly in areas not controlled by the Government.* The Mission observed in Lviv civic activists demanding the dismissal of the mayor.
The SMM recorded a lower number of ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region compared to the previous day. Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre, during the night hours of 8-9 June, the SMM heard 67 undetermined explosions and eight bursts of heavy machine-gun at locations 5-7km north-west of its position. Whilst in Donetsk city’s Kyivskyi district (“DPR”-controlled, 7km north of Donetsk city centre), the SMM heard 13 undetermined explosions at locations 2-3km north-north-west of its position.
Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk), during the night hours of 8-9 June, the SMM heard four undetermined explosions, two outgoing mortar explosions, two mortar round impacts, two automatic-grenade-launcher shots, and 46 bursts of heavy-machine-gun and small-arms fire at locations 2-10km from south-west to north-west of its position.
Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 52 undetermined explosions, 82 single shots and 52 bursts of small-arms fire, and 20 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire at locations 2-7km ranging from south-west, west, west-north-west, north-west and north-north-east of its position.
Whilst in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM heard 12 undetermined explosions and at least 80 shots of small-arms fire at locations 3-6km south, south-east and east of its position. The SMM heard two explosions assessed as caused by impacts of 122mm artillery rounds 5km south of its position.
Positioned in government-controlled Pervomaiske (17km north-west of Donetsk), the SMM heard 11 undetermined explosions at locations 5-7km south-west of its position.
The SMM observed some ceasefire violations in Luhansk region compared with none during the previous day. Whilst at the “LPR” checkpoint south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge (16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard a single small-arms shot some 500-700 meters from its position. The SMM could not ascertain the direction of fire. Just after the shot, the SMM heard two explosions assessed as impacts less than 100 meters north of its position. The SMM members felt the shock wave while they were getting into the vehicles. No casualties and damage occurred.
Whilst in government-controlled Sievierodonetsk (74km north-west of Luhansk), the SMM heard four undetermined explosions 4km south and south-west of its position.
Positioned at the Zolote (60km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard an undetermined explosion 3km north-east of its position.
The SMM followed up on reports of shelling. In Kuibyshevskyi district of Donetsk city, the SMM visited nine locations in residential areas affected by shelling. The SMM observed damage to several houses, including severe shrapnel damage to roofs and walls facing west and south, shattered windows and damaged apartment buildings. The SMM found pieces of projectiles and shrapnel of 122mm artillery rounds. The SMM analysed four fresh craters near private houses and assessed them as caused by impact of 120mm mortar rounds fired from a westerly direction (three craters) and north-westerly direction (one crater). At one house, the SMM saw blood traces on a mattress. Residents told the SMM that the shelling had started on 8 June at around 23:00 and that one elderly woman had been wounded and hospitalized. The SMM observed damage to a three-floor apartment building with shattered windows and damage to walls facing west assessed as being caused by an explosion. The SMM found pieces of projectiles and assessed that the explosion was caused by impacts of 122mm rounds. Some 450 metres north-east of that location, the SMM spotted four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm), in violation of withdrawal lines, as highlighted below.
In Kyivskyi district of Donetsk city, the SMM observed damage to houses and punctured roofs facing north-west. The SMM analysed five fresh craters near private houses and assessed them as caused by impacts of either 122 or 152mm artillery rounds fired from a westerly (four craters) and north-north-westerly direction (one crater). No casualties were reported.
In “DPR”-controlled Dokuchaievsk (30km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM visited four locations affected by shelling. The SMM observed damage to several houses, including shrapnel damage to roofs and walls facing west and north-west. The SMM saw that the gas pipeline close to a residential building had shrapnel marks. The SMM analysed six fresh craters in the vicinity of private houses and assessed them as caused by 120mm mortar rounds fired from a westerly direction (two craters) and a west-south-westerly direction (three craters) and north-north-westerly direction (one crater). According to residents, shelling had started on at 00:30 on 9 June, lasting until 4:30. No casualties were reported.
In “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed a fresh crater approximately 70cm deep and 215cm wide and 210cm long next to a platform of the railway station, located between two railway tracks. The SMM observed that two sets of train electricity wires were damaged. The SMM conducted analysis on one crater and assessed it as caused by 122mm artillery fired from a north-westerly direction. Several people at the railway station told the SMM that shelling had occurred on 8 June at around 23:45. None of them could confirm any casualties.
The SMM followed up on reports of civilian casualties in “DPR”-controlled Makiivka (12km north-east of Donetsk) and visited hospital no. 2. The SMM spoke to the chief of the intensive care unit who confirmed the death of a woman. According to him, the woman had suffered injuries from shelling outside her house and had been hospitalized on 8 June at 22:30 and passed away on 9 June at 01:30. He said the woman had suffered multiple shrapnel injuries all over the body, limbs and face, and had died in the hospital.
In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of measures, beyond withdrawal lines but outside storage sites, the SMM observed at a training range in “LPR”-controlled Myrne (28km south-west of Luhansk), 15 stationary tanks (T-64).
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons foreseen in the Minsk Package of Measures. The SMM has yet to receive the full information requested in the 16 October 2015 notification.
In violation of respective withdrawal lines the SMM observed in “DPR”-controlled Kuibyshevskyi district of Donetsk city, the above mentioned four surface-to-air missile systems (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm).
The SMM revisited locations known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they do not comply with the specific criteria set out for permanent storage sites in the notification.
In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such locations and observed: 11 multiple-launch rocket systems (MLRS; BM-21 Grad, 122mm), 18 self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm), 12 mortars (seven 2B11, 120mm; five PM-38, 120mm), and twelve anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm). The SMM noted as missing, for the first time, three anti-tank guns (D-48, 85mm) and one MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), first observed missing on 23 February).
In “DPR”-controlled areas beyond respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such locations and observed nine MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), eight towed anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm), and five self-propelled howitzers (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm).The SMM noted as missing: two MLRS (BM-21 Grad, 122mm), first observed missing on 5 April 2015, four towed anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm; two observed missing on 12 August 2015, the third on 8 November 2015 and the fourth on 22 December 2015). The SMM observed one additional self-propelled howitzer (2S1 Gvozdika, 122mm).
The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft weapons in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM observed three armoured personnel carriers (APC; BTR-60) moving in a northerly direction in Trokhizbenka (32km north-west of Luhansk), two APCs (BTR-60, BTR-4E) stationary in Popasna (69km west of Luhansk), one APC (BTR-60) stationary in Raihorodka (34km north-west of Luhansk) and one APC (BTR-80) moving south in Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), 12 infantry fighting vehicles (BMP-2), two anti-aircraft guns (ZU-23) mounted on two military-type trucks (ZIL131), and two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM) in Nyzhnii Minchenok (33km north of Luhansk). In “DPR”-controlled areas the SMM observed six multi-purpose light-armoured towing vehicles (MTLB) in the vicinity of a shell-damaged building and a school in Kuibyshevskyi district of Donetsk city.
The SMM continued to observe the presence of unexploded ordnance (UXO). Near an “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge in government-controlled Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), the SMM observed an unexploded 82mm mortar round lying 10cm away from the road. The SMM immediately left the area and reported this to the “LPR” members at the checkpoint and to an “LPR” demining team present in the area. Later on the SMM observed that the unexploded mortar grenade had been removed.
The SMM continued to monitor queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. At the “LPR” checkpoint south of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed 150-200 persons leaving non-government-controlled areas within about 15 minutes. At the government checkpoint north of the bridge, soldiers told the SMM that the bridge had been closed after an attack on their position, which had caused an explosion inside their bunker at around 8:00. The SMM saw traces of an explosion outside the bunker and was not allowed to check inside it. The SMM saw at 8:40 that around 400 people were waiting at the closed government checkpoint. At 12:15the SMM observed that the Ukrainian Armed Forces re-opened the checkpoint and the SMM observed 250 people waiting to proceed towards government-controlled areas; about 75 people were waiting to cross the bridge towards non-government controlled areas.
The SMM monitored two border areas not controlled by the Government. At the “LPR”-controlled Dovzhanskyi border crossing point (84km south-east of Luhansk) the SMM observed approximately 18 trucks (seven with Russian Federation and 11 with Ukrainian licence plates) - three trucks were without canvas and empty, the others were covered. In addition, the SMM observed 33 civilian cars (ten with Russian Federation and 23 with Ukrainian licence plates), and two buses with Ukrainian licence plates lined up to proceed towards the Russian Federation. The SMM saw 25 civilian vehicles parked close to the border crossing point (ten with Russian Federation and 15 with Ukrainian licence plates). At the “DPR”-controlled Uspenka border crossing point (73km south-east of Donetsk), the SMM observed 18 civilian cars: 12 with Ukrainian licence plates, five with Russian Federation licence plates, and one with Lithuanian licence plates. There were 84 covered commercial trucks with the majority displaying Ukrainian plates, 20 Russian Federation licence plates and ten Belarus licence plates lined up to proceed towards the Russian Federation.
In Lviv, the SMM monitored some 60 people (men, aged 20-30) enter the city council building to demand the dismissal of the mayor. The SMM observed the presence of 100 police officers inside and outside the building. Some 100 activists (men, aged 20-30) were in front of the building, most of them dressed in camouflage clothing. The SMM saw several of them waving black-and-red coloured flags. The situation remained calm and the SMM observed that after the activists had left the building, six minivans and three buses with law enforcement officers (police and National Guard) parked next to the Lviv city hall.
*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.
Denial of access:
Delay:
[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.
Related StoriesULAANBAATAR, 10 June 2016 – A three-day national anti-corruption needs assessment mission conducted by the Office of the Co-ordinator of OSCE Economic and Environmental Activities, upon invitation of Mongolia’s Independent Authority Against Corruption (IAAC), concluded today in Ulaanbaatar.
In the scope of the visit some 30 officials representing the IAAC, the Prosecutor General’s Office, the Department Against Economic Crimes of the National Police Authority, Transparency International Mongolia, the Mongolian Business Council, the National Chamber of Commerce and Industry and the World Bank residence office discussed the country’s legal, regulatory and institutional anti-corruption infrastructure and identified recommendations for improvement and potential follow-up activities.
“While corruption remains among key challenges for Mongolia, we are impressed with the quality and determination of the IAAC leadership and staff to retain its independent status, design and implement efficient policies to prevent and combat corruption in all its forms,” said Andrei Muntean, Senior Economic Officer at the OSCE Secretariat.
Acting Director General of the IAAC, Tseesuren Nyamdorj, added: “The IAAC works systematically towards implementing Mongolia’s adopted anti-corruption legislation. We stand ready to launch our co-operation with the OSCE and implement joint activities that were agreed upon during this mission as we expect them to enhance our capacities.”
The mission concluded with a multi-stakeholder OSCE-led round table discussion focusing on improving and strengthening the mandate and independence of the IAAC, the role of the judiciary, effectiveness of law enforcement authorities and the engagements of civil society and the private sector.
Thematic exchanges revealed the need to better regulate political party financing, strengthen the capacity of relevant authorities to collect, assess and investigate assets and income disclosure of public officials, better regulate public procurement processes and strengthen anti-money laundering and stolen asset recovery efforts.
Key messages of the recently published OSCE Handbook on Combating Corruption were also presented to the audience.
This national scoping mission is one in a series of such missions to 8 participating States conducted by the OCEEA since January 2016. These missions offer a platform to engage in open and productive dialogue with relevant authorities on issues of their concern in the area of good governance aiming the design of the OSCE-led capacity building activities.
Related StoriesSome 20 newly-recruited personnel of the Atlantis rehabilitation centre took part in a two-week capacity building training course, conducted in the premises of the penal colony in the village of Novopokrovka, which concluded on 10 June. The event was organized by the Kyrgyz State Service for Execution of Punishment (SSEP) and the OSCE Centre in Bishkek.
OSCE-supported international trainers and specialists on therapeutic work with drug- and alcohol-addicted prisoners presented the Minnesotan treatment model, which is recognized as a global best practice among psychotherapeutic programmes for treatment of people with such problems, and organized practical sessions on the development of therapeutic skills.
“Specific professional training is critical to enable the staff of the penitentiary service to carry out their work in full safety,” said Daniele Rumolo, Senior Human Dimension Officer at the OSCE Centre in Bishkek. “Providing them with the necessary skills to effectively deal with specific categories of prisoners is also crucial to prevent criminal activities inside the prisons and enhance the respect of the rule of law.”
The course is part of an OSCE project on supporting the implementation of the National Strategy on the Development of Penitentiary System “Umut-2”. The project addresses the human rights situation and safety in penitentiary establishments through capacity building activities for prison staff.
Related StoriesBISHKEK, 10 June 2016 – An OSCE-supported training course for 10 staff members of the National Security State Committee’s (NSSC) remand prisons on improving the prison service standards concluded today at the NSSC Institute in Bishkek.
The two-week course, organized by the OSCE Centre in Bishkek in co-operation with NSSC, was aimed at enhancing the capacity of remand prison staff in Bishkek and Osh in carrying out their duties in full compliance with criminal legislation and procedures, human rights and humanitarian law, and relevant internal regulations and instructions.
“Building the capacities of prison staff is of paramount importance in ensuring security and respect for human rights,” said Daniele Rumolo, Senior Human Dimension Officer at the OSCE Centre in Bishkek. “The OSCE Centre has been working with local authorities in this field for several years and will continue its support to Kyrgyzstan in implementing its OSCE commitments and progressing on a democratic path.”
The classes also focused on topics related to military security and ethics, provision of medical first aid, and confidentiality of information. Professional teachers delivered 12 lectures, which included theoretical and practical sessions, and provided individual consultations.
The training course was organized as part of the OSCE Centre’s project aimed at improving security in the penitentiary establishments.
Related StoriesThis report is for media and the general public.
SUMMARY
Kamensk-Shakhtinskiy, Russian Federation. The Observer Mission (OM) continues to operate 24/7 at both Border Crossing Points (BCPs). The overall cross-border traffic decreased at both BCPs.
OPERATIONAL REMARKS
The OM is currently operating with 21 permanent international staff members, including the Chief Observer (CO). The Mission is supported administratively by a Vienna-based staff member.
OBSERVATIONS AT THE BORDER CROSSING POINTS
Persons crossing the border
The profile of the people crossing the border can be categorized as follows:
The average number of entries/exits decreased overall from 10,917 to 10,491[1] per day for both BCPs compared to last week; the average net flow for both BCPs went from minus 60 (i.e. more exits from the Russian Federation) to minus 193 (i.e. more exits from the Russian Federation).
The Donetsk BCP continued to experience more traffic than the Gukovo BCP. The cross-border movements registered at both BCPs accounted for a little over 37 per cent of all entries/exits in Rostov region.
Persons in military-style outfits
During the reporting period, the number of men and women in military-style outfits, crossing the border in both directions, increased from 111 last week to 121 this week at both BCPs; 67 of them crossed into the Russian Federation while 54 of them crossed into Ukraine. Approximately 76 per cent of this category’s crossings occurred at the Donetsk BCP. Men and women continued to cross the border individually or in groups. Most individuals crossed by foot, however, some made use of private vehicles, buses or minivans, making it more difficult for the observer teams (OTs) to observe their movement across the border.
Families with a significant amount of luggage
During the reporting period, the OTs observed families, often with elderly people and/or children, crossing at both BCPs with a significant amount of luggage or travelling in heavily-loaded cars; three families were observed crossing into the Russian Federation while 11 were observed crossing into Ukraine.
Bus connections
Regular local and long-distance bus connections continued to operate between Ukraine (Luhansk region) and cities in the Russian Federation. In addition to regular bus connections, the OTs continued to observe bus connections on irregular routes. Often the buses do not state their route; instead they just have a sign on the windshield saying “Irregular”.
Among the bus connections observed by the OTs, the following “irregular” routes or destinations were noted: Alchevsk-Kharkiv-Kyiv, Stakhanov-Luhansk-Kyiv, Luhansk-Anapa, Alchevsk-Kharkiv, Stakhanov-Kharkiv, Odessa, Kharkiv and St. Petersburg.
During the reporting week, on some occasions the OTs at the Donetsk BCP observed buses with children on board crossing the border in both directions.
On some occasions, the OTs noticed the bus drivers removing the itinerary signs from the windshields of their buses. The majority of long-distance coaches commuting between Luhansk region and cities in the Russian Federation have license plates issued in Luhansk region.
Trucks
During the reporting period, the OM continued to observe trucks crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. Compared to the previous week, the number of trucks decreased from 727 to 714; 360 of these trucks crossed to the Russian Federation and 354 crossed to Ukraine.
Most of the trucks observed by the OTs were registered in Luhansk region.
Separately, the OTs also observed tanker trucks crossing the border in both directions. The number of tanker trucks increased from 48 last week to 59 this week. These trucks were observed crossing the border at both BCPs. The trucks, for the most part, had the words “Propane” and “Flammable” written across the tanks in Russian or Ukrainian. The majority of tanker trucks have hazard signs, indicating that they are transporting propane or a mix of propane with butane.
All trucks undergo systematic inspection by Russian officials, which may include an X-ray check. During the reporting period no X-ray checks could be observed at the Gukovo BCP since the Observation Team has no view of the mobile X-Ray, but it could be heard operating several times during the reporting period. 125 X-ray checks were observed at the Donetsk BCP. Out of these 125 trucks scanned during the reporting period, 98 trucks (78 per cent) were bound for Ukraine; the remaining 27 trucks (22 per cent) crossed into the Russian Federation.
Minivans
During the reporting period, the OM continued to observe passenger and cargo minivans[2], crossing the border in both directions and at both BCPs. The OTs observed minivans predominantly registered in Luhansk region; however, the OTs frequently saw minivans registered in the Russian Federation.
Compared to the previous week, the number of cargo minivans decreased from 342 to 322; 158 crossed to the Russian Federation and 164 to Ukraine.
Trains
The OTs continued to pick up on the sound of trains running on the train tracks located approximately 150 metres south-west of the Gukovo BCP. During the reporting week, the OTs heard trains on eight occasions; the OTs estimated that three trains were going to the Russian Federation and five trains were bound for Ukraine. The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine was informed about the trains bound for Ukraine. Visual observation was not possible because of the line of trees in between the train tracks and the BCP and unfavorable light conditions.
Other observations
The majority of vehicles crossing the border have license plates issued in Luhansk region or in the Russian Federation.
The OTs continued to observe vehicles with Ukrainian license plates, including articulated trucks with “LPR” or “Novorossiya” stickers, or in rare cases “DPR” stickers on their license plates masking the Ukrainian flag.
During the reporting week the OT at the Donetsk BCP observed an ambulance on one occasion. The ambulance which was registered in Ukraine crossed the border into the Russian Federation and several hours later that same day it returned back to Ukraine. The Observation Team on the spot could not confirm if there was an injured person on board.
[1] Data received from Rostov region Border Guard Service
[2] Cargo minivans: light commercial vehicles with a maximum authorized mass of more than 3.5 t and not more than 7.5 t; with or without a trailer with a maximum mass of less than 750 kg (small cargo vehicles which correspond to driving license C1).
Related StoriesThe OSCE Mission in Kosovo and the OSCE Mission to Serbia, for the second consecutive year, will organize the Dialogue Academy for Young Women as part of the Follow Us initiative. The initiative gathers prominent women from politics, academia, media and civil society from Belgrade and Prishtinë/Priština and supports the process of dialogue, reconciliation and confidence-building between the two societies.
The purpose of the Academy is to empower young women by educating them on issues relating to women’s role in promoting dialogue, reconciliation, and co-operation. The 2016 edition of the programme builds upon last year’s experience and success whereby 22 young women from Prishtinë/Priština and Belgrade had the opportunity to participate in a series of instructive lectures and team-building exercises and be part of a wide network of activists and experts in the fields of women empowerment, women in politics, dialogue and reconciliation.
This year, 24 female students of social science and young professionals in the areas of media, politics, and civil society will be attending the Academy programme from 30 September to 9 October 2016, organized at the Peace Castle Schlaining, Austria.
Graduates from the Academy will become Dialogue alumni and are expected to create their own alumni network which will enable them to design and implement joint projects, following the example of the 2015 OSCE Dialogue Academy alumni.
For more information on the application please click here.
Related StoriesKYIV, 7 June 2016 – The OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine (SMM) will hold its regular news briefing tomorrow in Kyiv.
Alexander Hug, the SMM’s Principal Deputy Chief Monitor, will talk about the recent activities of the Mission and the general security situation throughout Ukraine.
Journalists are invited to attend the news briefing tomorrow, 8 June, at 10:30 (Kyiv time), at the Ukrainian Crisis Media Centre, at 2 Khreshchatyk street, Ukrainian house.
Live online streaming of the news briefing will be available at http://uacrisis.org/ru/stream/#eng
Related StoriesAccess to justice in courts of administrative jurisdiction in times of conflict, protection of human rights and application of the European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law were in the focus of an OSCE-supported seminar on 6 and 7 June 2016 in Kramatorsk, Ukraine, which brought together some 60 judges working in the administrative courts relocated from Donetsk and Luhansk regions, as well as local and international experts.
The OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine organized the event in co-operation with the Higher Administrative Court of Ukraine, the OSCE Special Monitoring Mission to Ukraine and the joint Council of Europe-European Union project.
The participants discussed the issue of access to justice and justice delivery challenges, including lack of access to documents and court materials. The judges of the Higher Administrative Court presented a summary of court practice in Ukraine as a useful guide for the judges of the lower instances.
“This is the second seminar aimed at providing a platform for the discussion of issues relating to access to justice and of challenges which administrative court judges are facing in justice delivery, as well as a place for sharing relevant international experience,” said Jeff Erlich, Senior Project Officer at the OSCE Project Co-ordinator in Ukraine. “We also plan to carry out a series of multi-stakeholder dialogue events with the engagement of judiciary, experts, civil society and other stakeholders, to discuss and elaborate possible roadmaps for overcoming existing challenges.”
International experts made presentations about the experience of other countries in accessing justice on territories outside of the government’s control, positive obligations imposed by the European Convention on Human Rights on member states that are not controlling their territories, as well as about the protection of internally displaced persons’ rights in ECtHR case law and the implementation of ECtHR case-law in areas outside of government control.
The seminar is part of the OSCE Project Co-ordinator’s project on enhancing the coherence of administrative court practice in Ukraine, implemented at the request of the Higher Administrative Court and funded by the Government of Germany.
Related StoriesThis report is for media and the general public.
The SMM observed more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region compared to each of the previous two days, and noted a high number of ceasefire violations, including 266 explosions, in Luhansk region compared to none on 4 and 5 June. The SMM conducted crater analysis in government-controlled Krymske and at the “LPR” checkpoint on the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge. It continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential infrastructure in the Zolote-Pervomaisk area and in Veselohorivka. It continued to monitor the withdrawal of weapons. The SMM monitored gatherings in Odessa. Its freedom of movement was restricted on four occasions on both sides of the contact line.
The week in Donetsk region started with a slightly higher number of recorded ceasefire violations[1] as compared to 4 and 5 June, concentrated around the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata area, south of Svitlodarsk and in Oleksandrivka.
Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard, between 6:30 and 6:42, 25 undetermined explosions, 4-6km north-west of its position. Positioned at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre) the SMM heard 42 explosions (39 undetermined explosions 3-8km north-north-east and three impacts 3-5km north-north-east of its position).
Positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM heard more than 200 undetermined explosions, and numerous bursts and single shots of heavy machine-gun and small-arms fire at locations from 1-6km ranging from south-west to north-north-west of its position. Whilst in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk) the SMM, within one hour, recorded 37 undetermined explosions 4-8km east, south-east and south of its position.
During the night of 5 June, whilst in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 85 explosions assessed as caused by artillery and mortar impacts, heard 53 explosions (13 assessed as caused by outgoing mortar rounds), and saw 11 tracers of cannon (BMP1 30mm) fire 1-8km south, south-west and west of its position. Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) the SMM, between 22:10 and 22:30, heard 32 explosions assessed as caused by artillery impacts 15-17km north-north-west of its position. The following day, whilst in “DPR”-controlled Oleksandrivka (20km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM, between 16:00 and 17:18, heard 117 undetermined explosions, more than 400 bursts of heavy-machine-gun fire, and 300 single shots of small-arms fire 2-4km west and west-north-west of its position.
In Luhansk region, the SMM observed a high number of ceasefire violations, with 266 explosions recorded during the night of 5 June in government-controlled Stanytsia Luhanska (16km north-east of Luhansk) as compared to none on both 4 and 5 June, but fewer than on 3 June. Positioned there, the SMM heard, between 21:31 and 22:38, 266 explosions (105 assessed as caused by automatic grenade launcher fire or 30mm automatic-cannon fire, and 156 undetermined explosions), saw first 16 red tracers flying east to west, then four red tracers flying from west to east, and then another two white tracers flying south, 1.5-5km south-south-west and west of its position.
The SMM followed up on shelling at the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge The SMM observed fresh impacts on the wall of the “LPR” checkpoint structure south of the bridge assessed as caused by automatic grenade launcher (AGS-17) fire. The SMM also noted a fresh crater on the asphalt road 150m north of the bridge, in the area between the “LPR” and government checkpoints, which it assessed as caused by grenade launcher fire from a northerly direction. Some 4km south-east of government-controlled Krymske (42km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM saw an infantry fighting vehicle (BMP-2) that had been struck by a wire guided missile (9K113 Konkurs). The SMM traced the direction of the guiding wire in a south-south-easterly direction.
In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of Measures the SMM revisited Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent weapons storage sites whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines, and noted at one site that all previously recorded weapons were present. Two other sites were abandoned as first observed on 4 April, with 16 tanks (T-64), and three mortars (two 2B9, 82mm; and one BM-37, 82mm) missing.
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons foreseen in the Minsk Package of Measures. The SMM has yet to receive the full information requested in the 16 October 2015 notification.
In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM continued to observe a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm) near government-controlled Nyzhnie (56km north-west of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report 27 May) on 4 June, and 15 multiple launch rocket systems (BM-21 Grad, 122mm) in "LPR"-controlled Khrustalnyi (formerly Krasnyk Luch) (54km south-west of Luhansk). Also in violation of the withdrawal lines, aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence on 5 June of what is assessed to be a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10 120mm) in “DPR”-controlled Korsun (31km north-east of Donetsk).
The SMM revisited locations known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they do not comply with the specific criteria set out for permanent storage sites in the notification.
In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such locations and observed eight towed artillery pieces (D-20, 152mm). The SMM noted as missing: eight towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm, with four missing since 2 April and four since 23 April); 25 self-propelled howitzers (seven 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm, observed missing since 14 March; and 18 2S1, 122mm); 18 anti-tank guns (six D-48, 85mm, observed missing since 19 February, and 12 MT-12, 100mm); and 12 mortars (2S3, 152mm).
The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft weapons in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM observed: one infantry fighting vehicle (IFV; BMP-1) near Hirske (63km west of Luhansk), one armoured combat vehicle (MTLB), one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23), and a light-armoured vehicle (Kraz Cougar) mounted with a 50mm heavy machine-gun in Zolote (60km west of Luhansk), two armoured personnel carriers (APC; one BTR-60 and one BTR-4) in Komyshuvakha (68km west of Luhansk), two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) in Novozvanivka (70km west of Luhansk), and one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) and an APC (BTR-60) in Nyzhnie.
The SMM continued to observe no progress in mine action and noted the presence of mines and unexploded ordnance (UXO). At a potential crossing route in the Zolote-Pervomaisk area (60km north-west of Luhansk) the SMM observed no progress with the marking, fencing and mapping of the areas close to the potential crossing routes. The SMM observed that a 2km zone in the “LPR”-controlled areas surrounding the Pervomaisk-Zolote road was still mined. Two “LPR” members prevented the SMM from proceeding further in “LPR”-controlled Veselohorivka (64km west of Luhansk), citing ongoing demining work in the area.*
In government-controlled Troitske (69km west of Luhansk), the SMM facilitated a dialogue between a group of about 35 residents and the commander of a Ukrainian Armed Forces battalion aimed at providing mine awareness to the residents. The atmosphere was tense as the residents expressed frustration about booby traps in residential houses (see SMM Daily Report 26 May), the general security situation, and occupation of private houses by armed forces. Residents have expressed to the SMM concerns about the latter on several occasions; however, Ukrainian Armed Forces personnel have previously denied SMM access to those areas claiming that they were mined. The residents welcomed the mine awareness session, but requested concrete actions to be taken to clear the mines.
The SMM continued to monitor queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line and noted a generally calm situation. At a government checkpoint in Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk) the SMM noted 260 civilian vehicles and 150 pedestrians queuing to travel to government-controlled areas and none waiting to travel in the opposite direction. At a government checkpoint in Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk), Ukrainian Armed Forces told the SMM that the checkpoint had been closed from 6:05 to 12:05 because of a sniper reportedly operating in the early morning from a nearby five-storey building. At various instances at the government checkpoint north of the Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM noted a maximum of 300 people queuing to enter government-controlled areas and 15 people queuing to walk in the opposite direction. At the “LPR” checkpoint south of the bridge, the SMM saw some 100 people waiting to cross the bridge towards government-controlled areas.
The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works on essential infrastructure. The SMM saw that the gas pipeline repair in government-controlled Marinka was finished without interruption. Potentially, over 30,000 civilians and businesses in the area will benefit from this repair once the testing and inspection of the gas distribution station near the contact line is concluded. In government-controlled Obozne (18km north of Luhansk), the SMM facilitated and monitored the third day of ongoing electrical repairs.
The SMM monitored the 21st consecutive day of an around-the-clock protest by internally displaced persons (IDPs) in front of and inside the Odessa regional administration building, demanding housing close to the city, where they can have better work opportunities and access to medical care. The SMM observed ten IDPs (the majority women, aged 25-65) present. The SMM noted senior officials from the region meeting with the protesting IDPs. The acting head of the regional department of health and social protection told the SMM that the purpose of the meeting was to urge IDPs to enter into rental contracts with the two facilities used by IDPs as collective centres, and to inform them of alternative housing.
On 5 June, the SMM monitored the weekly commemoration of the 2 May 2014 events by anti-Maidan activities at Kulykove Pole in Odessa. The police had closed the main section of the square to all activists and the general public before the event, which they said was done to prevent clashes between the pro- and anti- Maidan activists. Beyond the police perimeter, the SMM observed 45 anti-Maidan activists (the majority women, aged 35-65) and also two pro-Maidan activists (a man and a woman, aged 35-40). The SMM noted 30 uniformed police officers in the area. The gathering passed off without incidents.
*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.
Denial of access:
Delay:
[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.
Related StoriesCOPENHAGEN, 7 June 2016 – Following today’s car bombing in a central tourist district in Istanbul, killing 11 and wounding dozens, OSCE Parliamentary Assembly President Ilkka Kanerva (MP, Finland) issued the following statement:
“It is with a heavy heart that I once again express my strongest condemnation of yet another terrorist attack in Turkey, this time a car bombing claiming the lives of at least 11 people in Istanbul. There is no justification for this sort of indiscriminate violence, which is becoming all too common, and I hope that the perpetrators are brought swiftly to justice.
“The OSCE Parliamentary Assembly stands together with our friends in Turkey as they deal with this horrific crime, and our condolences go out to the victims and their families. We must all redouble our efforts to eliminate the scourge of terrorism from all of our countries.”
Related StoriesThe OSCE Office in Yerevan, in close co-operation with the Armenian Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs (MLSA), organized a roundtable discussion on the economic integration of migrants in Armenia on 3 June 2016.
The event brought together around thirty representatives from state institutions, including the MLSA, State Migration Service of Armenia’s Ministry of Territorial Administration and Development, Ministry of Economy, Ministry of Diaspora, the Ministry of Education and Science, Ministry of Culture, as well as international organizations and civil society dealing with migration issues.
The increased number of migrants entering Armenia both to seek asylum and to find employment heightens the importance of sound migrant integration policies and legislation. Armenia is among the countries in Europe with the highest per capita ratio of refugees/asylum seekers from Syria, according to government figures. Identifying ways to meet the integration needs of migrants while giving value to their contribution can represent an opportunity to strengthen the existing economic integration mechanisms for the benefit of the entire Armenian economy and society.
“The discussion has provided national agencies with the opportunity to raise their issues of concern regarding the economic integration of migrants, outline their priorities and activities and explore areas of possible co-operation. The results of this event will also contribute to the revision of the policy concept for immigrant integration prepared by the state migration service, which has been submitted to other state bodies for consideration,” said David Gullette, the Democratization Programme Officer at the OSCE Office in Yerevan.
In addition to presenting their activities and discussing ways to improve their co-ordination, the participants underlined the importance of learning from more experienced countries. One of the key recommendations of the roundtable discussion was to approach the international community for support to organize a regional event for exchanging views on best practices in the area of the economic integration of migrants.
The discussion was organized upon the request of the State Employment Service of the Armenian Ministry of Labour and Social Affairs.
Related StoriesThis report is for media and the general public.
The SMM observed more ceasefire violations in Donetsk region both on 4 and 5 June as compared to 3 June, and observed a similarly high number of ceasefire violations in Luhansk region on the night of 3 June – compared to the previous night and fewer during the remainder of the reporting period – compared to 3 June. In particular, a sharp increase of violence was noted in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata area and south-east of Svitlodarsk. On both sides of the contact line, the Mission conducted crater analysis and observed damages to civilian houses caused by shelling; on one occasion, the SMM observed a dead person. The SMM noted that a “DPR” checkpoint had been relocated closer to a Ukrainian Armed Forces checkpoint. The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works to essential infrastructure. The Mission’s operations were restricted by the sides on several occasions.*
The SMM observed more ceasefire violations[1] in Donetsk region both on 4 and 5 June as compared to 3 June. In particular, a sharp increase of violence was noted in the Avdiivka-Yasynuvata area and south-east of Svitlodarsk.
Whilst in “DPR”-controlled Donetsk city centre, during the night hours of 3 June, the SMM heard 26 undetermined explosions 3-7km west of its position. The following day, positioned at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk railway station (6km north-west of Donetsk city centre), the SMM heard 64 explosions (22 impacts and 42 undetermined explosions) 2-7km north-west, north-north-west, north and north- north-east of its position. On the night of 4 June, whilst in Donetsk city centre, the SMM heard 52 undetermined explosions 4-8km north and west, and 20 air explosions of anti-aircraft-cannon fire 3-5km north-north-west of its position. On 5 June, positioned at the “DPR”-controlled Donetsk railway station, the SMM recorded nine undetermined explosions 2-7km north and north-east of its position.
On 4 June, positioned in “DPR”-controlled Yasynuvata (16km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 157 explosions (71 of which were assessed as caused by mortar rounds) at locations ranging from north-west to west-south-west and 3-8km of its position. Whilst in government-controlled Avdiivka (17km north of Donetsk), the SMM recorded 187 undetermined explosions (58 of which were assessed as caused by mortar rounds) at locations ranging from south-east to east and 3-6km of its position. On 5 June, positioned in Yasynuvata, the SMM heard 162 undetermined explosions 1-4km south-west, west-south-west, west and west-north-west of its position. On the same day, whilst in Avdiivka, the SMM heard 27 explosions (19 of which were assessed as caused by mortar impacts and eight were undetermined) 2-7km south-east, east and north-east of its position.
On the night of 3 June, whilst in government-controlled Svitlodarsk (57km north-east of Donetsk), the SMM heard 60 explosions (15 of which were assessed as caused by mortar rounds) 3-4km south-east of its position; on the following night, it recorded 95 explosions (seven of which were assessed as caused by mortar rounds).
In Luhansk region, the SMM observed a similarly high number of ceasefire violations on the night of 3 June compared to the previous night and fewer during the remainder of the reporting period – compared to 3 June. On the night of 3 June, whilst in Stanytsia Luhanska (government-controlled, 16km north-east of Luhansk), the SMM heard, within a 2.5-hour period, 383 explosions (13 of which were assessed as caused by outgoing mortar (82mm) rounds, 84 as outgoing automatic-grenade-launcher fire and 12 as impacts of automatic-grenade launcher fire, while the rest were undetermined) 2.5-6km south-south-east and south-west of its position. Between the morning hours of 4 June and the evening hours of 5 June the SMM recorded no ceasefire violations in Stanytsia Luhanska. On 5 June, whilst in the vicinity of “LPR”-controlled Kalynove (58km west of Luhansk), the SMM heard three outgoing explosions 5-8km south-south-west of its position and saw grey smoke rising assessed as caused by impacts of tank-fire at a location 3km to the south-south-west of its position.
The SMM followed up on reports of shelling. In a residential area of government-controlled Marinka (23km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM analysed four fresh craters and assessed them as caused by 120mm mortars fired from a north-easterly direction (two craters) and 122mm artillery rounds fired from an east-north-easterly direction (two craters). The SMM also observed a punctured gas pipeline, fractured walls, and destroyed roofs. The SMM also observed two impact sites in a residential area of government-controlled Krasnohorivka (21km west of Donetsk), which, according to residents, were caused on the night of 2-3 June. The SMM analysed a crater and concluded that it had been caused by a 122mm artillery round or a 125mm tank round fired from an east-north-easterly direction. In government-controlled Pervomaiske (17km north-west of Donetsk), two female residents (aged 60) informed the SMM they had heard shelling the previous night. At four locations in the village, the SMM analysed four fresh craters and assessed them as caused by 120mm mortar rounds fired from an easterly direction (one crater) and an east-south-easterly direction (three craters). The SMM saw one of the craters on an asphalt surface 4m away from the kindergarten building and another one in the kindergarten playground, and observed at least 60 broken windows and most parts of the roof broken. The kindergarten director told the SMM that due to the damage they would not be able to receive pupils in September. At an industrial compound in the village, a security guard informed the SMM that after the shelling during the previous night he had found his colleague (man, aged 42) dead at the compound. The SMM saw a human body lying partly covered with the roof debris and the upper part of his body covered with blood, and a big pool of blood under his torso.
In “DPR”-controlled Dokuchaievsk (30km south-west of Donetsk), at a children’s playground – 35m from a residential building, the SMM saw a tree it assessed as having been felled by a powerful impact of an undetermined weapon. The SMM assessed that the direction of fire had been from a south-south-westerly direction. At the courtyard of a detached house, the SMM observed a crater and assessed it as caused by a 125mm tank round fired from a south-south-westerly direction. The SMM saw a south-west-facing window of the house had been broken resulting from a blast shock. A woman (in her sixties) and her two grandchildren told the SMM that they had been inside the premise when they had heard an impact hitting the house at 1:16 the same morning.
In a residential area in the north-eastern parts of government-controlled Mykolaivka (41km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM conducted crater analysis on nine fresh craters, which had allegedly been the result of shelling on the night of 4 June, and assessed that they had been caused by 120mm mortar rounds fired from a northerly direction. The SMM saw that one house had been partially damaged by a direct hit, which had destroyed the roof completely and penetrated the north-facing wall and the ceiling of the house.
On the eastern outskirts of government-controlled Novotroitske (36km south-west of Donetsk), the SMM analysed 12 fresh craters and assessed them as caused by 82mm mortar rounds fired from a north-easterly and northerly direction. The SMM saw at least three houses had damages to their walls, windows, and roofs facing north and north-east.
In government-controlled parts of Stanytsia Luhanska, the SMM assessed damage to houses which, according to residents, had been caused by shelling on 2 and 3 June. At one house, the SMM observed that all windows were broken, and the west-facing walls were charred by burning. At three other houses, it observed holes on west-facing walls and entrance doors, which it assessed as caused by projectiles of undetermined weapons.
In relation to the implementation of the Addendum to the Package of measures the SMM revisited a Ukrainian Armed Forces permanent weapons storage site whose location corresponded with the withdrawal lines, and noted as missing 30 tanks (T-64) and six anti-tank guns (D-48, 85mm), as has been observed for the first time on 19 March and 6 January, respectively.
The SMM also revisited “DPR” permanent weapons storage sites whose locations corresponded with the withdrawal lines and noted that all weapons previously verified as withdrawn to those sites were present.
The SMM continued to monitor the withdrawal of heavy weapons foreseen in the Minsk Package of Measures.
In violation of the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM continued to observe a surface-to-air missile system (9K35 Strela-10, 120mm) near government-controlled Nyzhnie (56km north-west of Luhansk) (see SMM Daily Report 27 May) on 4 June. Also in violation of withdrawal lines, in government-controlled areas, the SMM observed: two surface-to-air missile systems (SA-8, Osa 120mm) in Kostiantynivka (60km north of Donetsk); six towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) in Vodiane (42km south-west of Donetsk); and three anti-tank guns (MT-12 Rapira, 100mm) in Novoselivka Druha (23km north of Donetsk), on 4 June.
The SMM has yet to receive the full information requested in the 16 October 2015 notification. The SMM revisited locations known to the SMM as heavy weapons holding areas, even though they do not comply with the specific criteria set out for permanent storage sites in the notification.
In government-controlled areas beyond the respective withdrawal lines, the SMM revisited such locations and observed: seven towed howitzers (D-20, 152mm). The SMM noted as missing 15 towed howitzers (four D-20, 152mm, first observed missing on 2 April; and 11 2S3 Akatsiya, 152mm, first observed missing on 14 March). The SMM noted that one site was abandoned with 18 towed howitzers (2A65 Msta-B, 152mm) missing, as observed for the first time on 22 April.
The SMM observed the presence of armoured combat vehicles and anti-aircraft weapons in the security zone. In government-controlled areas, the SMM observed: one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Zolote (60km west of Luhansk), one infantry fighting vehicle (IFV;BMP-1) near Hirske (62km north-west of Luhansk), on 3 June; one anti-aircraft gun near Pervomaiske, one armoured personnel carrier (APC; BTR-60), one armoured reconnaissance vehicle (BRDM-2) and one anti-aircraft gun (ZU-23) near Nyzhnie, two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Novotoshkivske (53km west of Luhansk), two IFVs (BMP-2) near Orikhove (57km north-west of Luhansk), three IFVs (BMP-2) near Shchastia (20km north of Luhansk), two APCs (BTR-60) near Popasna (69km west of Luhansk) on 4 June; one IFV (BMP-1) near Mykolaivka, two APCs (BTR) near Popasna, two armoured reconnaissance vehicles (BRDM-2) near Novozvanivka (70km west from Luhansk) on 5 June. Aerial surveillance imagery available to the SMM revealed the presence, on 2 June, of one armoured vehicle near Avdiivka. In “DPR”-controlled areas, the SMM observed one APC (BTR-80) in Donetsk city on 4 June. In “LPR”-controlled area, the SMM observed one IFV (BMP-2) near Kalynove on 5 June.
The SMM continued to monitor queues at entry-exit checkpoints along the contact line. During the morning hours of 4 June, at the government checkpoint north of Stanytsia Luhanska bridge, the SMM observed some 400 pedestrians waiting to enter government-controlled areas and no people waiting in a queue to proceed in the opposite direction. In the early afternoon, at the same checkpoint, the SMM observed some 200 pedestrians waiting to enter government-controlled areas and ten people waiting to proceed in the opposite direction.
On 5 June, the SMM noted that a “DPR” checkpoint on the north-western outskirts of Horlivka (39km north-east of Donetsk) had been relocated 900m further north-west, closer to a Ukrainian Armed Force checkpoint in government-controlled Maiorsk (45km north-east of Donetsk).
The SMM continued to facilitate and monitor adherence to the ceasefire to enable repair works on essential infrastructure. On 4 June, the SMM observed repair works on gas pipelines in government-controlled Marinka and Krasnohorivka. During its monitoring, the SMM heard 12 single shots of small-arms fire and one undetermined explosion 1-5km north-east and east-south-east of its location. On 5 June, the SMM observed repair works on power lines near “LPR”-controlled Obozne (19km north of Luhansk). Five meters north of a road under the power line to be repaired, the SMM noted a piece of unexploded ordnance (UXO), which it assessed as an artillery shell (122-152mm), and informed an “LPR” demining team. Subsequently, the demining team arrived and extracted the shell from the ground.
The SMM monitored two border areas not controlled by the Government and was obstructed on two occasions. On 3 June, at “DPR”-controlled Marynivka border crossing point (78km east of Donetsk), the SMM observed nine passenger cars, five commercial trucks and one bus (11 with Ukrainian licence plates and four with Russian Federation licence plates) waiting in a queue to cross to the Russian Federation. Whilst in Marynivka, an unarmed “DPR” member asked the SMM not to approach the border line.* On 5 June, at the border crossing point in “LPR”-controlled Voznesenivka (formerly Chervonopartyzansk, 65km south-east of Luhansk) the SMM observed 11 vehicles (nine with Ukrainian licence plates and two with Russian Federation licence plates) in a queue waiting to cross to the Russian Federation. On 4 June, in the vicinity of “LPR”-controlled Izvaryne (52km south-east of Luhansk), a man stopped the SMM and did not allow it to proceed further to the border crossing points in Krasnodarskyi and Nyzhnia Harasymivka (58 and 56km south-east of Luhansk, respectively).*
*Restrictions to SMM’s freedom of movement or other impediments to the fulfilment of its mandate
The SMM’s monitoring is restrained by security hazards and threats, including risks posed by mines and unexploded ordnance, and by restrictions of its freedom of movement and other impediments – which vary from day to day. The SMM’s mandate provides for safe and secure access throughout Ukraine. All signatories of the Package of Measures have agreed on the need for this safe and secure access, that restriction of the SMM’s freedom of movement constitutes a violation, and on the need for rapid response to these violations.
Denial of access:
Conditional access:
Delay:
Other impediments:
[1] Please see the annexed table for a complete breakdown of the ceasefire violations as well as map of the Donetsk and Luhansk regions marked with locations featured in this report.
Related StoriesInternational standards and good practices concerning the human rights of armed forces personnel were the focus of an event, co-organized by OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights (ODIHR) and the European Organization of Military Associations (EUROMIL) in Riga on 7 June 2016.
The roundtable gathered representatives from military associations and unions, authorities, ombudsperson institutions and civil society organizations from Estonia, Finland, Germany, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland and Ukraine to discuss the state of the right of military personnel to form associations, and the necessary conditions to enable such associations to safeguard the rights of servicemen and servicewomen.
"For many years now, ODIHR has advocated for OSCE participating States to permit all members of the armed forces to join either professional associations or trade unions representing their interests," said Ewa Sapiezynska, Human Rights Officer at ODIHR. "These associations or unions should be consulted in discussions concerning the conditions of service for men and women in the armed forces."
Emmanuel Jacob, President of EUROMIL said: "The freedom of association is still limited for military personnel in some countries, for which reason EUROMIL member associations in Lithuania and Latvia asked for further support on this issue. With this roundtable meeting we hope to provide a platform for the exchange of ideas and best practises."
Discussions also included gender aspects related to service in armed forces.
"We discussed how servicemen and servicewomen benefit from forming trade unions and independent associations," said Jacek Zmarz from the Polish Council of Senior Officers. "The recruitment and advancement of women in the armed forces, as well as parental leave for both men and women in the military were brought to the table."
The event was organized as part of ODIHR´s programme on human rights, gender and security, which supports OSCE participating States in making their security sectors human rights compliant and gender responsive.
Related StoriesNEW YORK, 3 June 2016 – The OSCE is a platform for co-operation in countering global criminal challenges through police peace operations, said the Head of the OSCE’s Transnational Threats Department’s Strategic Police Matters Unit, Guy Vinet as he addressed the United Nations Chiefs of Police Summit (UN COPS) today in New York.
He said that the OSCE has been responding to complex crises since 1998, when it deployed police monitors to Croatia to succeed the United Nations Police Support Group (UNPSG).
“The OSCE is neither without experience nor a mandate to respond to complex crises which include numerous peace spoilers – such as organized crime in its various facets thriving from conflict,” said Vinet. “We approach the conflict cycle from all dimensions, including criminal justice sector reform, with the OSCE’s unique features of a comprehensive approach to security, consensus-based decision-making and inclusive membership.”
Vinet said that the OSCE is widely recognized as a flexible soft-security organization, able to provide targeted responses to different crisis situations with its 57 participating States and 11 Partners for Co-operation. He added that the OSCE works closely with the United Nations, particularly its Office on Drugs and Crime, with which the OSCE Secretariat recently signed a Joint Action Plan for 2016–2017.
UN COPS, opened by United Nations Deputy Secretary-General Jan Eliasson, is a historic gathering of more than 100 police leaders out of over 400 participants from around the world. At the Summit, national chiefs of police, together with key partners and senior UN representatives charted the way forward for UN Police in order to deliver greater impact on the ground and to tackle the policing challenges of the twenty-first century. UN COPS also served as a forum to discuss how peace operations and national policing complement and mutually reinforce each other when addressing current and emerging challenges, such as transnational threats.
Related StoriesDUSHANBE, 3 June 2016 – Twenty-two officials from customs and border agencies of Afghanistan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan completed today the Risk Analysis and Management in Border Security Course at the OSCE Border Management Staff College in Dushanbe, Tajikistan.
The course, which ran from 22 February to 3 June, consisted of two face-to-face workshops and a post module assignment. The first module focused on developing a strategic approach to risk analysis. It aimed to help participants develop risk management models to improve border security and management in their respective countries. The second module enhanced this knowledge with analytical techniques for protecting borders at the operational and tactical levels. Furthermore, it prepared participants to identify the core knowledge, skills and competencies required to perform the duties of a border security and management analyst.
“Proper risk management increases the efficiency and effectiveness of border-related operations,” said Dita Nowicka, Director of the OSCE Border Management Staff College.”
Peter Girvan Allan, Director of Allan Consultancy Ltd from the United Kingdom said: “The experts are delighted with the level of co-operation and commitment the participants demonstrated over the duration of the course. The College created an environment where they learned from the experts and from each other.”
The course was funded by the Export Control and Related Border Security (EXBS) Program of the United States Department of State.
Related StoriesVIENNA, 3 June 2016 – In his address to the OSCE Permanent Council in Vienna yesterday, Georgia’s Foreign Minister Mikheil Janelidze reiterated his country’s firm commitment to OSCE’s confidence-building measures in the face of security challenges in Europe and its efforts to tackle transnational threats.
“As we are witnessing one of the worst security crises on our continent, the role that the OSCE has to play in addressing it is ever more important. We need a strong and resolute OSCE, which fosters a comprehensive, indivisible and co-operative approach to security, as envisaged by numerous milestone documents we all have subscribed to,” Janelidze said.
Janelidze emphasized the importance of the Vienna Document in relation to conventional arms control and expressed Georgia’s full support for this important confidence and security building mechanism. “Georgia is ready to constructively engage in the negotiation process on updating the Vienna Document in 2016, with the aim of increasing military stability, transparency and predictability for all participating States.”
Highlighting the OSCE’s contribution to addressing transnational threats, Janelidze said: “We should use all means provided by this institution to tackle threats arising from violent extremism and radicalization that lead to terrorism, cybercrime, human trafficking and other forms of organised crime.”
Georgia’s Foreign Minister expressed appreciation for the role which the OSCE Office for Democratic Institutions and Human Rights and the OSCE Parliamentary Assembly, along with other international institutions, had played in improving the election system in Georgia.
“2016 is a year of parliamentary elections in Georgia. We are determined to hold transparent, free and fair parliamentary elections in full compliance with international standards and best democratic practices,” Janeldize said.
In his address, Minister Janelidze spoke about Georgia’s domestic reform agenda and its strong commitment to the European and Euro-Atlantic integration process.
The Foreign Minister also called for a stronger role of the OSCE in addressing the situation of conflict-affected populations in Georgia, including through the restoration of a full-fledged and comprehensive OSCE presence, the continuation of the Organization’s active participation in the Geneva International Discussions and the expansion of confidence-building activities. In expressing concern over the recent tragic shooting of Giga Otkhozoria on May 19 in the village of Khurcha, Minister Janelidze emphasized the need for international monitoring of the security and human rights situation in the territories controlled by Sukhumi and Tskhinvali.
Related Stories